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ABSTRACT 
Reinsurance contract as a contract of uberrimae fidei, in contrast to ordinary 
commercial contracts, attracts a duty of utmost good faith requiring both parties 
to exercise their best effort and endeavor to help each other to make an 
informed decision and perform the contract concluded thereon without any 
dishonesty or deceit. There are various forms of reinsurance which adopt 
different ceding methods and have specific characters in the placing progress. 
The unique placing process in London subscription market of such complex and 
complicated reinsurance contracts by specialist brokers has to certain degree 
modified the operation of the doctrine of utmost good faith in reinsurance 
context. Moreover, from partial codification by the MIA 1906 to significant 
changed by Insurance Act 2015, it  is fair to that the doctrine of utmost good 
faith has experienced one hundred years long revolution. The courts have taken 
many opportunities to structure the doctrine, establish rules of the tests, confine 
the scope and clarify remedies for qualifying breach. Such development of the 
doctrine itself has important affect upon its operation in reinsurance context too.  
Modification of the doctrine in reinsurance occurs due to several reasons. First, 
the special placing process in London subscription market affects the formation 
procedure of reinsurance contracts, consequently reshapes operation of the 
doctrine. Secondly, the characters of reinsurance contracts distinguished from 
underlying insurance would have some impact on operation of the doctrine in 
reinsurance context. In addition, other significant common law rules such as the 
principle of waiver, which is in extensive use in the reinsurance market practice, 
will also modify the operation of the doctrine in reinsurance context. Moreover, 
evolution of the duty itself, from an absolutely strict duty to a duty only requiring 
fair presentation, and a proposal of a new proportionate regime of remedies 
brings potential problems of its operation in reinsurance context. Consequently, 
notwithstanding there has been a long history of the doctrine and clarification of 
many aspects of the doctrine comes from a reinsurance cases, difficulties and 
problems still exist in operating such duty smoothly and directly in reinsurance 
like in direct insurance context. Such problems extend to every specific aspect 
of operation of the duty in reinsurance context, from the formation to 
performance, and then remedies for qualifying breach of the duty in claim stage.  
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Background  
Since the Marine Insurance Act 1906 partially codifies the doctrine of utmost 
good faith which derived from Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Carter v Boehm1, 
the courts have taken many opportunities to structure the doctrine, establish 
rules of the tests, confine the scope and clarify the remedy for qualified breach. 
It has been clearly settled for a long time that, in contrast to general rules 
applying to ordinary commercial contracts, there lives a doctrine of utmost good 
faith in contracts which can be categorised as uberrimae fidei. Under such 
doctrine both parties are obliged to exercise their best efforts and endeavours to 
help each other to make an informed decision and then perform the contract 
concluded thereon without any dishonesty or deceit. The two commonest 
aspects of the doctrine in Lord Mansfield’s judgment, i.e. the duty not to make 
misrepresentation and the duty not to conceal information, are reaffirmed as the 
most important but not inclusive elements of the doctrine, requiring both parties 
mutually and positively volunteer information and passively refrain from 
misrepresentation. Breach of such draconian duties brings harsh result which 
affords the innocent party an option to avoid the contract retrospectively, without 
any other remedies like damages. Although there has been a long history of the 
doctrine, it cannot be said that its whole framework is crystally and clearly 
accomplished. S.17 of the existing Marine Insurance Act 1906 is quite broadly 
drafted, like an umbrella provision providing an overriding duty of utmost good 
faith. In addition, s.s 18-20 focus on the duties at pre-contractual stage. As a 
result the applicability of a continuing duty of utmost good faith at post 
contractual stage is still controversial and unsettled. Moreover, due to special 
practice in London subscription market, various submissions, arguments and 
pleadings have been arisen from unsettled issues on broker’s independent duty 
of disclosure codified in s.19. This long alive doctrine has experienced 
significant evolution in the last ten years. After being abolished in consumer 
insurance context, the current doctrine applicable to non-consumer insurance 
context is also going to have important changes after a new insurance act 
becomes into effect. The strict absolute duty is going to be replaced by a duty of 
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 (1766)3 Burr 1905. 
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fair presentation. Also a notion of proportionality is introduced by the new 
regime of remedies of qualifying breach. Reinsurance, which is considered as 
typical class of non-consumer insurance will be significantly affected by the 
evolution of doctrine of utmost good faith.  
Reinsurance, as defined as the insurance of insurers,2 is basically a contract of 
or for insurance under which the insurers seek cover for their exposure to 
liabilities occurred under the direct insurance policy. There are various forms of 
reinsurance contracts which adopt different ceding methods of risks. Basically, 
there are two general types of reinsurance agreement, facultative contracts and 
treaty arrangements. The distinction between these two main types is that a 
facultative contact is on a one-off basis on a particular risk; while treaty is a 
continuing arrangement, transferring risks of a type or certain types or even the 
whole book of reinsured’s business to the reinsurers. Treaty mechanisms are 
normally placed in three methods, namely obligatory treaty, facultative-
obligatory treaty and non-obligatory treaty. Each of them has different nature. 
Some reinsurance agreement is only a framework stipulating how reinsurance 
risk will be underwritten in future rather than underwriting any specific risk. 
Therefore, it is debatable whether such contract is a contract of insurance, thus 
attracts duty of utmost good faith. On the other hand, provided that duty of 
utmost good faith is indeed attracted, it may still raise many difficulties in 
operation of the doctrine in reinsurance context. As reinsurance has some 
characters distinguished from underlying insurance contracts, it would have 
some impact on operation of the duty in reinsurance context. Also the specific 
placing process of reinsurance contracts in a subscription market will also 
reshape operation of the doctrine. In addition, the principle of waiver, which is a 
significant rule in common law, will also modify the operation of the doctrine in 
reinsurance context. Therefore, notwithstanding there has been a long history of 
the doctrine, even clarification of many aspects of the doctrine comes from 
reinsurance cases, it still cannot be said that the whole framework of the 
doctrine operates perfectly and crystal clearly in reinsurance context. 
                                                          
2
 Merkin, R., Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed., 2006. p.579. 
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2. The aims and objectives of the thesis 
This thesis mainly aims to analyse and solve problems and issues arising from 
operation of the doctrine of utmost good faith in reinsurance contracts, due to 
the specific characters and nature of reinsurance. Basically, the aims of the 
thesis will be fulfilled by evaluating current mechanisms, discovering defects 
and unsettled issues in applicability, duration, scope and modification of the 
doctrine in reinsurance context due to its unique placing process in subscription 
market, complex nature and complicated placing methods and development of 
the duty itself. And then suggestions and reforming will be proposed to resolve 
those deficiencies and difficulties.  Eventually it can build a coherent framework 
of doctrine of utmost good faith which can better presenting the law in 
reinsurance context and service the reinsurance market better in practice. The 
research objectives can be approached by means of analysis of laws and the 
London market practice in UK. The thesis is composed of three parts, divided 
into eight chapters, provide background of operation of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance contract, and difficult issues emerging from it, for which solutions 
will be found. The structure and methodology of each chapter is briefly 
summarised as follows.  
3. The structure and methodology of the thesis 
This thesis comprises three parts. The first part introduces some basic 
conceptions of reinsurance agreements and describes the outline of doctrine of 
utmost good faith.  
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction on forms and types of reinsurance 
agreements, beginning with the definition, nature, function and main types of 
reinsurance. It is followed by separate scrutiny of facultative and treaty 
reinsurance contracts. Especially after the House of Lords’ decision inLexington 
Insurance Company v. WASA International Insurance Company Limited 3, the 
issue of nature of reinsurance contract, particularly the nature of facultative 
reinsurance plays a significant role in deciding the application of the full 
reinsurance clauses. Different types of reinsurance agreements have different 
ceding methods. Some distinct ceding methods make the agreement a contract 
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 [2009] UKHL 40. 
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for insurance rather than contract of insurance. Such distinction matters as it 
may affect whether the doctrine of utmost good faith would be attracted and 
how the duty operates, if it does be attracted.  
Chapter 2 describes the whole outline of the doctrine of utmost good faith by 
analysing the structure of the doctrine, the rules of tests and remedies for 
breaches of the duty. In existing legislation the doctrine is partially codified in 
Marine Insurance Act 1906. However, the legislation currently governing 
operation of the doctrine in reinsurance context is to be reformed by Insurance 
Act 2015.4 Significant changes brought by the new act have been anaylsed in 
this chapter. Conclusion of an insurance contract can be regarded as the 
division line in the operation of the doctrine. Since Lord Mansfield first time 
brought forward the theory, English law has focused on the duty which applies 
at the pre-contractual stage, structured the duty, established a two elements 
test, and set rules of remedies. Only recently emerges a trend to extend the 
duty to post-contractual stage. However, it is still controversial and arguable 
whether there is a continuing duty of utmost good faith during performance of 
the contract. After the draft Insurance Contracts Bill introduced by the Law 
Commissions finally received the royal assent,5 the doctrine of utmost good 
faith is officially to be replaced by a new duty of fair presentation in non-
consumer insurance context. In addition a new default regime of proportionate 
remedies is built up to replace the current harsh remedies regime. However it is 
arguable whether such reform has resolved the difficulties and problems arising 
from the operation of the doctrine in reinsurance context. The details will be 
discussed in the following two parts.   
Part two of the thesis focuses on specific issues relating to broker’s role in the 
disclosure process during placing reinsurance. 
Reinsurance brokers play significant roles in reinsurance market, because they 
have always been relied upon heavily to produce reinsurance business in 
London market which is one of the world’s most important centers for trade of 
reinsurance. Especially in Lloyd’s, it is a broker-orientated market and the whole 
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 Ths Act is to make new provision about insurance contracts. It  will apply to every insurance policy written 
in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the Act will come into effect in August 2016, 18 
months after the date it was passed.  
5
 Following agreement by both Houses on the text of the Bill, it received Royal Assent on 12 February 
2015. The Bill is now an Act of Parliament (law). 
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business system is built up on such tradition. It is a special relationship that is 
beyond a simple agent-client relationship developed between brokers and 
underwriters in practice. In subscription market, reinsurance brokers play 
various important roles, not only in placing reinsurance contracts but also in 
performing a number of administrative functions for underwriters. So in addition 
to his fundamental role of agent of the reinsured who gives placement 
instructions, the broker may also involve in other capacities, like retaining 
underwriting documents for underwriters, undertaking circulation of adjuster’s or 
lawyer’s reports among underwriters, drafting the policy wordings, processing 
premium payments and handling claims for underwriters, and even effecting 
retrocession covers for reinsurers . 
 As illustrated in chapter 2, in the MIA 1906 an insurance contract as a contract 
uberrimae fidei attracts the duty of utmost good faith on both parties under 
ss.17, 18 and on the placing broker under s.19. Therefore before conclusion of 
a reinsurance contract, the reinsured’s placing broker has a separate duty to 
fully disclose and truly represent all material facts which a prudent underwriter 
would consider in deciding whether to accept the risks or not and on what terms. 
Such duty is significantly changed by Insurance Act 2015. However, placing 
reinsurance in a subscription market is a complicated formation process which 
may modify the formation of a reinsurance contract, subsequently has some 
effect upon the performance of the broker’s duty of disclosure. As a result, it 
raises problems and difficulties which particularly affect the broker’s 
performance of duty of disclosure in the reinsurance context. Although a 
reinsurance broker performs a similar role to that of a broker placing direct 
insurance, there are several issues which come up more frequently in the 
context of reinsurance. This part will make scrutiny into  how a reinsurance 
broker performances the duty of disclosure, of himself or on behalf of the 
reinsured in the unique placing process in a subscription market, mainly based 
on the sources of statute and common law authorities. Particular attention will 
be paid on specific issues in context of reinsurance broker’s role in disclosing 
process, caused by the particular characteristics and special placing process of 
reinsurance contracts. It comprises two parts, chapter 3 on practical difficulties 
and problems in performing the duty of utmost good faith by reinsurance 
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brokers, and chapter 4 on problems of performance of the duty in broker’s 
placing process in a subscription market.  
The starting point of this part is difficulties and problems arising in current 
framework of the broker’s duty of disclosure in placing reinsurance contract. It 
analyses the problems in three aspects, i.e. the legal basis of the broker’s 
personal duty of disclosure, who is the relevant agent under the duty, and the 
scope of the duty of disclosure of the agent to insure. After clarifying the specific 
issues in those above three aspects, it proceeds to how a reinsurance broker 
will perform his duty of disclosure under a reinsurance contract in the 
subscription market. Difficulties arise because the duty cannot apply 
straightward when reinsurance is effected in subscription procedures. It will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 how current doctrine operates in reinsurance broker’s 
placing process. The difficulties will be analysed in following aspects, i.e. when 
the reinsurance contract is concluded in the subscription procedure, and then 
attracts the duty of utmost good faith. In addition, problems may arise in 
performance of the duty of utmost good faith due to the specific characters of 
the subscription procedure. Solutions will be found to cover the gap in both 
common law and market practice aspects. So that it can draw a whole picture of 
the broker’s duty of disclosure in placing reinsurance contract, which is different 
from that in context of direct insurance.  
Part III mainly discusses difficult issues arising in the operation of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith in reinsurance contracts. The issues relating to applicability, 
duration of the duty, the scope of the material circumstances subject to 
disclosure, modification by the principle of waiver, and remedies regime for 
qualifying breaches will be under detailed scrutiny. 
In early time, the law relating to reinsurance contracts is largely based on 
facultative marine insurance contract, which is effected on an individual offer 
and acceptance basis like a retail business. The relationship between reinsured 
and reinsurer under a facultative reinsurance is simply similar to the direct 
insurance. While after the developments such as treaty reinsurance coming into 
existence and taking most percentage of the market share, the relationship 
between the insurer and reinsurer under a reinsurance contract become more 
complicated and quite different from the relationship between insured and 
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insurers under a direct insurance contract. It is more closely aligned with the 
market practice that the reinsurance relationship is more like a partnership in 
the subscription market, where each party to the contract shares in the risk 
underwritten. As a result, the reinsurance relationship may be left with some 
problems which cannot be resolved by the MIA 1906 Act and existing common 
law rules. As the development of the legislation governing reinsurance contracts 
have not taken in account the later developments such as appearance of treaty 
reinsurance. The essential elements of the duty of disclosure can be 
summarised as three aspects, including timing, scope and content, i.e. that the 
duty of disclosure arises before the contract is concluded; that any material 
facts must be disclosed; and scope of disclosure is confined to the assured’s 
actual knowledge and blind eye knowledge. Although the essential elements 
have been long and clearly established by the Act and common law cases, the 
doctrine of utmost good faith may still create some anomalies and deficiencies 
in applying to reinsurance area in certain cases. Notwithstanding reinsurance is 
recognised as insurance for insurer, it is not a crystallised principle that all 
reinsurance contracts can be categorised as contracts uberrimae fidei to attract 
the duty of utmost good faith. Where a duty of utmost good faith is attracted, it 
deserves scrutiny what the scope and duration of the duty is, and what material 
facts should be disclosed, specially relating to reinsurance contract. Moreover it 
is worthy an analyse what happens when the duty is curtailed by the principles 
of waiver in reinsurance context, and whether the proposed proportionate 
remedy regime that is to reform the current remedy regime can serve better in 
reinsurance market practice.  
Actually in business insurance market practice the duty of disclosure under the 
MIA 1906 Act has become onerous to a certain degree, especially for complex 
business of large size and complicated nature. As identification, collection and 
collation of all material information related to the risks can be extreme difficult 
tasks involving multiple sources of information, proportionate to the size, nature 
and complexity of business insurance.6  To minimise the difficulties and the 
deficiency of enforcing the law, the reinsurers commonly follow the current 
business insurance market practice by designing particular standards and 
procedure of disclosure and inserting a specially draft clause in the reinsurance 
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 Airmic, Disclosure of Material Facts and Information in Business Insurance (2011). 
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contracts overriding the current legal rules set out in the MIA, rather than 
seeking enforcement of the full requirements of the act. In addition, it is 
necessary to clarify what the material facts are under reinsurance agreements. 
As information and facts which are material in the reinsurer’s underwriting 
assessment may vary according to the distinct placing methods by which the 
premium and losses are distributed between the reinsureds and the reinsurers 
under each individual reinsurance contract. Therefore chapter 5 will discuss in 
details circumstances which are commonly recognised as material information 
and particular concerns in placing risks under reinsurance contracts, besides 
the general material facts commonly recognised relating to the underlying risks 
under direct insurance. 
Moreover, where the reinsurance contract comes into existence before the 
direct insurance law due to the specific practice in the subscription market, the 
requirement that both policies are in existence at the same cannot be satisfied 
any more. Also where business was ceded to the reinsurer for example by use 
of bordereau so that the reinsurance agreement between reinsurer and 
reinsured are contracts for insurance rather than contact of insurance 
synonymous to the direct insurance, such reinsurance agreement works more 
like a contract of agency between the reinsurer and the reinsured rather than 
creating a partnership. In such circumstances, it is more complicated than the 
direct insurance as applicability and duration of the doctrine varies under 
different types of reinsurance agreements depending on their placing methods. 
The mandatory or non-obligatory nature of the ceding methods in placing 
reinsurance contract brings in different results.  The chapter 6 will discuss the 
anomalies and difficulties created by modification of applicability and duration of 
the duty operating in reinsurance contracts.  
In addition, in contrast with the consumer insurance market which is regulated 
under a mandatory regime, commercial insurance market is inclined to allow 
equivalently sophisticate and professional parties to adapt provisions which are 
appropriate in their particular circumstances and suitable for their own business 
interest. Commercial parties, who are normally in equivalent business power, 
will and should be allowed to modify and then perform the duty of utmost good 
faith in their own way. Therefore, the application of doctrine of utmost good faith 
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may be affected by the principle of waive which is a separate principle in 
common law. That’s to say, the parties of a reinsurance contract should be 
entitled to expressly contract out of the default regime, to design their own rules 
by clear and unambiguous contract terms which can bring sufficient attention to 
the business, or to curtail the doctrine of utmost good faith by implied waiver of 
their right or remedy. In chapter 7, it will analyse the difficulties arising in 
deciding the extent and requirements of the alteration of the default legal regime 
by reinsurance parties. As to express contracting out provisions, it is suggested 
to be a question of construction of the parties’ intention in interpreting the 
contracting out provisions in individual cases. The approach of construction will 
be analysed and advices will be given to the parties on how to draft a proper 
term to achieve the purpose of contracting out successfully, and to reduce the 
uncertainty to the reinsurance contract at the same time. In addition problems 
may be caused relating to the permissible scope of contracting out provisions in 
reinsurance contract; especially in the circumstances where express terms are 
drafted purporting exclusion of the reinsured’s liability for his broker’s fraud and 
to limit the reinsurer’s right of avoidance on the ground of such fraud. It will be 
discussed whether the public policy should come to prevent such exclusion or 
limitation of the right or remedy, and whether there is any possibility to develop 
a room for a lawful contracting out right where the agent to insure commits fraud 
against the reinsured. If the answer is positive, then it need be considered how 
to find out a solution to be consistent with current reinsurance market practice. 
In respect of the reinsurer’ implied waiver of the duty, the parties in the 
disclosing or representing process will face practical problems as to whether the 
reinsurers need to ask questions and if so how far the reinsurers are obliged to 
ask questions in the placing process, and then whether the reinsurer’s non-
inquiry, general or limited questions indicates his waiver of disclosure of those 
information falling outsider the questions. Comparison will be made in the 
following sections between the Australian law and English law to find a proper 
approach of establishing implied waiver to purport the purpose of prompting 
both of the reinsurance parties to make fair effect to get relevant material 
information disclosed.  
Last but not least, the chapter 8 will discuss about the difficulties and problems 
of the current and future regimes of remedies for breach the duty of utmost 
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good faith under a reinsurance contract. It is fair to say that the current regime 
of remedies for breach of the duty of utmost good faith is firmly established 
under English law. Such regime of remedies which adopts an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach receives more and more criticism as it gradually shows deficiencies in 
practice. This chapter will focus on the deficiencies and difficulties of the current 
regime of remedy applying in reinsurance context, and suggest a proper 
solution to those problems by proposing a proportionate remedy regime after 
comparing the regime under the ICA 1984 in Australian law, the current English 
law regime and the new regime proposed under Insurance Act 2015. It will start 
with the summary of the regime of remedies under current English law, and 
then proceed to scrutinise of the deficiencies, shortcoming of the current regime 
of remedy and difficulties caused by it to reinsurance practice. Due to those 
practical difficulties caused by the harshness and disproportionability of current 
regime of remedy, alternative proportionate approaches are proposed to 
replace current regime. The core spirit of the proportionate approach will be 
clarified first. Then it will proceed to detailed analysis of the proportionate 
approach adopted by the ICA 1984 in Australian law and the new regime 
proposed under the Insurance Act 2015. A method of comparison will be 
adopted to find a proper alternative approach to introduce the notion of 
proportionality into the regime of remedies. However difficulties will arise in 
drawing a hypothetic picture of what the contract would have been, and what 
the hypothetic ultimate position the reinsurance parties would have been in. A 
question must be answered to define the scope of the parties’ contractual 
obligations and duties first, namely what contractual terms the parties should 
perform. Shall the law keep digging in pursuit of the hypothesis of ultimate 
position where the parties would have been in? Is it possible to pursue the 
hypothetic position in practice?  Or should the law just focus on the insurer’s 
response to the disclosure of the true information, had the duty of utmost good 
faith been performed successfully? Even the above problem can be solved; it 
will still cause practical problems in applying the proportionate remedy approach 
in reinsurance context. Difficulties will arise in referring and proving a 
hypothesis of what the reinsurers would have been done had all material 
information been truly represented. It is not easy to resolve the issue of the 
difference between what the reinsurers would have done had it made a fair 
presentation and what actually occurred should be found out. In addition such 
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potential difficulties will even become more complicated in applying the new 
regime in specialist or complex reinsurance contract. Better solution will be 
suggested to the make up the deficiencies of the proposed proportionate 
approach at last, by analysing whether the effect of proportionate remedies on 
reinsurance can be left to freedom of contract. 
4. Outcomes  
 As a result of the research the following points will be made clear: 
• What is reinsurance 
• Summary of the framework of the doctrine utmost good faith in 
evolution  
• The role of the reinsurance brokers in performing the duty of disclosure 
in the placing process 
• Modification of the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance placing 
process in subscription market  
• Material facts need to be disclosed in reinsurance context 
• Applicability and duration of the duty of utmost good faith in various 
reinsurance contracts     
• Modification of the duty of utmost good faith by the principles of waiver  
•Deficiencies of current regime of remedies and potential problems of the 
new proportionate regime of remedies applying in reinsurance context  
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Part I BASIC CONCEPTS OF REINSURANCE AND FRAMEWORK OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH  
Chapter 1 Types and Classes of Reinsurance Agreement  
1.1 Introduction of reinsurance 
1.1.1 What is reinsurance? 
Reinsurance, as defined as the insurance of insurers7, is basically a contract of or for 
insurance under which the insurers seek cover for their exposure to claims liability 
occurred under the direct insurance policy. Therefore reinsurance agreement is 
regarded as species of insurance8. In essence, it is a contract of indemnity between 
insurers under which the reinsured, i.e. the insurer in the original policy, lays off part 
or all of a particular risk or a number of risks falling with the contract scope to the 
reinsurer.9 
The appearance of reinsurance dates back to the 14th century. 10  From simple 
contract covering an individual case transacted through ‘chambers or exchanges of 
insurance’11 to complex reinsurance arrangements transacted in Lloyd’s marketplace 
which has been existing for 300 years, reinsurance develops into a complex domain 
and functions as essential approach to spread risk. London plays a central role in the 
worldwide market for reinsurance as all manner of international risks are ultimately 
partially or completely reinsured in London.12 
Reinsured and reinsurer are the generic term of two parties of a reinsurance contract. 
In the treaty arrangements which are the most commonly used type of reinsurance 
contract, the cedant is often interchangeable with the reinsured, and the transfer of 
                                                          
7 
Merkin, R., Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed., 2006 p.579; Travelers Casualty & Surety 
Co of Europe Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Exercise [2006] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 63, para 57, per VAT 
Tribunal; Kiln, RJ/Kiln S, Reinsurance in Practice, Witherby’s, 4
th
 rev edn., 2001.  
8
 Ozlem Gurses, Reinsuring Clauses. London: Informa, 2010, p1; Agnew v Lansforsakringsolagens AB, [2000] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 317, Lord Millet, at 338. 
9
 [2006] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 63, para. 43. 
10
 Edwin W. Eopf, Notes on origin and development of reinsurance, p.5. 
http://casualtyactuarialsociety.net/pubs/proceed/proceed29/29022.pdf. The earliest reinsurances first appeared in 
transport, especially marine insurance, at a comparatively late date 14
th
 centuries. The first recorded reinsurance 
contract was agreed in 1370 between the Mediterranean merchants Guilano Grillo and Goffredo Benaira and 
Martino Sacco to reinsure a ship on a voyage form Genoa to the Burges harbor. 
11
  Ibid. p5.  
12
  Ozlem Gurses,  and Rob Merkin, Facultative reinsurance and the full reinsurance clause, LMCLQ, [2008] 366-
388. 
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risk is often described as cession. Where the reinsurer seeks cover for all or part of 
his liability in the retrocession, he becomes the retrocedant and who plays the 
insurer role under such contract is called retrocessionaire. 
Reinsurance and direct insurance are tied up tightly in practice that neither of them 
will perform well without each other. As reinsurance serves as a protection for 
insurers’ exposure to the original risks and effective means to balance insurers’ 
profitability and solvency, it is the prior concern and common practice of original 
insurers to find enough reinsurance protection before they accepted the inwards 
risks. The availability of reinsurance and its cost determines both the types and size 
of inwards business which an underwriter can accept. However, before deciding 
placing method by which the reinsurance is arranged, size and types of risks 
contained in his inwards portfolio of business requiring reinsurance cover will be 
brought up to the original insurer’s concern first, although those are not whole 
intricate factors related to decide what reinsurance to purchase.   
Although there is a close tie between the direct insurance and reinsurance as shown 
above, they are absolutely separate contracts. Each party has separate rights and 
obligations under individual contracts. Although there are indeed some authorities 
stating that reinsurance performs as a further insurance on the subject-matter of the 
direct policy, it is not a partnership or agency between the reinsured and reinsurers 
but a reinsurance relationship.13 Such reinsurance relationship brought about by the 
reinsurance agreement is only between the reinsured and reinsurer. It is mutually 
independent from the relationship between the insurer and the insured under the 
original cover. Even in the facultative reinsurance contract which contains a ‘full 
reinsurance clause’, the coverage terms are incorporated into the reinsurance 
contract in most cases, these two contracts are still separate normally with different 
premium, duration and claims provisions. Reinsurance is not an assignment of the 
direct policy by the reinsured to reinsurers,14 neither has the assured under the 
original cover any legal interest in the reinsurance contract.  
Based on the distinct nature of reinsurance cover analysed above, there is actually 
no contract privity between the assureds and reinsurers. It suggests that the liability 
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 RE Norwich Equitable Fire (1887) 57 LT 241. 
14
 Re Lancashire Plate Glass Fire and Burglary Insurance Co Ltd [1912] 1 Ch 35. 
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of reinsurer under reinsurance contract is sole to the reinsured, while the insurer 
retains all the liability encountered under the original cover to the assured.15 From 
the reinsurer’s point of view, the reinsurance contract creates new liabilities and 
obligations of the reinsurer to insure the reinsured’s liability encountered under the 
original policy. It is not a simple ‘share’ of the reinsured’s existing obligations and 
liabilities under the original policy. Although the underlying contract terms may be 
incorporated into the reinsurance contract, there is no contractual relationship 
between the reinsurer and original insured, therefore the two parties have no 
obligations or rights against each other. Such character of reinsurance contract is 
well enunciated by Court of Appeal in Meadows Indemnity Co Ltd v, The Insurance 
Corporation of Ireland plc and International Commercial Bank plc16 where May LJ 
rejected the reinsurer’s declaration that insurer was entitled to avoid the original 
insurance contract by the reason that “These two parties [the reinsurer and the 
original insured] have no rights or obligations against or to each other; they are not in 
a contractual relationship. Although there is of course a connection between the 
contracts of insurance on the one hand and of reinsurance on the other, [the 
reinsurer’s] rights are in no way involved in the existing dispute between [the insurer] 
and [the original assured]…Insofar as [the reinsurer] is concerned, any liability on 
their part will depend upon the contract of reinsurance and the factual situation which 
existed between them when this was entered into.…”.17As a result, reinsurance is 
distinguished from co-insurance, insurance arranged in layers and double insurance, 
where the assured has a separate contract of insurance with each underwriter. 18 
1.1.2 The function of reinsurance agreement 
Mance J has once enunciated the basic function of reinsurance in Charter 
Reinsurance Co Ltd v. Fagan19 as follows: “In insurance, the matching of exposure 
and protection to assure both solvency and profitability is absolutely fundamental. 
                                                          
15
 Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 9(2); Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v  Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd 
[1985] 2 Lloyd’s REP 599 AT 614, per Hobhouse J: “The relationship of a reinsured and a reinsurer is not that of 
agent and principal; it is one as between principals. The reinsurer is in no sense a party to the contract of original 
insurance and has no rights under it.” 
16
 [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 298. 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, 2nd ed, 2005, Hart Publishing, page 
390. 
19
 Per Mance J in Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313, 343. 
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Reinsurance—of what type—is a principal means to this end.”20 As stated above, 
spreading of risks by means of reinsurance arrangements functions principally in two 
folds, i.e. protecting exposure against liability and making business advantages.  
The primary function of reinsurance is to protect the direct insurers against his 
liability to the assured incurred under the original policy. The reinsurers share the 
risks and premium in various methods, thus spread the risk in whole market. 
Consequently, the reinsureds need not sustain whole losses on their own.  
Reinsurance not only serves protective functions, but also brings business 
advantages, such as promote financial stability. The original insurer is unable to 
predict which policy he underwrites will prospectively make profit and which one will 
result in unexpected accumulated losses or catastrophic losses during the cover 
period. Reinsurance can be used to balance such solvency and profitability by 
smoothing the peaks and troughs then promote stabilisation of profit. 21 
Moreover, reinsurance can also enlarge the direct insurer’s capacity to absorb larger 
risks worldwide which would have not been underwritten in absence of the 
reinsurance cover. Simultaneously, reinsurance can release part of the direct 
insurer’s capital which would otherwise have been reserved to cover potential losses 
to fulfill the ‘solvency margin’ requirements for regulation purposes. 22  Thus 
reinsurance can increase the original insurer’s capacity and strengthen its solvency 
ratio.23  
Furthermore, by the ‘fronting’ practice, worldwide reinsurers are able to participate in 
insurance business in certain areas where reinsurers are not allowed to insure such 
business directly due to some local restrictions or regulations. At the same time, the 
fronting insurers who themselves lack the expertise, resources and sophistication in 
such business can underwrite the risks and then cede them to reinsurers with no or 
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Edelman, The Law of Reinsurance, Oxford University Press, 2005, para 1.06.
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few retention. As a result, the fronting practice can bring both parties business 
advantages.  
1.1.3 Main types of reinsurance contracts 
This chapter will focus on the traditional forms of reinsurance contracts which are 
commonly employed in the London market. Basically speaking, there are two 
general types of reinsurance agreement, facultative contracts and treaty 
arrangements. The distinction between these two main types is that facultative 
contacts are on a one-off basis on a particular risk. While the treaty is the continuing 
arrangements under which risks of a type or certain types or whole book of 
reinsured’s business is transferred to the reinsurers. Treaty mechanisms are 
normally placed in three methods, namely obligatory treaty, facultative-obligatory 
treaty and facultative treaty or non-obligatory treaty. Each of them has different 
nature in placing progress.  
As to cessions under the reinsurance contracts, various forms have been developed 
to reflect different underwriting requirements in practice. Those forms can be divided 
into two classes, proportional and non-proportional. The difference between the 
proportional and non-proportional reinsurance is how ceding of risks is defined under 
the reinsurance contracts. Under a proportional contract, the reinsured and reinsurer 
share the risk and premium in proportion, whereas under a non-proportional contract 
the reinsurer accepts liability in excess of the reinsured’s deductible up to a given 
maximum sum. It suffices to say that the proportional reinsurance contract is risk 
based while the non-proportional contract is claim based. 
The principal arrangement forms of reinsurance, namely facultative cover and 
treaties are based on either proportional  or non-proportional basis. Facultative 
reinsurance is in most cases proportional. In respect of treaty framework, current 
proportional treaty arrangements can be divided into quota share and surplus cover; 
as well as combined quota share and surplus cover. Non-proportional treaty 
agreements can be divided into excess of loss treaty and stop loss treaty. Each of 
those forms will be described in detail in the following sections.  
1.2 Facultative reinsurance 
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1.2.1 What is facultative reinsurance? 
Facultative reinsurance is a method of placing whole or part of a particular single risk. 
Each risk is considered individually and the terms and conditions of the contract are 
specifically concluded for the very occasion. In most cases, facultative reinsurance is 
concluded in proportional form under which the reinsured retained small or even 
none proportion of the original risks and cede the balance to the reinsurer. It may be 
controversial whether such reinsurance can be regarded as a form of insurance in 
some jurisdictions. However, it has been a long-standing theory supported by many 
early authorities24 that facultative reinsurance is a contract of insurance; whereas 
other types of reinsurance, i.e. the treaties or stop loss contracts, are treated in some 
other ways. 25 As a result, most of the basic legal doctrines and regulations of 
insurance apply to facultative reinsurance.  
1.2.2 Characteristics of facultative insurance  
1.2.2.1 Separate contract  
As a basic type of reinsurance agreement, facultative reinsurance has all the nature 
of reinsurance. Although there is an orthodox opinion that reinsurance is a further 
insurance on the subject-matter in the original agreement26, the direct insurance and 
facultative reinsurance are absolutely separate contracts independent from each 
other. Even if the slip cover incorporates the terms of direct policy into it by a wording 
of “as original” in a version of the “full reinsurance clause”, these two presumed 
“back-to-back” policies are still separate contracts. It is a long-standing theory that 
there is no privity of contract between the facultative reinsurer and the original 
assured27. Therefore, the original assured are not entitled to bring an action against 
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 Delver v. Barnes, (1807) 1 Taunt 48; China Traders Insurance Co. v. Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation 
[1898] 2 Q.B. 187; Australian Windows Fund Life Assurance Society v. National Mutual life Association of 
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the reinsurer 28  or to add reinsurers as parties to an action against direct 
underwriters29, even that the direct insurer becomes insolvent.30.  
1.2.2.2 Facultative feature 
‘Facultative’, which derives from the word ’faculty’, 31  is the most significant 
distinguishing feature of facultative reinsurance which makes it different from the 
obligatory treaty or facultative obligatory treaty. Both parties have the option as to 
whether to enter into a contract in respect of each individual risk. There is neither 
obligation on the reinsured to cede, nor automatic acceptance of reinsurer. Whether 
the contract can be concluded depends on both parties’ discretion.  
1.2.2.3 Presumption of back-to-back 
In the London market, it is a common practice to place traditional facultative 
reinsurance contract in a simple method of appending a slip cover to the direct policy. 
Such simple slip normally contains a version of “full reinsurance clause” which is 
typically formulated as ‘Being a reinsurance of… subject to the same terms of 
conditions as original and follow the settlements of the Company’. It contains two 
parts, i.e. “as original” and “follow the settlements” It purports to incorporate the 
terms of the underlying policy by a brief wording of ‘as original’ and indicate the 
reinsurer’s intention to follow suit and make an indemnity to the reinsured when the 
parties of underlying policy enter into a settlement in the brief wording of “follow the 
settlements”. As a result, these two policies are presumed to be construed on a 
“back-to-back” basis.32  
As the indication of ‘as original’, it is the general notion that the terms of direct policy 
are incorporated into the reinsurance and take effect as a part of the facultative 
reinsurance 33 . When some differences on its face exists in the wording or 
construction of terms of the reinsurance, there is a presumption that the two polices 
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  Longmore LJ in Wasa v Lexington said that it derived from the Latin meaning “one-off”.  
32
 Arnould, J., Arnould’s law of Marine Insurance and Average, 18
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 edn, 2008, para 33-02. 
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 Ozlem Gurses, Rob Merkin; Facultative reinsurance and the full reinsurance clause, LLMCQ, [2008] 366-388. 
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are intended to be construed in a consistent fashion on a ‘back-to back’ basis34, 
subject to some limitation where express provisions in the facultative reinsurance 
policy overrides the presumption or there are no equivalent provisions between the 
policies.35 
By contrast to application of such presumption to proportional reinsurance contracts 
under which the parities share the risk and premium according to their proportionate 
undertaking, it is not the case of the presumption to be applicable to non-proportional 
ones under which reinsurers employ quite different means of calculation of premium 
and have distinct strategy and considerations during placing of the reinsurance. This 
point is well explained by Lord Mustill in Axa Reinsurance v Field36, although it is not 
a case of facultative reinsurance but an excess of loss treaty. Consequently, where 
there is a different wording in a non-proportional reinsurance contract, it is to be 
assumed that the parties intend a different interpretation from the underlying policy.  
1.2.2.4 Case-by-case transactions 
Known from treaty which is a pre-arranged framework facility to protect the 
underlying insurer against risks of certain types or to provide an embracing cover for 
insurer’s entire book of business, facultative reinsurance is just an insurance of a 
specific single risk or each underlying insurance policy in each one-off transaction. 
The parties to a facultative reinsurance have to deal with placement case-by-case. 
Each risk is considered and negotiated individually and the reinsured is obliged to 
provide full placing information at the inception and renewal on every occasion. As a 
result the reinsured has to pay high administrative cost. By contrast, the reinsurers’ 
administrative costs and commission rates for reinsurance placed on a facultative 
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basis become lower, even if generally a no-profit commission is operated.37 
1.2.3   Types of facultative reinsurance 
Facultative reinsurance contracts are in most cases written on a proportional basis. 
The parties will share the risk and underlying premium proportionately. Under such 
contract, the reinsured will generally retain a proportion of the direct risk for its own 
account and cede the balance to the reinsurer. The size of the reinsured’s retention 
varies from case to case and it is material to the reinsurer when placing the 
reinsurance. And the reinsurer will be paid a share of the underlying premium 
proportionate to his share of the direct risk less a deduction of ceding commission for 
the reinsured due to the expenses incurred in operating the direct policy, such as 
business acquisition, survey and claims investigation expenses.  
Although comparatively unusual, some facultative reinsurance contracts are indeed 
placed in non-proportional form, excess of loss facultative reinsurance. Under such 
contract, the reinsurer only assumes liability when the loss under the underlying 
policy reaches a certain level which is pre-agreed in the reinsurance contract. As a 
result, the share of risk under the non-proportional facultative reinsurance does not 
depend upon each party’s undertaking proportion. The reinsured will retain the loss 
until it reaches the agreed level and cede the excess part to the reinsurer. Distinct 
from the proportional facultative reinsurance, reinsurers under non-proportional 
facultative reinsurance will determine the premium in every respect of the specific 
circumstance, such as the whole loss frequency and reinsured’s capacity etc, without 
automatic reference to the underlying premium. Furthermore, very significantly, there 
is no presumption of ‘back-to-back’ principle in a non-proportional facultative 
reinsurance.  
1.2.4 Why facultative reinsurance is purchased 
Although facultative reinsurance, which is a method of laying off individual risks on 
one-off basis, is gradually taken over by treaty reinsurance, such facultative 
operation remains an essential means of spreading risk in practice. This mode which 
used to be the predominant fashion of reinsurance in 19th century still plays a 
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significant role in placing specific risks in the following circumstances.  
First, when there is no available or sufficient cover under the treaty arrangement, 
direct insurer will seek facultative reinsurance cover as supplements to the treaty 
arrangement. For instance, direct insurers may expose to risks when there is some 
special limits of their existing treaty arrangement, such as limits of amount, 
geographical areas etc. Also, when there are exclusion provisions in the treaty cover, 
a facultative reinsurance contract is an effective method to provide extra protection 
for such additional risks.  
Moreover, facultative reinsurance contract can protect the insurer against major 
losses of a particular high-risk when the insurer has no automatic obligatory 
reinsurance cover for such risks. For example when there is difficult to find a 
common, mature and experienced automatic mechanism to cede a particular new or 
high risk, the reinsurer will prefer to accept such risks on a facultative basis.  
Furthermore, facultative reinsurance cover can be set up for some poor quality or 
unstable risk which the insurers are unwilling to cede via their existing treaties in 
order to avoid any effects on the overall achievements of reinsurance treaties.38 
1.2.5   Fronting Arrangements 
It is a common practice that facultative reinsurance is placed to bring in overseas 
risks which cannot be insured directly. For instance, it is commonly used where the 
reinsurers are restricted to write direct insurance business in their local countries, or 
there are some local licensing or exchange control requirements for regulatory 
purposes. As a result, reinsurers have to conceal their unlicensed or unacceptable 
security behind an acceptable fronting insurer. 39  When the overseas reinsurer 
concludes an agreement to reinsure a risk with an individual or business, it needs to 
capture a local insurance company to underwrite the risks. The Local insurers will 
underwrite the direct risks first and then cede the entire or most risks to them in a 
facultative reinsurance cover. Acting as a ‘fronting’ insurer, the reinsured will cede 
most or all of the underwritten risks to foreign reinsurers with only small or none 
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proportion of retention.40 Such fronting practice may turn out to reverse the traditional 
insurance business procedure, as reinsurance comes into existence before the direct 
insurance. Alternatively, the fronting facultative arrangements can enable the local 
market, which may not have had sufficient expertise or capacity to assume 
considerable risks, to underwrite the business. After issuing the direct policy, 
retaining a ceding commission, they can cede whole or vast majority of the risk to a 
fronted reinsurer which specialized in that type of business.41 
In most cases, such fronting arrangement contains a co-operation clause and a 
claim-control clause, which enable the reinsurer take control of the underwriting 
direct risks, loss adjustment, and negotiation of any direct claims handling with the 
assured. The reinsured even lacks the capacity of a full-fledged insurer both in terms 
of human resources and administrative systems. 42 The relationship between the 
reinsurer and reinsured is more like an agency or partnership other than reinsurance 
agreement parties. Even though the reinsurers act in effect as the insurers in reality, 
it is nature of reinsurance that reinsurers neither undertake the direct liabilities in law; 
nor take over the reinsureds’ legal positions. The direct insurer is the only party who 
takes all the responsibilities for the insured’s claims. Disputes may arise here, 
particularly when the direct insurers are insolvent and gone into liquidation. But the 
assured does not have a cause of action against the reinsurer, as there is no 
contract privity between them.43 
1.2.6 Facultative reinsurance after WASA 
1.2.6.1 WASA facts  
Lexington was one of various insurers which had provided liability or all risks 
property insurance to cover physical loss and damage to property at Aluminum 
Company of America (Alcoa)’s sites during the period 1946-1985. On 1 July 1977 
Lexington issued to Alcoa a three-year all risks property damage and business 
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interruption insurance policy which contained an insuring clause stating “all physical 
loss of, or damage to, the insured property …” and a standard US “Service of Suit” 
clause. Then Lexington reinsured the original risk through  London insurance brokers 
in the London market in 1977 under one-page slip policy, described itself as a 
‘contributing facultative reinsurance’ covering 2.5% of the original risks. The period 
was stated to be for 36 months at date 1.7.77… and / or pro rata to expiry of original. 
The reinsurer WASA, AGF, on conditions of “Full R/I Clause No.1 amended”, 
undertook to cover “All Risks of Physical Loss or Damage excluding Fire and Allied 
Perils &or as original”. Although the “Full R/I Clause No.1 amended” referred to 
conditions had not been identified, it was common ground that the reinsurers agreed 
to follow the settlements of the reinsured retained during the currency of the policy. 
However no formal policy was issued.44 
On 2 December 1992 Alcoa began proceedings in the Supreme Court of the State of 
Washington against his insurers who had provided cover during the period 1946-
1985 including Lexington. On 4 May 2000 the Supreme Court handed down its 
judgment, relying on a series of asbestos cases dating from 1983, held that insurers 
including Lexington, on risk at any time during the period of damage, were jointly and 
severally liable to Alcoa for all property damage during the period 1946-1985. 
Therefore, Lexington was not only barred to rely upon his suit limitation provision in 
the underlying policy but also jointly and severally liable to Alcoa for all property 
damage before, during and after the inception of its policy. On 4 November 2003 
Lexington entered a settlement with Alcoa indisputably acting in a bona fide and 
businesslike fashion. On 30 January 2004 Lexington notified the successors to the 
former placing brokers that they had settled with assured and had incurred and paid 
legal costs in defending Alcoa’s claims and sought their indemnification under 
reinsurance contract. Following this, WASA and AGF began a proceeding seeking 
declarations that they were not liable under the reinsurance contract.   
                                                          
44
 The slip referred to a choice of form J1 or NMA 1779. It reflected an administrative practice in the London 
market for the issue of formal policy documentation. As no formal policy was issued, it was not clear which form 
was actually used. The J1 form contains the words:’ Being a reinsurance of and warranted same gross rate, 
terms and conditions as and to follow the settlements of the [reassured].’ Whereas, the NMA 1779 form differs in 
wording that ‘…to pay or to make good to the Reinsured all such Loss as aforesaid as may happen to the subject 
matter of this Reinsurance, or any part thereof during the continuance of this Policy’.  Although the NMA1779 
form does not contains a follow settlements clause, the wording imposed the reinsurer an obligation to pay the 
reinsured if they made a settlement with the assured within the reinsurance cover. Therefore, which front sheet 
had been adopted by the brokers is of no significance in essence. The Court of Appeal refused to consider that 
the outcome of the case could depend upon which front sheet had been used. 
42 
 
1.2.7.2 Issues in WASA 
At  first instance45, the principal issue was whether the reinsurance contract requires 
WASA and AGF to indemnify Lexington in respect of the settlement with Alcoa. In 
particular, whether the reinsurance contract provides a cover for an indemnity in 
respect of the remedial costs sustained in cleaning up the damage which occurred 
during the three-year-period specified in the reinsurance or which occurred prior, 
during and after the three-year-period? Simon J finally granted the claimant, 
reinsurers, the declarations they sought..46 The learned judge also expressed their 
view that reinsurance contract is  a further insurance on the subject-matter under 
underlying policy rather than the insurance of liability of reinsured occurred in the 
original policy. 
After Simon J granted the claimants a declaration that, as a matter of English law, 
reinsurers were not liable to indemnify the defendant for damage at all, Lexington 
appealed. In the Court of appeal47 , the judges treated the principal issue as a 
construction of contract.  Rather than focusing on whether the reinsurance was 
intended to be back-to-back, they switched to define the intention of the parties. 
Therefore, the question to be asked is whether the parities intended, to the extent 
that they used the same or equivalent wording in the reinsurance contract as the 
underlying policy, the wording to have the same meaning in both contract, i.e. 
whether the period of cover was effectively identical under both contracts. Although, 
the court did not reach their decision relying upon the presumption of back-to-back 
cover, they were strongly in favor of Lexington’s general approach. As regards 
question of interpretation, the court was unanimous that the parties intended the 
period clauses in both policies to bear the same construction. Therefore, the judges 
reversed every aspect of Simon J’s decision. They regarded the reinsurance as one 
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against liability and not against direct losses of and damage to the subject-matter in 
underlying policy. Moreover, Lexington’s reinsurance cover was proportional and fully 
back-to-back. The duration clause itself was nothing special. Furthermore, the 
wording of underlying policy was not necessary to be clear from the outset to make 
the two contracts back-to-back.  
After the Court of Appeal decided that the parties truly intended the period clause to 
bear the same construction, therefore fully back-to-back, the reinsurer appealed 
against the decision. Finally the House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal’s 
decision and restored Simon J’s judgment, although on different grounding. 49 Their 
Lordships rejected the argument advanced by Sedley L.J. in the Court of Appeal and 
ruled that reinsurance, even a facultative reinsurance on back-to-back terms, is not 
equivalent to liability insurance in which the reinsurer undertook to indemnify the 
reinsured against any liability which it had properly incurred under the insurance.50 
Therefore, the mere proof of liability established under the underlying policy does not 
create an automatic link to reinsurer’s liability to indemnify the reinsured. A reinsurer 
could not be held liable unless the loss fell within the risk assumed under the 
reinsurance cover as well. Moreover, what fell within the cover of reinsurance is not 
necessarily presumed to be co-extensive with the underlying cover.51 It is a matter of 
construction. The reinsurers are entitled to rely upon their own applicable law to 
construe the policy wording. The general “full reinsurance” clauses and “follow the 
settlements” clauses do not extend the scope of reinsurance coverage clearly 
worded in the policy. In the present case, at the time of conclusion of the reinsurance 
contract, there was no identifiable system of law applicable to the insurance contract 
which could provide a basis for construing the reinsurance contract in a manner 
different from his ordinary meaning under English law. Consequently, despite the 
strength of the presumption of back-to-back, the reinsurer did not intend to provide a 
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cover to respond to all claims irrespective of when the damage occurred and 
irrespective of the period to which the losses related; so they were entitled to restrict 
their liability to damage occurring in the 36-month period of cover. 
1.2.7.3 The issue as to nature of reinsurance contract 
There has been a long standing division as to the nature of reinsurance, i.e. whether 
reinsurance is a form of liability insurance providing indemnity for the reinsured 
where he is liable to pay under underlying policy, or reinsurance is a further 
insurance on the direct subject-matter. The issue matters in two respects. One is for 
regulation purpose.52 It determines whether the reinsurer has to be authorised to 
participate the business on a one-class basis, i.e. liability insurance or a class-by-
class basis. On the other hand, the nature of reinsurance contract determines what 
test has to be satisfied to trigger the reinsurer’s liability to pay.53  
Previous authorities are not easy to reconcile on this point.54 In Wasa v Lexington, 
their lordships unanimously agree to follow the English orthodox theory, 55  by 
rejecting the suggestion that reinsurance is a form of liability insurance, 56  and 
preferring the view that reinsurance is an independent further insurance on the 
original subject-matter. Lord Mance hold that reinsurance is a separate contract 
which contains its own independent terms requiring to be satisfied before insurers 
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can claim indemnity under it and even a perfectly proportional reinsurance is not an 
insurance against liability, still less against any liability which the reinsured may be 
held to incur under the insurance. In his opinion, the subject matter reinsured is the 
original subject matter and the insurable interest which entitles the insurer to reinsure 
in respect of that subject matter is the insurer’s exposure under the original 
insurance. Therefore, the principle of indemnity limits any recover from reinsurers to 
the amount paid in respect of that insurable interest. 57  However, Lord Mance’s 
approach is not perfectly beyond question. There are still contrary comments 
welcoming Sedley L.J’s view. 58  Lord Mance’s argument was commented as a 
curious one for three reasons.59 First of all, the first limb to trigger reinsurer’s liability 
is that the reinsured’s liability under underlying policy has been established and 
quantified, rather than that a insured peril has occurred causing the subject matter 
lost or damaged. Secondly, the amount of the reinsured’s indemnity is limited to his 
exposure of liability under the underlying policy, rather than all the damage and loss 
suffered by the insured subject matter. Furthermore, it is hard to see what the 
reinsured’s insurable interest might be if the reinsurance is an additional insurance 
on the original subject-matter. It would be problematic and inconsistent to 
independent nature of reinsurance which bars the assured to make a direct claim 
against the reinsurers. 60 
However, it is suggested that the traditional theory is more attractive, although not 
perfect. The reinsurance contract is in essence an agreement under which the 
reinsurers share, proportionally or non-proportionally, part of insured perils and risks 
on the original subject matter with the reinsured and earn premium in return. Once 
the original insured subject matter suffered a loss or damage caused by insured 
perils or risks within the scope of original cover, the reinsured will incur liability to 
indemnify the assured. Naturally he will be prejudiced by the subject matter’s 
damage, loss or liability incurred thereof. It is opined that the reinsured has obtained 
his own insurable interest on the original subject matter by sharing the risk,61 which 
may prejudice the assured’s interest; rather than obtain the insurable interest by his 
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 [2009] UKHL 40, para 32, 33 per Lord Mance. 
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exposure of liability. However, he could only be indemnified by the reinsurer for the 
amount he has been  suffered under underlying policy, if he can satisfy the two limbs 
test established in Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance Co Ltd.62 Even in 
reinsurance against liability, the reinsurer’s indemnity is still subject to the specific 
reinsurance terms which have to be satisfied. Although the direct trigger to 
reinsurer’s liability is the establishment and quantification of the reinsured’s liability to 
indemnify the assured, the fundamental reason is that the reinsured is prejudiced by 
the loss or damage to the original subject matter. The reason why the reinsured 
could only recover the amount calculated based upon his exposure of liability is the 
principle of indemnity. This is irrelevant of the source from which the reinsured 
gained his insurable interest. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the independent 
nature of reinsurance because the reinsurers share with reinsured the risk that 
exposes the reinsured of being prejudiced by the loss or damage to the original 
subject matter, rather than share with the assured. There is no contract privity 
between the reinsurer and the assured. Furthermore, this is consistent with the 
current regulatory system whereby reinsurance business activities are authorised on 
a class-by-class basis rather than by a single liability insurance class basis. 
Actually, the reinsurers are free to draft his intention whether he wants the contract to 
be a further insurance on the originally insured subject matter or a form of liability 
insurance by using very clear wording. Indeed, in Feasey v. Sun Life Assurance Co 
of Canada,63 the reinsurance of an employers’ liability policy was expressed to be 
one which responded to injuries suffered by the victims of negligence rather than the 
reinsured’s liability to indemnify the insured employers. However, it is still 
problematic how clearly the wording should be drafted. In Wasa their Lordships 
found Lexington failed to do that and indeed that it would have been difficult to define 
what more could have been done.64  
1.2.7.4 The issue of construction of contractual terms under the effect of full 
reinsurance clause  
It is a common ground that in order to recover under a facultative reinsurance 
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47 
 
contract, the reinsured must prove that the loss falls under both the insurance and 
reinsurance contracts. The two-limb-test derived from the classic judgment of Robert 
Goff in Insurance of Africa v. Scor (UK) Reinsurance.65 In accordance with the Scor 
case, the first limb is that the reinsured must establish his own legal liability to the 
assured.66 If the reinsured entered into a settlement with the assured, the settlement 
is binding on the reinsurers only if the reinsured can prove that he would have been 
held to be liable for the assured at least the amount agreed in the settlement, had 
the matter proceeded to trial or arbitration. 67  The second limb is a question of 
construction, i.e., the reinsured is required to prove the loss falls within the scope of 
the reinsurance cover as a matter of law.68 
In practice, most facultative proportional reinsurance contracts, including the one in 
WASA , contain a full reinsurance clause, which is worded as “as original” and 
“follow the settlements”. Under the Scor case, it is further decided that with the follow 
the settlements clause, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the reinsured where the 
reinsured enters into a settlement with the assured. Therefore, the two-limb-test is 
affected by the “full reinsurance clause”. As to the first limb, the reinsured is 
exempted from establishing his legal liability to indemnify the assured under direct 
policy unless the reinsurers can prove that the settlement is not reached in a bona 
fide and businesslike manner.69 As a result, the effect of first limb is ousted by the 
follow the settlements clause. As regards the second limb, the requirement should be 
considered together with the back-to-back presumption that the insurance and 
reinsurance contract should be interpreted in a consistent fashion as the coverage 
terms of the original policy are indented to be incorporated into reinsurance by the 
wording “as original”. Even if the insurance and reinsurance are governed by 
different applicable laws which deliver different construction of the common terms, 
                                                          
65
 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 132. See also: Hill v Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co Plc [1996] L.R.L.R 341 (HL); 
Assicurazioni Generali v. CGU International Insurance Plc [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 39.  
66 
Commercial Union Assurance Co. v NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 439. It can be proved 
by being sued to judgment, or by means of obtaining an arbitration award. However, it is possible for reinsurer to 
argue that the foreign court was not a competent jurisdiction, the judgment was obtained in the foreign court in 
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, the judgment was manifestly perverse, or the reinsured failed to take 
proper defences. 
67  
Commercial Union Assurance Co. v NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 439. King v. 
Brandywine Reinsurance Co [2005] EWCA Civ 235. So a mere settlement is not enough for the reinsured to 
satisfy the first limb test. 
68 
Assicurazioni Generali v CGU International Ins plc [2003] 2 CLC 852 per Mr Kealy QC at para. 36. 
69
 Insurance Co of Africa v Scor (UK) Reinsurance [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312; Insurance Co of the State of 
Pennsylvania v Grand Union Insurance [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 208; Hill v Mercantile & General Reinsurance [1996] 
LRLR 341 (HL). 
48 
 
the scope of reinsurance cover is still presumed to be co-extensive with those of the 
underlying insurance.  
Previous authority gave powerful support to such back-to-back presumption. The 
leading case is the House of Lords’ decision in Forsakringsaktieselskapet Vesta v 
Butcher.70 A proportional facultative reinsurance of a Norwegian insurance company 
was placed in London market. The reinsurance policy was governed by English law 
whereas the original policy was subject to Norwegian law. Both of the policies 
contain a 24-hour watch warranty which expressly provided that failure to comply 
with any warranty was to ‘render the policy null and void’. Despite those express 
words, under Norwegian law there is a causation requirement between the loss and 
breach of warranty which is right opposite to English law. The House of Lords held 
that, by virtue of the ‘back to back’ nature of the reinsurance, the warranty was to be 
construed in the English law reinsurance as having the same meaning as it had in 
Norwegian law. The different interpretation, flowing from the different applicable laws 
was to be disregarded. 71  Similarly, in Groupama Navigation et Transports v. 
Catatumbo CA Seguros72, a different interpretation of a classification warranty arose 
between the Venezuelan law which governed the original policy and the English law 
which governed reinsurance contract. Again, the Court of Appeal held that the 
presumption of back to back applied so the reinsurers were liable and barred from 
relying upon the English law interpretation.  
Although House of Lords in WASA has affirmed the affect of the back to back 
presumption, it is decided here not be an absolute rule of law. There are indeed 
authorities showing that the second limb of the Scor test is still alive, rather than 
automatically satisfied by the follow the settlements clause and the back-to-back 
presumption. In Hiscox v Outhwaite (No.3),73 Evans J pointed out that the reinsurers 
are always entitled to raise issues as to the scope of the reinsurance even if where 
the risks are co-extensive in both policies and there is a follow the settlement clause. 
Such analysis was relied upon with approval in Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU 
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International Insurance Plc,74  it was held that where the original insurance and 
reinsurance are back-to-back and there is a full reinsurance clause in reinsurance, 
the reinsurers are not dictated to indemnify the reinsured for a settlement made in a 
bona fide and businesslike fashion. It remained necessary for the loss to fall within 
the scope of the reinsurance or at least “arguably so”.75  Moreover, in Municipal 
Mutual Insurance Ltd v Sea Insurance Co Ltd76 Hobhouse LJ stated that ‘It is wrong 
in principle to distort or disregard the terms of the reinsurance contracts in order to 
make them fit in with what may be a different position under the original cover. The 
words “conditions as underlying” cannot contradict either the period or limit 
provisions of the individual reinsurance contracts.’ Therefore, it can be said that the 
back-to-back presumption is not an inflexible rule of law. Even if there is a full 
reinsurance clause in reinsurance contract, the reinsurers are always entitled to raise 
issues to the scope of the reinsurance cover and rely on the defences provided by 
the reinsurance terms. The presumption may be ousted if the reinsurance contains 
clear contradictory wording or the words of the insurance and reinsurance are quite 
different and there is no equivalence between them. It is always necessary for the 
reinsured to satisfy the second limb of the Scor test in order to recover under the 
reinsurance contract.  
In WASA, neither was there any argument about the competence of the jurisdiction 
in the original insurance or any assertion that the decision had been perverse, nor 
arose any challenges about the reinsured’s manner of the settlement with the 
assured. Therefore, it can be said that the reinsured had successfully established his 
liability to indemnify the assured under the original insurance. Therefore, the only 
issue was that whether the reinsured’s liability fell within the reinsurance cover. As to 
this point, House of Lords in WASA finally found that the Vesta and Groupama cases 
were distinguished and re-affirmed the analysis in the Generali case. As a result, the 
reinsurers’ liability did not automatically arise because of the full reinsurance clause, 
whether the reinsured’s liability fell within the reinsurance cover as a matter of law 
was a question of construction.  
In fact, in both Court of Appeal and House of Lords, the issue of interpretation of the 
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period clause is relied upon construction of the parties’ intentions rather than the 
presumption of back-to-back basis. Therefore, the question to be answered is 
whether the effect of terms in a reinsurance contract governed by English law should 
be interpreted to be in accordance with the meaning in direct insurance contract 
governed by foreign law. Between the two distinct analyses adopted in first 
instance77 and court of appeal,78 their Lordships thought distinguished features of 
WASA make the analysis of ‘reinsurance must respond what direct insurance covers’ 
reflected in the Vesta and Groupama cases not applicable. The most important 
distinguished feature of WASA in their reasoning was the unpredictability and 
uncertainty created by the Service of Suit clause in the original policy. Distinguished 
from the Vesta and Groupama cases where at the time of concluding the reinsurance 
it was certain for the reinsurer that Norwegian and Venezuelan law would apply, it 
was impossible for reinsurers in WASA case to identify which foreign law would 
apply to the original policy.79 Therefore the reinsurers should not be expected to 
undertake to indemnify the reinsured whatever his liabilities were, in a circumstance 
that it was not clear which law should govern those liabilities. However, it could not 
be right to say that WASA has established a rule of law that, in order to apply the 
presumption of back to back in the Vesta and Groupama cases, the requirement of 
certain and identifiable applicable law must be satisfied. In other word, certain and 
identifiable applicable law to insurance contract is not a necessary requirement to 
trigger the back-to-back presumption. It was the House of Lords’ decision of 
construction on a particular issue based upon particular facts of WASA. Therefore, 
from the reinsured’s point of view, it is not safe enough for them to simply insert a full 
reinsurance clause in the MRC in order to get a back-to-back cover. It is suggested 
that the reinsured should ensure that the original policy contains identifiable 
applicable law in order to preclude the reinsurer from arguing that they did not intend 
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to provide a cover by reference to the situations in direct insurance under whatever 
an applicable law would be ascertained later. 
1.2.7.5 Conclusion 
WASA, as a leading case regarding proportional facultative reinsurance, has 
discussed many important issues of reinsurance contracts, especially the nature of 
reinsurance contract and interpretation of facultative reinsurance contracts which 
contains a full reinsurance clause.  
First, as to the nature of reinsurance contract, their Lordships rejected Sedley L.J’s 
suggestion and reaffirmed the orthodox view in common law that reinsurance 
contract is further insurance on the original subject matter.  
Secondly, regarding the interpretation of proportional facultative reinsurance contract, 
WASA as an exceptional example reaffirms that the back-to-back presumption, 
although has strong authority supporting, is still not an inflexible rule of law but 
subject to some limits. The reinsurance terms should not be interpreted co-
extensively with the terms in original policy if it is inconsistent with the parties’ 
intention even if the two contracts contain identical or equivalent wording. The 
reinsurers are always entitled to rely upon any defence provided in the reinsurance 
contracts if the reinsurer clearly drafts the reinsurance policy to the contrary or there 
is no equivalence between two obviously different wording. From the reinsured’s 
point of view, in order to make the reinsurance cover having the same meaning as 
the direct insurance therefore provide identical cover, the reinsured at least need to 
draft the full reinsurance clause clearly to that exact intention.   
Thirdly, both CA and HL steered clear of the prick presumption of back-to-back, but 
focused on the issue of construction of the reinsurance contract as whole. The court 
searched for clues in parties’ intention at time of conclusion, to decide whether they 
should grant the same interpretation of the two policy terms subject to different 
applicable laws, rather than simply decided whether the two contracts should be 
presumed back-to-back. Although the result in WASA is considered inconsistent with 
the commercial purposes of proportional facultative reinsurance, it is clearly showed 
that construction is the key to resolve the problem.  
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Fourthly, it is suggested that their Lordship’s reasoning why WASA was distinguished 
from the Vesta and Groupama is neither convincing nor commercially 
reasonable;furthermore, to some extent, lessens commercial certainty in proportional 
facultative reinsurance market. It is hardly correct to say that WASA established a 
rule that an identifiable applicable law should be ascertained in direct insurance 
contract for reinsurance cover to be presumed back-to-back. It was just a decision 
on particular facts of WASA. However, their Lordships recognised that their decision 
was inconsistent with commercial purposes of proportional facultative reinsurance 
contract. They proposed the parties some approaches to avoid such uncommercial 
result, i.e. by making both insurance and reinsurance contracts governed by the 
same applicable law,80 or concluding the reinsurance contract as a liability cover etc. 
However, it might become impossible or unpractical to reconcile two policies subject 
to same governing law or where multiple assured located in different jurisdictions 
leaving the direct insurer exposed to uncertain underlying applicable laws. Particular 
difficulties may arise from similar facts in WASA where direct insurance covering US-
wide risks contains a US Service of Suit clause rather than express choice of law. 
Therefore, although the final decision in HL was welcomed by the English 
reinsurance market, it was still worried that such commercial uncertainty would make 
the English proportional facultative reinsurance market less attractive. However, as 
WASA reflects, after all it is construction of terms, the magic bean, which matters in 
deciding the scope of the reinsurance cover. The clearer the parties draft the terms 
of their contracts to reflect their intention, the easier will they win the battle once 
disputes arise.  
1.3 Treaty reinsurance 
1.3.1 What is treaty reinsurance? 
 
As the word “treaty” implies, treaty insurance is an agreement under which the 
reinsured cedes to the reinsurer a part or all of risks of a certain type or types falling 
within its scope, and in return the reinsured pays the reinsurer a sum of premium 
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agreed in advance. In contrast to the facultative placement of individual risks, treaty 
reinsurance protects the ceding primary insurer against a number of losses under a 
book of business.81 The two methods of reinsurance can be linked to “wholesale” 
versus “retail”. 82 Treaty reinsurance is in essence a pre-arranged framework for 
future cessions of risks. Before placing the treaty, risks which may fall within the 
scope of the potential treaty are reviewed in detail by the reinsurer taking every 
specific aspect of the cedant into consideration, such as the general background, 
historic underwriting record, expertise on claim control etc. The general terms as to 
the mode of treaty, scope of coverage, limits and exclusions, calculating of premium, 
reinsurance and profit commissions, statement of account, bordereaux submitting, 
currency and exchange rate etc. are negotiated and concluded in advance. Thus, 
future cessions will be made under the framework efficiently during the continuing 
cover period.  
1.3.2 Methods of placing reinsurance treaties 
Normally, methods of placing reinsurance treaties can be categorised into three 
classes: obligatory treaty, non-obligatory treaty, and facultative obligatory treaty. All of 
them possess the common characters of treaty reinsurance, whereas each has its 
own specific nature. This matters as it will affect the applicability of doctrine of utmost 
good faith to the treaty which will be discussed in later chapter.  
1.3.2.1 Obligatory treaty 
As the predominating method of placing treaty reinsurance, obligatory treaty has a 
distinctive feature that all the risks falling within the scope of the cover, no matter that 
the risk is profitable or inclined to incur losses, are automatically ceded to the 
reinsurer. Neither party has discretion as to the cession, i.e. the reinsurer is bound to 
accept the risks and the reinsured is obliged to cede risks no matter it is beneficial 
for him to reserve or not. Although risks are automatically attached, the reinsured is 
normally obligated to inform the reinsurer his cession of risks by means of regular 
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‘bordereaux’ as for information purposes.88 However, these documents do nothing 
with the effect of cessions. Failure of declaration will not vitiate the automatic 
attachment of risks, even if notification is not made until after the loss has occurred.89  
Obligatory treaty is in essence a pre-arranged framework facility under which 
contracts of insurance are automatically concluded without individual presentations. 
Each declaration makes a contract of insurance. As the reinsurer is automatically 
bound to accept the risks which the reinsured is exposed to, the very nature of 
obligatory treaty makes it controversial that whether the obligatory treaty is a contract 
for reinsurance or a contract of reinsurance. 
1.3.2.2 Non-obligatory treaties 
Treaty reinsurance can be placed by a non-obligatory method. Non-obligatory 
declaration policy is in essence an agreed framework facility under which insurance 
covers are provided by subsequent declarations. Such a treaty serves to establish a 
mechanism for the presentation of proposals by the reinsured and acceptance of 
risks by the reinsurer. Under non-obligatory treaty, all risks are presented and 
accepted on a mutual facultative basis. The reinsurer is not bound to accept every 
declaration the reinsured make but has discretion in accepting or refusing the 
cessions. Equally, the reinsured also has the option of ceding the risk or retaining it. 
Once the reinsured has decided to cede the risk, there is a duty of notification on the 
reinsured. Such declaration of risks serves different purpose from the informational 
one in obligatory treaty. The declaration fulfills the function as an offer of the 
reinsured to present the risk. Once the declaration is accepted by the reinsurer, a 
contract of insurance is created.  
As a result, such non-obligatory treaty is entirely a mechanism under which contracts 
of insurance are concluded. It does not operate as insurance cover by itself but a 
contract for insurance in nature.  
1.3.2.3 Facultative obligatory treaty  
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Facultative obligatory treaty90 is a hybrid of facultative reinsurance and obligatory 
treaty under which the reinsurer is obliged to accept all the risks which the reinsured 
selects to cede. It confers the reinsured an option whether to utilize the facility or not. 
By contrast, the reinsurer does not have discretion to refuse the reinsured’s 
subsequent declarations of risks which fall within the terms of treaty. Once the 
reinsured makes a decision to cede the risks to the reinsurer, he is imposed an 
obligation to notify the reinsurer what have been ceded by means of regular 
bordereaux. A declaration is so fatal to the cover that the risk will not attach until 
such requirement of notification is satisfied. Also it is settled law that the reinsured 
are not allowed to make a declaration after he has become aware of a loss.91 It is the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal in Citadel Insurance Co. v. Atlantic Union Insurance 
Co. S.A.92 that a fac/oblig treaty is no more than a standing offer. A facultative 
obligatory treaty does not provide insurance cover to any risks on its own. Individual 
contract of insurance is created by the subsequent declaration under the facility. As a 
result, it is a contract for insurance in nature rather than a contract of insurance.  
From the reinsured’s point of view, the fac/oblig treaty arrangement acquire benefits 
in two aspects. First is that the reinsured can not only have a pre-arranged 
programme providing cover for a specific accumulated risk from a particular loss for 
certain duration,93 which saves him from individual presentations, but also have the 
option to cede the risk or not like in a facultative contract. Secondly, the reinsured 
can benefit from a profit commission and ceding commissions which is higher than 
that if the risk is placed individually on facultative basis. As to the reinsurer, the 
fac/oblige treaty can bring business convenience to accept large numbers of risks 
potentially falling within the scope of the treaty, and also reduce the underwriting 
expenses. However, it is potentially disadvantageous for the reinsurer that it involves 
a risk of anti-selection. Once a fac/oblig treaty is concluded separately from an 
underlying or associated obligatory treaty applicable to the cedant’s entire portfolio 
risks,94 the reinsurer neither has any information or supervisory control over the 
cession under the fac/oblig treaty, nor has any discretion in respect of acceptance of 
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the ceded risks, it may adversely impact the reinsurer when the reinsured cedes the 
risks which are selected as having a higher chance of loss contemplated by the 
applicable insurance rate, namely the bad non-profitable risks. As a result, such 
method of placing reinsurance is only appropriate when there is trust between the 
treaty parties and the reinsured is able to act in good faith95 or the cedant retains a 
proper proportion of the underlying risks for its own net account in an associated 
obligatory treaty. In practice it is often utilised in the circumstances that the reinsurer 
has already subscribed to a quota share or surplus treaty with the cedant’s but is 
willing to provide the cedant with additional automatic capacity on certain selected 
risks when the treaty is exhausted.96 
1.3.3. Types  of treaty reinsurance 
One of the most significant parts in the treaty mechanism is about how the cession of 
risks is defined under individual declarations. This determines the form of the treaty 
and the specific feature of the parties’ duties and obligations. Various types of 
cessions under treaty mechanisms have been developed to meet the need of 
reinsurance commercial practice. Those forms can be divided into two classes, 
proportional and non-proportional. That is to say the most outstanding distinctive 
feature between the proportional and non-proportional reinsurance is how the 
cession of risks is defined under the treaty framework. It suffices to say that the 
proportional reinsurance contract is risk-based whereas the non-proportional 
reinsurance is loss-based. Under proportional treaty, a post-transfer relationship is 
maintained by the parties and all the subscribers of the risks are required to assess 
all the risks and use the risks to prorate the proportion of premiums, expenses and 
losses. Under non-proportional treaty, cession of risks is based on loss retention. 
The reinsured agrees to accept all losses up to a pre-determined level, and get 
reimbursed by the reinsurer for the losses above the predetermined level up to a limit 
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provided for in the treaty.99 
1.3.3.1Proportional treaty  
Proportional treaty is a reinsurance agreement under which the cedant transfers to a 
fixed proportion of each individual risks within the limits 100  in direct ratio to the 
premium paid to the reinsurer. The most distinguishing feature of proportional treaty 
is that the share of risks and premium between the cedant and reinsurer is on a pro 
rata basis. The underlying insurer agrees to cede the proportion of all the inward 
portfolio within the treaty limits, and also the reinsurer agrees to accept the share 
and collect the same portion of inward premium in return subject to some deduction. 
Absolute majority of proportional treaties are obligatory mechanism in nature. 
Therefore, once the treaty is agreed, the risks are automatic attached when they fall 
within the scope of treaty. The underlying insurer is obliged to cede and the reinsurer 
is bound to accept all risks with neither party having the discretion in the matter.  
The primary function of such a treaty is to increase the reinsured’s underwriting 
capacity. By ceding a large portion of underlying risks, the insurer can accept high 
value risks which cannot be underwritten without reinsurance protection. Moreover, 
the primary insurer can reduce the exposure to catastrophic events by spreading 
risks with other insurers under such exchanging participations in other insurers’ 
business.  
Quota share treaty and surplus treaty are two commonest forms of proportional 
treaty. Different from the fixed percentage stipulated in a quota share treaty, under a 
surplus treaty only the liability above the cedant’s retention on a particular risk within 
the limits of treaty is ceded to the reinsurer as a multiple of the sum retained by the 
cedant. 
The most distinguished feature of a quota share treaty is that like proportional 
facultative reinsurance construed on a back-to-back basis, the reinsured and the 
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Gail Sessoms, Demand Media, The Difference Between Proportional and Nonproportional Reinsurance. 
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It is a common practice for reinsurers to set a limit of the amount which they will pay with regard to each risk 
ceded protecting reinsurers from exposure to unacceptable large risks. See, Barlow Lyde & Gillbert’s, 
Reinsurance Practice and the Law, LLP, 2004. The limits of the treaty can be in relation to the type of risk, the 
amount of risk, the area for which the risk is provided, for example, only certain countries).  
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reinsurer share the risk and premium on identical terms and conditions.101 Such 
principle is applied in Allianz Via Assurance & Others v. Merchant & Other102  where 
the reinsurer were entitled to avoid the contract because the broker had made a 
misrepresentation of the nature of the reinsurance arrangements by use of the word 
“quota share”. The judge held that the words “quota share” indicated that a fixed 
proportion of all risks which fell within the treaty would be ceded in return for the 
same proportion of original premium. When the broker used “quota share”, he had 
indicated that the reinsurer and the Lloyd’s syndicates would share the risks and 
premiums in the same agreed proportion.  
With a fixed proportional share in every risk and premium agreed in advance, 
administrative simplicity is the most advantageous quality of quota share treaties. 
The reinsured need not devote any more effort to arrange reinsurance cover or 
negotiate the premium and claims.103 Therefore, such simple treaty is suitable for 
small scale insurance company or providing underwriting capacity for a large book of 
small premium business, or arrangements for simple exchange of participation in 
each other’s national business.104 However, as the percentage of every risk within 
the cover is fixed in advance, neither party has the power to increase or reduce the 
retention or amount ceded when particular risks are unprofitable or fruitful. 105 In 
contrast to quota share treaty which stipulates a fixed percentage share on every risk 
throughout the portfolios, the surplus treaty is much flexible for the reinsured. The 
cedant is permitted to decide the monetary sum of his retention up to the line on 
each risk.106 For a particularly poor risk within the categories covered, the cedant 
may chose to retain a sum less than the line. Such flexibility in picking out small and 
profitable risk benefits the reinsured more than the quota share treaty does, although 
the administrative cost is higher. Although it may be unappealing for the reinsurer in 
this point, the surplus treaty is a properly comprehensive mechanism under which 
various categories of insurance business having different loss ratio can be 
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 Barlow Lyde & Gillbert’s, Reinsurance Practice and the Law, LLP, 2004. 
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 Ibid. Under the EC’s single market programme, enforced by the Reinsurance Direct, European Parliament and 
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59 
 
protected.1.3.3.2 Non-proportional treaty  
Non-proportional treaty is a mechanism by which the reinsurer assumes liability for 
the amount, up to an agreed maximum limit, of a loss or aggregated losses from one 
event or series of events in the portfolio above the cedant’s retention in return for an 
agreed premium. Under a non-proportional treaty, only the fact that the amount of all 
losses in the portfolio exceeds the excess point agreed in advance will trigger the 
reinsurer’s liability. The parties in a non-proportional treaty do not share the risks 
proportionately but share the potential claims by layers.110 What the reinsurer really 
cares about is not individual attachment of risk to the treaty because he does not 
have a proportional interest in each original risk. He concerns about the loss 
frequency and severity across a certain class or group of risks111 during the treaty 
period as he is not interest in any loss until the excess point is reached. Therefore, 
there is not presumption of back-to-back in non-proportional treaty.112 Due to such 
loss based nature, administration of non-proportional treaty is cheaper and easier 
compared to the risk based proportional treatyThe main function of non-proportional 
treaty is to protect the reinsured against large catastrophic loss or substantial 
aggregate losses from a particular event or occurrence. 
Excess of loss treaty and aggregate stop loss treaty are two commonest forms in 
placing non-proportional treaty. Excess of loss treaty can be subdivided into two 
types by the basis on which the losses are calculated, i.e. excess of loss treaty per 
risk basis115 and excess of loss treaty per occurrence or event basis.116 The ceding 
company may risk exposure to “attritional losses” within its retention. In such 
circumstance, an aggregate stop loss treaty can supply a higher level protection to 
fill the gap, where a reinsured is unable to aggregate such losses on a particular 
event or occurrence, excess of loss treaty can not avail the reinsured. Aggregated 
                                                          
ithin the deductible layer. While the reinsurer is obligated to accept the excess liability when agreed excess point 
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 Barlow Lyde & Gillbert’s, Reinsurance Practice and the Law, LLP, 2004. 
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 In Axa Reinsurance v. Field, the reinsured under an excess of loss treaty unsuccessfully argued that 
aggregation clauses which were differently worded in the insurance and in the reinsurance should be construed 
back-to-back so as to allow the reinsured to recover on the same basis that it had paid out. 
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 Such simple mode can be used to protect direct insurer against working cover in a particular location, fire 
cover, marine cargo cover, third party cover in motor insurance, and medical cover during a certain period for a 
single person etc. small size claims in liability insurance in general. 
116 Such comprehensive cover is desirable when the reinsured risks a considerable number of exposure units in 
a catastrophic event. 
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stop loss treaty can be subdivided into two main forms117, namely aggregate excess 
of loss and excess of loss ratio, depending on how the excess point is defined.  
  
                                                          
117
 Sometimes there is also an amalgamation of the two. One often finds hybrid stop loss policies being effected 
in which the ratio and specific sums are both included, with the reinsurance cover provided expressed to be a 
maximum of one or the other. Where the amounts at stake are large, a combination of the various forms of 
reinsurance may be used. In particular there may be a number of different excess layers of reinsurance. 
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Chapter 2 Utmost Good Faith—the Doctrine in Evolution 
2.1 Introduction  
In Carter v Boehm, 120  the Lord Chief Justice Mansfield expressed his view on 
principle of good faith which in his opinion should apply to “all contracts and 
dealings”.121 His judgment in Carter v Boehm becomes the headspring of various 
and distinct submissions, arguments, pleadings and decisions which have aimed to 
apply the principle, extend or reduce the ambit of the duty of good faith. Hundreds of 
years passing by, the principle of misrepresentation has remained122 and universally 
applies to all contracts in English law, whereas the duty of non-disclosure does not 
survive in all types of contracts.123 Nowadays the English contract law cannot police 
the fairness of every commercial contract by reference to moral principles or 
undertake the reopening of commercial transactions in order to adjust any injustice 
with hindsight. Neither does the law require the parties of a commercial transaction 
to volunteer information positively to each other as a general duty no matter how 
relevant the information is to conclude the deal on whatever terms.124  
However, in contrast to general rules applying to ordinary commercial contracts, 
there exists a doctrine of utmost good faith in contracts which can be categorised as 
uberrimae fidei partially or as a whole, with contract of insurance established as a 
classic example. Although the origin of the doctrine can trace back to hundreds years 
ago, it still remains difficult to define such emotional and moral duty in a legal sense. 
Since Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Cater v Boehm is codified by MIA 1906, the 
courts have taken many opportunities to structure the doctrine, establish rules of the 
two-limb test and set up regime of remedies for qualifying breach. Under current 
English law, the duty of utmost good faith requires both parties to exercise their best 
effort and endeavor to help each other to make an informed decision and perform 
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 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1910. 
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 Ibid. He identified two basic aspects of the principle that a party of a contract should not induce the other party 
into commercial transactions by making false representations or concealing information which may be relevant to 
decide whether to enter the contract or not and on what terms. 
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 The law will assist the party who is induced into a contract by the other’s misrepresentation. Such contract 
may be voidable, i.e. be set aside retrospectively, restoring the deceived or misled party to the position where 
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 English contract law introduces an adversarial model in contractual negotiations that parties should enter the 
contract and stipulate their rights and duties on a completely free basis, behave and take responsibility for each 
own interests. The principle of caveat emptor reflects the universal legal spirit in contract law. 
124
 Banque Financiere de la Cite v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd (sub nom Banque Keyser Ullman SA v Skandia 
(UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 953, 1013 per Slade, LJ. 
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the contract concluded thereon without any dishonesty or deceit The two commonest 
aspects in Lord Mansfield’s judgment, i.e. duty not to make misrepresentation nor 
concealment of information is reaffirmed as the most important but not inclusive 
elements of the doctrine, requiring both parties mutually and positively volunteer 
information and passively refrain from misrepresentation. Specificities of duty of 
utmost good faith at pre-contractual stage will be described briefly. Moreover, breach 
of such draconian duties brings in harsh result which affords the innocent party an 
option to retrospectively avoid the contract without any other remedy, like damages. 
Such complex doctrine, especially the harsh regime of remedy received much 
criticism all the time. After abolished in consumer insurance context, the legislation 
currently governing operation of the doctrine in reinsurance context, which can be 
regarded as a typical type of non-consumer insurance, is to be reformed by 
Insurance Act 2015. Once the act comes into effect the duty of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance context will shrink into a duty of fair presentation the details and ambit of 
that will be discussed in the following chapter.  Furthermore, there recently emerges 
a trend to extend the duty to post-contractual stage. But it is controversial and 
arguable whether there is a continuing duty of utmost good faith during performance 
of the contract. So applicability of the duty at the post-contract stage remains to be 
defined and scrutinised.    
2.2 The doctrine of utmost good faith at the pre-contractual stage 
2.2.1 Source of the doctrine of utmost good faith  
Since the 1906 Act partially codifies the common law, the duty of utmost good faith 
has a statutory source. However, the origin of the doctrine is arguable all the time. 
The origin of the doctrine is of significance to reveal its nature and application in 
practice, particularly the remedy available for qualified breach of the duty.  
From the long abandoned ‘actual fraud’ or ‘willful intention to deceive’ analysis in 
early cases,128 to “the implied contingent condition of the contract” analysis adopted 
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 See MacDowell v Fraser (1779) 1 Dougl. 260; Fillis v Brutton (1782) 1 Park, Ins. 414; Fitzherbert v Mather 
(1785) 1 T.R. 12; Feise v Parkinson (1812) 4 Taunt. 640; Dennistoun v Lillie (1821) 3 Bligh 202; per Lord Abinger 
in Cornfoot v Fowke (1840) 6 M. & W. at 378. per Willes J.: “There is no doubt that a material (mis-
)representation, though perfectly honest at the time, made with the intent that it should be acted on by the insurer, 
and which has led to the policy being granted, will defeat the policy.” Anderson v Pacific Fire and Mar Ins Co 
(1872) L.T. 7 C.P. 65 at 68. See the dicta of Lord Mansfield in Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Cowp. 785; Bize v 
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in Blackburn v Vigors,129 later to modern authority Banque Financiere de la Cie v 
Westage Insurance Co,130 in which the Court of Appeal adopted an equity origin of 
the duty of utmost good faith rather than the contractual origin, this controversial 
issue is finally arguably determined by the House of Lords in the Star Sea.131 It is 
endorsed that the duty of utmost good faith derives from a separate rule of law 
before a contract comes into existing. There are no general duties under common 
law imposed on the parties engaging in commerce to volunteer information. 
Therefore, there is no liability for non-feasance or inaction, requiring parities to look 
after their own interests in an adversarial mode.132 However parties are at their 
liberty to imposes such a duty by expressly or impliedly agreed terms of contract,  
but breach of such duty entitles the innocent party only contractual remedies.  
There are some types of contract uberrimae fidei constituting an exception to the 
general rules under common law.133 Those contracts are based upon a doctrine of 
utmost good faith, requiring each party to open their mind positively and pay close 
attention to the other’s interests to the furthest extent. In the notable insurance case 
Carter v Boehm134, Lord Mansfield said that: “The governing principle is applicable to 
all contracts and dealings. Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he 
privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and 
his believing the contrary.”135 Although Carter v. Boehm was not the first case trying 
to define a duty of good faith, neither did it succeed in introducing a doctrine of good 
faith into general common law; it is still considered as the foundation of the notion of 
utmost good faith in insurance context despite in obiter dicta.  
Since the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the doctrine of utmost good faith governing 
insurance context finally has a statutory footing.136 However, the current common law 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Fletcher (1779) 1 Dougl. 12 n; the dictum of Lord Tenterden in Flinn v Tobin (1829) Moody & Malk. 367. Current 
doctrine established an absolute duty to disclose material facts and avoid misrepresentation so the parties’ state 
of mind is irrelevant. Therefore, the ‘actual fraud’ or ‘willful intention to deceive’ analysis is only of historical 
relevance now. 
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 [1991] 2 A.C. 249. 
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 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd, [2001] UKHL 1. 
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 Once a party does act in certain ways, e.g. making some representations, he may expose himself to potential 
liabilities, for instance for misrepresentation, if his action vitiates the other parties’ interest. 
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 Those contracts can be a case of partnerships, employment contract of fiduciary relationships, and insurance 
contracts. 
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 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1910. 
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 Ibid. 
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 The statutory source of notion of utmost good faith is ss.17-20 under the part heading ‘disclosure and 
representations’ in Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
64 
 
decisions and insurance market practice have clearly shown that the legislation 
governing the insurance contract area is in many aspects outdated, uncommercial 
and divorced from realities of 21st century business practice. Insurance law reform 
has been on the agenda in the UK for over 50 years. 137   Since 2006 the Law 
Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission have started a 
joint project to reform the insurance law by publishing a series of issues papers, 
consultation papers and reports. The reform programme has been divided into two 
parts in relation to consumer insurance and business insurance. The Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representation) Act 2012 was born first and then 
abolished applicability of the doctrine of utmost good faith in consumer insurance 
area.138 In July 2014, a new draft bill in non-consumer insurance context has been 
published,139 and becomes a parliament law, i.e. Insurance Act 2015. Accordingly, 
the doctrine of utmost good faith is recast into a new regime, and modern principles 
for pre-contract presentation are adopted,140 but in non-consumer insurance context 
only, and then has a new legal root.141  
2.2.2 Framework of the doctrine of utmost good faith  
2.2.2.1 Statutory principles codified in Marine Insurance Act 1906 
MIA 1906 partially codified the current doctrine of utmost good faith by ss.17-20. 
S.17 presents a general enunciation of the duty, with following s.s 18-20 providing 
particular details, content and scope of the duty of disclosure and avoiding 
misrepresentation which are two most significant but non-exhaustive manifestations 
of the notion, i.e. duty of disclosure on the assured in s.18, duty of disclosure on the 
broker in s 19 and duty not make misrepresentation in s 20. In practice, s.18 often 
subsumes s.20 as misrepresentation can often be treated as non-disclosure of true 
information. It seems a usual practice of the insurer to plead both defenses if 
possible. s. 17, though attracting less attention in common law than ss.18-20 which 
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 The duty of disclosure was replaced by a duty of the insured to take reasonable care to avoid 
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define detailed pre-formation duty, is recognised as presenting an overriding duty of 
utmost good faith which umbrellas following sections.142 Therefore, s.17 can play a 
supplementary role where there is a genuine bad faith not falling accurately within 
the scope of ss.18-20. However section 17 is silent on its application in post-
contractual stage, which makes the post-contractual duty a controversial issue.  
The rationale behind the duty of disclosure is that the assured is normally in a much 
better position than the underwriters to possess considerable information about the 
insured subject-matter. In order to balance the informational asymmetry so that the 
insurer can make informed underwriting decisions on whether to accept the risk and 
on what terms if risk is accepted, the assured and his broker are required, separately 
by s.s18 and 19, to volunteer all material information about the risk presented for 
insurance. According to s.18 (1), such disclosure of information is not only relevance 
of the assured’s actual knowledge, but also extends to those facts deemed known by 
the assured in his ordinary course of business. The assured is only required to 
disclose material information before the contract is concluded under s.18(2).  
As to duty not to make misrepresentation, actually it is not a special rule applicable 
to insurance context only, even not to general contractual law context only. Section 
20 of the MIA 1906 requires that the proposer should not only make substantially 
correct representations of existing and past material facts, but also true statement of 
his belief and expectation before the contract is concluded. 
2.2.2.2 The duty of fair presentation under the Insurance Act 2015  
After governing the insurance contact area for longer than 100 years, the 1906 Act 
has been pleaded unable to reflect the commercial realities of the practice any more. 
The Law Commission, that has been working on reforming the law in this area over 
eight years, identified several problems with the current doctrine, including that the 
legislation of the duty of disclosure is not explanatory and poorly understood; the 
stakeholders, particularly large companies, feel difficult to know how to comply with 
the duty; the current doctrine encourages data dumping by business in the 
disclosure process and it also encourages underwriting assessment made at claims 
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stage etc.143 Then a number of important practical difficulties has been identified  due 
to specific feature of the MIA 1906.144 First, the current materiality test appears on its 
face to require the assured to predict what a prudent insurer might find interest to 
know. Secondly, the current remedies regime appears too harsh being frequently 
disproportionate to the degree of the breach. Thirdly, difficulties exist in operation of 
the separate duty of disclosure imposed on the agent to insure. Fourthly, there is no 
clear statement of exactly requisite knowledge possessed by both parties. 
Consequently, the law commissions make significant changes to current positions in 
non-consumer insurance contracts, by proposing a duty of fair presentation to recast 
the duty of utmost good faith and introducing a new regime of remedies based upon 
the recent development in modern common law authorities, but re-enacting other 
parts of the current positions.145   
According to Part 2 of the Insurance Act 2015, a new duty named ‘the duty of fair 
presentation is introduced to replace the current two elements of the duty of utmost 
good faith codified in ss.18 to 20 of the MIA 1906, but in non-consumer insurance 
context only.146 Significant changes have been made to the duty of disclosure, while 
the duty not to make misrepresentation is more or less untouched.147 Accordingly, 
the Act repeats the earlier principle in s.7 (5) so that every material representation as 
to a matter of expectation or belief must be made in good faith and every material 
representation as to a matter of fact must be substantially correct and material 
representation is substantially correct if a prudent insurer would not consider the 
difference between what is represented and what is actually correct to be material.148 
Consequently, according to s.21 (2), the ss.18 to 20 of the MIA 1906 are repealed.  
In addition, to replace the current harsh remedies stipulated in s.17 of the MIA 
1906,149  s. 8 of part 2 of the Insurance Act 2015 introduces a new regime of 
proportionate remedies for qualifying breach based on what the insurer would have 
made if all the true information had been revealed by a fair presentation of the 
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insured.150 This new regime of remedies is proposed in Schedule 1 of the Act . 
However, as stipulated in s. 2(1) of the Act, this also applies to non-consumer 
insurance contracts only.151  
According to the s. 14 in Part 5 of the Act 2015 states, s.17 of the MIA 1906 is 
reformed by removing the remedy of avoidance for qualifying breaches of the duty, 
so in s. 17 of the MIA 1906, the words from “, and” to the end are omitted.152 In fact, 
in the MIA 1906, the broad wording of s.17 introduces an overriding mutually and 
only mutually duty of utmost good faith.153  Moreover it goes further beyond than the 
following ss.18-20, which illustrates circumscribes and defines the detailed duties, by 
providing consequence of qualified breach. Fulfillment of requirements of disclosing 
material information and avoiding misrepresentation is only two non-exhaustive 
aspects of the general principle in s.17.The assured is also required to provide any 
information fairly which is considered interesting or relevant by the insurer and draw 
the insurer’s attention to any mistaken information during the contractual negotiation. 
Meanwhile, the insurer is required to observe the duty and exercise his right to avoid 
the contract fairly rather than using avoidance of contract a means to escape from 
liabilities.154 Therefore, under s.17, the insurer is also required to disclose all material 
circumstances to the assured and not to make any material misrepresentation. 
Suchdisclosure is not limited to all facts about the nature of the risk sought to be 
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 S. 8 Remedies for breach  
 (1) The insurer has a remedy against the insured for a breach of the duty of fair presentation only if the insurer 
shows that, but for the breach, the insurer— 
 (a) would not have entered into the contract of insurance at all, or 
 (b) would have done so only on different terms.  
 (2) The remedies are set out in Schedule 1. 
 (3) A breach for which the insurer has a remedy against the insured is referred to in this Act as a “qualifying 
breach”.  
(4) A qualifying breach is either— 
 (a) deliberate or reckless, or  
(b) neither deliberate nor reckless.  
(5) A qualifying breach is deliberate or reckless if the insured —  
(a) knew that it was in breach of the duty of fair presentation, or 
 (b) did not care whether or not it was in breach of that duty.  
(6) It is for the insurer to show that a qualifying breach was deliberate or reckless. 
151
 Insurance Act 2015, Schedule 1 Part 1 General section 1: This Part of this Schedule applies to qualifying 
breaches of the duty of fair presentation in relation to non-consumer insurance contracts (for variations to them, 
see Part 2). 
152
 Part 5 Good Faith and Contracting Out,  section 14 Good faith  
(3) Accordingly— (a) in section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (marine insurance contracts are contracts of 
the utmost good faith), the words from “, and” to the end are omitted. So the section 17 in MIA 1906 will be that ‘A 
contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith.’ 
153
 Although the duties imposed by the doctrine of utmost good faith are in most cases owed by the assured to 
the insurer, s.17 in MIA 1906 clearly states that doctrine of utmost good faith is bilateral. It illustrates the 
reciprocal nature of the duty so that the insurer and the assured owe the duty to observe good faith to each other 
mutually. 
154
 Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc [2004] 2 All E.R.(Comm) 65. 
68 
 
covered by the policy, but also extends to any material information relating to the 
recoverability of a claim which a prudent assured would like to consider when 
making a decision whether or not to place the risk. If the insurer has realised that any 
information is misunderstood by the assured, he is obliged to disclose it to the 
assured as well. However by the variation made by the Insurance Act 2015, this 
bilateral duty is replaced by a duty of fair presentation placed only on the insured.155 
Therefore there is no duty like fair presentation on the insurer anymore which used 
to be almost only relevance of theoretical level, as there are few circumstances 
where the assured would plead insurer’s breach of duty in practice.156  
Moreover, the duty of disclosure has been changed significantly by the duty of fair 
presentation. According to s.7 (3), the test of materiality remains untouched by the 
Act 2015. But the level of strictness of the current absolute duty has been reduced 
by introducing a notion of fairness. Consequently the insured is still required to 
disclose to the insurer ‘every material circumstances which the insured knows or 
ought to know’ that would ‘influence the judgment of a prudent insurer’ in assessing 
the risks. However, a disclosure in a reasonably clear and accessible manner will be 
enough to fulfill the requirement, 157  as the insurer is encouraged to play a more 
active role in the negotiation process to make the material information disclosed. In a 
word, in contrast to the current strict duty of disclosure, the insured will still be able to 
discharge the duty of fair presentation, if the disclosure gives the insurer sufficient 
information to put a prudent insurer on notice that it need to make further enquiries to 
reveal material circumstances stipulated in s.3. and its supplementary explanation 
under s. 7.  
To explain the knowledge of the insured and of the insurer, ss. 4 to 6 make further 
provisions and set out detailed rules concerning attribution of knowledge, particularly 
to non-natural persons such as insurance companies.158 Those sections can be said 
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to embody most obvious changes to current positions of legislation.159 Apparently 
different from current position in law, the insured will also be required to carry out 
reasonable research for information, as he ought to know such information which is 
available to him revealed by a reasonable search, no matter by making enquiries or 
by any other means. 160 However, the Act 2015 does not continues to define the 
scope of such reasonable research that should be carried out by the insured, but just 
assists to explain the information subject to such research in s.4(7).161 It can be 
predicted that such ambiguous scope of the duty will almost certain to be a focus of 
contradiction before the courts. Especially for a big multinational enterprise entity, 
that needs large and complex insurance cover not only for itself but also needs to 
pursue cover for its subsidiaries, associates, directors and officers etc., difficulties 
will arise in practice as to how far the insured needs to make research to dig material 
information that might be known by so many relevant agents involved in the business 
to satisfy the requirement of reasonability. 162 In addition, the act for the first time 
provides illustrations of material facts in s.7(4), although there is much complex 
authority on the classes of fact that are likely to be material, namely: special or 
unusual facts relating to the risk; any particular concerns which led the assured to 
seek insurance cover for the risk; and anything which those concerned with the class 
of insurance and field of activity in question would generally understand as being 
something that should be dealt with in a fair presentation of risks of the type in 
question. 163  As to the insurer’s knowledge, it is relevant to the issue of fair 
presentation, as the disclosure of material information within the reinsurer’s 
knowledge is expressly waived by the Act 2015 in s.3 (5). Therefore s. 5 explains the 
scope of the knowledge of insurer, including the actual knowledge, blind eye 
knowledge, presumed knowledge and imputed knowledge.  
2.2.3 Establishing qualifying breach of the duty   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the class in question to the insured in the field of activity in question would be expected to know in the ordinary 
course of business. The knowledge of an insured company will be what is known to its senior management or 
those responsible for the company’s insurance. http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/publications/insurance-
contract-law.htm. 
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Although the duty of utmost good faith is long recognised as a draconian duty and 
breach of it can bring harsh consequence, namely avoidable ab. initio, the test of 
breach of duty is not clear and finally settled until House of Lords’ decision in Pan 
Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd164. After Pan Atlantic, the test 
of breach comprises two limbs, i.e. an objective test of materiality and subjective 
requirement of inducement. A policy is only avoidable if both of the two aspect of 
requirement is satisfied.  
2.2.3.1 Limb 1: test of materiality  
Although the doctrine requires the highest degree of positive good faith, the proposer 
need not disclose all the information within his knowledge throughout the whole life 
of policy. As codified in s.18 and s. 20, the duty of disclosure and avoiding 
misrepresentation is qualified by a delimiting factor, i.e. materiality. That is to say only 
concealment or misrepresentation of material information may make the policy 
avoidable. The test of materiality comprises two significant aspects, namely what 
degree of importance must the circumstances assume in appreciation of the risk, 
and at what time is the materiality assessed. 
2.2.3.1.1 What fact can be considered material? 
S.18 (2) and s.20(2) of the MIA 1906 clearly declares a formula that every 
circumstances is material which would influence  the judgment of a prudent insurer in 
fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. A ‘prudent insurer’ 
rather than ‘actual insurer’ criteria embodies the objective assessment of risk 
proposed for insurance, reflecting reasonable underwriting practice. However, the 
unqualified word ‘influenced’ does not reveal what degree of importance the 
concealment or misrepresentation needs to assume in the hypothetical  prudent 
underwriter’s mind in order to satisfy the test of materiality. Such test is not settled 
until comparatively recently by House of Lords in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v 
Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd.165 In Pan Atlantic, their Lordships upheld the former CTI 
case in confirming the rejection of ‘the decisive influence’ test or ‘different decision 
test’. Moreover, the House went further to conclude that a circumstance is material, if 
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 [1993]1 Lloyd’s Rep 496. [1995] 1 AC 501. 
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 [1993]1 Lloyd’s Rep 496. [1995] 1 AC 501. 
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it clear denotes an effect on the thought process of the insurer in weighing up the 
risk.  Therefore, in order to satisfy the test of materiality, the insurer just needs to 
prove that the concealed or misrepresented circumstance is relevant to an 
appreciation of the risk so that the prudent insurer would like to take it into account. 
There is no need to prove that different decision would have been concluded if the 
circumstances were disclosed or accurately represented.   
The ‘prudent insurer’ approach under the MIA 1906 receives widespread criticism 
during the consultation process, as it on its face value requires the insured to know 
what a prudent insurer is interest to know. Although the Insurance Act 2015 bring 
significant changes to the duty under the MIA 1906 based on modern common law 
principles, the test of materiality is retained by the Act 2015.166 The reasoning of the 
law commissions is that the overwhelming majority of commercial risks are placed by 
brokers who are equally cognisant with insurers as to what facts are material, so that 
the test is unlikely to be damaging in practice. 167 Consequently under the duty of fair 
presentation, the insured is still obliged to disclose every material matter of fact 
substantially correct and represent every material matter of expectation or belief 
within the his actual knowledge and constructive knowledge in good faith in a 
reasonably clear and accessible way to a prudent insurer. 
2.2.3.1.2 When is the materiality assessed? 
As codified in s. 18 (1) and s. 20(1), materiality is assessed during the negotiation for 
the contracts. That is to say the duty of disclosure and duty not to make 
misrepresentation attaches only in the pre-contractual stage. Any information which 
comes into the proposer’s knowledge after the contract’s conclusion is irrelevant for 
assessment of risk therefore not material anymore, so that the two duties terminate 
operation. This point remains untouched under the Insurance Act 2015.168 
2.2.3.2 Limb 2: requirement of Inducement  
2.2.3.2.1 Establishing an requirement of inducement 
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 S.7(3) of the Insurance Act 2015.  
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 Rob Merkin and Ozlem Gurses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing interest of insurer and assured not 
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 Part 2, section 3 The duty of fair presentation  
(1) Before a contract of insurance is entered into, the insured must make to the insurer a fair presentation of the 
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Conclusion of an insurance contract may be erased if the duty of utmost good faith is 
not observed in the negotiation of the contract. However, it would only be fair if there 
is a causal link between the proposer’s breach and representee’s entrance into the 
policy. In other words, remedy of avoidance would only be grounded in the case that 
the material misrepresentation and non-disclosure is relied upon by the actual 
insurer. It is the very position in general contract law that a subjective ‘inducement’ is 
required to establish the right of rescission for misrepresentation, notwithstanding 
there is no duty of disclosure in general contract law. Although there is no mention of 
such subjective element to qualify the remedy in the MIA 1906, it is confirmed by 
House of Lords in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd,169 
which reversed CTI v Oceanus on this point, that breach of utmost good faith by 
material misrepresentation or non-disclosure is only actionable if it actually induces 
the actual underwriter into conclusion of the contract.170  Therefore, it is a firmly 
determined matter that actual underwriter’s subjective inducement is a necessary 
requirement in addition to materiality in order to make a breach of duty actionable, no 
matter by misrepresentation or non-disclosure. It suffices to say here that the 
inducement test became the dominant issue in the vast majority of cases.171 
The Insurance Act 2015 takes the same attitude as to the inducement test and 
officially codifies the common law position, so that the subjective inducement test will 
have a statutory foot, once the Act comes into force.172 Generally, it is the insurer 
who is burdened the onus to establish not only materiality but also his actual 
inducement.  
2.2.3.2.2. Test of inducement 
It is a controversial matter what precise motivating impact on the actual underwriter’s 
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 Section 8 Remedies for breach 
(1) The insurer has a remedy against the insured for a breach of the duty of fair presentation only if the insurer 
shows that, but for the breach, the insurer— 
(a) would not have entered into the contract of insurance at all, or 
(b) would have done so only on different terms. 
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state of mind the material misstatement or non-disclosure must assume in the 
negotiation of the policy. Analogous to the test of materiality, there have been two 
main approaches to define inducement. One is ‘substantial influence test’ that the 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation should play ‘a real and substantial part, though 
not by itself a decisive part, in inducing the contract; and the necessary inducement 
would be present if the representee was motivated or influenced …to any substantial 
extent’.173 On the other hand, a comparatively higher threshold, namely ‘a decisive 
influence’ test, is suggested that the actual underwriter need to show that he would 
have acted differently, either by refusal to enter the contract or underwriting it on 
different terms; had the material circumstances been disclosed or represented 
accurately.174  
The Court of Appeal has made a significant progress to define inducement in Drake 
Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc. 175 Referring to the insurer’s underwriting 
evidence of their office practice and underwriting guidelines, the court seems to be 
entitled to speculate what would have happened between the insurer and assured; 
and ultimately whether the insurer will enter into the contract on the same premium 
and on the same terms. It is now considered to be even harder for insurers to 
discharge the burden of proof of actual inducement by being asked the question 
whether the insurers would have acted differently had the circumstances been 
disclosed or stated truly. The alleged low threshold of materiality is balanced by such 
higher requirement of proof of actual inducement. Apparently the  new test under the 
Act 2015 which only applies to non-consumer insurance contract adopts the higher 
threshold. To prove a qualifying breach, first of all the insurer needs to prove that he 
would not have entered into the contract of insurance at all, or would have done so 
only on different terms. 
2.2.3.2.3. Proof of inducement  
The legal burden of proving subjective  inducement rests upon the party who alleges 
his being induced into conclusion of contract, which is almost invariably the insurer in 
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practice.176  
2.2.3.2.3.1 Presumption of inducement  
Although it is still controversial what exact motivating impact on the innocent party’s 
state of mind should be fulfilled to satisfy the requirement of inducement, the alleging 
party should at least prove that there exists a causal link between the 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure and the formation of a marine insurance 
contract. But there exists a theoretical presumption of inducement in favour of 
proving a causative effect. The presumption was first introduced by Lord Mustill in 
Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd,177 and re-affirmed in St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co UK Ltd v McDowell Constructors Ltd.178  It is 
presumed that the withholding or misrepresentation of material information unlikely 
makes no difference. It is a matter of common sense that satisfactory proof of 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts will favour a presumption of 
inducement at face value.179  
2.2.3.2.3.2 No such legal presumption of inducement  
There is no such formal presumption as a rule of law. 180 As a result, once the insurer 
has proved materiality, there is no automatic inference of inducement. Although the 
more material the concealed or misstated information is, the more likely the insurer 
will be induced into formation of the contract; the fact that a prudent underwriter 
would consider a fact relevant to access the risk does not necessarily result in that 
an actual underwriter would decline such risk or underwrite on different terms if the 
material information is concealed or misstated.181 Evidence of materiality would only 
play an indirect and circumstantial role in assisting the alleging party to discharge 
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burden of proof of inducement on a balance of probabilities.182 There may be some 
circumstances where inference of inducement from materiality is reasonable and 
feasible, for example where the actual underwriter in question cannot give evidence 
for a good reason and other underwriters have given satisfactory evidence of 
inducement. However, if there is good reason or the actual underwriter does appear 
in court to testify, the insurer has to proceed to proof his inducement into contractual 
formation after proof of materiality.183 As the Insurance Act 2015 clearly codifies the 
test of inducement, there apparently needs a requirement of proof of inducement. So 
no such legal presumption of inducement is settled in law.  
2.2.4 Regime of remedies 
2.2.4.1 Current regime of remedies under the MIA 1906 
Section 17 of the MIA 1906 declares without uncertainty that the contract may be 
avoided by the innocent party if the duty is not observed by either party. Moreover, 
section 18(1) and 20(1) emphasises the right of avoidance again in case of material 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation. It is a well established principle under 
common law that the innocent party is entitled to go back to the position where he 
would have been had the duty been performed. In insurance context, as to the 
breach occurs before the formation of the policy, the remedy has retrospective effect 
of avoiding the whole policy ab. initio so as to make the parties back to the position, 
i.e. before conclusion of the contract. It is a draconian consequence for the assured 
that he is deprived from all cover whereas the insurer discharges all liability under 
the policy and any loss paid already is recoverable. However, the wording ‘may be 
avoided’ in s.17 reveals that avoidance does not happens automatically, neither is a 
judicial intervention required. The insurer has an election to avoid the contract or 
confirm it. Moreover, avoidance of the contract is the only available remedy. 
Damages cannot be claimed if the innocent party chooses to avoid the contract, 
unless any contractual or tortuous obligations can arise.184  
2.2.4.2 The new proportionate remedies regime proposed by the Insurance Act 
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2015  
To replace the harsh remedy stipulated in s.17 of the MIA 1906, the Act 2015 
introduces a new regime of proportionate remedies for qualifying breach based on 
what the insurer would have made if all the true information had been revealed by a 
fair presentation of the insured in s.8 of part 2 ‘the duty of fair representation’. And 
then the Act explains the proportionate regime in details in its Schedule 1. The state 
of mind of the party when committing the breach of the duty is introduced into the 
regime as significant criteria which divides the remedies for disclosure failures into 
two camps: one for dishonest conduct and the other for non-dishonest failures to 
make a fair presentation of the risk. According to the Paragraph 2 of the Schedule 
1,185 where the qualifying breach is deliberate or reckless, the insurer is entitled to 
avoid the contract as the current remedy regime, refusing all the claims under the 
contract and still keep the premium. Besides the remedies for deliberate or reckless 
breaches, all other breaches fall into the non-dishonest failures to make a fair 
presentation of the risk and then lead to a proportionate remedy. Paragraphs 4 to 6 
set out a new proportionate approach to provide remedies for a qualifying breach 
which was neither deliberate nor reckless. 186  Accordingly, the new range of 
proportionate remedies will only apply to non-dishonest behaviours which are neither 
deliberate nor reckless, depending what the insurer would have done had all the true 
material facts been fairly presented. If the insurer can show that it would have not 
entered into the contract at all, he will be entitled to avoid the contract and return the 
premium. If the insurer can prove that the contract would have been concluded on 
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77 
 
different terms, then such terms can be treated as having been included into the 
agreements. If the reinsurer can prove that a higher premium would have been 
charged, and then the amount of claims will be reduced proportionately.  
2.2.5 Summary of pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith  
Contract of insurance as a contract uberrimae fidei attracts a duty of utmost good 
faith which burdens both parties to mutually volunteer information and avoid 
misrepresentation. Beaching of such draconian duty brings harsh consequence, 
especially for the assured who inevitably takes the prominent burden. Since the duty 
is codified in the MIA 1906, it takes the court a long time to finally establish the two 
limb test of breach. The assured is required to disclosure and accurately represent 
all information that a prudent insurer may feel interested to know in decision making 
process at the pre-contractual stage. However, it is argued that it is unfair for the 
assured to disclose what a prudent underwriter would like to know. The court has 
make efforts to balance the threshold by introducing a subjective element of 
inducement. In order to prove inducement, the actual underwriter is required to show 
what would have been done or have not been done, had the assured disclosed the 
material information, although the final decision is the court’s call based upon pure 
speculation. Once the actual underwriter in question is actually induced by assured’s 
material non-disclosure or misrepresentation, it is up to the insurer’s decision 
whether to avoid the policy.  
Nowadays, there emerges more and more voices proposing reform of the 
controversial frame of law which has been regarded as unfair to burden the assured 
such heavy duties. It finally results in the Insurance Act 2015 reforming the duty of 
utmost good faith in non-consumer insurance context. S.17 of the MIA 1906 will be 
read as ‘marine insurance contracts are contracts of the utmost good faith’, removing 
the remedy of avoidance for qualifying breaches.187 In addition, according to Part 2 
of the Insurance Act 2015, a new duty named ‘the duty of fair presentation is 
introduced to replace the broad duty of utmost good faith described by the unlimited 
wording in s.17. Accordingly current absolute duty of disclosure  to the insurer ‘every 
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material circumstances’ which would ‘influence the judgment of a prudent insurer’ in 
assessing the risks  will be tailed into a duty of fair presentation of ‘every material 
circumstance which the insured knows or ought to know’, or failing that, making a 
disclosure ‘which gives the insurer sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on 
notice that it needs to make further enquiries for the purpose of revealing those 
material circumstances’. The spirit reflects in the Insurance Act 2015 encourages the 
insurer to act more active in disclosure of material information once he is put on 
notice of further material information, so that an informed underwriting decision can 
be made by both parties’ effort. In addition, a new proportionate regime of remedies 
is introduced to replace the current harsh all or nothing regime that will be discussed 
in details in chapter 8. 
2.3 Post-contractual stage—a continuing duty? 
Before the MIA 1906, there are actually a number of cases confirming the existence 
of the pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith.188 As a partial codification of existing 
law, the MIA 1906 only expressly enunciates applicability of the duty to pre-
contractual stage, but is silent about applicability of the duty after formation of the 
contract. It is not clear whether the unlimited wording in s.17 extends the scope of 
the duty to post-contractual stage. It is fair to say that the duty of utmost good faith at 
post-contractual stage is one of the most controversial issues with more than a 
century history, although it has not come into focus until the recent two decades. And 
it is worthy investigation if there does exist one, how it operates after contractual 
conclusion; what is the scope, duration, rules of test and remedy for qualified breach. 
Analysis of development of the law on post-contractual duty of utmost good faith will 
come first in chronological order, from cases prior to the MIA 1906 to modern 
authorities beginning with The Litsion Pride. Then the present status of post-
contractual duty of utmost good faith will be under scrutiny in following sections by 
considering each practical situation which is proposed to attract a post-contractual 
duty.  
2.3.1 Development of the law on continuing duty of utmost good faith  
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2.3.1.1 Position of the law before the MIA 1906  
Since the 1906 Act is a codification of the status of law before the act, the authorities 
on post-contractual duty before the 1906 Act are notable. In an early case, Shepherd 
v Chewter189 , an adjustment agreed without disclosure of deviation prior to the 
casualty was held not binding, therefore the underwriter was entitled to discharge his 
liability relied upon the deviation. However, it is not clear whether the decision can be 
treated as authority on the proposition that breach of continuing duty of disclosure 
renders the policy avoidable because later cases decided that an adjustment would 
not prevent policy defenses ever. 190   
Moreover, in Britton v Royal Insurance Co191 , which is considered as the main 
authority on existence of continuing duty of utmost good faith at the claim stage 
before the act, it is established that an assured who asserts a fraudulent claim 
cannot recover it at all. 192 However, it is treated as a common law principle on 
fraudulent claims issue rather than rules specify the scope of any continuing duty of 
utmost good faith in post-contractual period. Although the phrase ‘good faith’ was 
employed in the judgment, the case attempted nothing to define the scope or 
duration of the post-contractual duty.  
Furthermore, prior to the 1906 Act, there are also cases establishing that the 
assured is under no continuing duty to disclose information about the insured risk 
coming into his attention after conclusion of the contract, 193  and innocent 
misrepresentation about the insured risk after the formation of the contract cannot be 
relied upon by the insurer to avoid the policy. 194  
2.3.1.2 Continuing duty introduced by the broad wording of s.17 of the MIA 
1906? 
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It is suggested that although s.18 confines duty of disclosure and materiality to the 
pre-contractual period, the notion that attempts to import a continuing duty of utmost 
good faith into the post contractual stage by the broader and unlimited wordings of s. 
17 is not convincing and should not be supported.  
First of all, based on the earlier common law cases, it can be saidthat there are no 
precise authorities supporting existence of general continuing duty of utmost good 
faith after formation of the contract before the 1906 Act. At least, if there does exist 
any as some arguments suggest, the post-contractual duty does not have the same 
scope and operation as the pre-contractual one has. This is the status of law which 
the 1906 Act codifies.  
Secondly, the rationale behind the doctrine of utmost good faith is to balance the 
informational asymmetry between the parties and make sure that the insurer can 
know all the material information and circumstances before he made an informed 
decision. Materiality is irrelevant after formation of the contract because insurers 
have already assessed the risk and made their decisions whether to underwrite the 
risk and at what premium.  
Moreover, it is a well-established common law rule that the assured is perfectly free 
to increase the risk under the policy, while subject to certain limitations. 195  The 
insurer is not entitled to reconsider terms of the policy or take advantage of any 
changes of circumstances after making his underwriting decisions. So it is not 
surprising that the duty of disclosure and duty not to make misrepresentation comes 
to an end when the insurance contract is concluded. It does not have any application 
in the post-contractual stage. It is against the original rationale and the background 
to say that a general continuing duty of utmost good faith is enacted in s.17 of the 
1906 Act.  
2.3.1.3 Modern authorities  
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Beginning with The Litsion Pride,196 successive modern authorities emerge aiming to 
specify some particular situations which may attract post-contractual duty of utmost 
good faith.  
In The Litsion Pride,197 the vessel which was sent into an additional premium war 
zone without prompt notice to insurer became destroyed by a missile. The 
underwriters refused the claim upon the owner’s breach of duty of utmost good faith 
in deliberately failing to notify an additional risk and slip the vessel through a war 
zone without paying any additional premium. Hirst J. concluded that there was a 
general continuing duty of utmost good faith derived from the implied contractual 
terms after the conclusion of the contract. So the assured was decided to be 
required to disclose all material information and avoid misrepresentation of material 
facts about increased risk in respect of giving notice, paying additional premium, 
insurer’s decision as to his reinsurance, insurer’s exercising a right of cancellation 
etc. As to the remedy, the assured’ breach of the duty affords the insurer a choice to 
avoid the policy ab. initio or alternatively discharge from liability under any vitiated 
claims. The Litsion Pride which defined a broad scope of post-contractually 
continuing duty and extended it to culpable non-disclosure was criticised and not 
followed by a series of first instances cases198, and finally overruled by House of 
Lords in The Star Sea.199 
In the Star Sea200 the underwriters rejected the ship owner’s claim on the owner’s 
breach of continuing duty of utmost good faith at claim stage by non-disclosure of 
reports on the vessel’s deficiencies which caused her constructive total loss in a fire. 
A letter from the owner’s broker in negotiating a settlement was also alleged to be 
misleading relating to an earlier casualty suffered by owners’ another vessel. Their 
Lordship unanimously decided that the insurer was not entitled to reject the claims 
because fraud was required to prove breach of continuing duty of utmost good faith 
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in respect of a claim; and the continuing duty of utmost good faith come to an end at 
the beginning of litigation in which disclosure of information was governed by the 
procedural rules of court. However, the House of Lords did not go further to define 
the scope of such continuing duty except affirming that the continuing duty did not 
extend to post-contractual increase of risk. Although the scope of the duty was 
‘elusive’ and had been curtailed to very narrow sense in practice, their lordship was 
reluctant to abolish the continuing duty which, in their lordship’s opinion, was clearly 
imposed by s.17. As to the remedy for breach of the post-contractual duty, a less 
intensive form than the pre-contractual one and flexible construction, which was 
characterised by Lord Hobhouse as ‘fair dealing’, were preferred to avoid the harsh, 
unjustified and disproportionate result. The insurer is disallowed to use the remedy of 
avoidance of the policy as an instrument to escape retrospectively from the liabilities 
which he validly undertaken. 
A few months after The Star Sea, the scope of continuing duty of utmost good faith 
came into focus once again in The Mercandian Continent. 201  The insured 
fraudulently manufactured a jurisdiction agreement in the course of negotiation with 
its liability insurers. The insurers sought to avoid the claim and the policy for 
assured’s breach of the continuing duty of utmost good faith. The Court of Appeal 
followed House of Lords in The Star Sea affirming that s.17 expressly embodies a 
continuing duty of utmost good faith at post-contractual stage. However, by analysing 
various situations which may attract post-contractual duty of utmost good faith, the 
Court of Appeal went further to conclude that the situations attracting post-
contractual duty of utmost good faith were limited.  
2.3.1.4 Position of the law in The Insurance Act 2015  
Under the Insurance Act 2015 the issue of attachment point and duration of the duty 
remains the same position as it is in theMIA 1906. The wording of s.3 expressly 
confines the scope of the duty of fair presentation to pre-contractual stage. 202 
Therefore, it is suggested that the Insurance Act 2015 will not change the position of 
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law stipulated in the MIA 1906 regarding the scope of the duty; consequently the 
post-contractual duty will still have no legislative root as it does now.  
2.3.2 Situations which may attract post-contractual duty of utmost good faith  
From the above analysis on development of the law regarding continuing utmost 
good faith, it can be concluded that, before the emergence of the modern authorities 
upon post-contractual duty, there is no general continuing duty on the assured to 
disclose or not to misrepresent the increase of risk or any changes of the 
circumstances which are irrelevant with the assessment of the risk and premium 
after formation of the contract. Although there are no authorities supporting existence 
of a continuing duty after conclusion of a contract, some controversial situations, for 
instance renewal of a policy, extension of a policy, additional cover under held 
covered clauses, cancellation clauses, right of inspection, follow the settlement and 
claims cooperation clauses, and particularly fraud in claims stage etc. are still 
unclear. Actually those are just the points where the modern authorities of the 
continuing duty start. It is suggested here, although the courts tried to import and 
finally accepted a doctrine of utmost good faith at post-contractual stage, the 
harshness of remedy for breach of such duty make the courts continuously curtail 
the scope of duty leaving very limited room for application of post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith. In practice, those situations which may arguably attract a 
continuing duty after the conclusion of the contract can be divided into two 
categories, distinguishing by whether the insurer has further underwriting decisions 
to make. Each of them is anaylsed below. 
2.3.2.1 Where the insurer has further underwriting decisions to make 
2.3.2.1.1 Renewal of the policy  
At the post-contractual stage, renewal of the original policy can be regarded as a 
typical situation which attracts duty of utmost good faith. Although the renewal brings 
the original policy which has already expired into reinstatement, it is still a new 
contract per se which attracts a brand new duty of utmost good faith because the 
original one has terminated. The assured is required to disclose and make true 
representation of all material circumstances happened during the currency of the 
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original contract. However, such duty is in essence pre-contractual duty of utmost 
good faith.203 Therefore, once there is breach of such duty, only the renewal part will 
be avoidable by the innocent party, leaving the original policy untouched and 
outstanding claims valid.  
2.3.2.1.2 Extension, variation of the policy, held covered clauses 
After formation of the contract, the parties may make some alteration to the policy 
terms, in order to vary the scope or duration of cover. Also due to occurrence of 
particular eventualities, the parties would like to exercise their contractual rights to 
extend the cover when the insured risk increases during currency of the contract so 
that the assured can be held covered. As an additional consideration the assured is 
required to give the insurer prompt notice and pay some additional premium.204 In 
such circumstances suffice it to say that the parties of the original policy conclude a 
new and distinct agreement to vary or extend the original cover. Such endorsement 
of contract puts the insurer in the position again, to make an underwriting decision by 
assessing the risk and premium. Therefore the informational asymmetry imposes the 
assured a new duty of utmost good faith by disclosing all material information and 
not making any misrepresentation about the extension or variation part. Thus, it is 
suggested that such duty of utmost good faith is pre-contractual per se governed by 
the MIA 1906 ss.18-20 rather than a post-contractual one. Such approach is 
congruous with the principles existing authorities establish.205   
The scope of duty of utmost good faith in extension or variation situations only 
extends to the requested variation or extension context. Therefore, the assured is 
only under a duty of disclosure and making accurate representation of circumstances 
material to the additional reassessment of the premium or terms of cover. However, if 
the variation or held covered part does not alter the insurer’s contractual rights or is 
just favourable to him, then no material facts need be disclosed.206 Such cases may 
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happen where the assured is automatic held covered by giving the insurer a prompt 
notice and paying pro rate premium agreed in advance207. As was said by Longmore 
L.J. in The Mercandian Continent any principle that the assured has to make full 
disclosure on the exercise of rights which he has under the original contract is 
“somewhat puzzling”.208 
With respect of remedy for breach of the duty, since Fraser Shipping Ltd v Colton209, 
it is established that insurers are entitled to ‘’to avoid the policy, as varied by the 
endorsement’’ upon the assured’s breach of utmost good faith. Such rules are 
affirmed by both House of Lords in The Star Sea and Court of Appeal in The 
Mercandian Continent. As materiality and inducement is only assessed to the 
variation, extension or held covered extent, it is absurd to suggest that such breach 
of assured would entitle the insurer a right to avoid the entire policy. Such a remedy 
would be disproportionate and unreasonable. Therefore, ranking the duty as pre-
contractual one is a reasonable and appropriate solution so that only the 
endorsement decisions induced by the assured’s breach is avoidable leaving the 
entire original policy unstained.  
2.3.2.2 Where there is no further underwriting decisions to make  
Outside underwriting decisions, it is ambiguous whether there is any room for a post-
contractual duty of utmost good faith.  
2.3.2.2.1 Fraudulent claims 
Although The Star Sea narrowed down the scope and duration of fraudulent 
claims,210 their Lordships did not go further to specify whether fraudulent claims is an 
aspect of post-contractual duty of utmost good faith or what the remedy is where a 
fraudulent claim is made. By deciding that the post-duty of utmost good faith exists 
only when the contractual terms impose such an obligation to volunteer information, 
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the court affirmed that the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith did not extend 
to fraudulent claims which should be regarded as an independent common law 
rule.211 As to the duty, if there exists any, is based on contractual terms, the remedy 
for breach of such duty should resort to contractual remedies as well. Therefore, 
immaterial fraud, which does not enable the insurer to repudiate the contract, just 
like the position in The Mercandian Continent, would not be relied upon by the 
insurer to avoid the policy ab. initio, although damages may be claimable under 
common law rules. The insurer is not allowed to step aside the contract by resorting 
to such tricky instrument, namely treating fraudulent claims as an aspect of the post-
contractual duty of utmost good faith.  
Consequently it can be seen that the court is reluctant to treat fraudulent claims as 
part of the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith. There is a tendency to remove 
it from the frame and make it an independent common law rule. Such trend can also 
be illustrated by the remedy for fraudulent claims. According to s.17 of the MIA 1906, 
the only remedy for breach of duty of utmost good faith is an option of the innocent 
party to avoid the policy ab. initio. However, since Britton v Royal Insurance Co,212 it 
is a well established common law rule followed by many authorities that the insured 
who has made a fraudulent claim will not recover the claim at all. 213  Moreover, in 
practice many policies embody such rule by an express clause to the effect that 
fraud by the assured will forfeit the claim or discharge insurer from liabilities 
prospectively. Furthermore, in The Aegeon,214 Mance L.J. confirmed such principle 
again by suggesting that assured’s using fraudulent devices or means to prompt a 
claim would be regarded as a sub-species of fraudulent claim forfeiting the claim 
itself or discharging the insurer’s liability prospectively. Therefore, it is fair to say that 
remedy of avoidance ab. initio is not available in fraudulent claims because 
fraudulent claims do not have a retrospective effect on prior separate valid claims 
which have already been settled before any fraud occurs. This position is re-affirmed 
in the Insurance Act 2015. In part 4 on fraudulent claims, separate from part 2 
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regulates the duty of fair presentation, remedies for fraudulent claims is expressly 
codified and divided into two parts, to the claims taint by the fraud and to the effect of 
the contract thereon, leaving the already performed part of contract untouched.215 
Therefore, although there is no clear authority on whether fraudulent claims principle 
is a part of post-contractual duty of utmost good faith, it is well illustrated that 
fraudulent claims principle can live as an independent rule of law. So it is suggested 
that placing the fraudulent claims rule into the doctrine of utmost good faith is 
superfluous. It is better to stand alone.   
2.3.2.2.2 The express or implied terms in insurance contract requiring the 
assured to provide information   
There is a suggestion that the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith can be 
arisen by express or implied terms in policy which impose the parties such a 
continuing duty.216 Under such an approach, the post-contractual duty of good faith is 
aligned with and arisen by contractual terms. Breaching of such obligations brings 
contractual remedies rather than remedy of avoidance ab. initio like in the pre-
contractual stage.217 The entitlement to avoid the entire policy ab. Initio for qualifying 
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beach only confines to the situation where the assured’s breach of contractual 
obligation to provide information repudiates the policy. However, an obligation to 
provide information is generally an innominate term breaching of which would be 
very hard to repudiate an entire policy, leaving little room to argue a breach of post-
contractual duty of utmost good faith.218  Therefore the test set up in The Mercandian 
Continent is very stringent and difficult to satisfy in practice. Even the approach is 
correct, it has little practical significance.219  
Moreover, It is not uncontroversial that post contractual duty of utmost good faith, if 
does exist, can be arisen on a contractual basis. It is well established that the legal 
basis of the duty of utmost good faith is derived from common law with equity origins, 
rather than contractual in origin no matter expressed or implied. It exists as a rule of 
law before a contract is concluded. If a duty of utmost good faith is still alive at post 
contractual stage, it should still be a rule of law per se. Although the parties to an 
insurance contract are free to stipulate obligations to continually provide information 
after formation, it means neither that there exists a post contractual doctrine of duty 
of utmost good faith as a rule of law nor that legal basis of the doctrine is changed 
into contractual origin. The assured is required to provide information by his 
contractual obligations rather than the doctrine of utmost good faith. Consequently, 
the remedy, for breach of such contractual obligations, even in bad faith, would only 
avail the innocent party ordinary contractual remedy proportionate to the gravity of 
the breach. 220  Even though the repudiation of contract justified in particular 
circumstances equals avoidance ab. initio in practical effect, it does not indicate that 
the remedy for non-performance of insurance contracts has the same genius as the 
one for breach of duty of utmost good faith. 
2.3.2.2.3 Follow the settlement, claim co-operation and claim control clauses in 
contract which imply the insurer’s performance in good faith  
Where a reinsurance contract contains follow the settlement, claim cooperation, and 
claim control clauses is taken as an instance to define the insurer’s post contractual 
duty of utmost good faith. Argument that there exists post-contractual duty of utmost 
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good faith to carry out the contract dates back to enactment of the MIA 1906. In 
Boulton v Houlder Bros & Co,221 it is said that “it is an essential condition of the 
policy of insurance that the underwriters shall be treated with good faith, not merely 
in reference to the inception of the risk, but in the steps taken to carry out the 
contract.” In Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Cresswell and others (Cresswell),222 Rix 
L.J. following The Mercandian Continent, decided that as those claim co-operation 
claims are conditions precedent of the reinsurer’s liability, the reinsurer is under a 
duty, arising from an implied term, not to exercise their discretion under a claim 
provision in bad faith, capriciously or arbitrarily. Such implied duty on insurer to act in 
good faith is affirmed again in Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd 
(No.2 & 3).223 However, in court of appeal, Mance L.J. expressly disagreed with that 
the duty from implied term is an expression of the post contractual duty of utmost 
good faith by saying: “…this conclusion does not involve an inadmissible extension 
of the duty of utmost good faith in insurance law or of the consequences of breach of 
any such duty. The qualification… does not arise from any principles or 
considerations special to the law of insurance. It arises from the nature and purpose 
of the relevant contractual provisions…”.224 
Therefore, it is a purely implied contractual term from which such duty to act in good 
faith arises rather than the post contractual duty of utmost good faith. The duty here 
does not possess any nature special to contract uberrimae fidei. It cannot function as 
a post contractual duty of utmost good faith. Qualified beach only avails the innocent 
party ordinary contractual remedy, just like the situation aforementioned where the 
express or implied contractual term requires the assured to provide information after 
conclusion of contract. Those terms are ordinary contractual terms which should be 
performed without assistance of doctrine of duty of utmost good faith in interpretation, 
especially given the modern emphasis on giving regard to the intentions of the 
parties. 225 Therefore, it is suggested that post-contractual duty of utmost good faith 
in above situations is of little practical importance and should be curtailed with no 
application hereof.  
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2.3.3 Conclusion 
There is no generally continuing duty of disclosure or duty not to make 
misrepresentation after conclusion of contract in law. In respect to situations where 
the insurers have further underwriting decisions to make after conclusion, the parties 
conclude a fresh policy by renewal or create a fresh agreement to vary, extend the 
cover of existing policy. It is unequivocal that the duty of utmost good faith does 
attach herein. However, such duty of utmost good faith is pre-contractual pre se 
distinguishing from lack of good faith during the performance of the contract. The 
assured is required to disclose and make accurate representation of all material 
information relating to the underwriting decisions. Any breach of the duty make the 
induced decision avoidable leaving the entire original policy untouched. The post-
contractual duty of utmost good faith has nothing to do in such situation. Situations 
where the insurers have no further underwriting decisions to make after conclusion 
are more complicated and controversial. It should be noticed that doctrine of utmost 
good faith should be distinguished from lack of good faith in performance of contract. 
Where a contract contains express or implied contractual terms requiring provision of 
information and implied contract terms require the parties to act in good faith to each 
other should be construed as ordinary contractual terms reflecting parties’ intentions 
rather than doctrine of utmost good faith in law pre-existing before the contract. Such 
contractual terms should be performed without assistance of doctrine of utmost good 
faith, and breach of such terms brings the innocent parties only ordinary contractual 
remedies. As to fraudulent claims principle which derives from a common law rule ‘a 
person should not benefit from his own wrong’, it can live as an independent rule of 
law. Therefore, it is suggested that placing the fraudulent claims rule into the doctrine 
of utmost good faith is superfluous. It is better to stand alone. In a conclusion, it is 
suggested that post-contractual duty of utmost good faith is of little practical 
importance and should be elimination at all, leaving contractual law and common law 
rules governing performance of contract.  
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Part II Broker’s Role in Disclosure Process in Placing Reinsurance in 
subscription market  
Chapter 3 Practical Difficulties and Problems in Performing the Duty of Utmost 
Good Faith by Reinsurance Brokers 
3.1 Introduction  
It has been discussed in above chapter that the English law has imposed a duty of 
volunteering information on both parties in order to make an informed underwriting 
decision. To place a reinsurance contract, besides the reinsured’s personal duty 
imposed by s.18 of the MIA 1906, there is also established an independent duty of 
disclosure imposed upon the agent who is instructed by the reinsured to effect 
reinsurance by s.19.226  It has been settled that s.19 places a personal duty of 
disclosure upon the agent to insure separately from the reinsured’s duty under s.18, 
rather than going through the imputation route. 227  Therefore the broker in the 
disclosure process is not only required to disclose material facts which his principal 
is bound to disclose, but also obliged to disclose material circumstances which even 
neither know nor ought to have known by his principal, but known or deemed to be 
known by him as provided in s.19 (a).  
It is noteworthy that many of the leading authorities clarifying the framework of the 
duty of utmost good faith, particularly more recent authorities, are in fact reinsurance 
cases.228 The reinsurance placement practice modifies the duty of utmost good faith 
and frequently arise specific issues which apply particularly in determining disclosure 
obligations in the reinsurance context. For instance, it is a common practice in the 
reinsurance market that there is more than one type of agents involved in the placing 
process. It is only the placing broker who is the last ache of the chain of intermediate 
                                                          
226
 The MIA 1906 section 19 provides that an agent must disclose to the insurer: (a) Every material circumstance 
which is known to himself, and an agent to insure is deemed to know every circumstance which in the ordinary 
course of business ought to have been known by, or to have been communicated to him, and (b) Every material 
circumstance which the assured is bound to disclose, unless it comes to his knowledge too late, to communicate 
it to the agent. 
227
 Blackburn Low & Co v Vigors (1887) 12 App. Cas. 531; HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase 
Manhattan Bank [2003] Lloyd’ Rep. I.R. 230. 
228
 Sirius International Insurance Corp v Oriental Assurance Corp [1999] Lloyd’s Rep.I.R. 343; Bonner v Cox 
[2006] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 385; Pan Atlantic  Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501; 
Kingscroft Insurance Co ltd v Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd (No.2) [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 603; 
Assicurazioni Generali v Arab Insurance Group [2003] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 131; Bonner v Cox [2006] Lloyd’s Rep. 
I.R. 385; Simner v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1995] L.R.L.R. 240. WISE Underwriting Agency Ltd v Grupo 
Nacional Provincial SA [2004] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 764. 
92 
 
agents to deal with the reinsurer directly. As a result, the practice causes a series of 
problems as to operation of the duty of disclosure upon the agent to insure under 
s.19. First, the legal basis of the duty for the purpose of s.19 needs to be anaylsed, 
as it may cause controversy of applicability of the exception rules to the duty of the 
agent to insure under s.19. Secondly, it is worthy further discussion as to who of the 
chain of intermediate agents involving the complex negotiation process of the 
reinsurance contract qualifies for the agent to insure of the purpose under s.19. It is 
arguable whether the agent to insure confines only to the placing broker, i.e. whether 
the duty of disclosure extends to other intermediate agent involving in the middle of 
the placing chain. If the answer is negative, how the law accommodates the 
knowledge of other intermediate agents will be analysed in the following. Moreover, 
the market practice of placing reinsurance contracts create lots of difficulties in 
defining the scope of the duty of disclosure upon the reinsurance broker under s.19, 
as the broad wording of the section is still unsettled.  In practice the broker may not 
only play the role of agent to insure but also plays multiple roles in the operation of 
the business, involving in some other processes with the insurer of direct insurance 
or the reinsurer, such as concluding an open cover or a binding authority with the 
reinsurers before any contract of insurance comes into existence, or acting as the 
underwriting agent in managing an insurance pool and undertaking to reinsure the 
pool’s liabilities like a dual agent. It is worth discussion how the duty of utmost good 
faith applies to the broker in a multiple-role circumstance or a dual-agency situation, 
as it is controversial in conflicting authorities whether the broker needs to disclose 
any material information known to him in any other capacity. In addition, as to the 
scope of duty of disclosure on the agent to insure, it is unsettled whether there are 
any exceptions undermining s.19 except circumstances expressly excluded from 
duty of disclosure by s.18 (3). Furthermore, in the broker’s placing process in 
practice, sometimes the broker may do wrongs or even commit fraudulent conduct 
against the reinsurer or his principal, i.e. the reinsured. It is arguable whether such 
wrong doings or fraud committed by the broker is a material circumstance to be 
disclosed to the reinsurers under s.19. If there should exist a fraud exception to the 
scope of the broker’s duty of disclosure, how should the fraud exception rules be 
interpreted and how will it affect the reinsured’s right under the reinsurance contract 
which the broker effects on his behalf? In addition it will be discussed whether there 
should be a wider exception rule to the application of the broker’s duty of disclosure 
93 
 
beyond fraud, such as any dishonesty lack of fraud or any information which is 
unreasonable to be inferred into the reinsured’s knowledge.  
The following chapter will analyse difficulties and problems relating to operation of 
the broker’s duty of disclosure in practice in three aspects, the legal basis for the 
duty, the relevant agents under the duty and the scope of the duty burden upon the 
agent. Solutions are proposed to resolve the difficulties. In addition, a comparison 
will be made between the duty of utmost good faith under MIA 1906 and the duty of 
fair presentation under Insurance Act 2015, to see whether the new insurance act 
can resolves the existing practical problems.  
3.2 Legal basis for the duty of utmost good faith imposed on reinsurance 
brokers 
The relevance of legal basis for the duty of disclosure imposed upon the agent to 
insure matters, as it will affect the ambit of relevant agents under the duty, the scope 
of their duty, and then affect the reinsured’s rights under the reinsurance contract. 
The leading authority on such legal basis is decision of the House of Lords in 
Blackburn Low &Co v Vigors where raised a divergence of opinions. 229  Majority of 
the members of the House adopted an imputation of knowledge analysis whereas 
Lord Macnaghten as minority opined that the placing broker was required to 
communicate material facts to underwriters because of his capacity as the assured’s 
agent to effect insurance. If Blackburn v Vigors justifies that the duty is not based on 
imputation of knowledge, then it could be arguable that fraud exception in Re 
Hampshire Land case does not apply to the broker’s duty under s. 19. By this token, 
the relevance of legal basis for the duty of disclosure on agent to insure is of 
importance and deserves detailed investigation. 
3.2.1 Divergence of the views on this issue   
In Blackburn Low A & Co v Vigors,230 a Glasgow firm of brokers which had previously 
produced reinsurance for the reinsured had been informed that the subject vessel 
had been lost. However, they did not pass on this information to the reinsured before 
the placement of reinsurance by another London broker instructed by the reinsured. 
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The reinsurer alleged non-disclosure of this material fact. The House of Lords held 
that the knowledge of the Glasgow broker was not the knowledge of the reinsured; 
therefore the policy was not voidable. At the same time, their lordships reached the 
same agreement, although on two different grounds, that if the reinsured’s placing 
broker had been aware of the relevant facts, the reinsurer would have had a right to 
avoid the policy for non-disclosure of such facts. Majority of the members of the 
House of Lords adopted an imputation of knowledge analysis that the broker would 
communicate facts known to him to the reinsured, therefore the reinsured was 
deemed to known such facts imputed into his knowledge. By contrast, Lord 
Macnaghten as a minority expressed the view that the agent of the assured who is 
employed for the particular purpose of effecting the insurance is required to disclose 
material facts because he is bound as the principal to communicate to the 
underwriters all material facts within his knowledge, rather than the knowledge of the 
agent is to be imputed to the principal. Such opinion is also followed by some later 
authorities. 231  Although Phillips J. adopted the imputation of knowledge analyses in 
Deutsche Ruckversicherung Aktiengesellschaft v Walbrook Ins Co Ltd,232 it was not 
followed in latter cases.233 In both PCW Syndicates v PCW234 and Reinsurers and 
Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Ltd,235 the Court of Appeal rejected general 
imputation of knowledge from brokers to reinsureds, and Staughton L.J. expressed 
that it was clear that s.19 gives effect to Lord Macnaghten’s view. The same view 
was expressed by Colman J. and the Court of Appeal in Kingscroft Insurance Co Ltd 
v Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd. 236 In HIH Casualty & General Insurance 
Company & Others v. Chase Manhattan Bank & Others,237  the judges also accepted 
that the broker has a separate and independent duty of disclosure to the insurers 
under s.19. 
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3.2.2 Legal basis for the broker’s duty under s.19 of MIA 1906 
As Lord Macnaghten’s view is confirmed by the House of Lord in HIH Casualty and 
General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank,238 it is now a finally a settled law 
that under s. 19 of the MIA 1906, imputation of knowledge rule does not apply to 
agent who is instructed to effect insurance. The relevant point of particular 
importance in the HIH case is that whether a policy term which purported to exclude 
the assured’s personal duty of disclosure had the same effect to exclude the agent’s 
duty of disclosure. By holding that such provision would not exclude the agent’s duty 
of disclosure unless there was express reference to it, their lordships ruled that the 
agent to insure is under a personal duty of disclosure independent of the assured’s.  
Accordingly, it is now clearly established that the s.19 of the MIA 1906 does not 
operate through the imputation of knowledge route, but imposes brokers who effect 
reinsurance a distinct duty of disclosure independent of the assured’s. So the 
reinsurer is entitled to avoid the contract of insurance induced by the broker’s 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts, even though the reinsured has 
performed his duty of disclosure under s.18 perfectly by passing material information 
to the broker.239 Information provided by the reinsured to his own broker, that makes 
the effect like disclosing to himself, is not deemed to have been received by the 
reinsurers. After all it is the reinsured who takes the risks of non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation by his own agents under the rules of disclosure.  
3.2.3 Legal basis for the broker’s duty under the Insurance Act 2015 
As discussed in the above chapter, the new  Insurance Act brings significant 
changes to current legislation applicable to non-consumer insurance context, 
including the duty of disclosure imposed upon the insured. Although the duty to 
volunteer information is retained by the act, reflected by a duty of fair presentation 
inclusive of the current duty of disclosure and making no misrepresentation, it will be 
solely imposed upon the insured himself.  By contrast to current s.19 of the MIA 1906, 
s. 3 (1) of the Insurance Act 2015 clearly states that the duty of fair presentation is 
imposed upon the insured. Under such duty, it is the insured that must make 
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disclosure of every material circumstance known or ought to be known by him to the 
insurer, in a reasonably clear and accessible manner to a prudent insurer.240 The 
new act does not mention a separate duty imposed upon the agent to insure any 
more like it does in the MIA 1906. But in s. 4 which defines the knowledge of insured, 
an insured is regarded to know or ought to know what is known to one or more of the 
individuals who are responsible for the insured’s insurance. Therefore, even though 
the broker is not bound to make a fair presentation to the insurer by new insurance 
contract law, his knowledge is still attributed into his principal’s  by a imputation route, 
falling within the material circumstances disclosable to the insurer under the 
insured’s  personal duty.  
3.2.4 Possible practical problems of the imputation approach under Insurance 
Act 2015 in reinsurance market 
It is not an uncommon practice in reinsurance market that more than one 
intermediate are involved in placing reinsurance. Under certain circumstances the 
producing broker who is authorised to place an insurance contract by the reinsured 
will instruct a placing broker who is qualified to access a particular market or has 
special expertise in certain areas, rather than places the risks personally. It is argued 
that the current independent duty basis based on s.19 of the MIA 1906 is more 
plausible and consistent with the reinsurance market practice. The approach under 
the new insurance act of switching to the imputation route may cause practical 
difficulties in practice. Under the Insurance Act 2015, the duty of disclosure is solely 
imposed upon the reinsured. It is the reinsured’s and only his duty to make all the 
material information fairly disclosed and represented to the reinsurer. Such duty 
cannot be simply satisfied by the reinsured passing down his knowledge to his 
brokers, as the contract could be vitiated if the person who is employed specially to 
effect reinsurance conceals information from the reinsurer. It should not be 
reinsurers that bear the risk of such knowledge gap between the reinsured and the 
brokers; after all it is the reinsured that is the primary principal of the brokers. So the 
existing approach by imposing a distinct duty of disclosure upon the brokers who 
effect reinsurance directly with reinsurers can be said to be a fair, to make sure the 
reinsurers could make informed underwriting decisions. To solve this issue, the 
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Insurance Act 2015 attributes all the disclosable knowledge of the agent to insure 
into the reinsured’s. So all material information subject to a separate duty of 
disclosure on the broker falls within the knowledge that needs to be fairly presented 
by the reinsured. Accordingly, to fulfill the duty of fair presentation, the reinsured is 
required to fairly disclose and refrain from misrepresentation of all the material 
circumstances known to his agent to insure encompassing risks managers and any 
employee assisting collection of date or negotiation of the contractual terms.241 In 
addition, the reinsured is required to make reasonable search of information 
available to him, in order to reveal material circumstance which ought to be known 
by him. Actually, in practice, it is harsh to deem the reinsured to know all the material 
facts possessed by the placing brokers who are at the end of the intermediate chain, 
as the reinsured may even not know the existence of such agent to insure. Neither is 
it easy for the reinsured to know or ought to know all the material information 
processed by the brokers, nor is it practical for the reinsured to make reasonable 
search to reveal such information. Moreover, attribution of brokers’, at least placing 
brokers’ knowledge into the reinsured’s inconsistent with current common law rules. 
In Simner v New India Assurance Co Ltd,242 and then followed by ERC Frankona 
Reinsurance v American National Insurance Co,243 it is held that knowledge of the 
agent is imputed into the assured’s in two situations, i.e. where the agent would be 
an ‘agent to know’ or where the agent is in a predominant position in relation to the 
assured. It is doubted that the agent employed to effect the reinsurance contract falls 
into either of the two categories. In practice, it is not reasonable to assume that the 
placing broker will communicate his knowledge to the reinsured so that such 
knowledge can be treated as what ought to be known by the reinsured in his ordinary 
                                                          
241
 Herbert Smith Freehills Dispute Resolution, Litigation Note, Insurance Act receives royal assent, p.3  
http://hsfnotes.com/litigation/2015/02/13/insurance-act-receives-royal-assent/ 
242 
[1995] L.R.L.R. 240. See also in ERC Frankona Reinsurance v American National Insurance Co, [2005] 
EWHC 1381 (Comm), where the defendant ANICO, in 1998 underwriting year, participated in a pool which was 
established by National Accident Insurance Group in 1997. The pool was managed by National Accident 
Insurance Underwriter (NAIU). NAIU instructed his London brokers Bradstocks to place a quota share 
reinsurance of Philadelphia Life’s one-third participation in the pool with ERC. ERC subsequently claimed to be 
entitled to avoid its line on the 1998/99 quota share because NAIU had failed to disclose the criminal record of 
the Chief Executive Officer of NAIU. Relying upon decision in Simner v New India242, Andrew Simon J defined 
situations where the reinsured’s agent’ knowledge would be imputed into the reinsured’s, as a result falls within 
the scope of duty of disclosure under s.18, i.e. the reinsured’s agent to know who is relied upon for information 
concerning insurance subject matter, and the reinsured’s agent who is in such a predominant position in relation 
to the reinsured that his knowledge can be regarded as the knowledge of the reinsured. In current case, neither 
the NAIU was the American National’s agent to know nor was his predominant agent. As a result, the NAIU’s 
knowledge about Mr. Drobny’s previous criminal record was not imputed into the reinsured’s knowledge; thereby 
falling within the reinsured’s duty of disclosure under s.18 of MIA 1906. 
243
 [2005] EWHC 1381 (Comm). 
98 
 
course of business. As a result, in general situations, broker’s knowledge should not 
be imputed into the reinsured; neither should the broker’s knowledge fall within the 
scope of duty of fair presentation upon his principals for the purpose of s. 3. 
At a face value, it appears more simplified and clearer in the position of the new 
Insurance Actthat integrates the current two separate duties of disclosure into one. It 
seems that the new approach technically makes the test rules and scope of duty 
easier to understand. No matter how many intermediates are involved in the placing 
process and no matter what their capacities are, all the relevant information material 
to the prudent insurer’s underwriting decisions are all disclosable by the reinsured for 
the purpose of the duty of fair presentation.  However, the new approach significantly 
changes the current legislation,244 and overturns the current common law rules on 
the attribution of knowledge. The ambit and test of the knowledge of the reinsured 
which is subject to the duty of fair presentation is still complex, involving new legal 
and factual test to be established and clarified. It is still unknown whether the new 
tests can serve the market practice better than the current existing rules. So it can be 
said that it will be some time and judicial decisions, like the current settled rules, to 
show whether the prescriptive approach of attribution of knowledge route will 
successfully eliminate current unfairness or uncertainty in existing legislation and 
common law cases. Those will be discussed in the following sections.  
3.3 Relevant agent under the duty of utmost good faith  
As discussed above, it is clearly settled that in the MIA 1906 s.19 (a) imposes on the 
agent to insure an independent duty of disclosure when effecting the contract. And it 
is a common market practice that there are more than one agents involved in placing 
reinsurance. In addition, in practice there are some circumstances where the brokers 
play multiple roles and function beyond the agent of the reinsured. For instance, 
brokers may also act as the agent of a coverholder when effecting binding authority 
on behalf of him. Also it is possible for an open cover or treaty to be concluded 
before any contract of insurance actually coming into existence.245 Consequently it 
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raises a practical problem who qualifies for the agent to insure of the reinsured for 
the purpose under s.19. The meaning of this simply phrase ‘agent to insure’ is to 
some extent ambiguous and needs to be clarified. This section will focus on what 
types of agents the duty of utmost good faith applying to. It is arguable that whether 
a coverholder or a broker who also acting as underwriting agent in such cases is an 
agent to insure who owes a separate duty of disclosure under s.19 of the MIA 1906; 
also whether all brokers in placing reinsurance are under a duty of disclosure 
contemplated by s.19; and how the law accommodates their knowledge if s.19 does 
not apply to them. As the Insurance Act 2015 takes completely different approach 
from the MIA 1906 in respect of this issue, it will be discussed whether the new Act 
can resolve such difficulties caused s.19 of the MIA 1906. 
3.3.1 Intermediate agents involved in the reinsurance market 
There are generally two broad types of intermediate agents involved in the 
reinsurance market, i.e. brokers and underwriting agency.  
Underwriting agency is authorised by the insurer under a binding authority to accept, 
manage and carry out underwriting business, collect premiums, issue certificates of 
insurance and service claims on behalf of the insurer within specific limits. The 
underwriting agent, who can also be called ‘coverholder’, can be regarded as holding 
the pen of the insurers and exercising underwriting assessment on behalf of the 
insurer. Therefore, it is basically recognised that underwriting agency is the agent of 
insurer’s rather than the assured’s, although underwriting agency may also act as an 
agent to insure when it is managing and carrying out business for an insurance pool. 
In practice, when a leading underwriter or the following underwriters under a 
reinsurance contract are mentioned, it is generally used to refer to their underwriting 
agents to whom the reinsurance broker actually presents risks, and who will accept 
or decline the risks for the syndicates or insurance companies for which he 
represents. Such underwriting agent should not fall within the scope of agent to 
insure for disclosure purpose under s.19. Actually, the binding authority, which is in 
essence similar to an contract creating agency relationship, is just a contract for 
insurance in the sense that contract of insurance will be effected by relevant agents 
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based upon those contracts.246 Consequently it cannot be regarded as an insurance 
contract or a contract uberrimae fidei to attract the duty of utmost good faith,247 
although it is suggested in obiter dictum that the underwriting agents may owe some 
personal responsibilities to the reinsurers similar to but not limited to the duty of 
disclosure.248 
On the contrary, a broker is instructed to place insurance on behalf of the insured. In 
practice, it is often implied that the reinsurance broker is authorised by the reinsured 
to appoint sub-brokers who have expertise in certain areas or be qualified to access 
a particular market. The reinsurance broker who deals with reinsurers directly is the 
placing broker, in contrast with the producing broker who is in the middle of the chain. 
Generally, it is settled that a broker is the agent of the reinsured or would-be 
reinsured.249 Normally the agents of the reinsured can be distinguished into two 
different types, i.e. the agent to know and agent to insure.250 It is now clearly decided 
by common law cases that the agent to know and the alter ego of the reinsured fall 
into the scope of s.18 of the MIA 1906, whereas the agent to insure is covered by s. 
19.251 But it is only a seemingly settled law that s.19 only applies to agents employed 
to effect the insurance whose knowledge should not be deemed to be that of the 
insured. 252 It will be discussed in the following section that what types of agent to 
insure are under a duty of disclosure contemplated by s.19; and how the law 
accommodates other intermediate agent’s knowledge if s.19 does not apply to them.  
3.3.2 The seemingly settled law as to the relevant agent under s.19 of the MIA 
1906 
In both of Court of Appeal’s cases, PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurance253and 
Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance 254  arose one same issue whether the 
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underwriting agents had to disclose his fraud against the reinsured to the reinsurers 
under s.19 (a). By rejecting such argument, the Court of Appeal gave ‘agent to insure’ 
a restricted meaning that the only person who can be agent to insure is the placing 
broker.  
In PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurance,255 which can be regarded as the leading 
authority to define the agent to insure for disclosure purpose, members of 56 
syndicates at Lloyd’s employed PCW Underwriting Agencies Ltd to manage its 
underwriting business between 1967 and 1982. PCW arranged reinsurance of 
marine and non-marine risks through brokers for them with 24 insurance companies 
and 62 other Lloyd’s syndicates, i.e. reinsurers. During this period, a number of 
individuals in PCW underwriting agency misappropriated the premiums received for 
the benefit of the insurers and applied them for their own purposes. The reinsurer 
subsequently alleged to avoid the reinsurance contracts on the grounds that such 
dishonest conduct was a material circumstance which ought to have been disclosed 
to them. The judge rejected the reinsurer’s argument on the ground that the insurers 
were not deemed to know such dishonest conduct by s.18 of the MIA 1906, neither 
did the PCW agency fall within the category of ‘agent to insure’ under s.19 (a) of 
MIA1906. On appeal, the judges dismissed reinsurer’s appeal by holding that the 
PCW Underwriting Agency Ltd was not ‘agent to insure’ within s.19 (a) of the 
MIA1906, since they had not effected the reinsurance contract themselves directly 
but had placed the risks through brokers. It had been held that an agent to insure, 
who is required under an personal duty to disclose not only all material 
circumstances which the reinsured is bound to disclose but also all material 
circumstances which ought to be known to him in his ordinary course of business, 
only applies to the agent who directly places the reinsurance contract with the 
reinsurer. In current case, the agent to insure was the subsequent broker Kininmonth 
rather than NAIU. Consequently, the NAIU was not the agent to insure who is under 
a separate duty of disclosure under s.19. Therefore, if American National had not 
themselves been aware of Mr. Drobny’s past, their reinsurance would not have been 
susceptible to avoidance on the basis that NAIU was aware of it.  
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The similar issue arose in ERC Frankona Reinsurance v American National 
Insurance Co,256 the claimant ERC provided a quota share reinsurance cover to the 
defendant ANICO who participated in a pool established by National Accident 
Insurance Group (NAIG). The pool was managed by National Accident Insurance 
Underwriters (NAIU). NAIU instructed London brokers to place a quota share 
reinsurance of Philadelphia Life’s one-third participation in the pool with ERC. ERC 
subsequently claimed to be entitled to avoid its line on the 1998/99 quota share 
because NAIU had failed to disclose the criminal record of the Chief Executive 
Officer of NAIU. Smith J rejected that argument by following the decision of the 
majority of the Court of Appeal. It is held that NAIU who is the intermediate agent is 
not kind of agent to insure whose non-disclosure of material information would 
render the reinsurance contract avoidable.  
In conclusion, based on the Court of Appeal’s decisions, ‘agent to insure’ is given a 
restricted meaning that the only person who can be agent to insure is the placing 
broker. In another word, duty of disclosure under s.19 only burdens on the broker 
who actually deals with the insurer directly and concludes the contract in question.257 
In deciding whether an agent falls within the scope of agent to insure under s.19, 
three significant elements should be taken into consideration, i.e. whether the agent 
is relevant of placing business for the reinsured, whether the agent deals with the 
reinsurers directly in placing procedures and whether the agent functions as effecting 
the contract of insurance in question.  
3.3.3 Problems in practice relating to the relevance of agent to insure for the 
purpose of duty of utmost good faith  
Although it is clearly established that the agent to insure is imposed a separate duty 
of utmost good faith by s.19 of the MIA 1906, it still arises problems in practice. In 
London subscription market, the procedure is complicated to place a reinsurance 
contract of complex nature and large size. It is not an uncommon practice to involve 
a chain of agents in arranging reinsurance covers. Typically the producing broker 
instructed by the reinsured will often instruct a different placing broker to present the 
risk to the reinsurers, for geographical reasons or to use the expertise of a broker 
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specialising in the particular type of risk in question. It is controversial whether the 
agent to insure for disclosure purpose confines only to the placing broker, or maybe 
putting it in this way, whether the duty of disclosure extends to other brokers in the 
middle of the placing chain.  
As discussed above, it is a seemingly settled law that s.19 only applies to agents 
employed to effect the insurance whose knowledge should not be deemed to be that 
of the insured. 258 However, such decision is not incontrovertible. Although following 
cases found them have to be bound by this decision, opponent opinion was 
advanced that knowledge possessed by an intermediate agent should be 
disclosed.259 In ERC Frankona Reinsurance v American National Insurance Co,260 
although the Andrew Smith J found himself bound to follow the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in the PCW and Group Josi cases, he still expressed he recognition of 
potential forceful criticism of such reasoning in PCW. It is still arguable whether the 
placing broker is the only one kind of agent to insure contemplated by s.19. If the 
answer is affirmative, then how could the duty of disclosure accommodate the 
knowledge of other kind of intermediate agent appointed by the insured to arrange 
insurance cover? It is concerned that absence of duty to disclose would make 
intermediate brokers who is in the middle of the chain withhold or conceal material 
information simply by appointing a sub-broker to carry out placement no matter he 
chooses to do so intentionally or is required to do so by market custom. However, it 
does not reconcile with the market practice to burden a duty of disclosure upon the 
producing broker or other intermediate agents. How could they disclose the material 
information if he does not deal with the reinsurer at all? Actually, even if where the 
information within the producing broker’s knowledge is caught by s.19 (a),261 i.e. if 
the producing broker has any information which ought to be communicated to or 
ought to be known by the placing broker in the ordinary course of business, it does 
not matter whether the producing broker are required to disclose it personally to 
reinsurer or not, because the reinsurer will know it anyway so far as placing broker 
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has fulfilled his duty of disclosure.262 It makes little difference in practice whether the 
producing broker falls within ambit of agent to insure in s.19 or not. Therefore, it is 
indicated that even though the agent to insure for the purpose under s. 19 is not 
confined to placing brokers, they must be the most obvious example of the type of 
agent contemplated.263  So where an intermediate agent was obliged to disclose 
every material circumstance under s.19 it was very likely that it should be made by 
the agent at the last tache of the chain dealing with the reinsurer directly anyway.  
Although it is seemingly decided that the any intermediate agents in the middle of the 
chain are not required to disclose material information directly to reinsurers, the 
common law does not intent to make any agent to inform escape from passing on 
their possessed material information down the chain. In PCW Syndicates v PCW 
Reinsurers,264 where the issue as to whether an agent to insure was limited to a 
broker arose, Saville L.J., by relying upon Blackburn Low & Co. v Vigors, 265 
expressly objected burden of disclosure upon the intermediate agents but 
emphasised that what an intermediate agent is expected to is to pass on information 
either to further intermediaries or to those actually dealing directly with insurers. The 
insurer is entitled to rely upon that the agent to insure who is effecting the insurance 
has received information from the producing broker in his ordinary course of 
business. Even though the intermediate agent’s knowledge is not passed on to the 
broker who actually deals with the reinsurers, such knowledge may be imputed to 
the reinsured and then subject to a duty of disclosure of the reinsured under s.18 
rather than falling within the scope of the placing broker’s duty under s.19.  
This is actually the reasoning of ss. 3 and 4 under the Insurance Act 2015. Under the 
new approach, all the information within the knowledge of relevant agent who is 
responsible for the reinsured’s reinsurance is imputed into the reinsured’s knowledge, 
consequently subject to a fair presentation to the reinsurer. It means that the 
reinsured is obliged to disclose not only what he actually knows but also what ought 
to be known by him, i.e. what is known to the individuals who are responsible for the 
reinsured’s reinsurance contract. Therefore, it achieves the same effect as a 
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combination of s.18 and s.19 under the MIA 1906. It doesn’t matter whether such 
material information is actually known by the agent to insure who deals with the 
reinsurer directly, or any other intermediate agents in the middle of the chain like 
producing brokers. As long as it is actually known or ought to be known by the 
intermediate agents responsible for the reinsured’s reinsurance in his ordinary 
course of business, it needs to be disclosed to the reinsurer under the reinsured’s 
duty of fair presentation. The Insurance Act defines the relevant person responsible 
for the insured’s insurance in s. 4(8) (b).266 So any individuals participating on behalf 
of the reinsured in the process of procuring reinsurance can fall within the scope. 
Basically they are divided into two campuses, namely the employees of the 
reinsured himself, and the agent to insure of the reinsured. It is not easy to put 
forward the exhausted examples of all possible capacities of the reinsured’s agents 
involved in the placing process. For example it could include the agent of the 
reinsured responsible for risk management, collecting relevant information of the 
reinsurance contract, negotiating the contract terms, doing reasonable search of 
information of material circumstances, passing on placing information to agent 
responsible for next step,  and finding qualified placing broker to deal with the 
reinsurer etc. Therefore it is suggested that, basically any intermediate agent of the 
reinsured involved in the placing process and relevant in effecting reinsurance 
contract for the reinsured can be included into this category for imputation of 
knowledge purpose under s.4. Consequently this broad ambit of relevant agent to 
insure may have some impact on the scope of the knowledge of the reinsured; 
subsequently effect the scope of the duty of fair presentation.  
3.4 Scope of the knowledge possessed by the agent to insure for the purpose 
of duty of utmost good faith  
Under the  MIA 1906, s.19 formulates the personal duty of disclosure on the agent to 
insure in two aspects. s.19 (b) employs a straightforward way by requiring the agent 
to insure to pass on material information which his principal is bound to disclose,267 
whereas the s.19 (a) is more complicated requiring the agent to insure by a broad 
wording to disclose every material facts within his own knowledge, including both 
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actual knowledge and deemed knowledge, no matter his principal knows the 
information or not. Besides the materiality test, there are only some general 
exceptions in s.18 (3) and a limit provided in s.19 (b) qualifying the agent’s personal 
duty of disclosure, so that the scope of the duty is ambiguous. Such broad wording 
arise two controversial issues in respect of the scope of the placing broker’s duty of 
disclosure, i.e. whether information acquired and held by the agent to insure 
exceeding his capacity as broker of the reinsured need to be disclosed to reinsurer 
and whether s.19 operates subject to the fraud exception established in the Re 
Hampshire Land case or even wider principle. Consequently, difficulties may arise in 
practice where the broker who plays the role of agent to insure may also play 
multiple roles in the operation of the business, involving in some other processes 
with the reinsurer or the reinsured, such as concluding an open cover or a binding 
authority with the reinsurers before any contract of insurance comes into existence, 
or acting as the underwriting agent of the reinsured in managing an insurance pool 
and undertaking to reinsure the pool’s liabilities like a dual agent. It is worth 
discussing how the duty of utmost good faith applies to the broker’s knowledge in 
such circumstances, as it is controversial in conflicting authorities whether the 
knowledge of any material information acquired by the broker in any other capacity 
needs to be disclosed to the reinsurer. In addition, as to the scope of knowledge 
disclosable to the reinsurer by the broker, no matter under his personal duty of 
disclosure imposed by s. 19 of the MIA 1906 or on behalf of the reinsured under s. 3 
of the Insurance Act 2015, it is unsettled whether there are any exceptions 
undermining the duty besides circumstances expressly excluded from duty of 
disclosure.268 Those difficulties will be discussed in the following sections. 
3.4.1 General exception to the scope of broker’s knowledge for duty of 
disclosure purpose  
S.18 (3) of the MIA 1906 expressly provides some general exceptions to the scope 
of the assured’s duty of disclosure.269 It can be said that those four circumstances 
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set out in the section are either immaterial or material but waived from disclosure to 
insurers. Although s.19 (a), which is only about the broker’s duty of disclosure, 
adopts a broad wording requiring every material circumstances to be disclosed to the 
insurer, it is suggested that s.19 should operate subject to provision s.18 (3). Such 
reasoning is supported in an authority Societte Anonyme d’Intermediaries 
Luxembourgeois (SAIL) v Farex Gie.270  In SAIL v Farex Gie, Saville L.J. said that 
why it should be a breach of good faith sufficient to deprive the assured of his 
contract if the agent fails to disclose something which, had the assured known of it, 
would not have had to be disclosed by the latter.271 Therefore, exceptions provided 
by s.18 (3) should apply to s.19 too. The agent to insure should not be obligated to 
disclose facts which the reinsured would not be required to disclose if the reinsured 
knew them. It is irrelevant whatever the broker’s state of mind is. Applying exceptions 
in s.18 (3) to s.19 will make those two allied sections function correspondingly. 
However, in practice if the reinsurer does inquire about the circumstances listed in 
s.18 (3), it is still the reinsured’s and his broker’s duty to disclose and make a correct 
representation those information. 
Under the Insurance Act 2015, there is no separate duty of utmost good faith 
imposed on the brokers any more. But the general exception rules set by s.18 (3) is 
retained by the new act but with some modification.272 Compared with s.18 (3), 
material information which either diminishes the risk, within the insurer’s knowledge, 
or waived by the insurer is still excluded from the scope of the duty of fair 
presentation imposed on the insured like before. However, the exception that any 
circumstances superfluous to disclose by reason of any express or implied warranty 
is removed by the new act. 
Moreover, s.19 (b) of the MIA 1906 expressly provides an exception to the broker’s 
duty of disclosure that the insurer is not entitled to avoid the contract on the ground 
of the broker’s non-disclosure, if the material information comes into the assured’s 
knowledge too late to communicate it to the broker. Therefore, if the reinsured is 
informed of any information material to the risk, it is the reinsured’s duty to forward 
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those material facts with all reasonable diligence to his broker so that the broker can 
pass on the information before the reinsurance is effected. In 21st century, with 
modern methods of communication in worldwide use, it becomes more difficult for 
the reinsured to prove that information reached his knowledge too late to 
communicate it to its agent. It actually makes little effect in practice, so such 
exception is also removed from the new act. 
3.4.2 Difficulties in practice as to disclosure of the broker’s knowledge 
possessed in other capacity  
3.4.2.1 Information possessed and held by the broker in other capacities rather 
than agent to insure 
S.19 (a) provides that an agent must disclose to the insurer every material 
circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to insure is deemed to know 
every circumstance which in the ordinary course of business ought to have been 
known by, or to have been communicated to him. The broad wording of s.19 (a) 
makes ambit of the disclosure controversial. It is unsettled whether brokers are 
required by s.19 to disclose material information possessed and held in other 
capacities rather than agent of the assured according the broad meaning of the 
words in s.19 (a). If the answer is positive, then to what extent, and in what 
circumstances is the broker obliged to disclose information acquired in this way? 
Such difficulties might arise particularly in context of reinsurance contract, as the 
extent of reinsurance broker’s duty to disclose his knowledge of claims may 
depending upon other reinsurance policies of the same reinsured.273  There are two 
contrary opinions in this respect of the scope.  
3.4.2.1.1 Conflicting authorities  
It can be said that the common law authorities governing scope of knowledge of an 
agent to insure acquired in a different capacity for disclosure purpose is complex and 
difficult to reconcile. There are two contrary opinions in this respect of the scope of 
knowledge of the agent to insure. 
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On one hand, it is proposed that material facts disclosable are confined to those the 
broker possesses and holds in his capacity as the agent of the reinsured. In PCW 
Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers,274 reinsurers alleged that reinsurance contract should 
be avoided because the reinsured’s underwriting agent did not disclose that he had 
defrauded his principal. At first instance, it was decided by Mr. Justice Waller that a 
broker who had committed a fraud against his principal was not obliged to disclose 
such fact to the reinsurer as he acquired that knowledge in a capacity other than 
agent of the reinsured.275 On appeal, the court upheld the decision but on different 
grounding. However Staughton L.J. went on further to comment that there were no 
authorities supporting the broker to disclose information received in capacity other 
than agent of the reinsured.276 Therefore the court refused to go further to decide on 
this point. However, in reliance on the decision in PCW, it has been suggested by 
certain comments that material circumstances known to broker need not to be 
disclosed, unless such knowledge was acquired in his capacity as agent of the 
insured under the contract in question. Therefore, in the context of reinsurance, it is 
held that such knowledge is not disclosable if acquired by the reinsurance broker at 
a different level in the reinsurance chain.  
On the contrary, there are authorities holding the opinion that duty of disclosure 
under s.19 should have an inclusive ambit as the broad wording presents. It means 
that, in addition to information acquired in the capacity as the agent of the reinsured, 
information under the broker’s duty of disclosure extends to all material facts within 
the broker’s actual or deemed knowledge, no matter acquired as the broker of the 
reinsured in respect of the reinsurance contract in question or not, even not 
functioning as his broker at all. The general rules governing whether the knowledge 
of a broker acquired in other capacity should be disclosed derives primarily from 
Blackburn Low & Co v Vigors.277 In Blackburn v Vigors, a case which the s.19 is 
founded on, House of Lords rules that the agent to insure is bound to disclose all 
material facts within his knowledge as his principal. It is the wording of s.19 itself that 
suggests disclosure of all known material facts subsuming information acquired in 
other capacities. Such view is supported by following authorities, though in dicta. In 
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El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc,278 Hoffmann L.J. held that the broker’s failure to 
disclose material facts within his knowledge may make the insurance avoidable, 
even though he did not obtain that fact in his capacity as agent for the insured. The 
editor of Arnould’s law of Marine Insurance and Average 16th ed. took the view that 
all information that is or ought to be within the broker’s knowledge must be disclosed. 
However, he also admitted that “[D]ifficult problems sometimes arise, particularly in 
reinsurance contracts, concerning, for example, the extent of the broker’s duty to 
disclose his knowledge of claims pending on other policies of the same 
reassured.”279 
3.4.2.1.2 Proposition relating to scope of the broker’s knowledge for the 
purpose of disclosure 
As it is not easy to reconcile the authorities, the proposition that broker’s knowledge 
for the purpose of disclosure is merely confined to facts known in capacity of the 
reinsured’s agent to effect reinsurance contract is still not convincing. Before any 
suitable case comes to the court, brokers are advised to disclose all the material 
information within their knowledge to reinsurers, irrespective of the capacity in which 
the information is acquired or held.  
In practice, there are quite complex scenarios where the broker may be involved at 
different stages in a placement chain of insurance, reinsurance and retrocession 
covers; or as broker for a different reinsured on other overlapping reinsurances.  It is 
quite far from straightforward to just apply the general principles outlined in 
Blackburn Low case. Caution should be exercised in relying on those authorities 
outlining general rules on whether knowledge gained at one level in the reinsurance 
chain should be disclosed at another level. The principal authority dealing with 
knowledge gained by a broker in other capacities in acting at different levels in a 
reinsurance chain is Societe Anonyme d'lntermediaires Luxembourgeois v Farex 
Gie.280 In SAIL v Farex, the broker who is employed to place reinsurance obtained a 
retrocession cover offer before approaching reinsurers. However, the retrocession 
was avoided by the retrocessionaires on the ground that their own agent had 
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exceeded his authority. Therefore, the reinsurer alleged that the reinsurance contract 
should be avoided as the brokers did not disclose his knowledge that the 
retrocession might not be valid. The court rejected the reinsurer’s argument because 
of the broker’s unawareness of the authority flaw. However, the court went further to 
comment that even if the broker had actually possessed such information, the 
reinsurer, for whom such information is held, would be deemed to waive disclosure 
of it, since the broker was the agent of the reinsurer when he obtained retrocession 
cover for the reinsurer and the reinsurer’s knowledge of such information make it 
immaterial any more. Although the facts in the SAIL v Farex case did not arise on the 
issue of scope of the broker’s duty of disclosure, it is still considered by Hoffmann L.J 
that the reinsured and his agent are under a duty to disclose ‘every material 
circumstance’ of which they have knowledge of, irrespectively of the way in which 
that knowledge is acquired.281 Later Hoffmann LJ added that the agent’s duty to 
disclosure includes all material circumstances known to him in any capacity. 282 
Saville L.J. expressed his agreement with above comment that the duty of disclosure 
should not confine to the knowledge acquired by the agent from the reinsured but 
extends to knowledge otherwise acquired. 283 Therefore, in the scenario where the 
broker is involved in more than one stages of placing a chain of insurance, 
reinsurance and retrocession cover, the broker is still obliged to disclose material 
information acquired in another levels. But if the broker holds such information for 
the reinsurer, it can be regarded that the disclosure of such information is waived by 
the reinsurer, rather than such information is not within the scope of disclosure. 
However, such situation should be distinguished from the situation of separate 
divisions of a large broking company placing different reinsurance contracts. The 
broker is only required to disclose the information actually known or ought to be 
known by him in his ordinary course of business. It is not necessarily for one division 
of a large broking company to know information communicated to other different 
divisions. It is the circumstances in individual case that determines whether an 
individual broker ought to obtain such material information from his colleagues. 
Actually this proposition corresponds with market practice, as it is possible for 
reinsurance broker to acquire material information entirely unconnected with his 
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function as the reinsured’s broker, such as refusals by other reinsurers, losses 
reported to the market or pending claims on other policies not effected by the broker. 
The reinsurer should be informed of such information within the broker’s knowledge, 
unless where the broker owes a duty to a third party to keep that information 
confidential. For instance, in placing direct insurance and reinsurance contracts, a 
broker may be under the duty of disclosure to disclose some confidential information 
obtained in his capacity as agent of the underlying insured from a third party. 
However, it is suggested that normally confidentiality will rarely be an excuse for not 
producing material information in practice, as it is a general understanding in the 
insurance market that information used for placing insurance may be disclosed by 
the reinsureds and their broker for the purpose of placing reinsurance if necessary. 
To solve this difficulty, the Insurance Act 2015 expressly stipulates that confidential 
information known by the broker will not be imputed into the insured’s knowledge, if 
the broker acquires such information through a business relationship with a person 
who is not connected with the contract of insurance. 284  As such confidential 
information is not that material information ought to be known by the reinsured in his 
ordinary course of business, thereon subject to disclosure. Consequently, the broker 
will not face such dilemma anymore in presenting material information to the 
reinsurer on behalf of the reinsured. 
Moreover, there may be market practices or customs that some broker possesses 
professional knowledge base and therefore is regarded as a specialist in certain 
areas. Such information may be mystery to the reinsured or has come into the 
broker’s knowledge when he is not in capacity of the reinsured’s broker. It is advised 
that brokers had better to disclose such information to reinsurers, especially when 
their expertise and reputation are relied upon by the reinsurers.  
Furthermore, the Insurance Act 2015 reflecting the latest legal spirit supports such 
proposition too. Under s. 4(8) (b), it expressly states that an individual is responsible 
for the insured’s insurance if the individual participates on behalf of the insured in the 
process of procuring the insured’s insurance whether the individual does so as the 
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insured’s employee or agent, as an employee of the insured’s agent or in any other 
capacity. It means when the broker participates in placing reinsurance on behalf of 
the reinsured in whatever capacities, he falls within the scope of individuals 
responsible for the reinsured’s reinsurance contract. Consequently his knowledge 
including that acquired by him in any capacities should be imputed to the reinsured’s, 
and needs to be presented to the reinsurer fairly.   
To sum up, it is suggested that the placing broker should disclose all material 
information known or ought to be known by him irrespective of where it is acquired 
and for whom the information is held, i.e. no matter as the broker of the reinsured to 
effect the reinsurance contract in question at all, even if the broker acquired such 
information coincidentally. 
3.4.2.2 Difficulties arising from the situation of the broker functioning in dual 
agency situation 
Given the proximity and complex nature of the relationship between the participants 
in the market practice, the broker may find himself in a dual agent role, serving both 
of the original insured and the original insurer/reinsured, or acting as the agent of the 
reinsured and the reinsurer in placing reinsurance and retrocession covers. It is not 
an uncommon practice of a broker acting as agent for two potential or actual 
opposing parties in the Lloyd’s insurance market. Such dual agency roles of the 
broker may give rise to potential conflicts of interest, enlarge the ambit of knowledge 
of the broker accessed in multi capacities, and then affect the operation of the duty 
of utmost good faith in placing process.  
3.4.2.2.1 Importance of the consent of the primary principal  
 Under common law it is settled that the reinsured is the primary principal of the 
broker in placing reinsurance so that the reinsured’s interests must be placed first 
above all other parties. 285  It is decided that no agent who has accepted an 
employment from one principal can in law accept an engagement from a second 
principal inconsistent with his duty to the first principal, unless he makes the fullest 
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disclosure of his interest to each principal and obtains their consents to the dual 
employment.286 Consequently the broker owes a full rigour of fiduciary duties to the 
reinsured and the principal’s consent must be obtained by the broker before he can 
act as underwriting agent for the reinsurers. It is open to the broker’s primary 
principal, i.e. the reinsured to agree the broker’s conduct. Therefore such conflicting 
position may not always cause a problem as it is often agreed by the broker and 
reinsured in advance.  
3.4.2.2.2 Practical difficulties for the broker to obtain consent of his primary 
principal  
It is a frequent practice in the business insurance market that a broker acts as 
agents for two opposing parties, such as a underwriting agent of the reinsurers by 
concluding an open cover or a binding authority with the reinsurers before any 
contract of insurance comes into existence; or acting as the underwriting agent in 
managing an insurance pool and undertaking to reinsure the pool’s liabilities for 
more than one principal; or starting at the top of the retrocession chain and work 
backwards, for instance, securing a reinsurance package first before trying to place 
the insurance itself with no identified insured  at all. In such a case the fact that 
reinsurance is already available is likely to be a material element to influence the 
underwriting decision.287 And the broker will have a better prospect of persuading the 
underwriter to participate in the primary insurance if he is able to offer him 
reinsurance cover at the same time. In fact, the broker is on his own initiative to 
approach potential principals to be with an advance agreed binding promise of 
reinsurance cover, rather than instructed by the primary principle’s instruction. As to 
the reinsurer, he is bounding by his promise to provide reinsurance cover for 
whatever reinsured may subsequently write a line on the primary cover and desire to 
reinsure the whole or part of the line.288 Such process practice can carry on further 
up the chain for the broker to approach the retrocessionaire to find retrocession 
cover for the potential reinsurers.  
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As the broker is in fact on his own initiative to approach potential principals to be, the 
so called primary principal has not come into existence then, it is arguable who 
should be the broker’s principal and whose authority should be obtained in the above 
discussed dual-agency scenarios. Although the broker becomes the agent of the 
insurer or reinsurer first in placing reinsurance or retrocession, it is suggested that 
his primary principal should still be the potential insured or reinsured. As it is already 
settled that the broker should be agent to insure of the original insured or reinsured 
in placing insurance covers. The identity of the insured or reinsured will not 
necessarily be known at the time when reinsurers are approached. Nor will the 
broker needs to know for certain whether the prospective insurers will even want to 
purchase the reinsured cover or not. The broker is anyway functioning as the agent 
to insure of the insured or reinsured to be, with anticipation of the potential principal’s 
request and stands in the interest of his principal, but just having the intending 
principal’s identity pending until the contract of insurance is finalised.289 Even when 
the broker offers the firm indication from the proposed reinsurer to his original 
principal, he is still acting on behalf of his principal, the reinsured. Therefore, the 
broker should take his intending principal’s interest as priority above all other clients, 
even though he may not know its identity.  
3.4.2.2.3 Managing the conflicts of interests 
The issue as to potential conflicts of interest in dual-agency situation was considered 
by the Court of Appeal in HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v JLT Risk Solutions 
Ltd,290 where the broker was involved in the placement of insurance and in arranging 
reinsurance cover for the reinsured.291 Although the decision did not concern conflict 
of interests issues alone, the existence of such practice in the London Market is 
recognised by the court. It was held by the court of appeal that the fact that a broker 
acting for two principals may find himself in a conflict of interest, does not necessarily 
absolve him of his duties to both principals.292  As the broker has assumed duties to 
both principals, he must properly carryout his duties to both those principals. The fact 
that the broker did not perform his duty to one principal does not absolve him from 
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performing his duty to another. If there is information which may potentially put cover 
at risk, both clients will want to know about it and, in normal circumstances both 
clients should be informed of the fact. This is consistent with the way in which market 
practice works. However, in normal circumstances, if the broker failed to disclose to 
the reinsurer material information passed on by the reinsured, the reinsurer on 
whose behalf the risks are underwritten by the broker should not be allowed to avoid 
the contract for non-disclosure.293 It is suggested that such information possessed by 
the underwriting agent of reinsurers is deemed to be imputed into the reinsurers’ 
knowledge so that disclosure of such knowledge is waived by the reinsurer, although 
such knowledge does fall within the scope of disclosure upon the broker.  
3.4.3 Fraud exception to the broker’s independent duty under s.19 
In practice, there is possibility that the broker may do wrongs or even commit fraud 
against the reinsurer or his principal, i.e. the reinsured in placing process. It is 
arguable whether such wrong doings or fraud committed by the broker is a material 
circumstance to be disclosed to the reinsurers under s.19. If there should exist a 
fraud exception to the scope of the broker’s duty of disclosure, how the fraud 
exception rules should be interpreted and how it will affect the reinsured’s right under 
the reinsurance contract which the broker effects on his behalf? Details will be 
discussed in following sections.  
3.4.3.1 Is fraudulent act included in the broker’s knowledge disclosable to 
reinsurer?  
3.4.3.1.1 The Re Hampshire Land principle  
English law has long established a well-recognised exception to the circumstances 
where agents’ knowledge might be regarded as the principal’s. There will be no 
imputation of such knowledge into the principal’s if the agent to know has committed 
a fraud against his principal or be guilty of irregularity. 294  As it is against common 
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sense that agent will communicate such information to his principal; therefore such 
fraud is not what the principal will be aware of in his ordinary course of business. 
Although the actual facts and ruling in Re Hampshire Land Co. Re295 does not 
support this proposition,296 it has now been taken as the authority and applied in 
number of cases. The phrase ‘Re Hampshire Land’ has been used as the title of the 
exception to the rule of imputation of knowledge, and recently it is arguably proposed 
that the principle would be wide enough to protect the principal from his agent’s 
wrongful acts.297  
3.4.3.1.2 Difficulties of applying the ‘Re Hampshire Land’ rule to the duty of 
disclosure  
In respect of performing duty of disclosure in effecting reinsurance, it is unsettled that 
whether the fraud exception can apply to ss.18 and 19 which are a discrete set of 
rules requiring both the reinsured and its broker to disclose every material 
information within their knowledge.  
Under s.18 the reinsured is required to disclose all material information known and 
ought to be known in his ordinary course of business, including the knowledge of his 
agent to know under the imputation rules. As the Re Hampshire Land principle 
negates imputation of an agent’s fraud into the reinsured’s deemed knowledge, the 
agent’s dishonesty is not the information which the reinsured needs to disclose to the 
reinsurer, unless he actually knows it.298  
By contrast to s.18, s.19 imposes an independent duty on the agent to insure in 
effecting reinsurance for his principals. Therefore the relevant knowledge to be 
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disclosed is the broker’s rather than his principals’, i.e. the reinsured’s. S.19 (a) 
confines such knowledge to all the material information what ought to be known by 
or communicated to the placing broker in his ordinary course of business. So the 
knowledge of the broker for duty of disclosure purpose includes not only what the 
reinsured is bound to disclose, but also what the broker knows beyond the assured’s 
knowledge ambit. If the reinsured’s other agent has committed dishonesty, it is 
apparently not information which ought to be communicated to the agent to insure in 
his ordinary course of business then falls into the scope of the placing broker’s duty 
of disclosure. Therefore, unless the placing broker actually possesses information of 
such fraud, the placing broker is not under a duty to disclose such information to the 
reinsurer. However, it is problematic whether the agent to insure is required to 
disclose his own fraud against the reinsured or even against the reinsurer which 
makes the reinsured secondary victim.299  
It is settled law that s.19 imposes an independent duty of disclosure upon the agent 
to insure, rather than proceeds through the route of imputing the agent’s knowledge 
into the assured. Therefore, the Re Hampshire Land principle which is an exception 
to imputation of knowledge rule is not pertinent to the issue here. Even if the Re 
Hampshire Land principle could protect the reinsured from losing reinsurance cover 
due to non-disclosure of its agent’s fraud against himself through the route under 
s.18, it is still possible for the reinsurer to allege that the reinsurance contract is 
avoidable due to the placing broker’s breach of the separate duty under s.19 by 
concealing his fraud against his own principal.  
3.4.3.1.3 Justification of applicability of the fraud exception to the broker’s 
duty of disclosure under s.19 
Although the imputation route set up in the Hampshire land principles is closed under 
the s.19, there are strong authorities supporting applying such fraud exception to 
s.19. In PCW Syndicates v PCW Insurers300  and the parallel case Group Josi Re v 
Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd, 301  the reinsurers alleged to avoid the reinsurance 
because reinsured’s underwriting agent did not disclose that he defrauded the 
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reinsured. The court of appeal held that the fraud exception applies to section 19 
although on different grounds. It is held by Saville L.J that claims for avoidance 
should be dismissed because an underwriting agency is not the agent to insure 
under s.19 (a). By contrast, Staughton L.J. approved such decision on different 
ground. In his opinion, the duty of disclosure under s.19 arises out of the fact that the 
agent to insure is acting as an agent of the reinsured. When the agent defrauds the 
reinsured, he neither acts as the reinsured’ agent nor acquires or possesses such 
information in the capacity of reinsured’s agent. So the placing broker is not 
regarded as possessing such information of fraud. Therefore, s.19 does not give the 
reinsurer a defense to avoid the contract. Although it is still unsettled and 
controversial whether the agent to insure need to disclose information possessed in 
the capacity other than the reinsured’s agent, the court of appeal prepares to confirm 
the application of the fraud exception to s. 19. The reasoning in the PCW case is 
consistent with the one behind Re Hampshire Land principle.302 An innocent principal 
should not be harmed by his agent’s fraudulent commission or guilt of irregularity 
against himself if it is impossible for him to be actually aware of it. 
Moreover, it is proposed in Arab Bank Plc v Zurich Insurance Co that an employee is 
under no duty to disclose his own dereliction of his duty to his employer. 303 In Arab 
Bank plc v Zurich, the managing director deliberately made a fraudulent valuation on 
behalf of the insured. The insurer alleged to avoid the insurance cover on the ground 
of non-disclosure of the agent’s fraud. Although the primary victim of fraud was the 
lending institute who had been relied upon the fraudulent valuation, Rix J found that 
the insured was the secondary victim of the agent’s fraud, or at least the insured’s 
agent had been guilty of dishonesty. It is held by Rix J that an employee is under no 
duty to disclose his own dereliction of duty to his employer. Therefore analogically, it 
is absurd to impose a duty upon the agent to insure to disclose his own dishonesty 
against his principal to reinsurer when effecting reinsurance contract. 
Furthermore, if the agent’s dishonesty is not which should be known by the assured 
in his ordinary course of business under s.18, why should the assured be vitiated by 
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the dishonesty of his agent to insure under s.19? Staughton L.J expressed such 
concern in PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers.304 In his opinion, the reinsured that 
was protected by Re Hampshire Land Co exception should not be vitiated merely 
because the fraudster is agent to insure under s.19. Re Hampshire Land Co principle 
should not be confined to cases where the agent’s knowledge is imputed into the 
principal or deemed to be the knowledge of the principal. It should extend to any 
case where the principal’s rights are affected if the agent does not make disclosure 
to a third party.305 No matter the scope of the Re Hampshire Land Co principle can 
be extended or not, the rationale behind is consistent with its original intention. The 
principal’s right should not be impaired by his agent’s fraud or dishonesty, even if the 
agent is an agent to insure who takes an independent duty of disclosure in effecting 
reinsurance. It would be unreasonable to create such remarkable difference between 
those two allied sections.  
It can be concluded that s.19 operates subject to a fraud exception as well as s.18, 
so that the reinsured’s rights will not be impaired by broker’s non-disclosure of fraud 
committed at least against himself, although the fraud exception here is not exactly 
the same as the Re Hampshire Land principle which negates imputation of such 
fraud into the assured’s knowledge under s.18. Such difficulty should eliminate after 
the Insurance Act 2015 comes into force. S.3 of Insurance Act 2015 takes the 
imputation approach that attributes all the information within the person who is 
responsible for the insurance contract into the insured’s knowledge. Consequently 
Re Hampshire Land principle can apply to the duty of fair presentation directly. Any 
fraud conducted against the reinsured’s interest is not a information that can be 
imputed into the reinsured’s knowledge. Therefore the broker is not obliged to 
present such information to the reinsurer.  
3.4.3.2 A wider principle than the fraud exception applicable to the duty of 
disclosure? 
Since the reinsured is protected from vitiation by the agent’s fraud against himself, it 
is proposed that there may be a wider principle than the fraud exception applicable 
to the duty of disclosure so that the exception will extend to circumstances which 
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lack actual fraud of the agent against his principal. 306  Although there are some 
authorities expressing readiness to accept a wider exception rule, it is still open for 
the court to define the ambit of exception rule.  
3.4.3.2.1 Information unreasonable to be inferred into the principal’s 
knowledge 
In Group Josi Re, Saville L.J was prepared to define the scope of the fraud exception 
as cases of ‘the agent’s or director’s fraud or other breach of duty to the company’.307 
In Kingscroft Insurance Co Ltd v Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd,308 Colman 
J concluded that, besides the situation where the agent’s fraud against its principal is 
not to be imputed into its principal, there are also circumstances where imputation is 
negated in absence of actual fraud. It is the type and nature of information in 
question that makes it unreasonable to infer principal’s knowledge in his ordinary 
course of business. That is to say, no matter the agent has committed any actual 
fraud against its principal or not; the information will not be imputed into principal’s 
knowledge unless it is a reasonable case to infer that the agent will refer such 
information to its principal in the ordinary course of business. For instance, it is 
proposed that an agent will not generally disclose its wrongdoing or non-fraudulent 
breach of duty to its principal in the ordinary course of business.  
3.4.3.2.2 Knowledge of his own dishonesty beyond fraud held by broker  
In Arab Bank plc v Zurich Insurance Co,309 Rix J adopted Colman J’s analysis and 
went further to accept that there should be wider exception beyond fraud. In his 
judgment, Rix J comments that the agent’s knowledge of his own dishonesty, even 
without fraud, will not be transferred to his principal, if it is impossible to infer so in 
justice and common sense.  
However, such decision was doubted by the Court of Appeal in Stone & Rolls Ltd ( In 
Liquidation) v Moore Stephens (A firm), 310  where a company claim against its 
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accountants for not picking up the fraud of the company’s controller directed against 
third parties to whom the company had become liable. It was held by the Court of 
Appeal that the fraud committed by the company’s controller was directed against 
the third parties rather than the company itself. Therefore, the fraud had been 
imputed into the company’s knowledge so that it cannot be saved by the Re 
Hampshire Land rule. Although the House of Lords reached the decision on different 
ground that Re Hampshire Land rule does not applies to one-man company situation 
where the company and the agent cannot be distinguishable, their lordships still 
upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. 312 
In ERC Frankona Reinsurance v America National Insurance Co, 313  reinsured 
alleged that his agent’s failure to report losses which reflected badly on the agent 
should not be imputed in to the principal because the agent would not disclose 
information that reflected badly on it in ordinary course of business. Although Andrew 
Smith J accepted Colman J’s opinion in Kingscroft v Nissan case, he rejected the 
reinsured’s argument.  
As discussed above, although there are some authorities ready to accept existence 
of wider exception beyond fraud, none of the allegers succeeded due to the facts in 
the cases. As a result of current authorities, scope of the exception rule will be 
regarded open for the Court of Appeal to consider until any suitable case reaches the 
court.  
3.4.3.2.3 Proposition for the rules of a wider exception principle  
If there is a wider exception principle beyond fraud protecting the reinsured, it is 
arguable that whether such wider exception rule would apply analogically to s.19 
which burdens the broker a personal duty of disclosure, although not through the 
imputation route. Provided that there exists a wider exception beyond fraud 
applicable to s.18, the reason why reinsureds are exempted from disclosing some 
type of information to reinsurers is that they are deemed to have no knowledge of 
such non-fraudulent information rather than reinsurers waive disclosure of such 
information within reinsureds’ knowledge. If the reinsured did actually know such 
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material information from any possible path, he is still obliged to disclose it. As to 
broker who effects reinsurance personally under s.19, it is doubtful why he can 
escape from disclosing such material information if he actually possesses it, even 
though it may reflect badly on himself to some extent. After all, it is the essence of 
doctrine of utmost good faith that all material known information should be disclosed 
precisely so that the insurer could make an informed decision.  
Therefore, it is suggested that there should not be any wider exception beyond fraud 
exempting the broker from disclosing information within his knowledge to the 
reinsurer. Even if there does exist one, the test should not be easy to satisfy 
otherwise it would undermine the doctrine of utmost good faith. This proposition 
corresponds the spirits reflected in the latest insurance legislation. The Insurance Act 
2015 is silent on any possible wider exception to the duty of fair presentation. The 
only qualification to the scope of the knowledge for disclosure purpose is the general 
exception rules set out in s.3 (5) and the confidential information exception set out in 
s.4(4) on the insured’s knowledge. The essence of the duty of fair presentation is 
that both  parties should exercise reasonable effect and endeavor to make the risks 
presented fairly so that an informed underwriting decision can be made by the 
insurer.   
3.5 Summary of the framework of duty of utmost good faith regarding the 
reinsurance broker’s duty of disclosure  
Since House of Lords’ decision in HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase 
Manhattan Bank,314 it is a settled law that s.19 places a personal duty of disclosure 
upon the reinsurance broker separately from the reinsured’s duty of disclosure under 
s.18 rather than going through the imputation route. The broker is not only required 
to disclose material facts which the reinsured is bound to disclose, but also required 
to disclose material circumstances as provided in s.19 (a) which the reinsured 
neither know nor ought to have known.  However, this duty is significantly changed 
by the Insurance Act 2015. Under the new act, broker’s personal duty is eliminated 
and his knowledge which is material information disclosable to the reinsurer is 
imputed into the reinsured’s, and then should be fairly presented to the reinsurer.  
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As to relevant agent under s.19, on the balance of authorities, it is seemingly settled 
that s. 19 only applies to the agent who is the last tache in the chain to place the risk 
directly with reinsurer, i.e. the placing brokers. Once any intermediate agents are 
involved into the negotiation of effecting reinsurance, no matter underwriting agency 
or appointed sub-brokers dealing with the reinsurer indirectly, they do not fall into the 
scope of agent to insure for the purpose of s.19. However, the producing brokers are 
supposed to pass his possessed material information down. The placing broker is 
deemed to know such information in his ordinary course of business then disclose it 
to the reinsurer under s.19 (a). Therefore, s.19 (a) can protect insurer from situations 
where material information does not reach placing broker or the placing broker has 
received the information but fails to disclose it. The Insurance Act 2015 adopts such 
reasoning by using the imputation of knowledge route. Therefore it is suggested that, 
basically any intermediate agent of the reinsured involved in the placing process and 
relevant in effecting reinsurance contract for the reinsured can be included into this 
category for imputation of knowledge purpose under s.4 of the Insurance Act 2015.  
However, the scope of the broker’s duty of disclosure is still unsettled. By contrast to 
the broad wording of s.19 requiring disclosure of every material information to the 
insurer, it is suggested that there are some exceptions apply to the duty of utmost 
good faith. First, circumstances enumerated in s.18 (3) of the MIA 1906 and s.3(5) of 
the Insurance Act 2015 are only clearly settled exceptions applying to s.19. The 
brokers should not be required to disclose what the reinsured are not bound to 
disclose. Secondly, the duty of utmost good faith operates subject to a fraud 
exception that brokers are not required to disclose their fraud against their principals, 
although the reasoning is different from the Re Hampshire Land principle through the 
imputation of knowledge route. However, it is doubtful whether there exists any wider 
exception beyond fraud to the broker’s duty of disclosure. Moreover, if the broker 
plays a dual agency role in the placing process, it is regarded that the insurer should 
bear the risk. Furthermore, although there are some authorities supporting a gloss 
on s.19 that brokers are only required to disclose material information known by or 
ought to have been communicated to them in the capacity of reinsured’s broker, the 
reasoning is still unconvincing. As a result it is still unsettled and controversial 
whether the broker is only required to disclose information held and acquired in 
capacity of the reinsured’s broker. Before a suitable case comes to the court, brokers 
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are advised to disclose all material information within his knowledge received in all 
capacities. 
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Chapter 4 Performance of duty of utmost good faith in broker’s placing 
process in a subscription market  
4. 1 Introduction  
Reinsurance as an important type of commercial insurance involving large amounts 
of money and high risks in London market is inevitably underwritten by more than 
one reinsurers, usually represented by Lloyd’s and some insurance companies 
outside Lloyd’s market. Lloyd’s, as a representative market whose practice and 
placement procedure is commonly adopted in London market, is a place where 
facilities and regulation are provided for his members to conduct business 
transactions, rather than an insurer who by itself issues commercial insurance 
covers. Reinsurance brokers have always been relied upon heavily for producing 
reinsurance business in London market, especially Lloyd’s whose system functions 
on a broker-orientated basis. 
However, such traditional and unique subscription placing process in the market will 
have some impact upon the formation of the insurance contracts, and then affect the 
attachment of duty of utmost good faith to the contract.  Difficulties may arise 
because the duty of utmost good faith cannot apply straightforward when 
reinsurance is effected by a subscription procedure. Therefore it will be discussed in 
this section how current doctrine of duty of utmost good faith operates in broker’s 
placing process of reinsurance in the subscription market. The difficulties will be 
analysed as to when the reinsurance contract is concluded in the subscription 
procedure, and then attracts the duty of utmost good faith. In addition, problems may 
arise in performance of the duty of utmost good faith due to the specific characters of 
the subscription procedure. Solutions will be found to cover the gap in both common 
law and market practice aspects.  
4.2 The placing process of reinsurance contract in the subscription market  
4.2.1 The scratching process in the subscription market by use of a slip  
Placing of reinsurance contract at Lloyd’s was inevitably using a slip which was also 
commonly used to effect commercial insurance between insurance companies 
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outside Lloyd’s. After obtaining the quotations from the underwriters, the broker at 
the beginning of the placing process will approach the leading underwriter with a 
prepared brief memorandum called the slip, containing details of the intended cover. 
The slip can be regarded as offer of the reinsurance contract. Normally the leading 
underwriter will go through the slip with the broker by negotiation of the terms and 
premium which can be considered as a counter-offer of a reinsurance agreement. 
Once all the amendment to the broker’s draft is agreed and premium gets fixed, the 
leading underwriter will initiate the ‘scratching’ process, by stamping and signing the 
name of his syndicate on the slip and indicating on the slip of the proportion and 
amount of the risk that he is willing to accept. Subsequently, the broker will take the 
initialed slip around the market successively among following underwriters until 
satisfactory level of subscription is received. It is not an uncommon practice for the 
broker to get oversubscription by continuing presenting the risk in the market after 
100% has been achieved, in the purpose of reducing proportionately subscription of 
each underwriter under the principle of indemnity.315  After cease of subscription of 
the risks, the broker may give each subscriber a signing indication which is a 
statement of the total percentage subscription to the underwriters. 
However the subscription procedure by use of a slip raised a number of practical 
problems as to the uncertainty of the contract and inconsistency between the slip 
and policy issued later. Therefore since 2000 Lloyd’s initiated a thorough review and 
reform of the insurance placement procedures in the market. Subsequently a short-
lived London Market Principles 2001317 was published to clarify the protocols and 
stands for placing of risks and claim-handling in the London market, by use of a new 
form of slip and the increasing  use of leading underwriting clauses. For mitigating 
disputes and regulating purpose, in 2001 Xchanging Ins-sure  was established to 
issue a single policy which records the terms and conditions of the contract effected  
on behalf of all the contributing underwriters in the London market. 318  However, 
difficulties may still arise in practice where, especially in the reinsurance market, no 
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unified formal policy is to be issued. 319   Finally LMP 2001 did not survive the 
challenge of the insurance regulator, i.e. the FSA, to find a better solution to the 
problem of inadequate documentation of the contract of insurance.  
4.2.2 The scratching process in the subscription market since the MRC stage  
To beat the challenge of the FSA, two separate working groups was established by 
the London insurance market, i.e. the Subscription Market Reform Group to reform 
the market using slip in placing risks and the Non-subscription Market Reform Group 
to reform the market which is dealing all other insurance transactions. Code of 
Practice was issued by the two groups to provide guidance on contract certainty. 
Finally in 2007 a consolidated code of Practice was successfully issued to enhance 
the certainty of the insurance contracts and all previous contract certainty guidance 
was replaced.320  
According to the principles set out in CCCP, to ensure the certainty of the contract, 
the insurer/reinsurer and his brokers must, by the time of entering into the contract, 
ensure that all the terms are clear and unambiguous. Therefore at the time of the 
offer to enter into a contract of insurance or acceptance of the offer, all the terms 
must be clearly expressed and includes any conditions or subjectivities. In addition, 
after the conclusion of the contract of insurance, contract documentation must be 
provided to the insured/reinsured promptly. If there is any changes to the contract, it 
need to be certain and documented promptly accordingly. Moreover, the CCCP tried 
to give guidance on decreasing contract uncertainty caused by the signing down 
practice and avoiding oversubscription problems. According to the specific nature of 
the subscription placing procedure, more than one participating insurer/reinsurers 
will be involved in a contract of insurance. The contract must include an agreed basis 
on which each subscriber’s final participation will be determined, and their final 
participation must be provided to each subscriber promptly, so that the 
oversubscription problem in the signing down practice can be avoided.   
To achieve the aim and objectives of such guidance principles, the London Market 
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Group321  introduced to the London market a placing standard to provide a standard 
form of submissions. In 2007 a standardised form of agreement, initially LMP and 
now MRC (the Market Reform Contract), is used to replace the slip, when a risk is 
presented by the broker to the market. Annual review of the MRC has been carried 
out by a cross-market group. Until now several versions of MRC have been 
published to provide guidance to placing risks in subscription market. Changes have 
been updated into the MRC, for example in July 2011 changes arose from the non-
admitted and Reinsurance Reform Act (NRRA) and was added to surplus lines filing 
requirements. Consequently, the MRC guidance for binding authorities, lineslips and 
lineslip declarations has now been updated in line with these changes made in the 
‘Open Market’ Guidance version 1.4. 322  Until now the latest version has been 
published by the group as MRC 1.5.323  
As stipulated in the MRC guidance, it must contain all the details set out in the 
guidance, i.e. the risk details,324 information supporting the assessment of the risk at 
the time of placement,325 security details,326 subscription agreement,327 fiscal and 
regulatory, 328  and broker remuneration and deductions. 329  Therefore, when the 
broker is approaching the subscription market, he will make a presentation 
consisting of an introductory section including out the most important details of the 
risks instead of the slip used to be referred in the placing process. In addition to the 
similar ‘old slip’, a document of schedule consisting of all the terms of the policy 
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should be attached by the broker. It serves the function of a combination of old slip 
and policy.  When the underwriter scratches the documents, the entire contract can 
be presented in front of the underwriters. Consequently, it can solve the difficult issue 
of inconsistency between the slip and policy and deliver the effect requested by the 
CCCP that all of the documents should be prepared at before conclusion of the 
contract. 
4.3 Difficulties of attachment of the duty to the reinsurance caused by the 
modification of contractual formation process in subscription market  
The presence of the MRC offers a clear structure of the insurance contract and 
means for the broker in presenting risks in a subscription market, so that an 
insurance contract can be concluded in a consistent manner. This results in clarity to 
the negotiation of the terms of the contract and then enhances the efficiency of the 
placing process. It notably ensures the content of contract of insurance is aligned 
with the needs of contract certainty. Consequently, the difficult issue of inconsistency 
between the slip and policy is only historical. It is now easy to answer the questions 
what has been concluded between the reinsurance parties in the contract. However, 
difficult issues still exist even though the MRC resolves the problems from the 
weakness of the previous slip procedures prima facie. Notwithstanding the MRC 
resolves the difficult issue of inconsistency between the slip and the policy issued 
later in the previous slip time, some problems due to the subscription procedure still 
remain. As a result, it modifies the contractual formation process and consequently 
causes some difficulties in attachment and duration of the duty of utmost good faith 
to the reinsurance contract. Therefore the most significant issue here is when the 
reinsurance contract is concluded and how the duty of utmost good faith operates in 
the negotiation which is modified by the specific contractual formation process. 
Moreover, particular difficulties may arise in situation where the reinsurer is 
approached by the broker before existence of any direct insurance. It is arguable 
whether the reinsurance contract is concluded before the identity of the reinsured, i.e. 
the original insurer under underlying slip, can be said for certain.  
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4.3.1 When the duty of utmost good faith is attracted to a contract of 
reinsurance in subscription market 
It may be found sometimes struggling to make the general legal principles of contract 
law apply to reinsurance contract due to its placing process in London subscription 
market practice. It is arguable when a binding contract is concluded between the 
reinsured and the reinsurer in the scratching process. It need to be clarified whether 
scratching the MRC by an underwriter can be considered as an acceptance of a 
prospective reinsured’s offer to contract so that a binding contract is concluded 
between each reinsurer and the reinsured by putting down his line; or the 
reinsurance contract will remain open to acceptance and finally be concluded until 
the slip was fully subscribed.  
In very early stage, the contractual effect of the slip has been confirmed by 
Blackburn J. in Ionides v Pacific Fire and Marine Insurance Co.330 that the slip is a 
complete and final contract between the parties, fixing the terms of the insurance 
and the premium. The modern authority supporting the conclusion of a reinsurance 
contract by a slip is General Reinsurance Corporation v Forsikringsaktiebolaget 
(Fennia Patria),331 by rejecting the earlier dicta in Jaglom v Excess Insurance Co 
Ltd.332 In Fennia Patria, the reinsured Fennia had reinsured its liability under two 
facultative reinsurance policies. In a process of reinsured’s broker taking an 
amendment slip around the subscribing underwriters, the loss happened when just 
two out of twenty-eight of the specific loss underwriters had initialed the slip. 
Thereupon, the broker was instructed by the reinsured to withdraw the amendment 
slip. The disputing issue is whether the two reinsurers who had initialed the 
amendment slip were bound and whether the reinsured was entitled to withdraw a 
partly subscribed slip. It was decided by Court of Appeal that the slip which is 
initialed by the reinsurers as acceptance of the broker’s offer is a binding contract 
between the reinsured and reinsurers. Therefore it is now a settled law that a slip is 
regarded as containing an offer, acceptance of which gives rise then and there to a 
separate binding contract between the parties.333 A party cannot withdraw from the 
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agreement even though the slip may be partially subscribed.334 Although the slip is 
no longer used for placing reinsurance contract, MRC which now serves the 
combined function of the slip and the policy should inherit the role of the slip. So the 
same principles as to the contractual effect of a slip should apply to MRCs. As a 
result, the reinsurance underwriter’s unconditional subscription to the MRC creates a 
binding contract between the parties. Whether the underwriter has subscribed the 
MRC unconditionally needs to be determined objectively, rather than by reference to 
his actual belief,335 even though the MRC itself says that it is made subject to the 
qualification ‘to be entered’ or the MRC is scratched in pencil.336 It is a question of 
construction as to whether the subjectivity is a condition precedent to a binding 
acceptance. However in the situation where the underwriter indeed specially 
imposes subjectivities which have to be satisfied before the scratching becomes 
binding upon the contractual parties, provided any such condition is imposed before 
the scratching is complete,337  the parties are not bound by the agreement until the 
condition is satisfied. Even though the loss has occurred before the MRC has been 
fully subscribed, each underwriter is bound by his scratching and is liable and only 
liable for his subscribed proportion of the total amount once the risks has incepted.   
As to the contractual privity between the reinsured and all subscribers, it is decided 
that the slip used to represent a bundle of separate rather than joint and several 
binding contracts,338 even a policy has not been issued. Consequently, it is fair to say 
that each subscribing reinsurer on scratching the MRC accepts individual 
underwriting obligations to the reinsured under a separate contract. The MRC will 
bind the subscriber individually for his own part rather than collectively or jointly and 
severally. Therefore, according to the general rules of application of the duty of 
utmost good faith, the duty attaches to the negotiation of contract of insurance and 
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ceases to exist when the contract is concluded. As a result, the reinsured and broker 
owes separate duty of disclosure and duty of refraining from misrepresentation in the 
scratching process to individual reinsurers. Each reinsurer, not only the leader but 
also the following reinsurers, deserves a full disclosure of all material information 
concerning the underwritten risks so that an information underwriting decision can be 
made by him. Once the reinsurer scratches the slip after an underwriting decision is 
made, a reinsurance contract is concluded. Thus terminates the operation of duty of 
utmost good faith. No more duty of disclosure of material facts is required by the 
broker to the reinsurer even if the underwritten risk is not fully subscribed yet. If a 
loss had occurred between the date which the slip became fully subscribed and the 
date which the policy is issued, the reinsured would still be covered, as the policy 
would be merely a formal recording of terms in the contract agreed between the 
parties. It is suggested that such rules are consistent with current market practice. 
Each of the reinsurers has an individual contract of reinsurance with the reinsured on 
the same risk and only liable for his own subscribing proportion of the risks, and 
each contract of reinsurance attract a separate duty of utmost good faith between 
the parties involved.  
4.3.2 Problems arising in the situation where reinsurance exists before the 
direct insurance   
As discussed above, it is settled that reinsurance contract is concluded when the 
reinsurer scratches the MRC as an acceptance of the broker’s offer on behalf of his 
principal, i.e. the reinsured. However, difficulties may arise in the situation where the 
broker places reinsurance cover before he brokes the direct insurance.  
At the time when the broker approaches the reinsurer with an offer on behalf of a 
potential reinsured whose identity may not be known by the broker for certain, the 
presence of the documentation could not be regarded as an offer to a contract of 
reinsurance made by the broker on behalf of the reinsured. As the broker does not 
actually act on behalf of any identifiable principal or can be said to simply give an 
offer on behalf of himself. It is arguable whether the reinsurance contract is 
concluded before the identity of the reinsured, i.e. the original insurer under direct 
insurance, can be said for certain. If the answer is the negative, then further 
questions need to be asked is when a binding contract of reinsurance is deemed to 
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be concluded. 
In General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation and Others v Peter William 
Tanter and Others (“The Zephyr”),339 it was found by Hobhouse J that when the 
reinsurance underwriter put down his line, he was just agreeing to provide cover to 
any reinsured who subsequently wrote the underlying cover and came within the 
description of a reinsured under the reinsurance slip. Such opinion was approved by 
Mustill LJ in the Court of Appeal, although the issue was not the subject of appeal.340 
The issue arose again in Bonner and Others v Cox Dedicated Corporate Member 
Ltd.341 In Boner v Cox, the broker approached the reinsurance underwriter with the 
reinsurance slip prior to broking the renewal of an existing open cover. While the 
brokers were taking the reinsurance slip around the market, a substantial loss 
occurred to the open cover for the previous year. The issue whether the reinsurance 
was concluded became vital, as if the brokers had been aware of the loss before the 
conclusion of the reinsurance contract, such material information should have been 
disclosed to the reinsurers. Morison J at the first instance adopted the approach in 
The Zephyr. It was recognised that the reinsurers by scratching the reinsurance slip 
was making an offer to all potential qualifying underwriters of the underlying cover, to 
provide reinsurance on the terms of the slip. Such opinion gained approval on 
appeal.342   
Therefore, it is suggested that initialing the MRC is just functioning as a binding 
promise to provide reinsurance for whatever person who subsequently write a line on 
the primary insurance and desire to cede the risks to the reinsurer. As a matter of law, 
the offer was capable of being accepted by a communication by a qualifying 
underwriter to the broker to that effect. So once the reinsurance had been accepted 
by the original underwriter, the reinsurance contract is concluded binding the parties. 
Even without a communication of that acceptance made to the reinsurers by the 
broker, a binding contract comes into existence on strict contractual analysis.  
As a result, the duty of utmost good faith has attaches the reinsurance contract since 
the broker starts to approach the reinsurer at the beginning of the scratching process. 
                                                          
339
 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58. 
340
 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 529. 
341
 [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 569. 
342
 [2006] Lloyd’s Rep 152 at p 157. 
135 
 
The broker must anticipate the placement request of a potential reinsured in respect 
of a proper reinsurance protection and then make a full disclosure of all material 
facts and information concerning the underlying risks and the reinsurance agreement 
itself to individual proposed reinsurers during the scratching process. The duty of 
disclosure continues after the reinsurer has put down his line on the MRC. Any 
material information comes into the broker’s knowledge after the reinsurer has made 
the scratching must be disclosed by the broker to the proposed reinsurer. As a result, 
in contrary to normal situation, the broker remains under a duty of disclosure until the 
underwriter of the underlying cover has accepted the offer to conclude a binding 
contract. 
4.4 Problems in relation to performance of duty of utmost good faith in placing 
process in the subscription market  
As shown in previous section, placing reinsurance in a subscription market to some 
extent modifies the formation process of a reinsurance contract, and subsequently 
effects the operation of the doctrine of utmost good faith under the reinsurance 
contract concluded. As a result broker’s performance of duty of disclosure has been 
transformed to some extent by the special placing procedure. Difficulties arise in 
broker’s performance of the duty as a gap is created between the rules of law and 
the market practice. Relevant solutions in common law and the market practice have 
been proposed and practiced to cover gap which will be discussed in details in the 
following sections.  
4.4.1 Difficulties created by the gap between the rule of law and the market 
practice in disclosure process  
It is now established that the duty of utmost good faith attaches to the slip which has 
a legal status as reinsurance contract, so that it may be set aside if the scratch has 
been induced by misrepresentation or non-disclosure. 343  Due to the contractual 
effect of a slip, it is determined that each of a bundle of contracts concluded by the 
slip attracts a separate duty of utmost good faith between the parties. There is strict 
contact privity between the individual reinsurer and individual reinsured, no matter 
how many reinsurers or reinsured are involved in the subscription of the underwritten 
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risks. Therefore as required by the duty of utmost good faith, both the reinsured and 
his placing broker are under separate duty of disclosure and making no 
misrepresentation not only to the leading underwriter but also to all the following 
underwriters on the subscription list. It is hardly true that the following underwriters 
will care nothing about whether the risk is a good one thereupon waiver the 
reinsured and the broker’s duty of disclosure.344 
However according to the market placing procedure illustrated above, rather than 
going through the contractual negotiation with the broker, the following underwriters 
subscribe the slip simply and largely by considering who the leading underwriter is 
and what proportion he has subscribed the risks. The leading underwriter’s skills and 
judgment in deciding whether to accept the broker’s offer and to accept it on what 
terms and premium is believed and trusted by the following underwriters. It is 
assumed by the following underwriters that the leading underwriter has duly 
ascertained and weighted all material circumstances and then made an informed 
decision after being disclosed and represented all material information accurately.  
As a result, in case where a misrepresentation or non-disclosure is made to the 
leading underwriter, the gap between the rule of law and the market practice will 
cause difficulties as to whether the following underwriters would have the same 
defense as the leading underwriter does to avoid their insurance contracts, 
especially in absence of a leading underwriter clause in the slip or in any event that 
no line slip is used. Also, problems will arise where non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation is made to the following market but not to the leading underwriters. 
The following sections will focus on the difficulties arising from such transformation 
and discuss detail the solutions proposed by the common law and adopted in the 
market practice, so that it can show how the common law and market practice react 
in order to make the duty of utmost good faith is performed well in the placing 
process.  
4.4.2 The deemed communication rule 
In order to cover the gap between the law and the market practice in performance of 
the duty of disclosure, a solution is suggested that there should be a deemed 
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communication rule. Such deemed communication rule is supposed to grant each 
underwriter on the subscription list a defence  that, when there is a non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation made to the leading underwriter, such non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation was deemed to be communicated to the following market as well. 
Consequently the following underwriters could take advantage of non-disclosure or 
misrepresentations established in the case of the leading underwriter. 345 
4.4.2.1 Flaws of the deemed communication rule  
Such rule is not flawless, as it has to some extent made violation of the duty of 
utmost good faith which is crystallised rule of law under ss.18 to 20 in the MIA 1906. 
The reinsurer is only allowed to avoid the reinsurance contract if he could actually 
establish that there was a non-disclosure or misrepresentation of material facts to 
him, and actual inducement requirement need to be satisfied as well. 346  The 
rationale behind the deemed communication rule is to protect the innocent following 
underwriter who is induced into a contract of insurance without knowing material 
facts. It should not be used by a following underwriter to get rid of his own 
contractual liabilities without proof of actual non-disclosure or inducement just 
because someone he relies upon and trusts in has been induced into another 
separate contract of insurance.  
4.4.2.2 Dissatisfaction of the deemed communication rule shown in authorities  
The courts have showed their passive and dissatisfactory attitude by recognising a 
limited application of the rule. Such dissatisfaction can be smelled in General 
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp v Tanter (The Zephyr),347 although this case did 
not directly concern the duty of disclosure issue but about signing down indication by 
analogy.  
In The Zephyr, the assured instructed his broker to place suitable insurance cover. 
The broker first obtained a quote from the leading underwriter, a total loss 
underwriter, and the leading underwriter singed a line of 10 percent of value at a total 
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loss rate of 0.45 percent after having been given a 1/3 signing down indication by the 
broker. Then the broker confirmed that all the insurance cover required was 
completed after having proceeded to the following market. 11 days later, the Zephyr 
stranded and suffered serious damage, and then all risks underwriters gave notice of 
abandonment on the basis that the Zephyr was a constructive total loss. The 
reinsurers refused to pay the claim on the basis that the reinsurance broker did not 
achieve the 1/3 signing down indication. At first instance,348 Hobhouse J. held that 
the broker was liable to the leading underwriters in the tort of negligence but not to 
the other following underwriters. The issue on appeal was the liability of the brokers 
to pay damages to damages to underwriters for breach of duty. The court of Appeal 
disapproved the finding of tortious liability based on the signing down indication. It 
was held that the signing down indication, according to the practice of the market, 
implied acceptance of a responsibility to use best endeavors to procure the signing 
down by the date of inception. However, in this case, there was nothing to suggest 
that a bare optimistic promise given by the broker was not founded upon honest and 
reasonable belief. As to the broker’s tortious liability to the following underwriters, it 
was held that the broker was speaking to the leading underwriter about a transaction 
effected between the broker and the following underwriters was not capable of 
creating a situation where the broker must do what he conveyed he would do or pay 
damages in default. Therefore, in absence of an express signing indication, the 
brokers could not be held liable where nothing was said to the following underwriter.  
It can be concluded that the reasoning of the following underwriters’ argument was 
derived from an analogy with the deemed communication rule. The disapproval of 
such analogy to some extent, indicated the courts’ dissatisfaction with the deemed 
communication rule.  
4.4.2.3 A solution of effecting a supposed rule 
The doubts about the deemed communication rule discussed above does not stand 
alone. In Bank Leumi Le Israel BM v British National Insurance Co349, the assured 
took action against the insurers who tried to avoid the contract by alleging non-
disclosure and misrepresentations by the assured. As the 10th defendants, the 
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brokers argued that non-disclosure and misrepresentation were made only to the 
first three insurers not to other following underwriters. Therefore, the following 
underwriters could not rely upon such defense.Although he found himself not 
necessary to decide this point, Saville J. gave his comments on the deemed 
communication rule by expressing his agreement with Mustill L.J. in The Zephyr. 350   
He went further to find a solution to effect ‘the supposed rule’. In order to make such 
deemed communication rule valid, it should be established that a custom or usage of 
such supposed rule can be proven in the particular market, or it imported an implied 
term into the contracts between the reinsured and the following underwriters, or an 
implied representation had been made to following underwriters that all material 
circumstances had been accurately provided to the leading underwriter. Even though 
the solution suggested by Saville L.J can harmonise the rule of law and the market 
practice, the proposition is not logically perfect as the mere fact that the leading 
underwriter may be able to avoid his contract with reinsured does not necessary 
confer such defense on the following underwriters who have separate contracts and 
then separate duty of disclosure with reinsured.  
4.4.3 Other solutions in common law besides the deemed communication rule 
In addition to Saville L.J’s solution, an alternative solution is becoming popular in 
courts. It suggests that the fact that a misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material 
fact has been made to the leading underwriter is on its own a material fact which 
should be disclosed to the following underwriters and non-disclosure of such fact 
entitles the following underwriters to avoid the insurance policy.352 However, there 
are two different grounds supporting such solution. Comparison will be made 
between the two solutions to find a better way to cover the gap.  
4.4.3.1 Two different grounds supporting the solution  
In Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins Ltd,353 the reinsurer 
instructed his broker to place retrocession cover for him. During the placing process, 
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a misrepresentation about the nature of the reinsurance contract was made to the 
leading retrocessionaire. Arbitration between the reinsurer and retrocessionaire 
awarded the leading retrocessionaire entitlement to avoid the retrocession due to 
such misrepresentation. In addition, the arbitrators held that the following market 
could avoid on the ground that the brokers should have disclosed this failure to make 
a full and fair presentation to the leader. The brokers tried to argue that they were not 
liable for the following market due to the misrepresentation as a matter of law, relying 
upon the dicta doubting the deemed communication rule by Mustill L.J in The Zephyr 
and Saville J. in Bank Leumi. However, Cresswell J, based on the facts of the 
particular case, found that the following market had accepted the risk on the basis 
that a full and fair presentation had been made to the leading retrocessionaire 
underwriter. Therefore, such misrepresentation made to the leader should have been 
disclosed to the following underwriters. 
Such issue came before the court again in Brotherton and Others v Aseguradora 
Colseguros SA and another (No.3) 354  where the reinsurer sought to avoid the 
reinsurance contracts due to the broker’s non-disclosure as to the reinsured’s moral 
hazard. As to the issue on whether the following reinsurance underwriters would be 
able to avoid the policy, it was held that the non-disclosure of material facts to the 
leading underwriter was itself a material fact which should be disclosed to the 
following underwriter. However, different from Cresswell J relying on the particular 
facts of Aneco, Morison J focused on the expectation of the following market that a 
fair presentation had been made to the leading underwriter, if the leading underwriter 
was entitled to avoid the contract due to non-disclosure or misrepresentation, the 
following underwriter should be entitled as well. This can be regarded as a diversion 
from the alleged solution. Such alternative solution is accepted in Toomey v Banco 
Vitalicio De Espana Sa De Seguros Y Reaseguros,355 where the reinsurer alleged 
that the reinsured had made a misrepresentation as to the nature of underlying 
insurance which was cover for ascertained loss rather than for an agreed value. It 
was evidenced by one following underwriter that he had limited experience of this 
type of business and heavily relied upon the leading underwriter, moreover he would 
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not have subscribed the risk if it was not led by the leader.356 Andrew Smith J held 
that each of the underwriters was induced by the misrepresentation including the 
following underwriters who relied upon the presentation to the leading underwriter 
and the leader’s judgment in respect of the risk. 
4.4.3.2 Comparison between the two solutions  
In comparison, the latter of the two solutions is more attractive. First, the fact that the 
broker has made a non-disclosure to the leading underwriter  has not necessarily to 
be a material fact . In CTI v Oceanus,357  the proposition is that previous non-
fraudulent breaches of the duty of utmost good faith are not material facts for the 
purpose of latter applications. Whether misrepresentation or non-disclosure to the 
leading underwriter would be considered as a material fact depends upon a prudent 
underwriters’ judgment. Moreover, the fundamental reason why the broker’s non-
disclosure or misrepresentation to the leading underwriter would influence the 
following market is that the following underwriters have reliance upon the leading 
underwriter’s expertise and skill in underwriting such particular risk. The following 
underwriters enter into the contracts with an expectation that the brokers have made 
a fair and full presentation to the leading underwriter so that he has made an 
informed decision. Therefore, if a reliance or expectation can be established, the 
following market should be entitled the same defense as the leading underwriters.  
4.4.4 The leading underwriter clauses in market practice  
In addition to the common law solutions, the London market has its own practical 
exercise and reaction to save time and cost, and to avoid disputes. A leading 
underwriter clause is one of such important devices inserted into the contract to 
cover the gap between the law and market practice, to make sure the obligations of 
all subscribers are concurrent. It functions to facilitate the placement, administration 
and claim handling of a multi-party insurance contract. Such clauses are also widely 
used in the subscription market in declarations policies such as a line slip, an open 
cover or treaties. Corresponding to the adoption of the MRC in the subscription 
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market, a General Underwriters Agreement (GUA) is developed.358 It sets out the 
use of leading underwriter clauses with the MRC, especially concerning the 
amendment and claim-handling process after the placement of the risks. Therefore 
an agreement is created between the subscribing underwriters on a particular 
contract for the management of changes.359 It clarifies the extent of the authority of 
the leading underwriter who has been delegated to agree contract alternations and 
ensures all the following subscribers are notified of alterations.  
In most cases, the leading underwriter will usually but not necessarily the first 
reinsurer on the subscription list. He may, but not always subscribe the largest or 
one of the largest lines.360 It is irrelevant that that underwriter has taken only a small 
part of the risk in comparison to the following market.361 Also there may be more 
than one leading underwriter involved. For example in a reinsurance treaty which is 
arranged in layers, there may be one or more leading underwriter on each layer. The 
leading underwriter may be expressly identified on the slip. However, in the situation 
where the slip is silent on the identity of the leading underwriter, in the situation 
where the slip is silent on the identity of the leading underwriter evidence of the 
parties’ intention will be found by the courts. The courts may take into consideration 
several matters, such as who was the first reinsurer approached by the broker in the 
placing process, whether the reinsurer has scratched his line as the leader and any 
other evidence in the placing document created by the broker for his principal.362 
Which underwriter to be chosen as a leader is totally up to the broker’s discretion. 
Choosing a reputed leading underwriter whose judgment is believed and trusted by 
the following market will make the risk attractive to the following underwriters to be 
subscribed.363 
By inserting such clauses into the contracts between the reinsured and individual 
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underwriters, the broker approaches the leading underwriter on behalf of the whole 
market so that the following market will be bound by the decisions of the leading 
underwriters in the given circumstances provided by the clauses. Such clause may 
live throughout the period of contract, giving the leading underwriter the authority to 
bind all the following subscribers from the stage of contractual formation to claim 
handling, including negotiation of the terms of the policy,364 alteration or amendments 
to the wording,365  waiver of any conditions,366  settlements of claims,367  resolving 
disputes by arbitration,368 or accept declarations in respect to a declaration policy to 
which the following underwriters has subscribed, even though they might not 
become bound until later declarations are made at later stage where the declaration 
policies are placed in a non-obligatory or facultative obligatory method.369   
Due to non-standard wording of the clause and the various characteristics of policies 
in which the leading underwriter clauses are used,370 it is not easy to define the 
nature and effect of authority given upon the leading underwriter in such leading 
underwriter clauses. It is a question of fact depending on the specific wording of the 
clause in individual case. However, the legal effect of the leading underwriter clause 
is significant to determine the relationship between the leading underwriter and 
following underwriters. And it may subsequently have some effect on the broker’s 
performance of the duty of disclosure in formation of reinsurance agreements, 
especially in declaration policies.371  
4.4.4.1 Confusion of the nature of the relationship between the lead and 
following underwriter  
It is not settled what the nature of the relationship between the leading underwriter 
and the following underwriters is, 372  i.e. whether the leading underwriter acts as the 
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agent of the subscribing underwriters,373 or whether the leading underwriter clause is 
simply a mechanism or trigger whereby the subscribing underwriters become bound 
to the leader’s decisions made on their behalves.374 Although such divergence might 
affect the leading underwriter’s duties to the following underwriters, it is suggested 
that the clause satisfies to cover the gap between the market practice and the rule of 
law regards to application of the duty of utmost good faith in placing reinsurance 
agreements anyway, no matter which opinion prevails.  
4.4.4.2 Where the leader acting as the underwriting agent of the followings 
In the case where reinsurance is concluded between the parties immediately once 
the leading underwriter scratches the MRC, it can be said that the relationship 
between the leading underwriter and the following subscriber is pretty simple. There 
is hardly any room for the mechanism or trigger analysis, as each following 
underwriter is bound under its own individual contract of insurance with the reinsured, 
as soon as the leading underwriter scratches the MRC on their behalves. There is no 
more need for any further agreement, amendment of the cover or any settlements 
with the reinsured to be triggered, as they are already binding upon the following 
underwriters automatically, provided they are made within the authority. In such 
circumstances, the leading underwriter clause can be regarded as incorporating an 
agreement between the reinsurers that the leading underwriter can act as the agent 
of the following underwriters within the authority prescribed in the clause.375 Such 
authority is analogous to a binding authority between the underwriters and his 
coverholder who holds the underwriting pen on behalf of the insurer. The leading 
underwriter can be regarded as the following subscribers’ underwriting agent.  This 
was supported by Roadworks (1952) Ltd v Charman (Roadworks),376 where the slip 
contained a leading underwriter clause that provided ‘all alterations, additions, 
deletions, extensions, agreements, rates and charges in conditions to be agreed by 
the leading Lloyd’s underwriter, it was held by HHJ Kershaw Q.C. that the new 
agreement bound both the leading underwriter and  the following market as the 
leading underwriter was the agent of the following market with the authority.  
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Consequently, all the leading underwriter’s decisions within the authority are binding 
upon the following subscribers. For instance, if the following market is required by 
the clause to follow the settlements of the leading underwriter, the reinsured will only 
sue the leading underwriter as representative, as long as the settlement falls within 
the scope of the leading underwriter’s authority.377 Therefore, the broker can simply 
fulfill his duty of utmost good faith that is owned to individual underwriters by making 
no misrepresentation and disclosing material facts to the leading underwriter only. If 
the leading underwriter has been induced into a contract of insurance by the broker’s 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation of material facts, the leading underwriter’s 
option of avoidance or waiver of the remedy will bind the following underwriters as 
well. Therefore such establishment of agency can make the application of the duty of 
utmost good faith operate well and consistently with the market practice. In fact, 
even if no such agency relationship can be established, the clause can still cover the 
gap between rule of law and market practice just in a slightly different reasoning. 
Such leading underwriter clauses contained in the MRC constitutes an agreement 
between the reinsured and individual following underwriters. It gives the effect that 
the following underwriters will be bound by the leading underwriters’ agreement as to 
the wording of the contract which spells out the rights and obligations of the 
underwriters.  
However, if reinsurance between the leading underwriter and the reinsured is 
avoided ab. Initio due to misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts, the 
whole contact including leading underwriter clause is itself null and void, and then 
there hardly exists any agreement as to the reinsurance contract wording made by 
the leading underwriters to bind the following underwriters at all.378 Therefore the 
following underwriters should be able to take advantage of the leading underwriter’s 
defenses to avoid the agreement induced by the broker’s non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation.  
4.4.4.3 The leading underwriter clause used in declaration polices  
Situations may be complicated when the leading underwriter clauses are used in 
declaration polices such as a line slip, an open cover or a treaty. The facility effected 
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between the reinsured and the leading underwriter is probably merely a contract for 
insurance. In that case, contracts of insurance may not come into existence until 
declarations are made to the leading underwriter at later stage, rather than the time 
when the declaration policies are placed. The broker still needs to present all the 
risks which are chosen to be declared to the leading underwriter at the declaration 
stage. Therefore, the following underwriters do not become bound until the leading 
underwriter accepts the declarations which generate contracts of insurance then.379  
4.4.4.3.1 Nature of the relationship between the leader and the followings 
created by the clause  
It is arguable whether the leading underwriter becomes the agent, thus owes a duty 
of care to the following underwriters at the stage of formation of the declaration 
policies. As there are not any contract wording, underwriting, amendment or 
settlements decisions to be made by the leading underwriter then so that it could 
bind the following subscribers. There are some authorities, although in obiter dictum, 
supporting that the leading underwriter clauses in such policies are merely 
mechanism or trigger by which the following underwriters to be bound by the leading 
underwriter’s later decisions. 380  
In Mander v Commercial Union Assurance (Mander),381 where a broker placed a 
retrocession subscribed by the defendants for a number of Lloyd’s syndicates by 
developing an open cover. It provided that declarations be ‘t.b.a (L/U) only’382. The 
following underwriters who subscribed to the open cover denied their liabilities to 
indemnify the claimant, by alleging that the leading underwriter had not been 
authorised to be bound to accept the risk presented by the broker so that no proper 
declarations were ever made and accepted under the open cover; or alternatively the 
declaration to the open cover could be avoided if there ever were contracts of 
reinsurance with the defendants. Rix J, by cited dicta by Steyn J. in The Tiburon383 
suggested that a leading underwriter under an open cover was not constituted the 
agent of the following market by reason merely of a leading underwriter clause. The 
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following market only agreed, by subscribing to the cover, that they would be bound 
by a declaration falling within the scope of the cover and accepted by the leading 
underwriter. So the agreement of the leading underwriter worked as a "trigger" event 
by which the following market themselves came to be bound by the declaration, 
rather than as an act of agency.  Therefore the leading underwriter did not owe to the 
following market a duty of care as distinct from a duty of good faith with respect to 
their activities as a leader.  
4.4.4.3.2 Effect of the leading underwriter clause in declaration policies 
As to the effect of the leading underwriter clauses in declaration policies, it is 
suggested that it should be divided into two aspects according to the two-stage 
placing process.  
At first stage, suffices it here to say that the open over or treaty is only binding at its 
highest that the reinsurers offer the potential reinsureds an opportunity to order an 
insurance cover in the future. By inserting a leading underwriter clause in such 
facility, the following market only undertakes what the leading underwriter undertakes 
under the facility. Therefore, the facility could only be regarded as constituting an 
offer from the following underwriters that they will be bound by a declaration falling 
within the scope of the insurance cover, if the leading underwriter chooses to accept 
the risks that the reinsured choose to cede. So it is hard to say whether the 
relationship between the leading underwriter and following market is an agency 
relationship. At least, the leading underwriter is not acting as an underwriting agent 
of the following subscribers at this moment.  
At the declaration stage, i.e. when the reinsureds choose to declare the risks to the 
cover and the leading underwriter chooses to accept the risks, contract of insurance 
is generated through the medium of the framework facility provided that the risks fall 
within the insurance cover, consequently there come into existence a bundle of 
separate contracts of insurance between the reinsured and individual following 
underwriters who subscribe to the open over or reinsurance treaty. Due to the effect 
of the leading underwriter clause, as soon as the leader accepts the declarations, the 
following underwriters become bound by the leading underwriters’ decisions as to 
underwriting agreement, amendment of the cover, drafting the wording of the 
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contract even coming into settlements with the reinsured, provided that the leading 
underwriters are acting within the authority given by the clause. At this stage, it would 
be the same as the situation where a contract of insurance is concluded between the 
parties immediately once the leading underwriter scratches the slip discussed above. 
It is suggested that the clause satisfies to cover the gap between the market practice 
and the rule of law regards to application of the duty of utmost good faith in 
declaration policies anyway, no matter what the relationship it is between the leading 
underwriter and the following market. There should be no duty of utmost good faith 
attaching to the facility, as a contract of insurance is not yet concluded at that stage. 
Once declarations are made to the cover, generation of contracts of insurance attract 
the broker’s duty of utmost good faith so that the broker needs to disclose all 
material facts and make no misrepresentation to the leading underwriter who holds 
the underwriting pen on behalves of all the following underwriters within the authority 
given by the clause. Once the leading underwriter is induced by any non-disclosure 
or misrepresentations of the broker, not only the leading underwriter but also the 
following market is entitled to avoid the reinsurance. Even if an agency relationship 
can be established between the leader and the following market, there would have 
been only nominal damages for the breach of the authority given upon the leading 
underwriter, as there hardly exist any agreements as to the reinsurance contract 
made by the leading underwriters to bind the following underwriters and incur their 
liabilities at all. 
4.4.4.4 Conclusion  
In conclusion, it suffices to say that the problems caused by the deemed 
communication rule or other common law solutions can be avoided by the market 
practice by inserting a leading underwriter clause into the slips so that the leading 
underwriter can be regarded as the representative on behalf of the following market 
in respect of any disputes between the parties under a contract of insurance. 
However, whether the leading underwriter can act on behalf of the following 
underwriters depends on the scope of the authority given by the leading underwriter 
clause. It should be noticed that problems may still arise in circumstances where no 
leading underwriter clauses are  used in practice, such as where no such clause is 
contained in the slip, where the leading underwriter is acting beyond its authorisation, 
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or where non-disclosure or misrepresentation is made only to the following market 
rather than the leading underwriters. 384  In those cases the interpretation of the 
particular facts in the case should be relied upon to find solutions to enable the 
market practice to operate under rule of law. 
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Part III Difficult issues arising in the operation of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith in reinsurance context 
Chapter 5 Material Facts in Placing Reinsurance Contracts 
5.1 Test of materiality in reinsurance context 
Reinsurance which in essence is insurance for insurers can be categorised as 
contract uberrimae fidei, so the doctrine of utmost good faith is applicable to 
reinsurance which is a contract of insurance.386 The doctrine of utmost good faith 
plays significant role in reinsurance context. First, if the direct policy has been 
avoided due to qualifying breach of the duty, there is no legal liability of the reinsured 
to pay under the direct policy. As a result, the reinsurers are not liable to make 
payment to the reinsured under the principle of indemnity. Second, concealment or 
misrepresentation of the risk may be made simultaneously to the reinsured and the 
reinsurers, particularly in a fronting practice. Under such circumstances, both 
contracts are voidable, imposing the reinsurers no obligation to pay. Thirdly, the duty 
of utmost good faith is not simply satisfied by the reinsured by just passing on 
material information to the reinsurers. Failing to satisfy this strict duty may render the 
reinsurance voidable, even though the reinsured may remain liable to the direct 
assured under the original insurance. 
Actually many important aspects of formulation of the duty of disclosure and non-
misrepresentation derives from reinsurance disputes, for example when the duty 
attaches to the contracts, i.e. material misrepresentation and non-disclosure is only 
actionable if discovered before the contract is conclude; 387 test of materiality 
compromises not only objective test but also subject aspect that underwriters must 
prove his inducement by the reinsured’s non-disclosure or misrepresentation;388 the 
requirement of inducement is not to be assumed even the objective test is satisfied; 
the knowledge of an agent is not necessarily to be imputed to the assured for 
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disclosure purposes;389 the duty of disclosure is not waived by a  failure to ask 
questions etc. 390  Therefore, the application of duty of utmost good faith plays 
significant role in reinsurance contracts, even if deficiencies and difficulties exist in 
formulating the duty in reinsurance area due to specific nature of reinsurance 
contracts.  
As to the test of materiality in reinsurance, the general assumption is that 
reinsurance should be subject to the same test of materiality which is applicable to 
all forms of insurance.391 Under the statutory definition of materiality in s. 18 (2) MIA 
1906, every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a 
prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. 
Under the Insurance Act 2015 the absolute duty of disclosure and making no 
misrepresentation has been reformed into a duty of fair presentation that only 
requires the reinsured to disclose material information reasonably clear and 
accessible to a prudent reinsurer. Although the strictness level of the duty has been 
changed, the test of materiality is not touched. The act enunciated in s.7 (3) that a 
circumstance or representation is material if it would influence the judgment of a 
prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms. 
Then s.7 (4) continues to supply non-exhaustive examples of material 
circumstances.392 Therefore, the reinsured is still obliged to fairly present all the 
information which would influence a prudent reinsurer in underwriting assessment 
and calculation of the premium. 
This is simply the case in facultative agreements in which the reinsurer and 
reinsured share the risk and premium in an agreed proportion. In Highlands 
Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance  Co.393 ,  the underwriting agents on behalf of 
the Continental Insurance Co. ,which was actually the retrocessionaire treated as the 
reinsurer as the direct insurance was simply a fronting,  avoided its subscription to 
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the slip on the ground that the reinsured had made a material misrepresentation as 
to  the insured subject matter. 
Under proportional reinsurance treaties, although it had been argued that the test of 
materiality here might be more complicated as reinsurer’s share of premium may be 
deducted for payment of commission to the reinsured,394 it is still fair to say that such 
particular method of distribution of premium reflects the reinsurer’s assessment of 
the quality of the risk. While under non-proportional treaties, the reinsurer charges 
and calculates the reinsurance premium on its own judgment, with no relationship to 
the premium charged by the reinsured under the original policies, but still based on 
the information provided by the reinsured. Consequently, it suffices to say that the 
test of materiality under reinsurance contracts are the same as it applies to all forms 
of insurance so any information or representation can be material if the reinsurer 
would like to take it into account and assume the premium upon it during his 
underwriting assessment. 
5.2 Disclosure of material facts in reinsurance market practice  
It is a general assumption that reinsurance agreements which attract duty of utmost 
good faith should be subject to the same materiality test as that applies to all forms 
of insurance.395 Actually in business insurance market practice the duty of disclosure 
under the MIA1906 has become onerous to a certain degree, especially for large 
size, complicated nature and complex business. As under such large size and 
complex insurance business, identification, collection and collation of all material 
information related to the risk can be extreme difficult tasks involving multiple 
sources of information, proportionate to the size, nature and complexity of the 
business. To minimise the difficulties and the deficiency of enforcing the law, the 
reinsurers commonly follow the current business insurance market practice by 
designing particular standards and procedure of disclosure and inserting a specially 
draft clause in the reinsurance contracts overriding the current legal regime set out in 
the MIA 1906, rather than seeking enforcement of the full requirements of the act. 
Also it should be noticed that, in market practice, the test of materiality that which a 
prudent insurer would deem to be material to the underwriting of the risk will often be 
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exercised only after the occurrence of a claim, by contrast to the requirement of 
being disclosed prior to the inception of the contract established by the legal 
framework of duty of disclosure. In many cases, claims are often settled rather than 
avoided, even though the reinsurer may have been able to challenge the 
completeness and accuracy of the information disclosed.  
Unlike small business where the disclosure procedures is simple and merely involve 
completion of a proposal form, the reinsurer conducting large complex business 
insurance will require formal disclosure procedures, identify various disclosure roles 
and allocate responsibilities, draft a unique clause on non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation into the policy, and identify the nature of the material facts and 
information. Also in practice, larger business reinsurers may send detailed checklists 
and questionnaires describing the scope of required information. The reinsurers may 
give additional support and advice to emphasise the importance of understanding 
the concept of material facts in order to eliminate subjective interpretation. Therefore, 
it is crucial for the reinsurer and reinsured in the reinsurance market to work together 
to develop standards and guidance over what a satisfactory presentation and 
disclosure of the risk should include, so that such suitable and sufficient disclosure 
procedure could facilitate full disclosure of material facts and information.  
First of all, the key roles and responsibilities of disclosure of material information 
should be identified. So far as knowledge of material circumstances is concerned, 
s.18(1) of MIA 1906 states that every material circumstance is required to be 
disclosed if it is known to the assured, and such knowledge includes not only actual 
knowledge but also blind eye knowledge. This point stays the same in the Insurance 
Act 2015.396 However, in reinsurance market where the reinsured is a corporate 
entity, it is necessary to clarity whose knowledge is relevant, attributable to both the 
directing mind and will of the corporate entity and the staff who placed the insurance 
in question. Although the Insurance Act 2015 adopts complete different approach 
from the one under the MIA 1906, s.4 of the Insurance Act 2015 still describes the 
knowledge of insured from two separate campuses, namely the knowledge of the 
agent to know, and the knowledge of the agent to insure. Therefore it is important for 
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the business participant to allocate in the disclosure procedure, the knowledgeable 
persons who has or has access to the material information to be disclosed, the 
responsible persons who have the task of compiling all material information and the 
authorised person who will sign off the full adequate and accurate information. 
Secondly, the nature of the material facts and information needs to be identified, 
described and defined in a due diligence checklist in advance, in order to achieve full 
disclosure of material facts for the purpose of reinsurance submission. Although 
there is no legal definition, a material fact has been defined under decided common 
law cases as any fact that may influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in 
deciding whether to accept a risk and on what terms and at what premium. However 
the elements which would influence a prudent reinsurer’s judgment in subscribing 
the risk and fixing the premium may differ under various types of reinsurance 
agreements from the general elements under the direct insurance, reflecting the 
specific relationship between direct insurance and reinsurance premiums.  Rather 
than focusing on individual risks underwritten, especially in some treaty reinsurance 
contracts, under which the reinsurance is concluded like a wholesale business, the 
material information focusing on the general nature of whole portfolio offered by the 
reinsured in a long term. Therefore under reinsurance contracts, not only the 
information relating to underlying risks is material, but also facts relating to the 
reinsurance agreement is of significant concern of the reinsurers. Normally it 
includes the information of physical risks underwritten, such as processes, products 
and geographical areas of business activities and sector, increasing of the degree of 
risks like additional premises, risks insurable items in high risk geographical, 
geological or metrological areas, higher degree of risks than those in ordinary 
business course, greater liabilities than normal or expected due to specific contract 
terms and conditions, restricted rights subrogation associated with claims or loess; 
moreover, information concerns the financial statues of the reinsured’s business and 
the manner in which the reinsured runs his business matters as well to the reinsurer 
as it may affect the profitability of the reinsurer’s business, , for instance, the 
reinsured’s previous claims history and experience of the business especially in 
relation to historical, emerging or other unexpected risks, the reinsured’s previous 
policy cancellation and refusal of insurance, details of the business profitability, 
financial status of the business etc. In addition, the moral hazard of the reinsured 
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may be also of the reinsurers’ concern, such as status, reputation, length of services, 
qualifications and experience of board members, and details of any criminal 
convictions etc.  
Facts which are material in the reinsurer’s underwriting assessment may vary 
according to the distinct placing methods by which the premium and losses are 
distributed between the reinsureds and the reinsurers under each individual contract. 
In the following sections, material facts subject to duty of disclosure in placing 
facultative reinsurance and treaties will be summarised separately.  
5.3 Material Facts in Reinsurance Contracts 
Generally speaking, in the context of all forms of contracts of insurance, the material 
facts which need to be disclosed to the insurer can be separated into the physical 
hazard relating to the quality of the risk subscribed and the moral hazard relating to 
the personal characteristics of relevant parties, depending on the subject matter of 
the insurance, the nature of the insurance contract, the risks insured against, and 
attitude of a prudent underwriter. From case law, material circumstances can be 
identifies as including any unusual or special circumstances which increase the 
insured risk, any particular concerns about the risk which led to the insurance being 
placed and standard information which market participants generally understand 
should be disclosed.  
However the specific material facts which the reinsurer would take into account will 
be different from those in direct insurance context aligned with the nature of 
reinsurance relationship that each reinsurer subscribes part of the risks underwritten 
like operating in a partnership. Also the elements which would influence the 
reinsurer’s judgment in subscribing the risk and fixing the premium may differ under 
various types of reinsurance agreements depending upon the relationship between 
direct insurance and reinsurance. Therefore, facts which are material in the 
reinsurer’s underwriting assessment may vary according to the distinct placing 
methods by which the premium and losses are distributed between the reinsureds 
and the reinsurers under each individual contract. As a result, it is far from 
satisfaction of the duty of disclosure of the reinsured by simply passing on the 
information relating to the underlying risks. Any facts and information relating to the 
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general nature of the reinsurance agreements or whole reinsurance portfolio those 
may influence the reinsurer’s assessment of the business would be material, 
therefore falling within the duty of disclosure.  
5.3.1 Material Facts in Facultative Reinsurance 
After WASA,397 the leading case which clarified many significant issues of facultative 
reinsurance, it is reaffirmed that facultative reinsurance is further insurance on the 
original subject matter rather than a reinsurance of reinsured’s liability under the 
direct insurance. Even there are still contradictions after WASA, but it does not affect 
the materiality as to circumstances in respect of the underlying risks, especially 
under proportional facultative reinsurance. It suffices to say that factors which are 
material to the underlying risks are also material and need to be disclosed to 
facultative reinsurers. In most cases, where the reinsured and reinsurer share the 
risk and premium on an agreed proportion, the terms of reinsurance contract are 
incorporated from the direct policy by words ‘as original’, and the original insurance 
and reinsurance contracts are on a back-to-back presumption, subject to some limits. 
Such closely tied-up relationship between the two contracts results in that 
circumstances relating to the direct insurance may also affect reinsurers’ 
underwriting assessment. Therefore, the reinsurers may be interested in anything 
which affects his obligation to pay, not only information relating to the facultative 
reinsurance itself but also those relating to the direct policy.  
Consequently, material facts that the reinsurer would like to take into account in 
placing facultative reinsurance fall into two classes. The first class of material facts 
consists of facts concerning the circumstances relating directly to the underlying 
risks. Such circumstances in broad terms extends to any fact which increases the 
reinsured’s liability quantum or the physical hazard against which the subject matter 
is insured under the direct insurance, and any information concerning the moral 
hazard of the assured or his agent under the direct insurance. It suffices to say that 
any information which may affect the reinsured’s obligation to pay the assured is 
material to the reinsurers. The second class of material facts is facts which 
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specifically affect the reinsurance agreement itself rather than the underlying risks, 
relating to the manner in which the reinsurance contract has been underwritten.  
5.3.2 Material Facts in Reinsurance Treaty 
In contrast to a facultative reinsurance, the reinsurer under a treaty is not interested 
in retails but the wholesale business, focusing on the general nature of whole 
portfolio offered by the reinsured in a long term rather than concentrating on 
individual risks. Generally speaking, placing information material to facultative 
agreement will normally be material the treaties too. In addition to those, other 
information may also be material to the reinsurer, depending on particular features of 
the treaty, the method taken by the treaty, and the nature of business in original 
insurance to be ceded. For instance, as far as facultative obligatory and obligatory 
treaties concerned, materiality tends to focus on the reinsured’s own experiences in 
running his book of business, whereas material facts relating to individual declaration 
under a non-obligatory treaty may be similar to those material to a facultative 
reinsurance.  
It suffices to say that, being different from material facts in direct insurance, material 
facts to be disclosed in placing reinsurance agreements mainly relate to two aspects, 
compromising of operation of the treaty itself such as information about previous 
declarations to the treaty falling outside the treaty scope at renewal of the treaty398; 
and the manner in which the reinsureds run their business under the direct insurance, 
make underwriting assessment and handle claims, rather than the circumstances 
relating to the underlying risks. For example, the reinsurers may be interest to know 
the risk run by the reinsured, existence of other reinsurance and reinsured’s 
retention level, identity of other co-reinsureds, the reinsured’s loss experience, 
claims handling by the reinsured, and the premium the reinsured charge etc. 
5.4 Material facts concerning reinsurance agreement rather than the 
underlying risks  
Although the first limb of materiality is an objective one, the exact nature of the 
circumstances that must be disclosed or need not be disclosed by the reinsured will 
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always depend on the facts and circumstances of the individual cases. The following 
sections will discuss circumstances which are commonly recognised as material 
information and particular concerns about the placing risks under contract of 
reinsurance, besides the general material facts commonly recognised relating to the 
underlying risks under direct insurance.  
5.4.1 Reinsured’s Retention  
It is a common practice in reinsurance agreements that the reinsured maintain at 
least a small part of the risk as retention, although sometimes the reinsured is 
allowed to cede one hundred percent of the risk where the direct insurance is only a 
fronting practice for the reinsurance agreement. Normally the amount retained by the 
reinsured will be clearly stated in the agreement. Such retention can not only help 
the reinsurer to regulate the numbers of claims received reflecting the proportion that 
the reinsurer is willing to accept, but also guarantee the quality of the business 
underwritten by the reinsured so that the reinsured could underwrite good risks and 
manage his underwriting business prudently. Therefore, the reinsured’s retention 
cannot be said to be immaterial at all to a reinsurer in placing reinsurance agreement. 
However, is the reinsured under an obligation to retain a part of the risk by himself 
when the contract states a clear amount? If not so, can the reinsured cede his 
retention somewhere else? If the reinsured does reinsure his retention under other 
reinsurance agreement, does the reinsured need to disclose to his reinsurer such 
circumstance? The decided cases show that the position as to materiality of the 
reinsured’s retention does not stay the same. There has been a shift of the attitude 
towards the obligation of the reinsured to retain his part of risk.  
In early times, it was held that misrepresentation made by the reinsured as to his net 
retention was material so that the reinsurers could avoid the policy. In Trail v 
Baring,399 the Industrial Life Assurance Society insured the life of Lydia Taylor and 
reinsured £3,000 with the Provident Mutual Association. Then Provident retroceded 
£1,000 of the sum to Reliance and represented that it intended to retain £1,000 of 
the risk by himself.  Such representation was true when the reinsurance was placing.  
However, before conclusion of the contract, Provident retroceded its retention of 
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£1,000 to the Victoria. As a result, the reinsurers bear no retention at all. 
Subsequently, the retrocedant refused to pay on the ground that the reinsurer did not 
disclose such material change of circumstances. The court held that Provident’s 
failure to disclose the change of circumstances was material to permit Reliance to 
avoid the policy as Provident’s stated retention was a guarantee of the quality of the 
risk which induced the Reliance to enter into the agreement without any further 
investigation. Therefore, it can be said that the level of reinsured’s retention was a 
material fact that the reinsured could not misrepresent or conceal. Such opinion was 
shown in Kingscroft Insurance Co Ltd v Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd 
(No.2).400 In Kingscroft v Nissan, Weavers that was managing the business of an 
underwriting pool, ceded a proportion of the pool’s excess of loss reinsurance 
business to the defendant Nissan under two facility quota share (‘FQS’) treaties. The 
treaties provided that fiver per cent of the overriding commission to be retained by 
Weavers.  However, besides the FQS treaties, Weavers had its own excess of loss 
reinsurance protecting the pool’s casualty account and that reinsurance was within 
the classes of business ceded under the FQS treaties. When Weaver took 
proceedings to recover under the FQS treaties, Nissan refused to pay the said sum. 
One of the grounds is that the treaties are avoided due to Weavers’ 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure concerning the existence of the pool’s excess 
of loss reinsurance programme. The defendant claimed that the reinsured was not 
entitled to enter into excess of loss reinsurance in respect of its retained share of the 
business ceded under the FQS treaties.  The court held that there was no material 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation in respect of Weaver’s excess of loss 
reinsurance programme as Nissan was aware of the fact that it covered business 
which was to be ceded under the FQS treaties and Nissan would still have entered 
the FQS treaties even if it had even if it had been specially told such information. But 
the judges still held that it was a common ground that a reinsurer under a quota 
share treaty invariably wants to know what proportion of the risks being ceded the 
reinsured intends to retain for his own account because such proportion is of 
considerable importance reflecting a measure of the reinsured’s confidence in the 
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business underwritten and providing a continuing incentive to underwrite 
prudently.401  
However, Trail v Baring was basically a case based on misrepresentation. If the 
reinsured wanted to say something about the amount, they should not misstate such 
important information. But it does not necessarily reflect an imposition on a reinsured 
a duty of disclosure to disclose the amount of his retention. As there is distinct 
difference between misrepresentation and non-disclosure, it has been held in recent 
cases that the reinsurer must ask a specific question as to the reinsured’s intention 
to reinsure somewhere else first, while the reinsured is required not to misrepresent 
the amount of his retention neither the intention to reinsure elsewhere. Such opinion 
was stated in Societe Anonyme d’Intermediaires Lexembourgeois v Farex Gie,402 
where the ceding company retained for its own account a very small part of its 
retention under a non-obligatory open cover agreement, giving the reinsurer a 
ground to allege non-disclosure of material information concerning the retention. 
Gatehouse J accepted the cedant’s retention’s significant impact on a prudent 
reinsurer’s underwriting assessment, but he ruled that a prudent reinsurer could not 
rely upon any assumption that there was to be a retention when no mention of a 
retention was made by the reinsured when he declared to the reinsurer under the 
agreed facility, unless the reinsurer is told or is entitled to assume so from a previous 
course of dealing. So, it is not a burden on but is up to the reinsurer to make 
enquiries about the reinsured’s retention. If the reinsured considers the disclosure of 
the retention significant, he need to ask reinsured such questions. There is no 
general expectation of the reinsurer that the reinsurance is such a limited book of 
business so that the retention must be bear on the reinsured, unless the reinsurer is 
told so or is entitled to assume from a previous course of dealing. If the reinsured’s 
answer is not full enough, the reinsurer will enquire further. If the reinsurer is totally 
silent, disclosure is deemed to be waived by the reinsurer.  
More recently, there has been a trend comes into the courts, holding that the amount 
of reinsured’s retention for its own account is not a material fact in any event. Such 
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opinion was expressed in Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co.,403 
where the defendant reinsurers entered into a quota share reinsurance agreement to 
provide the claimant reinsured’s portfolio of marine and aviation business. Under the 
treaty, by the terms “agree to accept as 'insurer' and reinsure 90 per cent quota 
share hereon”, the direct insurances issued by the reinsured will be ceded to the 
reinsurer on a fixed proportion of 90 per cent, leaving 10 per cent retained by the 
reinsured net for its own account. The reinsurer later sought to avoid the treaty on 
the ground that the reinsured breached the warranty that he would retained its full 10 
per cent by obtaining excess of loss cover for 75 per cent of that figure.  The court 
rejected the defence and held that placement of the excess of loss cover did give the 
effect to reduce the reinsured’s net retention below 10 percent of each and every risk, 
but the provision as to the percentage of net retention did not establish a warranty in 
favour of the reinsurer. The word ‘fixed’ only allocated the risk to the parties to the 
quota share treaty rather than had an effect on other covers that either party took, 
therefore it did not prevent the any party from seeking further cover for its proportion 
of liability. So the reinsured had the freedom to seek further cover for its proportion of 
liability just as the reinsurer did by entered a retrocession.  Such tendency can be 
found in a similar decision delivered by courts in Kingscroft v Nissan 404  case 
discussed above. When placing the FQS, it was proposed that ‘the reinsured will 
retain 50% of not exceeding their 80% participation of the policies as defined for their 
own account. Besides the FQS, Weavers arranged the pool external excess of loss 
reinsurance to reduce 10% of the liability member’s retained line. The court held that 
there was no misrepresentation as to the statement concerning the pool’s retention. 
The members of the pool did intend to retain 50 percent of the risks for their own 
account uninsured, whether by excess of loss reinsurance or by FQS including 
WAQS insurance within the Weavers pool. It should be a true statement of present 
intention rather than a factual statement of fact giving the effect that the exact sum is 
to be retained with any further reinsurance protection.405 Besides, the court held that 
no material non-disclosure could be established because Nissan actually 
participated in the excess of loss treaty therefore the reinsurer knew about the 
additional cover. Moreover, the reinsurer was not induced by the reinsured’s 
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representation as they would enter into the agreement anyway whether the reinsured 
has additional protection or not. Furthermore, the learned judges commented that 
producing an excess of loss cover would be even immaterial at all because it was a 
common practice in the market especially for quota share treaty to seek about a 
further excess of loss cover as long as the amount purchased was not unreasonably 
beyond market norms.  
Therefore, the current view can be concluded that the reinsured’s net retention is not 
necessarily a material fact that must be disclosed to the reinsurer during placement 
of the reinsurance agreement. The reinsured is neither under an obligation to retain 
a proportion of the risk by him, nor does he have to retain the stated amount in the 
terms for its net account without any further cover, unless the contract clearly 
provides to the contrary. If the reinsured does reinsure his retention under any other 
further cover, it is not necessary for him to make a disclosure of it, given that it is a 
common practice to reinsure the retentions in the market; unless the reinsurer makes 
any enquiry about it. It is not a burden on the reinsurer to ask such questions. But if 
he is interested in it, it is up to the reinsurer to ask, and the reinsured should not 
make any misrepresentation on it.  
5.4.2 The reinsured’s potential exposure under the direct insurance  
Generally, besides the material information concerning the underlying risks under 
direct insurance contract, the reinsurers are interest to know the financial basis of the 
direct insurance contract, such as whether the policy is written on a valued or 
unvalued basis, the method by which the reinsured underwritten the risks, whether 
the liability of reinsured accepted has arisen the possibility of adverse risk selection, 
the amount of potential liability exposed by the reinsured, what is the nature of the 
business underwritten by the reinsured, whether there is any unusual risks to be 
declared to the reinsurer, whether risks are short-tail or long-tail, whether there are 
any unusual terms of the ceded policy etc. That information may affect the risk 
exposed by the reinsured under the direct policy, reflect the manner by which the 
reinsured runs his business, and then extend to the reinsurer’s appreciation of the 
risks which he tends to be exposed under the reinsurance agreement. If the risk 
posed upon the reinsured by the direct policy is greater than that indicated by the 
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reinsured, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of it would be material to the 
reinsurers.  
5.4.2.1 The form of the direct insurance  
The reinsurers are interested to know the method by which the reinsured 
underwritten the risks under the direct policy, because such facts may affect the 
reinsured’s potential risk exposure like adverse risk selection, and even the 
probability of the further spread of the risk in the market.    
In Irish National Insurance Co Ltd v Oman Insurance Co Ltd,406 the second plaintiff 
who was insurance brokers placed three-layer structured fire insurance for the 
Arabian American Oil Co.’s (ARAMCO) properties in Saudi Arabia in 1977. The first 
layer comprised claims up to $75 million in excess of $10 million; the second layer 
claims is up to $ 75 million in excess of $ 85 million; and the third layer comprises 
claims up to $ 50 million in excess of $ 160 million. Then reinsurance was arranged 
for certain of the insurers on the primary layer.  In 1978, a loss figured $53 million 
occurred and was fully borne by the primary layer except the first $ 10million 
retention.  The first plaintiff reinsured undertook a 9.5 percent line in the first layer 
and reinsurance had been arranged for 50 per cent of their line. When the first 
plaintiff reinsured claimed against the defendants under the reinsurance policy, the 
defendants refused to pay and argued that they were entitled to avoid the 
reinsurance contract because the broker had described the original insurance as 
having been effected on a “first loss” basis when it was in fact an “excess of loss” 
policy. The court was requested to decide whether the original insurance under 
which the reinsured born a deductible was a first loss insurance. Leggatt J held that 
the nature of first loss insurance is that the sum insured was less than the value at 
risk. Neither did the presence of a deductible by the reinsured which can be deemed 
self-insured nor did the existence of additional layers ceiling on the primary layer 
change the nature of the original policy as a first loss insurance. Therefore, the 
insurance broker’s statement was not a misrepresentation which was actionable to 
render the reinsurance agreement avoided.  
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The issue as to materiality of the form of the insurance contract arose again in Aneco 
Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins Ltd407 which is mentioned in 
above chapter. It is decided that the form of the underlying cover as a facultative 
obligatory cover rather than a quota share cover is particularly material to the 
reinsurer as such form of direct insurance may expose reinsured and then the 
reinsurer to potential risk of adverse risk-selection.  In Aneco v Johnson, the claimant 
was the reinsurers of marine excess of loss accounts of Lloyd’s syndicates under 
facultative obligatory treaties. Then the reinsurers instructed his broker to procure 
excess of loss retrocession cover for him. The leading retrocessionaire sought to 
avoid the retrocession by arguing that a misrepresentation about the nature of the 
reinsurance contract was made during the placing process because the defendants 
had presented that the risk underwritten by the reinsurers arose under quota share 
cover. Arbitration between the reinsurer and retrocessionaire was held in 1995 and 
the tribunal awarded the leading retrocessionaire entitlement to avoid the 
retrocession due to such misrepresentation, and declared that the six XL contracts 
had been validly avoided ab. initio by all the underwriters following. As compared in 
Chapter 1, there are crucial difference between a facultative obligatory treaty and a 
quota share treaty under which both parties are binding to cede and accept all the 
risks of a given class. The reinsurers under the obligatory treaty is potentially 
exposed the risk of reinsured’s risk selection as the reinsured has a discretion as to 
the risks which are to be ceded to the treaty, as a result the treaty may be under a 
tendency to become a ‘dumping ground’ for high risk or poor quality business.408 
Therefore, such exposure is crucial and material to the retrocessionaire’s interests 
as inherent anti-selection permitted under the facultative obligatory treaty could be 
against the retrocessionaire under their cover.  
In addition, setting aside the particularity of anti-selection in facultative obligatory 
covers, Cresswell J addressed that description of the reinsurer’s treaty itself is 
equally important, as the spread of business across the excess of loss underwriter’s 
book is highly material. The market evidence showed that it was almost impossible 
to obtain retrocession cover for a facultative obligatory reinsurance treaty. It is crucial 
to an established excess of loss leading underwriter that underwritten of a quota 
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share under which agreed proportion of all risks of a given class must be accepted 
fairly spread the loss geographically well and probably protect its account better as a 
quota share could include cessions on overseas contracts which may be very 
unlikely to clash.409  Therefore description or representation as to method by which 
the risks is underwritten by the reinsured is plainly material to a prudent underwriter. 
Whether there is any discretion of the reinsured as to acceptance of risks fell within a 
cover facility or not also matters to a prudent underwriter. It is of important relevance 
of the qualities of risks under the direct policy, particularly under obligatory cover, as 
the reinsurers may be at the mercy of its reinsured’s risks selection. In ERC 
Frankona Reinsurance v American National Insurance Co,410 the defendant ANICO 
participated in a pool established by National Accident Insurance Group (NAIG). The 
pool was managed by National Accident Insurance Underwriters (NAIU). NAIU 
instructed London brokers to place a quota share reinsurance of Philadelphia Life’s 
one-third participation in the pool with ERC. In the placement, the claimant was told 
that ANICO’s activities were confined to direct insurance. While in fact the reinsured 
had entered into a reinsurance agreement under which the reinsured’s liabilities fell 
within the scope of the quota share cover provided by ERC.  It was held that such 
misstatement was material.  
5.4.2.2 The nature of the risks exposed by the reinsured  
It is plainly material to the reinsurer to be informed of facts about the nature of the 
risk run by the reinsured in both facultative reinsurance and treaty reinsurance 
agreements; as such risk exposure by the reinsured may affect the reinsurer’s 
underwriting assessment of the reinsurance agreement. By contrast to the facultative 
reinsurance contract which is back to back to the direct insurance, the material facts 
relating to the treaty reinsurance agreements generally does not extend to details of 
individual underlying risks underwritten by the reinsured, but focus on the business 
portfolio as a whole, as such size of risks within the reinsured’s portfolio, the degree 
of the risk borne by the reinsureds, any exclusion of risks from the cover, the 
frequency and nature of large losses falling within the cover, the method adopted by 
the reinsured of allocating business of risk of that nature into the account, the 
procedures for calculation of premiums and losses, and the reinsured’s exercises of 
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any control over the risks accepted by the reinsurer etc. Whether a fact or statement 
regarding to the reinsured’s underwriting philosophy and methodology of running his 
business are material and need to be disclosed is a question of fact depending upon 
the form of the reinsurance treaty and the particularity of direct insurance 
underwritten by the reinsured.  
In Contrast Crane v Hannover Ruckversicherungs AG, 411  it was held that the 
reinsurer’s failure to disclose underwriting audits conducted was not a breach of duty, 
neither entitled the retrocessionaire to avoid the retrocession cover. The 
retrocessionaire entered into excess of loss treaties covering the reinsurer’s 
business which provided a specific class of casualty cover, i.e. carve-out cover, to an 
insurance company. The carve-out cover protected both a traditional account and 
another less strict account. The retrocessionaire participated in the carve-out cover 
for both accounts. In 1996, after the reinsurer changed its reinsurance pricing 
guidelines, the less strict program business could be allocated to the traditional 
account. Following this, the reinsurer’s audits had raise concerns about the 
reinsured’s claims handling and the appropriateness of using a loss rating approach 
for the program business without risk exposure analysis. Before agreeing to provide 
cover in 1998, the retrocessionaire requested details of how business was allocated 
between the two accounts, but he jumped into the agreement to secure the contracts 
by bringing his rates down without being presented the reinsurer’s guidelines. Then 
the retrocessionaire submitted that he was entitled to avoid the agreement by reason 
of failure of the reinsurer to disclose the underwriting and claims audits. The court 
held that such audits were not material. An adoption of loss rating for program 
business was just a matter on which underwriting judgment differed, but it was not 
significant enough to affect the judgment of a prudent insurer.  
In Limit No.2 Ltd v Axa Verischerung AG,412 the issue as to the materiality of the 
level of deductibles in the direct insurance underwritten by the reinsured came 
before the court. In 1996 the plaintiff’s broker approached the defendant by fax 
proposing a first loss facultative obligatory reinsurance treaty for 12 months, 
protecting the plaintiff’s energy accounts. The broker in his cover sheet stated that as 
a matter of principle the reinsured maintained high standards and would not normally 
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underwrite construction risks unless the original deductible were at least £500,000 
and preferably £1,000,000. The reinsurer agreed to enter into the reinsurance and in 
1997 agreed to extend the cover until 31 Jan 1998, further renewed the treaty for a 
12 moths effective from 1 Feb 1998. However the broker did not informed the 
reinsurer that the reinsured’s deductibles was not in fact being met due to 
deterioration of the energy market. The results turned out disastrous on the 1996 
treaty, including the 1997 endorsement, and the 1998 treaty. By inspection the 
reinsurer found that the reinsured had not been following its policy as to deductibles 
in underwriting its construction risks, therefore the reinsurer sought to avoid the 1996 
treaty and the 1997 endorsement and the 1998 treaty for misrepresentation and non-
disclosure of material facts. It was held that the reinsurer was entitled to avoid the 
reinsurance treaties by the reason that the reinsurer was induced to have concluded 
on the basis of the reinsured broker’s misrepresentation as to the reinsured’s 
deductibles in the direct insurance and the non-disclosure of the change to the 
deductibles in 1998 renewal. The level of deductibles written by the reinsured in the 
original insurance would be highly material to a prudent reinsurer considering 
underwriting a first loss treaty. The smaller is the underlying deductible, the greater 
the reinsurer’s exposure is. In addition, high deductibles under a direct insurance 
covering construction risks which tend to produce a high frequency of claims would 
protect the reinsurer against high frequency lower level claims. Consequently, the 
broker’s representation as to high deductible in the case was particularly material to 
the reinsurer’s appraisement of the risk. Therefore, it suffices to say that a 
misrepresentation of particularity of risk run under the direct insurance of that nature 
may be material to the reinsurer even such representation was not of itself a material 
statement  accordance with ordinary market standards.  
5.4.2.3 The amount of the potential liability exposed by the reinsured  
The issue as to materiality as to the amount of the reinsured’s liability arises in 
Toomey v Banco Vitalicio de Espana SA de Seguros y Reasseguros.413 Under the 
direct insurance, the Spanish football club Atletico de Madird insured against the risk 
of club’s relegation to the second division under a valued policy for 2.9 billion 
Spanish Pesetas (Pts). The defendant reinsured Vitalicio reinsured with Toomey 
                                                          
413
 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep. IR 354. 
168 
 
under a facultative contract on the same terms as original. After the club relegated at 
the end of the 1999/2000 season, the reinsurers asserted that there was a 
misrepresentation by the reinsured in that the direct policy was unvalued then based 
on indemnity for actual proven loss, whereas the direct policy was valued in fact. The 
court held that the financial nature of a direct policy could only be material if the 
amount recoverable was greater under a valued policy than under an unvalued 
policy. In this case, the football club’s total loss was Pts 3.169 billion including a 
relegation loss of Pts 2.639 and repayment of Pts 500 million to its exclusive 
broadcaster for failure to qualify for European club football competitions. However, 
the Pts 500 million loss had been disregarded as it had no relation to the relegation 
covered under the direct insurance. Therefore, the football club’s loss amounting to 
Pts 2.639 billion under the direct insurance cover was actually less that the insured 
value of the direct insurance. As a result, the court held that the misrepresentation 
was material rendering the policy voidable.  
5.4.2.4 The nature of business underwritten by the reinsured  
The risk run by the reinsurer is directly affected by the character of the business 
insured by the reinsured. It is plainly material to reinsurers to know what the 
reinsured has insured under the direct insurance contract, whether there is any 
unusual risks intended to be declared to the reinsurer and other such relevant 
information.  
This point was at stake in L’Alsacienne, Premiere Societe Alsacienne et Lorraine 
d’Assurances contre l’Incendie les Accidents et les Risques Divers v. Unistorebrand 
International Insurances AS,414In 1977 and 1978 a Norwegian insurance company 
‘Dovre’ participated in a pool writing reinsurance business in the London market 
operated by an underwriting agency ‘Accolade’. By 1978 Dovre entered into 
voluntary liquidation after encountered severe financial difficulties. Dovre’s portfolio 
of incoming reinsurance treaties including the sessions arising out of its membership 
of the Accolade pool were not included in that liquidation but was taken over by 
Unistorebrand. Unistorebrand arranged a takeover of Dovre’s Accolade portfolio by 
Kansa Reinsurance Company Limited. Under the agreement, Kansa thereupon was 
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credited with the premiums which had been earned by Dovre, and undertook 
responsibility to meet Dovre’s share of the claims generated by the Accolade 
portfolio for the 1977 and 1978 years of account.  Later, Kansa sought to avoid the 
Agreement for misrepresentation that the reinsured has described the portfolio as 
‘mainly property’ and ‘mainly Europe’.  While in fact at most 15 per cent of the 
portfolio was property business and no more than 20 percent was European.  Rix J 
regarded the statement as to the nature of business underwritten, property in this 
case, potentially significant, because pure property insurance is short-tail in nature. 
Besides the misrepresentation of ‘mainly property mainly Europe’, Kansa alleged 
another non-disclosure of the nature of the risks underwritten by the Unistorebrand 
that four run-off or stop loss contracts in the portfolio was unusual. Although the 
agreement which arranged Kansa as a substitute for Unistorebrand was not 
regarded by the Judge as one of reinsurance at all so that no question of materiality 
arose, the issue as to the nature of business underwritten by the direct insurance is 
important information that the reinsurers need to know.  
There is another different illustration of the materiality of the nature of the underlying 
risk in WISE (Underwriting Agency) Ltd v. Grupo Nacional Provincial SA. 415  A 
Mexican insurer (GNP) insured a cargo cover for a shipment of luxury goods from 
Miami to Cancun. The defendant GNP got reinsurance cover in London market. The 
slip presentation prepared in Spanish, had referred to Rolex watches, but the English 
translation referred to clocks by mistake. Due to this faulty translation of documents, 
the claimant reinsurer did not aware that the consignment included Rolex and other 
expensive watches. A container of goods was stolen in transit and GNP made a 
claim for over US$ 800,000 of which US $ 700,000 related to the loss of the watches. 
The reinsurer sought to avoid the reinsurance contract, arguing that it had been 
induced by misrepresentation of material facts.. The court decided that such 
misdescription amounted to a material non-disclosure which entitled the reinsurers to 
void the contract as reinsurers would not have agreed to cover watches if they were 
informed by the reinsured.  
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5.4.2.5 Unusual terms of the business underwritten by the reinsured  
It is the general rule that there is no need for the reinsured to disclose to the 
reinsurers the terms of the direct insurance as long as such terms are commonly to 
be found in the policies of the direct insurance’s nature, as the reinsurers ought to 
have such knowledge in his ordinary business. However, the reinsurers would be 
interested to know any unusual terms in the direct policy which offers extended 
coverage to the assured or imposes extraordinary or unique liabilities upon the 
reinsured. This is of particular importance to reinsurers in a facultative reinsurance 
which commonly incorporates the terms of direct policies into it by the ‘full 
reinsurance clause’. Therefore unusual terms in the original insurance policy are 
material facts which must be disclosed to the reinsurers, although in many cases the 
reinsurers may not look at the direct policy at the time when reinsurance agreement 
are concluded. The terms need to be disclosed must be unusual. Even the same 
clause may have contrary effects under different insurance policies. It is a question 
of fact in each individual case depending upon the nature of risk in the direct policy.  
It is not an uncommon practice in insurance policies that the insurers offer extended 
coverage to the assured by charging extra premium so that the assured would be 
deemed to be held covered within the specific limitations. In Charlesworth v Faber,416 
Charlesworth was the insurers of the hull and machinery of the steamship Merrimac 
under a marine time policy for 12 months. The defendant reinsured the claimant’s 
exposure. However, there was a ‘held covered’ clause providing that in the event 
that the vessel was still at sea on the expiry of the policy, the assured would be held 
covered at a pro rate daily premium. After the Merrimac’s total loss, the defendant 
alleged to avoid the policy by reason of the non-disclosure of such held cover clause. 
The court held that the reinsurer was not entitled to avoid the reinsurance contract as 
such held cover clause was in common use in the hull and machinery maritime time 
policy which ought to be known by the reinsurers in the business. In contrast, in 
Property Insurance Co. Ltd v. National Protector Insurance Co. Ltd, 417  it is 
demonstrated that some particular held cover clauses may need to be disclosed to 
the reinsurers.  The reinsured issued a marine policy insuring the hull of a steamship 
for 500 pounds. The premium was 6 per cent of the sum insured. There was a held 
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cover clause in the policy conferred upon the assured the option to extend the cover 
for navigation on the Great Lakes for an additional charge of 3 per cent of the sum 
insured. The existence of the clause was not disclosed to the reinsurer. The 
reinsurer received a share of the basic premium only for underwriting half of the 
reinsured’s liability. After the steamship suffered damage while navigating the Great 
Lakes, the reinsurer sought to avoid the reinsurance contract for non-disclosure of 
such held cover clause. Scrutton J. held that whether the clause need to be 
disclosed must depend a great deal on the nature of the risk. In this case, the 
extension of cover to confer the steamship a liberty to do unusual and dangerous 
things was an extraordinary risk unexpected by the reinsurer so that it ought to be 
disclosed by the reinsured. As a result, the reinsurance was avoidable by reason of 
non-disclosure of such extension clause.  
 In this aspect, the US authority has the same decision as English authority on this 
issue. Reference can be made to the New York Court of Appeals in Sumitomo 
Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. Cologne Reinsurance Co. of America, 418  the 
reinsured issued an all risks policy covering a steel mill which contained an 
extraordinary clause extending to cover losses caused by radioactive 
contamination.419 Sumitomo reinsured the direct policy with Cologne Reinsurance 
without disclosure of such extended cover clause. When the reinsured claimed loss 
caused by contamination arises from the radioactive material on the premises, the 
reinsurer denied the liability on the ground of the non-disclosure of adoption of such 
unusual terms in the direct policy. Although the court finally decided that the 
reinsured had waived disclosure by issuing a formal reinsurance certificate after 
notice of the occurrence of the loss, it still affirmed that such abnormal appearance 
of the nuclear risks which is generally excluded in the reinsured’s general business 
need to be disclosed to the reinsurer.  
Therefore, it suffices to say that general application of the rule excludes the 
reinsured’s disclosure of standard terms normally and customarily found in the direct 
policy of that nature, but existence of unique or extraordinary terms which would not 
normally appear in a policy of that kind and has the effect of extending the 
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reinsured’s liability scope in an unforeseeable manner in the reinsurer’s ordinary 
course of business need to be disclosed to the him. If the reinsurers waive the 
breach of the duty, then such unusual terms are binding on the reinsurers.420 
The situations may be distinct between reinsurance agreements without any 
limitations on the terms and reinsurance agreements which contain express 
independent restrictions upon the reinsurer’s liabilities. If there are not any limitations 
on the reinsurers’ liabilities, like stated above, reinsurers’ attention need to be drawn 
from any existence of unusual terms in the direct policy. If there are express 
independent restrictions upon the reinsurance coverage, and the reinsured still 
chooses to accept any unusual extended liabilities under the direct insurance 
contract which exceed the reinsurance coverage, the reinsurer is not obliged to 
indemnify the reinsured in respect of such liabilities even the reinsured has to make 
the payment under the direct insurance. Consequently, such existence of unusual 
terms in the direct insurance does not affect the reinsurer’s liabilities at all so that 
such facts are immaterial and need not to be disclosed to the reinsurers.  
The position could be even more complicated if there are independent restrictions 
terms qualifying the reinsurance coverage and the full reinsurance clauses worded 
as ‘subject to same terms and conditions as the original policy’ in the reinsurance 
agreement at the same time. It is debatable which clause has the prior force in 
application. Different positions would affect the extent of reinsurers’ liabilities and 
consequently affect the scope of the reinsured’s duty of disclosure. If the express 
limitation terms of the reinsurance agreement supersede the full reinsurance clause, 
then such specific qualification of the reinsurer’s liabilities excludes the incorporation 
of any contradictory clauses of the direct policies. Then such clauses are immaterial 
to the extent of the reinsurer’s liabilities and there is no need to draw the reinsurer’s 
attention to them.421 All other liabilities of reinsured’s arising from the standard and 
customary terms still fall within the express reinsurance coverage, not affected by 
the non-incorporation of the unusual terms. Alternatively, if the additional restrictions 
limiting the extent of the reinsurer’s liability are subject to the full reinsurance clause 
which worded as ‘subject to same terms and conditions as the original policy’, then 
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the reinsurance incorporates the terms of original policies.422 Whether the unusual 
terms of the direct policies extending the reinsureds’ liabilities or abnormally 
appearing in the policy of that nature are incorporated into the reinsurance 
agreement is ambiguous. However, the reinsured need to draw the reinsurers’ 
attention to the existence of such unusual terms so that such unusual terms can be 
incorporated. At same time, such unusual terms need to be disclosed and not be 
misrepresented by the reinsured so that duty of utmost good faith can be satisfied.423  
Any misrepresentation of such unusual terms in the direct policy would entitle the 
reinsurer to void the reinsurance contract at any time, 424even after a loss has 
occurred and tainted all other losses falling within the express reinsurance coverage. 
Therefore, those unusual terms need to be addressed to the reinsurer first of all, 
either to trigger the incorporation route, or falling within the duty of utmost good faith 
route. Either, no mention of such unusual terms to the reinsurer gives the effect that 
such terms are not incorporated into the reinsurance coverage, and then no duty of 
disclosure arises as they are immaterial to the reinsurers at all.  
Despite of judicial divergences on this issue, the current legal position is that the 
effect of the wording ‘as original’ overrides the reinsurers’ own express restrictions to 
the reinsurance coverage, incorporating the original terms and conditions into the 
reinsurance agreement, so that the extent of the reinsurers’ liabilities could be the 
same as the reinsureds’. However, it is a settled law that incorporation wording does 
not encompass all of the direct insurance provisions. 425But the incorporation is 
subject to the requirement in general contract law that a clause with an onerous or 
unusual nature cannot be regarded as incorporated unless the party relying on it 
proves that he drew the other party’s attention to it. Therefore, any unusual terms 
that are unexpected to be found in original policies of the nature are simply not 
incorporated into the reinsurance contract. Therefore, they are immaterial to the 
reinsurers and the reinsured is thus not obliged to disclose them.426  
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To summarise, the legal position as to disclosure of any unusual terms in the direct 
policy is in the following way. Generally speaking, terms normally found in the 
original policy of its nature need not to be disclosed to the reinsurers. If there are no 
express limitations on the reinsurance coverage, any unusual terms extending the 
reinsured’s liabilities or abnormally appearing in the original policy of its nature must 
be disclosed to the reinsurer. Any non-disclosure or misrepresentation of such 
unusual terms may entitle the reinsurer to void the reinsurance agreement. If the 
reinsurers waive the breach of the duty, then such unusual terms are binding on the 
reinsurers. If there are any express restrictions on the reinsurance coverage 
excluding indemnity of the reinsured’s liabilities arising from such unusual terms, 
such original terms and conditions are not incorporated into reinsurance, therefore 
not binding on the reinsurer at all. Consequently, such facts are immaterial and need 
not to be disclosed.  If the reinsurance contains both express restriction clauses and 
the full reinsurance clause worded as ‘subject to the same terms and conditions as 
the original policy’, then the full reinsurance clause should supersede. But the 
unusual terms in the direct policy are not incorporated into the reinsurance and need 
not to be disclosed to the reinsurers.  
5.4.3 The reinsured’s loss experience in respect of direct insurance  
A reinsurer may be interested to be informed of the reinsured’s past loss experience 
in conducting his business, because a long enough period record of the reinsured’s 
loss experience is indicative of the level of care and competence exercised by the 
reinsured in his business. It is the same position in both facultative and treaty 
reinsurance contract that the reinsured’s loss experience in respect of direct 
insurance is material to be disclosed to the reinsurer.427 The experience is examined 
according to many aspects, such as  frequency of the loss reflected by relevant 
number of times losses occur, the nature of the previous losses, the severity of the 
loss paid or occurred by the reinsured, the amount of the loss suffered by the 
reinsure,  loss ratio and profitability of the direct insurance, the expectation of loss or 
amount of the reinsured’s anticipated losses which has the possibility to trigger future 
claim, especially in renewal or extension of the reinsurance arrangements etc. In 
some situations, the reinsurer may probably be interested to know the reinsured’s 
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past loss experience with any other reinsurers as well. The materiality of such losses 
is a question of degree depending upon their relationship with the risks to be ceded 
to the reinsurers. Such critical information enables the reinsurer to assess the quality 
of the risk run under the direct insurance, to evalue the risk of a future claim under 
the policy to be issued, and to determine the proper premium, cost of protection and 
profit of the business. Therefore, the reinsured’s loss experience in respect of direct 
insurance may be material and need to be disclosed to the reinsurer.  
In Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada,428  the reinsurer entered into a 
reinsurance agreement to cover a P & I club ‘Steamship’ against its liabilities to 
indemnify its members for personal injuries and death suffered on board. Rather 
than entering into a conventional reinsurance, the reinsurer entered into a Personal 
Accident and Illness Master Lineslip Policy under which the reinsurer pay the club 
individual injuries suffered by original persons on board. The reinsurer syndicate 
retroceded to the retrocessionaire in respect of various liabilities under the lineslip. In 
Jan 2000, Sun life ceased to pay claims submitted by the reinsurer and alleged that 
the retrocession were voidable for the reinsurer’s misrepresentation that the payment 
of the reinsurer under the lineslip was to be a realistic estimate of average sums 
likely to be paid by the club to its members, and the reinsurer’s misrepresentation of 
its professional appraisal to fully investigate the reinsured’s loss statistics.  Although 
the court rejected to affirm the misrepresentations, Langley J held that those facts in 
question would have been material had they been misrepresented.  
It is notable that the reinsured’s loss experience which may need to be disclosed is 
not confined to the incurred or paid claims, but also extends to outstanding claims 
whether reported or not reported in connection with the account that he proposes to 
cede to a reinsurer. Such anticipated losses429 which may be greater than has been 
disclosed or appreciated are equally material to the reinsurer, at least if the amount 
of losses has reached a certain level which has the potential to trigger a claim.430 
This was illustrated in Aiken v Stewart Wringtson Members Agency Ltd, 431  the 
plaintiff were names of several Lloyd’s syndicates. In 1981, the syndicate through 
their agent entered into a contract of reinsurance with Syndicate 418 under with 
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Syndicate 418 agreed to provide aggregate excess of loss reinsurance in respect of 
all liability that might be incurred by the plaintiffs. Later, the reinsurer avoided the 
reinsurance agreement on the ground that the failure of the reinsured’s broker to 
disclose material facts. As a result of the avoidance of the reinsurance, the plaintiffs’ 
1985 year of account was left open and brought the syndicates’ losses about £85m. 
An action was brought by the plaintiffs against their underwriting agents. Potter J 
held that misrepresentation of the nature which was long tail business for asbestos 
diseases claims rather than short-tail cargo business and the number of lines written 
by the reinsured made the reinsurer’s potential exposure greater than had been 
appreciated. In addition, non-disclosure of a block reserve established by the 
reinsured to meet particular forms of loss which was not transferred to ‘known 
outstanding’ loss was held by Potter J to be a material fact as it indicated the 
syndicate’s own estimate of its liabilities. Therefore, it suffices to say that an 
anticipated loss by the reinsured which results in enhance of the reinsurer’s potential 
exposure is a material fact. However, it is established that existence of outstanding 
claims against the reinsured is not material to a reinsurer who is simply fronting for 
retrocessionaires protected by a simultaneous settlement clause, because what the 
reinsurer really care is the solvency of the retrocessionaires rather than the 
reinsured’s underlying claims.432 In Limit No.2 Ltd v Axa Versicherung AG,433 it was 
similarly held that potential losses were significant therefore changes in claims 
between cover of the original treaty and its renewal was material.  
There is no fast rule as to what kind of loss experience must be disclosed to the 
reinsurer. Generally speaking, the more remote from the risk run by the reinsured the 
loss experience is, the less likely it is to be considered as material to the risk, 
therefore whether relevant loss experience is material to a prudent underwriter is a 
question of degree, depending on particular circumstance in individual cases. There 
may be occasions where the reinsured has improved his level of care or business 
manner so that past experience may reveal less of the risk. If there has been any 
improvement or changes to the reinsured’s practice, it is more prudent for the 
reinsured to disclose such loss experience , and the improvement or changes 
undertaken to reduce the risk of similar losses, rather than keep silence at all.  
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5.4.4 Estimated premium income  
The reinsurers may be interested to be informed of relevant information concerning 
the reinsured’s estimated premium income, such as deductions, commission, and 
cost of supporting reinsurance protection etc., as such information would affect the 
profitability of the reinsurance, particularly in proportional facultative reinsurance and 
treaties where the reinsured and reinsurer share the premium income in an agreed 
proportion. For example, the reinsurer may make underwriting assessment by 
reliance upon the estimated premium income of the reinsured under the direct 
insurance.434 In an unreported case Allianz Assurance v Merchant,435 it was held that 
the reinsured’s insistence of increasing the premium rates was a material fact and 
need to be disclosed by the brokers to the quota share reinsurer, even though the 
additional part of premiums was retained by the broker rather than the reinsureds.   
The reinsurer may also be interest to know the level of underlying deductibles borne 
by the assured in the direct insurance if a substantial deductible in some unusual 
way is requested by the reinsured. Therefore any concealment or misrepresentation 
by the brokers of unusually high level amount of commission obtained for the placing 
of the direct risk may be material fact to be disclosed to the reinsurer. Because such 
a high level of commission paid for the broker reveals the assured’s own risk 
assessment and evaluation of the business, reflecting a greater degree of risk under 
the direct insurance than the reinsurers have assess. It may consequently affects the 
reinsured’s premium income, particularly in a proportional facultative  or treaty 
reinsurance agreement where the reinsurance premium is calculated on a 
proportional basis on the amount of premium payable under the direct insurance with 
a deduction for purpose of the reinsured’s costs and profits from the reinsurer’s 
premium income. Such case arose in Markel International Insurance Company Ltd 
and another & v La Repblica Compania Argentian de Seguors Generables SA.436 
The reinsurer of an insurance companies who underwritten medical malpractice risks 
alleged that they had been misrepresented that the premium payable under the 
direct insurance would be approximately US$ 4.3m per annum with a commission of 
27.5 per cent.  However, the actual commission taken by the direct broker was far 
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greater than the sum stated, and resulted in more than double of the premium 
payable under the direct insurance.  It was held that such misrepresentation was 
material to the reinsurer, as they might have taken an entirely different approach to 
assess the risk had they been informed of such high premium that the assured was 
willing to pay under the direct insurance. 
In addition, the cost of reinsurance protection may be interest to the reinsurer. In Hill 
v. C Insurance Co Ltd & Anor,437  it was decided by the court that the cost of 
supporting reinsurance protection was material facts which ought to been disclosed 
by the reinsured.  Hill was a Lloyd’s underwriter suing on his own behalf and on 
behalf all other members of Syndicates 186 and 193. The plaintiffs were excess of 
loss specialist syndicates. In 1989 and 1990 the defendants subscribed to quota 
share reinsurance treaties reinsuring all business allocated to the plaintiff’s excess of 
loss account. In placement of the quota share treaties, representations by Hills that 
‘the cost of XL protection before reinstatement costs etc. has approximated within 
recent years to around 20 per cent of gross net premium income …’ was relied on by 
the defendants. A further statement was represented by the plaintiff in 1990’s 
renewal that ‘the cash position remains healthy preserved by a comprehensive 
common account XL programme placed at a very reasonable cost ratio’. After 
inspection of the account, the defendants delayed payment when the Hill failed to 
comply with the reinsurers’ request about the high cost of reinsurance. After an 
inspection of the plaintiff’s records in 191, the defendants avoided the contracts 1989 
and 1990 for the reinsured’s misrepresentation and non-disclosure of material facts 
concerning the costs of XL protection. Cresswell J held that there was a material 
difference between the XL costs of 20 percent in recent years represented in the 
1989 placing information and the actual costs of over 40 per cent in the relevant 
years, and such material fact ought to have been disclosed to the defendants.  In 
addition, the increase in XL costs for the 1989 year and the likely increase for the 
1990 year which reflected a material change to the information represented in the 
placement for the 1989 year ought to have been disclosed to the reinsurers in the 
1990 renewal too. Therefore, the reinsurers were entitled to treat their contracts as 
void by reason of such material misrepresentation and non-disclosure.  
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5.4.5 Claims handling by the reinsured 
In addition to the manner in which the reinsured is running his business and the loss 
experience of the reinsured, information in respect of how the claims are developed 
by the reinsured may also be material to the reinsurer and need to be disclosed to 
the reinsurer. Particularly when the nature of the reinsured’s claims handling 
processes, reinsured’s claims monitoring approach, level of the claim amount, 
accounting, or the reserving policy deviate from what is usually expected in the 
market practice, such facts are material to a prudent reinsurer’s underwriting 
assessment.  For example, in General Fire and Life Assurance Corp v Campbell,438 
it was decided that claims running at a high level was a material fact that need to be 
disclosed. The claimant underwriter of an accident insurance scheme placed its 
reinsurance in three layers. The defendant participated in the third layer of £50,000 
to £100,000 at a premium of £500. The reinsurer sought to avoid the reinsurance on 
the ground of non-disclosure of a fact that the losses were running in excess of 
£10,000 per month. Branson J held that the defendant was fully entitled to avoid the 
reinsurance for such material non-disclosure because the reinsurer would have 
certainly rejected the risks had such information been disclose.  Moreover, in Feasey 
v Sun life, the reinsured’s misrepresentation in respect of his failure to monitoring the 
claims had been affirmed to be a material fact that the reinsurer was interested to be 
informed of.  
The reinsured need to make effort to establish a full circumstance surrounding an 
event that had given rise to a claim, therefore it is an usual market practice that a 
proper and reasonable reserve would be set representing the most likely financial 
exposure of the reinsured under the direct insurance, including legal and any 
associated expenses on a regular basis of liaison and regular updates from external 
advisers, loss adjusters and lawyer t etc. As to the materiality to the reinsured’s 
reserving policy, it was established that the reinsured’s practices for allocating 
reserves to potential claims to the extent that is unusual or unexpected need to be 
disclosed to the reinsurers. The leading authority addressing this issue is the Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Assicurazioni General SpA v Arab Insurance Group. 439  The 
plaintiff Generali was the reinsurer of several packages of insurance relating to US 
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construction risks. The reinsured retroceded the defendant ARIG a 7.5 per cent line 
in respect of the risks under a quota share retrocession agreement. As former direct 
insurer and later the leading reinsurer, Generali developed a system for investigation 
and evaluation of claims under direct insurance, through an independent loss 
adjuster. A claim file was established to ‘investigate all claims and recommend the 
amount of loss reserve to be established with respect to such claims’. So ARIG 
sought to avoid the retrocession arrangement by reason of the reinsurer’s failure to 
disclose that it adopted an unusual and impudent reserving principle. It alleged that 
such reserving policy that required losses to be established before any reserve are 
made gave the effect of understating the projected loss figures put forward by the 
reinsurer. Although the court of appeal disagreed with the retrocessionaire’s 
allegation, by finding that the reserve policy adopted by the reinsurer was not 
sufficiently an imprudent and unusual in market practice so that the non-disclosure of 
such information was not material to render the retrocession voidable, it did accept 
that an unusual nature of a reserving policy would be a material fact.  
5.4.6 Refusal of another reinsurer to accept or renew the risk  
Generally, the refusal of another reinsurer’s acceptance or renewal of a risk will be 
immaterial, particularly in marine insurance.  It would be impracticable for the 
reinsured’s broker to disclose all the approaches which have been made to the 
underwriters sitting in the underwriting rooms. Moreover, individual underwriter has 
his own philosophy of underwriting assessment to accept or refuse business, and 
what an underwriter consider good business may turn out to be unacceptable for the 
other underwriter. However if such refusal which reveal the financial performance of 
the direct insurance or reflect the premium income associated with the risk is 
misrepresented to the reinsurer, the issue of materiality may arise.  
In North British Fishing Boast Insurance Co Ltd v Starr,440 the plaintiff issued a policy 
covered the total loss of the motor fishing vessel Present Help. The defendant who 
was an underwriting member of Lloyd’s shared the risk £8 odd with the plaintiff under 
reinsurance, covering this motor fishing boat from loss or damage by fire when 
engaging in fishing in 1921. After a loss suffered by the vessel from a peril insurance 
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against, the defendant alleged to void the reinsurance policy by reason of non-
disclosure of material facts that the plaintiffs’ former reinsurer, who had been placing 
their reinsurance of the reinsured’s fire risks on motor vessel since 1914 to 1920, 
refused to renew of the fire risks of the reinsured because there had been an 
exceptional increase both in the number and the amount of fire losses in 1920, 
because the reinsured refused to accept the premium charge quoted, i.e. a premium 
which was more than double the previous premiums. Although the judge held that 
the reinsurer was not entitled to avoid the policy, he did opine that a circumstance of 
this kind is material in that sense.441 
5.4.7 Identity of other co-reinsureds 
Generally speaking, the identity of other co-reinsureds is not always material to 
reinsurers, particularly where the reinsured is the lead participant of the agreement 
because other co-reinsureds are free to make their own decisions in underwriting the 
direct insurance. However, in some situation the reinsurer may be interested to know 
and even induced to enter into the agreement by the fact that particular co-reinsured 
has participated in the underwriting the risks, even the co-reinsured is not leading 
underwriter under the direct insurance. Acceptance of risk by such co-reinsured of 
good reputation and professionalism may be an implication of the quality of the risks, 
so that the assessment of the risk by other co-reinsureds might be material in such 
appropriate circumstances, particularly where the reinsured itself has drawn attention 
to such fact. Such issue as to materiality was arisen in Assicurazioni Generali SpA v 
Arab Insurance Group,442 the plaintiff Generali was the reinsurer of several packages 
of insurance risks relating to US construction workers. The reinsured retroceded the 
defendant ARIG a 7.5 per cent line in respect of the risks under a quota share 
retrocession agreement. After the defendant refused to pay any more claims after 
Feb 1999, Gennerali issued proceedings for unpaid claims. ARIG raised a number of 
defences, one of that was there was a material misrepresentation of Generali that 
the reinsurance agreement was ‘supported’ by Munich Re. The statement was 
actually partly true as the Munich Re did support the programme, albeit just one of 
the two sections of the reinsurance cover. Although there was huge division to the 
approach of the Court of Appeal, it was finally held that the representation did not 
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have falsity; neither did it induce the retrocessionaire to subscribe the slips. As to the 
materiality of the statement, although two judges found it satisfied the prudent 
underwriter test on a simple ground,443 it is still notable to the reinsured to be more 
cautious to represent such relevant information when he tries to cede the risk.  
Situation may be different where the reinsured is one of the following market whose 
underwriting decisions are often highly affected by the leading underwriter’s 
acceptance of the risks, or even bound by the leading underwriter’s decisions to 
acceptance, fixing the terms, premiums and settlements  under leading underwriter 
clause, line slip etc. It is clearly material and need to be disclosed to the reinsurer 
whether the reinsured was bound by decisions of other co-reinsureds.  
5.4.8 Existence of other reinsurance cover and retention level  
As discussed in the reinsured’s retention context above, since the Trail v Baring444 
which decided that misrepresentation of the retention could entitle the reinsurer to 
avoid the contract, there has been a trend reflected in the courts’ decisions that the 
existence of other reinsurance cover and the reinsured’s retention level is not always 
material to the reinsurer. Alternative reinsurance arrangement covering the 
reinsured’s retention does not affect the retention’s primary function to eliminate the 
reinsurer’s liability for small claims. As it is shown in authorities,445 the reinsured is 
not under an obligation to retain the stated amount in the reinsurance terms for its 
net account unless the terms expressly provide so; and the reinsured is free to find 
alternative reinsurance arrangements to cover his exposure and such arrangements 
which are commonplace market practices in the reinsurance of that nature need not 
to be disclosed to the reinsurers, as those facts are immaterial information that the 
reinsurers ought to know in his ordinary course of business, for example in Kingscroft 
v Nissan,446 it was opined that it was a common practice in the market especially for 
quota share treaty to seek about a further excess of loss cover as long as the 
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amount purchased was not unreasonably beyond market norms. Therefore, if the 
reinsurers are particularly interest in existence of reinsured’s alternative reinsurance 
arrangements, he need to make express enquiry into it and if it is particularly 
important for the reinsurer that the reinsured needs to bear such retention in its net 
account, the reinsurer need to draft the wordings expressly and clearly enough. In 
Great Atlantic v Home Insurance, it has shown that the wording ‘hold 10% of the risk 
for its own account’ did not amount to a promise by the reinsured to retain such 
share but just meant that it was not for the reinsurer’s account. The same situation 
happened again in Kingscroft v Nissan. The reinsured’s statement that it would retain 
50 per cent of the risk was not a promise but merely amounted to a statement of 
intention. Again in Assicurazioni Gennerali Spa v Arab Insurance Group,447 it was 
held at first instance that representation by the reinsured of its retention was a 
statement of fact, not sufficient enough to perform as a continuing warranty giving 
the effect that all risks accepted by the reinsured would be retained for its net 
account during the policy period, as there was no good commercial reason for a 
reinsured to want to freeze its share for the whole year, nor the reinsurer would have 
such concern.  
5.4.9 Retrocession protection offered to the reinsurer  
Bearing an analogy to the relationship between the direct insurance and reinsurance 
contracts, retrocession is insurance of reinsurance between the retrocessionaire and 
the reinsurer. Although there is a market practice that the reinsured’s broker may be 
instructed to arrange satisfactory retrocession cover for the reinsurers before the 
reinsurers enter into the reinsurance agreement, the broker acts as the agent of the 
reinsurer rather than the reinsured’s in the arrangement, consequently the 
retrocession cover is a separate and distinct contract from the reinsurance contract, 
having nothing to do with the reinsured. Therefore, there is no any contract privity 
between the reinsured and retrocessionaire, nor is the reinsured imposed on any 
obligation to the reinsurer regarding to the retrocession cover. It suffices to say the 
nature of the reinsurer’s retrocession cover is prima facie a matter for the reinsurer 
rather than the reinsured. Whether the reinsurer is protected by proper retrocession 
arrangements is immaterial to the risk run by the reinsurers under the reinsurance 
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agreement. Generally speaking, the reinsured is not obliged to disclose any 
information concerning the retrocession to the reinsurer without any express inquiry, 
even such information happens to be known by the reinsured.  
The issue arose in Societe Anonyme d’Intermediaires Lexembourgeois v Farex Gie 
(SAIL v Farex).448 The plaintiffs SAIL was part of an American insurance group (AIG), 
and the defendants Farex were a reinsurance group in which the first defendants 
were sued as a representative reinsurer. In 1988 SAIL instructed its London broker 
to place a facultative reinsurance facility with Farex. Farex indicated that it would be 
prepared to accept the business only if the broker could arrange retrocession 
protection for Farex. After the broker arranged the retrocession cover for Farex with 
St Paul Fire& Marine Insurance Company, Farex signed the lineslip on 17 Nov 1988. 
However, the retrocessionaire later repudiated the retrocession arrangements, 
claiming that the representative had no authority to accept the retrocession and the 
broker was aware of such information. In early 1991, Farex suspended performance 
of the facultative facility before repudiating all liability to SAIL. In June 1991 SAIL 
issued proceedings against Farex for summary judgment. On an application for 
summary judgment, 1994 Gatehouse J granted declarations that except for 24 
declarations where Farex had an arguable case of material non-disclosure, all of the 
renewal declarations in the second year were valid and effect contracts of 
reinsurance.  Farex appealed and SAIL cross-appealed from Gatehouse J’s decision. 
Farex raised a new allegation of broker’s non-disclosure and misrepresentation 
concerning the invalidity of the retrocession arrangements, and further contention 
that broker’s knowledge of such fact was to be imputed to SAIL. The court of Appeal 
held that the broker acted as the reinsurer’s agent rather than the reinsured’s in the 
placement of retrocession arrangement. Therefore such knowledge known by the 
broker was not to be imputed to the reinsured under s.19 of MIA 1906 as the 
broker’s capacity was not the agent of the reinsured when he had acquired such 
information. Even if it was established that the reinsured happened to have 
knowledge of invalidity of the retrocession cover, the reinsured was under no duty to 
disclose it under s.18 (2) of the MIA 1906. The duty under the section did not extend 
beyond materials relevant to the reinsurance agreement between the SAIL and 
Farex, therefore the status of the retrocession agreement was not a material 
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circumstance within s.18 (2).449 Moreover, the reinsured was under no obligation to 
disclose the information because by s.18 (3) (b), there was no duty of disclosure on 
the reinsured to disclose the status of retrocession cover which ought to be known in 
the reinsurer’s ordinary course of business.  
The SAIL v Farex case can be an example of the situation that there is a certain 
extent of independence between the reinsurance and retrocession. Under such 
circumstances it is impossible for the reinsured to have knowledge of the nature of 
the retrocession cover, or the reinsured coincidentally possess some information that 
is immaterial to the nature of the risk run by the reinsurer under the reinsurance. 
Therefore, no duty of disclosure is born on the reinsured in placing the reinsurance 
contract. However, the position may be different under some circumstances where 
information possessed by the reinsured is highly correlated with the reinsurance 
agreement.450 Whether the facts within the reinsurer’s knowledge are material is a 
question of fact depending upon the relationship between the contracts involved and 
the nature of the information relating to the retrocession in individual cases.   
In Hill v Citadel Insurance Co Ltdcase mentioned above,452 in the Court of Appeal, 
the reinsured appealed from Cresswell J’s decision which granted the reinsurer 
entitlement to avoid the reinsurance treaties by reason of material misrepresentation 
and non-disclosure. The reinsurer were told by the reinsured’s broker that there was 
substantial excess of loss protection in place for them and the costs were ‘around 20% 
of Gross Net Premium Income’. The 1990 renewal information presented to the 
second defendant confirmed the existence of the excess of loss protection for the 
treaty, by providing that ‘The cash position remains healthy preserved by a 
comprehensive common account XL programme at a very reasonable cost ratio’. 
The court held that such statements relating to the cost of excess of loss protection 
was misrepresentation and dramatic increase in the cost ratio should have been 
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disclosed to the reinsurer. The nature of such placing information was designed to 
encourage the reinsurer to participate in the reinsurance programme, and it was 
virtually self-evident that the reinsureds through their broker were putting forward the 
stated cost ratio as a stable feature and a guide to future expectations. Therefore, 
the reinsurer was entitled to avoid the reinsurance agreement for such material non-
disclosure and misrepresentation.  
In conclusion, the general rule is that the reinsurer’s retrocession cover is prima facie 
a matter for the reinsurer rather than the reinsured, the reinsured is not obliged to 
disclose any information concerning the reinsurer’ protection even such facts are 
coincidentally known by the reinsured. However, if such relevant information was 
within the exclusive knowledge of the reinsured and the nature of information is 
material to the risk run by the reinsurer, then the information still need to be 
disclosed by the reinsured.  
 5.5 Conclusion  
It is long established under common law that the doctrine of utmost good faith 
applies to all form of insurance contract, therefore the reinsurance contracts should 
be subject to the same test of materiality like all direct insurance contracts. Although 
nowadays reinsurers tend to have a great deal of information at their disposal apart 
from which they obtain from their reinsureds, and the courts have accordingly tended 
to reduce the scope and application of the duty of disclosure where the reinsurer 
have great and independent knowledge of the risks they cover, the duty of disclosure 
is still retained as the most essential part of the doctrine of utmost good faith 
continuing to apply to the reinsurance business area, serving the purpose to enable 
the reinsurers to make informed underwriting decisions.  
However, in business insurance market practice the duty of utmost good faith has 
become onerous to a certain degree, especially for large size, complicated nature 
and complex business. To minimise the difficulties and the deficiency of enforcing 
the law in applying to large size, complicated and complex reinsurance business, the 
reinsurers commonly follow the current business insurance market practice by 
designing particular standards and formal procedure of disclosure and inserting a 
specially draft clause in the reinsurance contracts overriding the default regime 
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under current legislation, rather than seeking enforcement of the full requirements of 
the act. It is significant for the reinsured and reinsurer to identify various disclosure 
roles and allocate responsibilities, and the nature of the material facts and 
information in advance, so that it can facilitate a suitable and sufficient disclosure of 
material facts. 
Material facts subject to duty of disclosure differ between the direct insurance and 
reinsurance contracts, determined by the nature of the insurance contract and the 
placing method by which the contract is concluded. As to material facts to be 
disclosed in placing reinsurance contract, in addition to the material facts relating to 
the underlying risks, any information relating to the manner in which the reinsureds 
run his business and operation of the reinsurance agreement itself may be material 
to be disclosed to the reinsurers. Although the types of material information may be 
different between direct insurance and reinsurance, there is a similar fact under both 
direct insurance and reinsurance context, i.e. there is no hard and fast rule that what 
circumstances can be material in placing insurance agreements. The reinsured and 
his broker acting on his behalf face most exposure of the reinsurer’s potential 
allegation of materiality of a particular representation or non-disclosure. There are 
always inevitable disputes between the parties, and even the market expert 
witnesses may put forward conflicting advices. Therefore the assessment of the 
materiality in respect of a particular circumstance is a question of fact in individual 
cases.  
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Chapter 6 Applicability and duration of the duty of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance contracts  
6.1 Modifications of general rules of applicability and duration of the duty of 
utmost good faith in reinsurance  
Reinsurance which in essence is insurance of insurers can be categorised as a 
contract of uberrimae fidei, so that the doctrine of utmost good faith should be 
applicable to a reinsurance agreement which is itself a contract of insurance. 
Generally speaking, placing a reinsurance treaty under which a contract of insurance 
is concluded attracts the duty of utmost good faith just as all other forms of insurance 
contract. Therefore the reinsured owes the reinsurer a duty of utmost good faith to 
disclose and make no misrepresentation of all material facts that may affect the 
reinsurer’s underwriting assessment until the underwriting decisions are made to 
conclude a contract of insurance. However, due to the distinctions nature of 
reinsurance relationship decided by special placing methods in subscription market 
practice, difficulties and problems arise as to the issue of applicability and duration of 
the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance area.  
6.1.1 Modification of applicability of the duty of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance   
As discussed in previous chapters, distinctions exist between various types of 
reinsurance agreements. As an obligatory treaty is concerned, the cession of risks 
under the obligatory treaty is automatic, without any further underwriting assessment 
after conclusion of the treaty. Therefore such treaty can be regarded as a contract of 
insurance. However, position of the non-obligatory treaty is different as such treaty is 
only treated as a framework agreed in advance to make future reinsurance. 
Therefore such facility is in essence a contract for insurance under which 
reinsurance contract can be created by future cessions.  
It is the nature of the reinsurance relationship and particular placing methods that 
determines the applicability of the duty of utmost good faith the reinsurance 
agreement. As a result, the positions with the various reinsurance agreements might 
be different where the doctrine of utmost good faith is modified, different from that in 
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direct insurance. Anomalies and difficulties can be created in such modification of 
applicability and duration of the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance context. In 
deciding whether a reinsurance agreement attracts the duty of utmost good faith, the 
most significant question to be answered is when the reinsurer exercises his 
underwriting discretion to make assessment of the risks so that the application of the 
duty is triggered and when the contract of insurance is concluded to terminate the 
operation of the duty. Here suffice to say that the duty of utmost good faith only 
attaches to a reinsurance agreement which of itself a contract of insurance rather 
than a contract for insurance, such as a facultative contract, an obligatory treaty, or 
facultative obligatory treaty, and any declaration made under a contract for insurance, 
i.e. non-obligatory treaty. There is no duty of utmost good faith attaches to any non-
obligatory treaties or declarations to an obligatory treaty. Details in this respect will 
be discussed in details in the latter part of this chapter. 
6.1.2 Modification of duration of the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance 
contracts 
6.1.2.1 General rules of duration of the duty in reinsurance 
Since the duty is codified in the MIA 1906, it takes the courts a long time to finally 
establish a set of rules concerning the duration of the duty. Briefly the rules can be 
summarized as followings.  
The assured is required to disclosure and accurately represent all information that a 
prudent insurer may feel interested to know in decision making process at pre-
contractual stage, as codified in s.18(1) and s.20(6) of the MIA 1906 ‘before the 
conclusion of the contract’. Therefore not only the test of materiality is assessed only 
during the negotiation process prior to the formation of the contract as stated in 
s.20(1) MIA 1906, but also the duration of the duty of disclosure and the duty not to 
make misrepresentation attaches to the contract only in a pre-contractual stage. 
Prior to the conclusion of the contract, the reinsured remains under a duty to disclose 
and  to refrain from misrepresenting material facts coming into his attention, and is 
obliged to correct any false statements made to the reinsurer. 
190 
 
For example, in Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group (BSC)453 which 
was discussed in above chapter, the Court of Appeal held that the reinsured was in 
breach of the duty by failing to correct a false statement before the contract had 
been concluded. It is worth notice that the point at which the contract is concluded 
does not necessarily requires any issue of a policy or payment of premium which is 
clearly stated in s.21 of the MIA 1906. Once the offer proposed by the reinsured or 
his broker is accepted without any reservation or condition by the reinsurer, normally 
demonstrated by the underwriters’ scratches of the slip in subscription market, the 
contract has come into being with the policies to be issued at a later point.  
Once the risk has been accepted by the reinsurer, any false statement by the 
reinsured as to the risk or any information or changes to the circumstances which 
come into the reinsured’s knowledge after the conclusion of the reinsurance contract 
are irrelevant for the reinsurer’s underwriting assessment, consequently not material 
anymore for the purpose of the duty of utmost good faith.   
This was illustrated in Sirius International Insurance Corporation v Oriental 
Assurance Corporation.454 It was held that the reinsurers who had entered into a 
reinsurance agreement covering a direct policy on the contents of a building could 
not avoid the contract on the simple ground that misrepresentation in respect of the 
sprinkler system which was equipped the building was made at post-contractual 
stage. Even the contract expressly gives the reinsurer a right to cancel the cover by 
notice to the reinsured after the inception of the risk, there is no continuing duty of 
disclosure created on the reinsured after the conclusion of the contract.455 
6.1.2.2 Continuing duty in continuous reinsurance treaties? 
It suffices to say that the duty of utmost good faith which aims to enable the parties 
to make informed decisions terminates operation when the reinsurance agreement is 
concluded, unless express wording is incorporated into the terms to modify the 
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duration of the duty.456 However, there still exists divergence in the courts as to a 
continuing duty of utmost good faith after formation of the contract.  
Since The Litsion Pride457, the courts are reluctant to give up importing the doctrine 
into the currency of the policy and even post-contractual stage before any litigation 
concerning the disputes between the contractual parties start 458  , although the 
judges do accept that the duty of utmost good faith applies after the conclusion of the 
contract has to be curtailed to limited scope and with less harsh remedy. It is now an 
established rule that there is no general continuing duty of utmost good faith 
applicable to the currency and post-contractual stage of the policy. The reinsured is 
not obliged to continuously disclose any subsequent increase of risks underwritten. 
During the currency of the policy, any factors that may affect the parties’ rights and 
obligations are contractual issues to be governed by the express or implied terms of 
the policy itself. 459  
However, a further distinction between the direct insurance and reinsurance may still 
create some problems as to duration of the duty in reinsurance market practice. In 
practice some treaty reinsurance is continuous until terminated by either party. It is 
suggest that the duty of disclosure only attaches again if such reinsurance cover is 
renegotiated as a pre-contractual duty attracted by a newly negotiated agreement. 
Whereas generally non-proportionate treaties are on an annual basis, so that the 
duty of disclosure is revived on each renewal.  
Moreover as discussed above, distinct from direct insurance, under a quota share or 
non-proportionate treaties risks accepted by the cedent are automatically reinsured 
according to the terms of the agreement. Every time a declaration is made under the 
treaty, no further underwriting assessment is needed as this occurs after conclusion 
of the reinsurance contract. Therefore, it can be said that the duty of utmost good 
faith does not continue at the second stage of declarations. 
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In respect to situations where the reinsurers do have further underwriting decisions 
to make after the conclusion, the parties are actually conclude a fresh new policy by 
renewal, reinstatement, extension, variation of the existing reinsurance contract etc. 
It is suggested that the duty of utmost good faith attaches herein is pre-contractual 
per se and applicable only to the new policy created. So it is the revival of the pre-
contractual duty rather than a continuing post one, and the reinsured is only obliged 
to disclose and make no misrepresentation of all material information relating to the 
reinsurer’s new underwriting decisions. Any breach of the duty make the induced 
decisions avoidable leaving the others untouched.  
6.1.2.3 Problems as to duration of the duty arising in subscription market 
practice  
The subscription market practice may create problems as to the duration of the duty. 
As noticed, there may raise practical problems where there is a gap between the 
initial presentation of a risk and the party’s decision to enter into the contract, either 
the reinsurer’s decision to underwrite the risk, or the reinsured’s decision to accept 
the reinsurer’s standing offer. Also problems may arise where there is a gap between 
the reinsurer’s subscription of the underwriting lines and the inception of the risk.  
It is now established rule that any information or changes to circumstances, e.g. 
deterioration of claims figures which comes into the reinsured’s knowledge before 
the acceptance of the offer is material and should be disclosed;460 whereas has the 
reinsured been aware of such information after the acceptance of the offer, even if 
the risk is not attached at that time, no obligation of disclosure is imposed upon the 
reinsured.461 If the reinsurer has realized any materially increased risk between the 
acceptance and the inception, he might be discouraged to subscribe the risk at all or 
would like to alter the terms or premium acceptable to him. Then the reinsurer might 
attempt to notice the reinsured’s broker to withdraw from the contract and refuse to 
accept any premium. However, the duty of utmost good faith could not avail the 
reinsurer any right to avoid the policy on the ground of non-disclosure or 
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misrepresentation of such information concerning the changes of circumstances 
after conclusion of the contract.462  
There are many facilities developed in the London market to promote the efficiency 
and reduce the cost of the placing process. Under those facilities, large numbers of 
similar risks can be placed fast and conveniently. In the following sessions, details 
will be discussed as to the modification and alteration of the applicability and 
duration of the doctrine operating in the reinsurance contracts which are placed in 
various methods.  
6.2 Application of utmost good faith in facultative agreements 
As discussed in above chapters, a facultative reinsurance agreement is used by the 
reinsured and the reinsurer for placing whole or part of a particular single risk that is 
underwritten by the reinsured under the direct insurance. A slip is commonly used in 
the London market by brokers in placing a facultative reinsurance agreement, 
appending to the original policy. By a ‘full insurance clause’ which can be considered 
as the most important term in the slip, terms of the direct insurance contract are 
incorporated into the reinsurance agreement so that the two contracts can provide 
identical covers. Therefore a facultative reinsurance agreement which is probably the 
simplest form of reinsurance contract is in essence a contract of insurance between 
the reinsured and the reinsurer. So the doctrine of utmost good faith as a principle of 
law is equally applicable to facultative agreements as it is to original insurances. The 
duty upon the reinsured is analogous to that of the original insured both as to the 
scope and the duration of the duty.  Once the facultative reinsurer subscribes the slip, 
a facultative reinsurance agreement is concluded between the reinsured and the 
individual reinsurer. The reinsured is required to disclose and not to misrepresent all 
material information within his knowledge before the conclusion of the facultative 
agreement, so that the reinsurer can make an informed underwriting assessment. 
The consequences of misrepresentation or non-disclosure by the reinsured entitles 
the reinsurer to avoid the facultative agreement, even though the relative short-term 
risk period for which a facultative risk is reinsured may be over before such facts 
have come into light. There are few authorities on duration of the duty of utmost 
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good faith in facultative reinsurance context. In an very early case, Federal 
Insurance Co of New Jersey v Westchester Fire Insurance Co,463 it was held by the 
court that the reinsurance agreement which covers the reinsured’s liability under a 
direct policy insuring crops against damages was voidable on the ground that the 
reinsured failed to disclose material information that the crops had been subjected to 
severe hailstone storms. Such failure to disclosure the material information between 
the proposals submitted to the reinsurer and reinsurer’s formal acceptance render 
the facultative agreement voidable.  
6.3 Application of utmost good faith in reinsurance treaties 
6.3.1 Introduction 
There are many facilities developed in the London market to promote the efficiency 
and reduce the cost of the placing process. Under those facilities, large numbers of 
similar risks can be placed fast and conveniently without individual presentations by 
the brokers to underwriters on a case by case basis. The reinsurance treaty can be 
one of the most common facilities effected to place risks. A reinsurance treaty is a 
continuing pre-arranged framework under which risks of a type or certain types or 
even whole book of the reinsured’s business is ceded to the reinsurers by future 
sequent declarations during the cover period. So a reinsurance treaty creates 
reinsurance contracts by a two-stage process, i.e. placing the treaty itself and the 
cessions of risks falling within the treaty cover.  
In practice, treaty mechanisms are placed by different methods, generally including 
three types, i.e. obligatory, facultative-obligatory, and non-obligatory treaty. One 
significant effect of different methods in placing treaty agreements is to modify the 
reinsurer’s underwriting discretion as to acceptance of the risks which fall within the 
ambit of the agreement. Therefore there is a critical criterion whether the reinsurer 
has discretion as to the acceptance of the risks which are ceded by the reinsured, i.e. 
obligatory or non-obligatory for the reinsurer; rather than the manner in which the 
ceded risks are allocated to the treaty cover, i.e. proportional or non-proportional. 
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The specific nature of different methods may result in different conclusion timing of 
the contract of insurance created under the treaty framework, and then affect the 
application and duration of duty of utmost good faith attracted under the treaty. 
Whether the duty of utmost good faith applies either or both on the placing of the 
treaty or on the declarations ceding individual risks under the treaty is determined at 
the moment when the contract of insurance is brought into existence by the parties. 
It suffices to say that the duty is only attracted when the reinsurer is making 
underwriting decisions to conclude a contract of insurance, rather than attracted in 
placing a reinsurance contract which only functions as a contract for insurance giving 
both parties discretion to future cessions. As a contract for insurance does not itself 
providing an insurance cover, but just provides a mechanism under which contracts 
of insurance can be made through declarations of individual risks to the 
mechanism.464 The modification and alteration of the applicability and duration of the 
duty of utmost good faith to each different type of treaty and declarations made to it 
are discussed below. 
6.3.2 Operation of duty of utmost good faith in obligatory treaties  
As a predominating method of placing treaty reinsurance, the most distinctive nature 
of an obligatory treaty is that all risks falling within the scope of the treaty cover, no 
matter profitable or inclined to make losses, are automatically ceded from the 
reinsured to the reinsurers. Neither party has discretion as to the cession, i.e. the 
reinsured is obliged to cede all the risks, even if it is beneficial to the reinsured to 
reserve them; while the reinsured is bound to accept the risks with no right of refusal. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the obligatory treaty is a contract of reinsurance 
on its own right which attracts a duty of utmost good faith prior to conclusion of the 
contract; and then the duty terminates operation after the conclusion of the contract, 
so that there is no more room for the duty to live in later stage as regards to 
declarations to the treaty.  
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6.3.2.1 Applicability and duration of duty of utmost good faith to an obligatory 
treaty itself  
6.3.2.1.1 Difficulties as to the applicability and duration of the duty to an 
obligatory treaty—contract of insurance or contract for insurance? 
It is obviously established rule that the duty of utmost good faith is attracted in a 
contract of insurance before the conclusion of the contract. As discussed above, 
whether the duty of utmost good faith is applicable to the treaty depends on the 
nature of the treaty, i.e. whether it is a contract of reinsurance or a contract for 
reinsurance. There is no dissidence in the essence of an obligatory treaty that is a 
pre-arrange framework under which contracts of reinsurance are automatically 
concluded without individual presentations when the risks attach. However, it is 
controversial whether an obligatory treaty is contract of reinsurance or contract for 
reinsurance.  
There is no case which authoritatively determines this issue. This point arose in a 
very early case Glasgow Assurance Corporation v William Symondson & Co 465 
which was cited in many sequent cases concerning the duty of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance treaties. In this case, reinsurers entered into an obligatory agreement 
with brokers under which the reinsurers were obliged to accept all risks of a certain 
class at a fixed percentage premium. Later the reinsurer sought to avoid the 
agreement by the reason that the broker had made non-disclosure of a fact that they 
were not acting as intermediaries but the reinsureds in their own right and had ceded 
their own liabilities to the reinsurers under the agreement. It was decided by Scrutton 
J that the fact non-disclosed was not material to the risk so that the reinsurer was not 
entitled to avoid the contract. However, the agreement was not a contract of 
reinsurance in its own but a contract of utmost good faith. It is doubted whether such 
proposition represents the law. 
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6.3.2.1.2 Critical criteria—any underwriting assessment made before 
conclusion? 
According to the nature of the obligatory treaty, it is suggested that an obligatory 
treaty is in its own right a contract of insurance which attracts the duty of utmost 
good faith because the reinsurers has to make his underwriting assessment and 
then decide whether or not to subscribe the risks proposed by the reinsured when 
the treaty is placed.  
The English contract law has long established two requisites of a contract which is 
legally binding, i.e. the parties should have reached agreement generally at the time 
when one party accepts an offer made by the other; and the agreement must be 
certain and finial. In addition, in the process of reaching agreement, the requirement 
of contractual intention and consideration must be satisfied for the legal 
enforceability purpose. In respect of an obligatory treaty, an offer is made by the 
reinsured when his broker proposes the risks to the reinsurer by proposal form or a 
slip in the subscription market. Information about the risks is passed on to the 
reinsurers and questions may be asked as to all relevant circumstances which the 
reinsurers concern. The potential contractual parties may negotiate all the conditions 
and terms of the treaty and fix the premium to be charged. Once the reinsurer 
subscribes the risks, the offer proposed is accepted giving the effect that a bounding 
agreement is concluded between the reinsurer and the reinsured. All the rights and 
obligations of both parties are created and settled at the time of conclusion of the 
treaty, leaving the whole future cessions of risks which satisfy all financial, 
geographical or other criteria set out in the treaty to be ceded automatically.  
In the placing process to reach agreement, the reinsurers’ underwriting decisions are 
already made, without any further discretion upon the reinsurer to refuse when the 
risks attach to the cover. A future cession automatically operates through the treaty 
mechanism so that its effect does not depend upon whether a declaration is made 
validly and in time to the reinsurer at the second stage. As a result, it can be said 
that the obligatory treaty agreement itself is the contract of insurance through which 
the reinsurer reinsures the reinsured against particular type or types of risks, far 
more than mere machinery for placing contract of reinsurance. A bounding contract 
of reinsurance is coming into existence once the reinsurer accepts the risks 
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proposed by the reinsured’s broker, although the risks which fall within the treaty 
cover has not been automatically transferred to the reinsurer until the inception of the 
risks. Therefore, an obligatory treaty as a contract of reinsurance ought to attract the 
duty of utmost good faith on its own. As discussed in the first section, the duty of 
utmost good faith applies only to the pre-contractual stage, consequently the 
duration of the duty in an obligatory treaty lasts until the treaty itself is concluded. 
The reinsured is obliged to disclose all material facts that would influence the 
reinsurer’s underwriting assessment so that the reinsurer can get a whole picture 
how the treaty facility will be used and  make his own assessment that whether such 
arrangement will deliver a profitable business.  
6.3.2.1.3 Problems as to allocation of uncovered risks to the treaty  
It should be noticed that only risks within the cover provided by the treaty will attach 
to the cover automatically. The treaty is not touched by any class of business which 
falls outsider the agreed limits of the treaty. Problems may arise that where the 
reinsured or his broker tries to allocate some uncovered risks into the treaty. 
It seems that the duty of utmost good faith is unhelpful to the reinsurer in such 
situation in respect of the treaty, as those risks are never agreed to be covered  by 
the reinsurers consequently no duty of disclosure arises as to such information 
concerning the risks at all. Moreover, avoidance of the whole treaty seems unfairly 
disproportionate as non-disclosure or misrepresentation of material facts in respect 
of risks falling outside the treaty cover does not affect the reinsurer’s underwriting 
decisions as to the treaty.  
However, the duty of utmost good faith may sneak in through the route of variation of 
cover of the treaty on the reinsurer’s acceptance of the additional risks, or through 
the route of parties’ conclusion of a new ad hoc contract of insurance covering this 
particular class of risks besides the treaty. Either route gives the effect that a duty of 
utmost good faith is attracted to the new agreement which concludes a contract of 
insurance by the reinsured’s declarations. Non-disclosure or misrepresentation of 
material facts to the reinsurer make the contract avoidable, leaving all other cessions 
of the risks to the original treaty untainted.  
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This point is agreed by the courts in Inversiones Manria SA v Sphere Drake 
Insurance Co Plc. (The Dora)466, where the brokers sought to add to the reinsurance 
treaty a proposal from the claimants for direct insurance, rather than reinsurance 
which the reinsurers accepted. When the defendant reinsurers tried to deny liabilities 
by alleging a number of misrepresentations and non-disclosure of material facts, the 
claimants argued that the proposal had been incorporated into the treaty coverage, 
so that no additional duty of utmost good faith had attached to it. The court rejected 
the claimant’s argument and held that the proposal for direct insurance had not 
formed a part of the reinsurance, but a new contract of direct insurance agreed 
between the claimant and the reinsurers. Therefore, the claimant’s breach of the 
duty of utmost good faith made the contract avoidable.  
6.3.2.2 Applicability of utmost good faith to declarations to obligatory treaties 
6.3.2.2.1 The duty applicable to treaty terminates after conclusion of the treaty  
As suggested in the above section, the duty of utmost good faith applies to an 
obligatory treaty itself, as it is a contract of insurance under which the reinsurer 
undertakes to cover the reinsured against particular types of risks automatically at 
the inception of the risks. All the underwriting decisions have already been made at 
the time of conclusion of the treaty leaving all cessions of risks automatically binding 
the reinsurers, consequently arises no question of the reinsurer being influenced in 
deciding which individual risks to accept or what terms to apply. Information of 
increase of the risks or alteration to the circumstances after the conclusion of the 
treaty becomes immaterial to the reinsurers and does not fall within the scope of the 
duty of disclosure.467 So according to the general rule of duration of the duty of 
utmost good faith, the duty of utmost good faith does not apply anymore after an 
obligatory treaty has been concluded. The point arose in Law Guarantee Trust and 
Accident Society Ltd v Munich Reinsurance Co. 468 where the reinsurer entered into 
a quota share treaty to reinsure the reinsured’s liability from the original mortgage 
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insurance policies issued after a fixed time point. The reinsured was under a duty to 
notify the reinsurer of new insurance within eight days since their conclusion. When 
a claim against the reinsurer arose, the reinsurer alleged non-disclosure of a new 
insurance policy on the bordereau. But the argument was rejected by Eve J. on the 
ground that there is simply no room for application of utmost good faith to individual 
declarations within the cover provided by the treaty. Consequently, the duty of 
utmost good faith is not attracted in declarations made to obligatory treaties.  
6.3.2.2.2 Effect of the declarations  
The effect of a declaration itself determines that such an obligation to notice rather 
than effecting a contract of insurance does not attract the utmost good faith. Under 
an obligatory treaty, the reinsured may be required to prepare a bordereaux of the 
reinsurance account for a fixed period, for example quarterly, for administration 
purposes. The reinsured is normally obligated to inform he reinsurer his cession of 
risks by means of such regular bordereaux just for information purposes. It was an 
essential part of the contractual machinery, as it informed the underwriters exactly 
which risks had attached to the cover and enabled them to calculate and collect the 
premium due in respect of them. 469  Actually a tendency of decline in use of 
bordereaux in practice makes the reinsurer under an obligatory treaty receives less 
or even little information about the individual risks ceded. It perhaps indicates an 
implicit recognition by reinsurers that continuing information on the details of 
individual original insurances is time-consuming and adds nothing to the operation of 
treaties.470 The effect of declarations does not extend to the cessions of risks to the 
reinsurer which is triggered by automatic attachment of risks within the terms of the 
treaty. Consequently, failure of declaration will not vitiate the automatic attachment of 
risks or affect the liability of the underwriters in respect of a risk, even if notification is 
not made until after the loss has occurred as long as the reinsured has intended to 
make the declaration but negligently failed.471  
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The view is confirmed by Court of Appeal in Glencore International AG v Ryan (The 
Beursgracht),472 where the claimant issued liability insurance protecting shipowners’ 
liabilities against third party claims, an obligatory treaty was entered between the 
claimant and the defendant underwriters in respect of any sums for which the 
defendant were obliged  to indemnify chartered vessels shipowners. After a 
stevedore was accidently killed on the vessel The Beursgracht, which gave rise to 
the reinsured’s liability under the direct insurance, the reinsurer denied their liability 
of reimbursement by alleging that no insurance contract in respect of the vessel had 
ever come into existence since no declaration was made to accepted by the 
reinsurer, as an implied term in the open cover declarations had to be made within a 
reasonable time. The court rejected such allegation, holding that making declarations 
under an obligatory open cover does not need to be linked to the attachment of risks. 
The failure by GI to include the Beursgracht in a monthly bordereau was a mistake 
made in good faith. It was an implied term of the contract that the declaration had to 
be made within a reasonable time and omissions to make declarations might only be 
rectified if occurred in good faith. However, such implied term was an innominate 
term rather than a condition precedent or warranty. Breach of such innominate term 
did not entitle the party to repudiate the contract unless serious consequences could 
be proven. Failing to make declarations did not affect the reinsurer’s liability; so such 
breach was not repudiatory.  
In conclusion declarations made to an obligatory treaty have no relation with the 
attachment of the risks to the cover provided. Once the risks declared within the 
ambit of the cover of the treaty, the reinsurers are immediately on risk. Declarations 
only serve perforce retrospectively to declare the true position under the cover, 
rather than to create any risk or obligations. Consequently duty of utmost good faith 
does not apply to declarations to an obligatory treaty.  
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6.3.3 Application of the duty of utmost good faith in Facultative obligatory 
treaty  
Facultative obligatory treaty473 is a hybrid of facultative reinsurance and obligatory 
treaty. It confers the reinsured an option to utiliase the facility or not. By Contrast, the 
reinsurer is obliged to accept all the risks which the reinsured selects to cede by 
declarations falling within the terms of the treaty, without any discretion to refuse. 
Difficulties arise in deciding whether the duty of utmost good faith attaches to such 
reinsurance contract and when it terminates if it is attracted by such contract. It 
suffices to say it is the nature of the hybrid reinsurance contract which determines 
the applicability and the duration of the duty. The answers need to be asked are still 
whether such hybrid treaty is a contract of insurance or not, and when the 
underwriting assessment is made by the reinsurers. It is suggested that the 
operation of the duty of utmost good faith under a fac/oblig treaty has a similar effect 
and duration as it applies to an obligatory treaty, although on different justification.  
6.3.3.1 Applicability of the duty of utmost good faith to the fac/oblig treaty 
itself 
According to the criterion discussed in obligatory treaty section, whether the duty of 
utmost good faith applies to a fac/oblig treaty depends on its nature, i.e. a contract 
for reinsurance or a contract of reinsurance. It is not easy to justify in a fac/oblig 
treaty. Before discussing the nature of a fac/oblig treaty, distinctions between an 
obligatory treaty and a fac/oblig treaty need to be addressed, although distinctions 
between them are not always clear. 
6.3.3.1.1 Distinctions nature of a fac/oblig treaty 
In previously mentioned case Glencore International AG v Ryan, The Beursgracht,474 
the issue before the court was whether, on the true construction of the terms of the 
open cover, the relevant contract of reinsurance came into existence between the 
claimant and the defendants when the claimant charted the vessel Beursgracht and 
the charter was performed. In his opinion, the cover in questions is in essence an 
obligatory treaty, therefore the risks attach to the cover automatically when The 
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Beursgracht was charted. In answering the question, differences between a fac/oblig 
treaty and an obligatory treaty were explained by Tuckey L.J.475. Where the treaty is 
an obligatory contract binding both parties to its terms, the reinsured agrees to 
declare every item that falls within the scope of the open cover and does not have 
the option to place such risks elsewhere. Once the risks fall within the ambit of the 
cover, underwriters are immediately and automatically on risks. Therefore a 
declaration serves perforce retrospectively to declare the true position under the 
cover rather than to attach risks to the cover or to create any rights or obligations. 
While under a fac/oblig treaty which can be described as a form of open cover gives 
the reinsured a facility to declare risks to the cover at his option, although the 
underwriter is bound to accept declarations as long as they fall within the terms of 
the cover. The declarations to a fac/oblig treaty attach the risks to the cover. If the 
risk declared is within the terms of the cover, there is no need for any specific 
acceptance by the underwriter, as he is bound and only bound since the receipt of 
the declaration. Consequently, declarations have to be made to a fac/oblig treaty 
before the contract of insurance becomes binding on the reinsurers, by contrast to 
an obligatory treaty under which declarations have not always to be made to 
reinsurer before they are bound.476 As to the effect of failure to make declarations 
under an obligatory treaty, the common law seems to regard an obligatory treaty as 
having a certain flexibility that allows the reinsured to make declarations after the 
loss has occurred, even if such loss has been known by the reinsured as far as the 
reinsured act in good faith.477 However, under a fac/oblig treaty, a declaration that 
attaches risks to the cover can have the retrospective effect and can be made to the 
cover after the loss has occurred, but not if the reinsured has already known about 
the loss. It was confirmed by Moore-Bick J. in Glencore International AG v Alpina 
Insurance (Alpina).478 
It should be noted that such distinctions are not always clear between the treaties, 
depending construction of the terms of the treaty, so the same situations would have 
different outcomes. The parties’ common agreement will prevail to distinguish the 
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nature of the treaty.  When there is a dispute regards the nature between the parties, 
it is a question of construction of the terms and conditions of the cover, with the 
nature of the business and any established course of dealing between the parties 
taken into consideration as well.   
Due to those specific features of a fac/oblig treaty discussed above, it is often used 
in the circumstances that the reinsurer has already subscribed to a quota share or 
surplus treaty with the cedant but is willing provide the cedant with additional 
automatic capacity on certain selected risks when the treaty is exhausted. However, 
it is potentially disadvantageous for the reinsurer that it involves a risk of anti-
selection, thereby depriving underwriters of the premium recoverable from a 
‘balanced’ portfolio of good and bad risks.479 As a result, such method of placing 
reinsurance is only appropriate when there is trust between the treaty parties and the 
reinsured is able to act in good faith or the cedant retains a proper proportion of the 
underlying risks for its own net account in an associated obligatory treaty.  
6.3.3.1.2 Applicability of duty of utmost good faith to the fac/oblig treaty itself  
6.3.3.1.2.1 When the contract of insurance is concluded between the parties 
According to the features commented above, it can be said that a fac/oblig treaty is 
no more than a standing offer whereby the underwriter agreed to accept liability in 
respect of any declaration made within the terms of the cover, rather than a contract 
becoming binding between the parties. No contractual rights and obligations arise 
until risks are selected to be ceded and declarations are made by the reinsured, as 
an acceptance of the reinsurer’s standing offer.  
This is confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Citadel Insurance Co. v. Atlantic Union 
Insurance Co. S.A.480 and followed by many English authorities.481 In the Citadel, a 
US broker approached a London reinsurance broker to seek for a hull open cover for 
his client. Then a facultative obligatory open cover was placed by the London broker 
with the Greek defendants by a slip which was initialed by C. on behalf of defendants. 
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A year later after the initial of the slip, the Canadian plaintiffs became clients of the 
US broker. A proportion of the direct risks insured by the plaintiffs were declared to 
the London broker under the cover with the defendants. After losses occurred under 
the direct insurance, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants to recover 
the balance between the premium and losses. The defendants denied their liability 
by contending that those losses did not fall within the terms of the reinsurance cover. 
In considering where the contract were concluded, the effect of the open cover was 
examined by Kerr L.J., in his opinion the open cover under which the defendants 
accepted liability as reinsurers was a standing offer whereby they agreed to accept 
liability for any declarations made to them within the terms of the cover. The initialing 
of the original slip, which established the open cover, did not at that stage constitute 
any contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants.482 
6.3.3.1.2.2 Divergence of justification of the applicability of the duty to such a 
standing offer  
Although it seems settled that a fac/oblig treaty is no more than a standing offer 
rather than a contract of insurance, it is still controversial whether the duty of utmost 
good faith applies to the treaty.  
There are some arguments affirming application of utmost good faith to the fac/oblig 
treaty on different reasoning. The first kind of view regards the fac/oblig treaty as a 
contract of insurance to attract duty of utmost good faith by itself.483 Such view 
suggests that the agreement constitutes an immediate contract of insurance pending 
latent declaration to be made to the cover, due to the underwriter’s immediate 
commitment when declarations are made. However, it is suggested that such view 
seems inconsistent with the settled law that the fac/oblig treaty is just a standing 
offer and underwriters are not bound until declarations are made to the cover.  
The second kind of view, contrary to the first one, holds that the reinsurer is bound 
merely to offer insurance and there arise no contractual obligations under a contract 
of insurance between the parties. Therefore it accepts that a fac/oblig treaty is not by 
itself a contract of insurance, but creates individual contracts of insurance when 
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declarations are made and individual policies issued. 484  But the second view 
proposes that such a contract for insurance should be regarded as an insurance 
contract in broad sense to attract the duty of utmost good faith. Some authorities 
seem to be supportive to such view, but it is suggested that the justification of the 
view is problematic. In Glasgow v Sydmonson,485 the claimant submitted that the 
agreement under which the underwriter agreed to accept all risks of a certain class 
was not a contract attracting utmost good faith. Scrutton J. rejected the submission, 
but no reasons were given in the judgment. While in Berger v Pollock486, the treaty 
from which the disputes arise was non-obligatory in nature which did not attract the 
duty of utmost good faith at all. Consequently, neither of the cases can be 
considered supportive of the view.  
Although the reasoning in the second view is consistent with the authorities, the 
justification for applicability of utmost good faith is still not convincing. There is a third 
view which is quite similar to the second one but to certain degree different on the 
reasoning.487 It is consistent with the ‘standing offer’ authorities by holding that such 
declaration policies operate as contracts for insurance as opposed to contracts of 
insurance by providing a framework under which contracts of insurance can be made 
by individual declarations. Under this view, the fac/oblig treaty is regarded as a 
contract for insurance but one that ought to attract the duty of utmost good faith for 
practical reasons, because the insurer has no discretion to reject risks subsequently 
declared by the assured. Such lack of any discretion at declaration stage and thus 
the absence of any duty of utmost good faith at declaration stage would appear to be 
a conclusive consideration in favour of a duty applicable to the treaty stage.  
6.3.3.1.2.3 No duty of utmost good faith attracted by such a standing offer 
itself 
Although the second and third arguments are pretty convincing as to the nature of a 
fac/oblig treaty, the applicability of utmost good faith in such treaty is still unclear. It is 
suggested with respect that neither of the arguments has persuasive justification as 
                                                          
484
 Legh-Jones N., Birds J., Own D., eds. MacGillivray E.J. MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 10
th
 ed ., London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, p.960 para. 33-20. 
485
 [1911] 16 Com Cas 109. 
486
 [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 442.  
487
 Merkin R., ed. Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Looseleaf, 2002, 
10710-10718.  
207 
 
how a contract for insurance attracts the duty of utmost good faith just like the 
contract of insurance does.  
There are no decided authorities providing room for creation of such a specific kind 
of contract uberrimae fidei by analogy to insurance contracts. To define the 
applicability and duration of the duty of utmost good faith to a fac/oblig treaty, some 
questions need to be answered first, i.e. what is the nature of the fac/oblig treaty, 
when a contract of insurance is concluded and when the underwriting decisions are 
made by the underwriters to attract the duty of utmost good faith. As to the nature of 
the fac/oblig treaty, according to the settled law, a treaty is merely a standing offer 
which is binding the reinsurer himself to offer reinsurance cover in respect of 
particular risks in the future and there are no contractual obligations arising between 
the parties when the fac/oblig treaty is made. Hence no insurance covers are 
provided by the fac/oblig treaty by itself, in other words the treaty is not by itself a 
contract of insurance. Individual contracts of insurance are created by the 
subsequent declarations under the facility. Therefore there is a time gap between the 
underwriting assess at the first stage and conclusion of the contract of insurance at 
the declaration stage. The reinsurer has already made his underwriting decisions in 
respect of the particular risks to be covered in the future when he is ready to make 
such offer to the reinsured by entering into the fac/oblig treaty, even though the 
contract of insurance has not come into effect at that time pending future 
declarations which might or might not be made by the reinsured. Once the reinsured 
opts to cede the risks and thus makes declarations, provided they fall within the 
terms of the cover, a contract of insurance is immediately concluded and risks are 
automatically attached to the cover without any more underwriting assessment or 
acceptance to be made by the reinsurer. As a result, it is fair to say that the fac/oblig 
treaty is not a contract of insurance. No duty of utmost good faith applies to the 
fac/oblig agreement itself which is a simple binding on the reinsurer to accept the 
reinsured’s offer in the future.  
6.3.3.1.2.4 Timing of the attachment and duration of the duty   
Even though the duty of utmost good faith does not attach to the fac/oblig treaty itself, 
it is proposed that there does live a duty of utmost good faith in the whole two-stage 
underwriting process. The justification of existence of the duty need not go through 
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the ‘analogous to a contract of insurance’ route, or the ‘specific kind of contract 
uberrimae fidei’ route. The duty is attracted on the simple ground that contracts of 
insurance are concluded between the parties under the mechanism, although the 
time of conclusion is postponed to the declaration stage, as opposed to 
circumstances under an obligatory treaty where contracts of insurance come into 
existence at the moment of conclusion of the treaty.  
As to the duration of the duty, it is suggested the general rule of duration of utmost 
good faith applies here without any exceptions or modification, even though the 
fac/obligatory treaty has a hybrid nature. So that the duty arises from the point when 
a standing offer to provide insurance covers in the future is proposed, i.e. when the 
parties are negotiating a fac/oblig treaty; and lasts until the conclusion of a contract 
of insurance i.e. when a declaration is made to the fac/oblig treaty as acceptance of 
the offer. When a fac/oblig treaty is agreed, the reinsurer has exercised his judgment 
as to whether to accept such class or classes of risks in the future, so he deserves 
all material information in respect of the manner by which the business will be run 
and how the facility would be used in the future to make an informed underwriting 
decision; although the underwriting assessment seems terminates when he 
determines to enter into the fac/oblig treaty, rather than extending to the declaration 
stage when he is automatic on risks attached to the cover. According the settled rule 
of duration of the duty, there is no general continuing duty of utmost good faith after 
the conclusion of insurance contracts, therefore the duty terminates when the 
declaration is made to the fac/oblig treaty.  
6.3.3.2 Applicability of the duty of utmost good faith to declarations to a 
fac/oblig treaty 
As discussed in the distinctions between an obligatory treaty and a fac/oblig treaty, 
the effect of declarations to a fac/oblig treaty is crystal clear and confirmed by many 
English authorities. It is settled that declarations under a fac/oblig treaty attach risks 
to the cover. Once the reinsured makes a decision to ceded the risks to the reinsurer, 
he is imposed an obligation to notify the reinsurer what have been ceded by means 
of regular bordereaux.  
209 
 
6.3.3.2.1 Effect of the declarations to an fac/oblig treaty  
Contrary to declarations to an obligatory treaty, declarations to a fac/oblig treaty is 
fatal to the cover because the risks will not attach to the cover until such requirement 
of notification is satisfied as same as declarations to a non-obligatory treaty, 
although the reinsurer does not have a right to refuse the cessions.488 If the risk 
declared is within the terms of the cover, there is no need for any specific 
acceptance by the underwriter, as he is bound and only bound since the receipt of 
the declaration. 489  A new contract comes into existence when a declaration is 
made.490 Contractual obligations becomes binding between the parties.491 There can 
be no declaration after the reinsured has become aware that a loss has occurred.492 
However, it is not clear whether the duty of utmost good faith arises in declarations 
to the treaty.493 
6.3.3.2.2 Waiver of the performance of the attached duty to declarations 
Due to its effect commented above, it is suggested that a declaration made to a 
fac/oblig treaty serves as an acceptance of the reinsurer’s standing offer to conclude 
a contract of insurance, consequently should attract the duty of utmost good faith. 
The duty arises when the reinsurer is making his underwriting assessment at the first 
stage as discussed in last section, and terminates when the a contract of insurance 
is concluded i.e. when declarations are made to the treaty. However it is arguable 
whether the duty needs to be performed by the reinsured at the declaration stage for 
practical purposes, as it would not be consistent with the market practice. The 
reason why such fac/oblig facility is used in the practice is to provide a flexible, 
efficient and continuing coverage for a large number of particular risks without 
individual time-consuming presentations. As long as the risks declared fall within the 
ambit of the treaty, the reinsurers are automatically bound to accept them without 
any discretion anyway. So no more underwriting decisions are made at this stage. 
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Therefore it is suggested that the reinsurer waives unnecessary performance of the 
duty of disclosure at the declaration stage by his automatic acceptance,494 which 
gives the effect that the duration of the duty of utmost good faith seems to terminate 
already when the fac/oblig treaty are concluded between the parties just like 
circumstances under an obligatory treaty.  
6.3.4 Application of utmost good faith to non-obligatory treaties  
A reinsurance treaty can be placed by a non-obligatory method. A non-obligatory 
declaration policy is in essence an advanced agreed facility which does not provide 
reinsurance cover by itself but merely establishes machinery whereby risks can be 
presented to the reinsurer by subsequent declarations at later stage for 
consideration. Such market practice has modified the applicability and duration of the 
duty of utmost good faith to this type of reinsurance contracts. It can be generally 
summarised that the duty of utmost good faith does not apply to the treaty itself but 
applies to the declarations made to the treaty at the second stage. The point will be 
expanded in following sections. 
6.3.4.1 Nature of the non-obligatory treaty  
As previously discussed , whether or not the duty of utmost good faith applies to a 
treaty depends on the nature of the treaty, i.e. whether it is a contract of insurance or 
not. Contrary to an obligatory treaty, all risks are presented and accepted on a 
mutually facultative basis under a non-obligatory treaty. The reinsured has an option 
either to cede the risks or retain them for his own account. Equally the reinsurer is 
not bound to accept declarations proposed by the reinsured, but has discretion to 
accept or refuse the cession either. Once the reinsured has decided to cede risks to 
the reinsurer, he is under a duty of notification to the reinsurer. Such a declaration 
fulfills the function as an offer to present risks to the reinsurer rather than serves an 
informational purpose. The reinsurer will make his underwriting assessment as to the 
risks proposed. Once the offer is accepted by the reinsurer, a reinsurance 
agreement is concluded.495 Therefore it suffices to say that a non-obligatory treaty 
does not provide insurance covers by itself, but entirely a mechanism under which 
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individual contracts of insurance are concluded. Such treaty is thus best categorised 
as a contract for insurance.  
6.3.4.2 non-applicability of the duty of utmost good faith to the non-obligatory 
treaty itself  
The issue of applicability of the duty of utmost good faith to a non-obligatory treaty 
was discussed in SA d’Intermediaires Luxembourgeois v Farex Gie.496 In this case, 
the claimant SAIL instructed his London broker to place a reinsurance facility with 
the defendant, provided valid retrocession cover could be arranged for the reinsurer. 
After the broker arranged the retrocession cover for Farex with St Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Company, the reinsurer signed the lineslip on 17 Nov 1988. In early 1991, 
after discovering the invalidity of the retrocession cover, the reinsurer suspended 
performance of the reinsurance facility before repudiating all liability to SAIL as 
regards all declarations made by the SAIL to the facility. In the proceeding issued for 
summary judgment, Gatehouse J granted that except for 24 declarations which had 
an arguable case of material non-disclosure all the renewal declarations in the 
second years were valid and effect contracts of reinsurance. Moreover, Gatehouse J 
held that the lineslip was not a contract of reinsurance in its own right, and a 
separate contract of reinsurance was made on each declaration. In Gatehouse J’s 
opinion, it was impractical for the reinsured to disclose and represent a large number 
of interests when the lineslip was entered into; in addition at the date of conclusion of 
the lineslip, no risk had been transferred to the reinsurer therefore disclosure at this 
time was inappropriate, furthermore had a duty of disclosure attached to the lineslip, 
all declarations made under the agreement would be avoided for want of disclosure, 
even though information withheld may have no connection with the declarations at all. 
Consequently, the duty of disclosure attached to the declarations individually, rather 
than applied to the lineslip which was merely a ‘procedural mechanism’ for bringing 
reinsurance agreements into existence.  
It is suggested that the reasoning of Gatehouse J given in SAIL v Farex is generally 
convincing. The duty of utmost good faith only attaches to individually separate 
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contracts of reinsurance made on each declarations, rather than attaches to the 
treaty itself which is not a contract of insurance.  
First, when the parties are negotiating a non-obligatory treaty, no underwriting 
decisions are required to be made by the reinsurer at this stage. A duty of disclosure 
on the reinsured here is inappropriate as such a duty aims to enable the reinsurer to 
make informed underwriting decisions.  
Secondly, the terms of the treaty are not designed to provide any specific covers to 
the reinsured against any risks, but merely intend to establish a procedural 
mechanism by which reinsurance covers can be provided in the future. It imposes no 
obligations upon the parties to cede or to accept any cessions of risks at the first 
stage. It is impractical and unnecessary for the reinsured to provide detailed 
information as regards a large number of risks that might or might not be ceded by 
the reinsured in the future.  
Thirdly, the remedy for breach of a duty of utmost good faith is to entitle the party 
who has been induced into a contract by misleading information to avoid the 
agreement ab initio as if it has never been entered into. This is not a unique 
manifestation of uberrimae fidei, but actually harmonious with the general notion of 
remedy for breaching contractual obligations under common law, to reinstall the 
parties to the position where they are before the breach is committed. Under a 
contract of insurance, remedy for breach of utmost good faith allows the parties back 
to their place when such material information is withheld or misrepresented, i.e. the 
time before the contract is concluded, which gives the effect that the contract of 
insurance is avoided ab initio like never coming into existence. If the duty of utmost 
good faith had been attracted in the treaty which is a contract for insurance, then an 
want of disclosure concerning particular risks which are just ceded in part of the 
declarations will make all declarations made under the treaty would cease to operate, 
even though the material facts withheld or misrepresented may have had no 
connections with declarations at all. This is contradicted with the general notion of 
the remedy which could just protect the innocent party from the other’s wrongdoings 
rather than erase all things that happen between the parties. Therefore, the 
appropriate and proportionate remedy here is to entitled the reinsurer to avoid any 
contract of insurance concluded by individual declarations, without prejudice to the 
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umbrella facility which also establishes valid contracts of insurance else. This is also 
consistent with judicial decisions.497  
In conclusion, the duty of utmost good faith arose not at the stage at which the 
contract was made, but rather at the stage at which each individual declaration was 
made. Consequently, the duty does not apply to the non-obligatory treaty itself.  
It is worthy to mention that although no duty of utmost good faith attaches to the non-
obligatory treaty which imposes the parties a duty to volunteer information, the treaty 
is still subject to the general misrepresentation rule under common law and the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967. If a material false statement induces the non-obligatory 
treaty, the innocent party is still entitled to treat the contract voidable and capable of 
being set aside. This may undermine all the declarations to the treaty as they never 
have come into existence. In addition, damages, which is not an available option of 
remedy under the duty of utmost good faith, may be awarded to the innocent party 
for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation, subject to contrary terms in the 
agreement. 498 
6.3.4.2 Application of utmost good faith to declarations to the non-obligatory 
treaty 
The applicability of utmost good faith to declarations to the non-obligatory treaty is 
relatively straightforward. As discussed above, the duty of utmost good faith is not 
applicable to the non-obligatory treaty itself at the first stage, but is attracted in the 
second stage when contracts of reinsurance are concluded. And it is settled law that 
each declaration under a contract for insurance creates a binding contract of 
insurance.499 Therefore, it is suggested that the duty of utmost good faith attaches to 
the declarations to the non-obligatory treaty at later stage. 
It is confirmed by English authorities on this issue. The earliest important authority on 
this issue is Berger and Light Diffusers Pty Ltd v Pollock concerning an open cover 
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of original insurance. 501 The broker placed an open cover arrangement with the 
underwriter Pollock. A provisional cover in the form of a cross-slip, later replaced 
with a binding signing slip, was issued by the underwriter to insure the plaintiff 
Berger’s property. When the property was damaged in course of transit, the 
underwriter denied liability by alleging non-disclosure of a number of material facts 
relating to the value and history of the property. Kerr J. affirmed that the assured 
owed a duty of disclosure to the underwriter in respect of a declaration under an 
open cover. In Kerr J.’s opinion, according the facts in Berger and Pollock, the open 
cover was actually non-obligatory in essence, no binding agreement was to be 
concluded until the underwriter had received full information as to each risk and had 
exercised his discretion over whether or not to confirm the insurance by issuing a 
binding signing slip. There were some arguments that in Berger v Pollock the open 
cover in question, not like general obligatory open covers in practice which are 
obligatory, possess an exceptional conditional nature of permitting the insurer to 
refuse a risk. 502  However, the reasoning in Berger v Pollock was confirmed by 
Gatehouse J. in SA d’Intermediaires Luxembourgeois v Farex Gie 503  and HIH 
Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co,504 that in case 
an open cover which imposes no obligations upon either party to make or accept 
declarations, each declaration is a contract of reinsurance which attracts the duty of 
utmost good faith. The reinsurer is entitled to avoid any contract of insurance created 
by the declaration in the event of misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material 
facts. However, such avoidance does not extend to the non-obligatory treaty itself, 
leaving other declarations unaffected. 
It suffices to say what matters in deciding whether the duty of utmost good faith is 
attracted in reinsurance contract is the nature of the agreement rather than the form 
of it, i.e. whether the reinsurance agreement qualifies as a contract of insurance. The 
nature of the treaty provided is also critical to any consideration of the role which 
declarations were intended to play in the reinsurance treaty. The words used to 
describe the treaty are not determinative. Therefore the duty of utmost good faith is 
attracted when underwriting assessment is made by the reinsurers to conclude a 
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contract of insurance between the parties. In the case of a non-obligatory treaty, the 
crucial timing is when the declarations are made to the treaty by the reinsured, rather 
than the formation of the non-obligatory treaty itself.  
6.5 Conclusion  
In business insurance market practice, reinsurance contracts which have large size, 
complex nature are usually placed in various complicated methods. Such different 
placing methods result in distinct nature of the reinsurance contracts, and then 
modified the applicability and duration of the duty of utmost good faith in the 
contracts. No matter what method is adopted to place the risks proposed, there are 
always three significant timing in deciding the applicability and duration of the duty, 
i.e. setting up a facility under which risks are ceded by the reinsured, the reinsurers’ 
underwriting assessment of the risks proposed and conclusion of contract of 
insurance to cede the risks proposed. In direct insurance and facultative reinsurance 
contract which is similarly placed by a simple slip in practice, it is normally easy and 
simple to coordinate the three timing together in the negotiation of the contract. 
However, as to the treaties, especially where business is ceded to the reinsurer for 
example by use of bordereau under the treaties in future, it is more complicated than 
the direct insurance as there may exist gaps between the three timing according to 
the placing procedure in practice. As a result, applicability and duration of the 
doctrine is modified and varies under different types of reinsurance treaties. The 
determinative criterion is that whether the reinsurance agreement is a contract of 
insurance in nature synonymous to the direct insurance, as the incidence of the 
disclosure and representation obligation may arise only when the contract of 
insurance is made. If the reinsurance contract is in essence a contract for insurance 
which works more like a contract of agency between the parties rather creating a 
partnership, then the question to be answered should be when the reinsurers make 
underwriting assessment and when a contract of insurance is concluded according 
to the facility, then the attachment point of the duty to the policy is reallocated to the 
stage of each individual declaration which appears to be the case if the policy is 
facultative in that the reinsurers can refuse any individual declaration. 
In conclusion, the application and duration of the duty of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance agreements could be summarised as following.  
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As to facultative reinsurance agreements which are in essence contracts of 
insurance between reinsureds and reinsurers, the doctrine of utmost good faith as a 
principle of law is equally applicable to facultative agreements as it is to original 
insurances. 
As to reinsurance treaties, it can general be separated into three categories. The 
crucial criterion is when the contract of reinsurance is concluded.  
Under an obligatory treaty, the treaty itself in effect operates as a contract of 
reinsurance, as the reinsurer is bound to accept the risks ceded by the reinsured 
automatically. Accordingly, a duty of utmost good faith applies to the obligatory treaty 
itself. Declarations to an obligatory treaty in later stage do not attract duty of utmost 
good faith any more.  
Under a facultative obligatory treaty, the treaty itself is a standing offer only binding 
the reinsurer to offer cover in the future. No contractual obligations arise until 
declarations are made to the treaty in later stage. Consequently, the duty should 
apply to the contracts of insurance concluded by declarations rather than to the 
fac/oblig treaty itself. According to the general rule of duration, it supposes to last 
from parties’ negotiation of the fac/oblig treaty to their conclusion of the contracts of 
insurance by future declarations. However, as the reinsurer waiver the duty of 
disclosure at declaration stage by automatic acceptance of the reinsured’s cessions, 
the duration of the duty is modified as if it only attach to the first stage, i.e. conclusion 
of the fac/oblig treaty just like the practice in an obligatory treaty.  
Under non-obligatory treaties which are best categorised as contracts for 
reinsurance, a duty of utmost good does not apply to such framework facility which 
does not bring any contract of reinsurance into existence. When the reinsurer 
decides to accept a declaration by the reinsured, a contract of reinsurance is 
concluded between the parties. Then the duty of utmost good faith arises in the 
declaration stage. Where the reinsured fails to make a fair presentation in relation to 
the risks ceded, only the declaration relating to the particular risks is avoided, leaving 
the non-obligatory treaty and other declarations under it untainted.   
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It suffices to say that the criterion in deciding whether the duty of utmost good faith is 
attracted in a reinsurance agreement is the nature of the agreement. Such nature is 
also critical to any consideration of the role which declarations were intended to play 
in the reinsurance agreement. Therefore the duty of utmost good faith is only 
attracted when underwriting assessment is made to conclude a contract of insurance 
between the parties. All other features of the agreement, such as the form or the 
words used to describe it by the parties, are not determinative.   
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Chapter 7 Waiver of the Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Placing Reinsurance 
Contract 
7.1 Introduction  
The doctrine of waiver plays a significant role in curtailing the duty of utmost good 
faith in business insurance market. Although the legislation does not codify the 
doctrine of waiver, it expressly stipulates that information waived by the insurer need 
not to be disclosed by the insured.505 Also there has long established a regime on 
balance of authorities in common law explaining how the doctrine of waiver affects 
the application of the duty of utmost good faith. Normally, in the business insurance 
market, the reinsurers can waive the duty of disclosure in following ways, by express 
contract terms discharging the reinsured of any duty of disclosure or relieving the 
reinsured of disclosure of particular information;506 by failing to discover relevant 
information presented by the reinsured or his broker;507 either by failing to make 
reasonable enquiry when they have been prompted by the reinsured’s presentation 
that further relevant material information might exist;508 or by asking limited questions 
in relation to specific information after having been altered by the reinsured’s 
presentation, etc.509 However, difficulties will arise in relating to the practicalities of 
applying the waiver principles to reinsurance placing process in both scenarios, 
where the parties expressly contract out of the default regime and where  the 
reinsurer impliedly waive the duty by making non-enquiry or asking general or limited 
questions.  
In this chapter, those difficulties will be analysed in details and solutions consistent 
with current reinsurance market practice will be proposed in the following context, to 
draw a whole picture of how the doctrine of waiver affects the application of the duty 
of utmost good faith in business insurance market practice. Three issues will be 
addressed in this chapter. The first issue focuses on what requirements need to be 
satisfied to establish the reinsurer’s waiver of the duty and how the market practice 
effects those requirements. Then second issue concerns the problems caused in 
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reinsurance practice by expressly contracting out of the default legal regime. The 
third issue considered thereafter is difficulties arising in practice where the reinsurer 
is treated as impliedly waiving the duty of disclosure by making no enquiry or asking 
limited or general questions in the placing process. Then the position of law 
regarding whether the reinsurer needs to ask questions and how far the reinsurer 
should ask questions in the placing process will also be discussed.  
7.2 General rules of establishing waiver of the rights and remedies for the duty 
of utmost good faith   
In general contract law, rights and remedies may be lost by waiver or estoppel.510 A 
party will be held to have waived his right and to require the contract to be performed 
as the original contractual terms agreed, if he accedes to the other party’s request by 
not insisting on the original way of performance of contract. Waiver of this type is 
referred to as waiver by affirmation or waiver by election. Also he may be estoppeled 
from insisting on the strict performance of contract, if the other party acts in reliance 
on his representation or conducts showing that he will enforce or rely on the contract 
terms to be performed or observed. It can be said that the core inspirit of waiver lies 
on the party’s election between possible alternative or inconsistent rights exercised 
with full knowledge of their rights,511 whereas the essence of estoppel turns upon the 
reinsured’s reliance upon the reinsurer’s unequivocal representation, even that the 
reinsurer may not possess knowledge of their rights.512  
In placing reinsurance contract, the parties’ rights and remedies may be lost by 
waiver or estoppel, so that it can be said that principles of waiver and estoppel in 
common law can curtail the duty of utmost good faith in insurance contracts in many 
ways. 513 This section focuses on what requirements need to be satisfied to establish 
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the reinsurer’s waiver of rights or remedies for breaching the duty of utmost good 
faith, and how the market practice effects those requirements.  
7.2.1 Establishing waiver of rights or remedies of the duty of utmost good 
faith  
Under English insurance law, the contract of insurance is not avoided automatically 
due to qualifying breach of the duty of utmost good faith, but subject to the other 
party’s choice in respect of such breach, i.e. elects to avoid the contract ab. initio or 
affirms it for commercial reasons. Generally speaking, the right to avoid a 
reinsurance contract can be waived by the reinsurer either by express contract terms 
or by his conduct or representation if the contract is silent on this issue.  
7.2.1.1 Requirements to be satisfied to establish waiver  
A defendant will be regarded as having waived the right to avoid, if he has the 
knowledge of the facts giving rise to a right of avoidance for misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure and the knowledge of the right of avoidance itself, and then acts in 
a way which is only consistent with an intention not to treat the contract as at an 
end.514 Normally in practice there are two possible forms of waiver of the duty of 
utmost good faith, i.e. by affirmation or by election. In practice, there is actually 
little difference between the requirements of them. Both of the cases require the 
reinsured to establish the reinsurer’s knowledge of the existence of qualifying 
breach and his right to avoid the contract, and then his own reliance on the 
reinsurer’s behaviour which stated that the reinsurer would not rely upon his legal 
rights even he had been aware of them.515 In conclusion, it can be summarised 
that the following conditions had to be satisfied in order to establish an affirmation 
of the contract. First, the reinsurer must have actual knowledge of the facts that 
were concealed or misrepresented before formation of the contract.516 Secondly, 
the reinsurer must also know that qualifying breach of the duty creates the right to 
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avoid the contract. 517  Thirdly, the reinsurer should have a reasonable time to 
decide what to do. Fourthly, there must be an unequivocal communication to the 
reinsured by words or a conduct that the reinsurer has made an informed choice to 
affirm the contract.518 Finally, whether such a communication is found depends 
upon how a reasonable person in the position of the reinsured would interpret the 
reinsurer’s words or conduct.519 
7.2.1.2 Knowledge of the qualifying breach and relevant remedies  
To establish a waiver of the duty of utmost good faith, the full knowledge of qualifying 
breach of the duty and relevant remedies is necessary before an informed choice of 
affirmation is made. It means that the reinsurer must have the actual knowledge of 
the reinsured’s guilt of non-disclosure or misrepresentation, and his right to avoid the 
reinsurance contract due to such qualifying breach.  
In Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co.,520 the reinsurer Pine Top 
had reinsured the reinsured Pan Atlantic in respect of risks allocated to its casualty 
account under excess of loss reinsurance contracts. When the broker was renewing 
the reinsurance contract covering losses occurring the calendar year 1982, a file 
including two loss records was prepared and available to reinsurer for negotiating 
purposes, although only the short record was addressed to the reinsurer’s intention 
by the broker. The reinsurer intended to avoid the reinsurance agreement by arguing 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation in relation to the failure to disclose the long 
record of losses and the additional losses omitted from the short record. The Court 
decided that there was a non-disclosure on the part of the reinsured in relation to the 
additional losses omitted from the short loss record, but not in relation to the failure 
to the address the reinsurer’s attention to the long loss record and Pine Top had 
affirmed the reinsurance contract so that he was not entitled to avoid the contact on 
the ground of non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Walker J commented that there 
would have been affirmation of the contract if the party is with knowledge of the fact 
giving rise to a right of avoidance for misrepresentation or non-disclosure and 
possibly with the knowledge of the right of avoidance itself.  
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It should be noted that simply being put on inquiry that there may have been a 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith is not sufficient to be said ‘informed’.521 There 
could be no waiver of material information unless such information would have been 
disclosed on a common prudent underwriter’s inquiry. Nor an affirmation of the 
contract could be established in such situation, unless the underwriter entered into or 
carried out the contract after he had full actual knowledge of such material 
information.522 Moreover, neither mere lapse of time or intention to waive the right to 
avoid is enough to establish a waiver by an election.523  
As to the scope of the reinsurer’s knowledge for the purpose of waiver, only actual 
knowledge will suffice rather than constructive knowledge, although it does not 
matter how the reinsurer obtains his knowledge.524 Therefore having only the means 
of acquiring actual knowledge is not sufficient for the purposes of avoidance.525 
Whether the reinsurer has such knowledge is a question of fact in practice. It 
concerns the truth of the matter known and a firm belief in their truth, as well as 
sufficient justification for that belief in terms of experience information and 
reasoning. 526  In practice, an active and professional participant in business 
insurance industry may acquire intelligence, information etc. in many different 
contexts and channels. So it is necessary to consider the extent to which the 
knowledge received and whether it can be imputed to the reinsurer’s knowledge so 
as to found an argument of affirmation of contract. Generally speaking, it is settled 
that it is sufficient for the assured to show that an agent of the insurer, especially an 
employee of the insurer, has the requisite knowledge if that agent is authorised or 
appears to the assured to be authorised to receive the information communicated. 
Therefore it is insufficient to found a waiver by affirmation by giving the evidence of 
mere communication to a reinsurer of a substance. Whether it would afford sufficient 
knowledge depended upon the circumstances of receipt of the information and how it 
was dealt with after it was received by the reinsurer, subject to some limits such as 
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the ability to impute the knowledge, and where the agent is defrauding the principal 
etc.527   
7.2.1.3 Unequivocal representation or conduct as to election or affirmation 
Once the party has made an election whether to exercise his legal rights to avoid the 
contact, he should communicate his choice whether or not to enforce his right by an 
unequivocal representation or conduct with the other party. Conduct which is 
required for the purpose of election should be a continuing performance of the 
contract of insurance only when the contract exists. Whether the conduct is or not 
unequivocal is a question of fact in individual cases. General speaking, invoking or 
asserting a contractual right was a clear example of electing not to treat the contract 
as an end, 528  such as payment of claims, a claim or acceptance of unpaid or 
instalments of premium,529 exercise the rights of inspection,530 extension of cover, 
reliance on a policy defence, rejection of the claim on other grounds, variation to the 
contract, termination of policy etc. Mere lapse of time is unlikely of itself to establish 
an election. Therefore the reinsurer’s silence or inactivity will not generally constitute 
unequivocal conduct for the purpose of establishing waiver.531  
7.2.2 Establishing estoppel from insisting rights or remedies of the duty of 
utmost good faith 
An estoppel arises where the reinsurer represents such promises by express words 
or unequivocal conduct that he will not exercise his right of avoidance of reinsurance 
contract, and the reinsured acts in reliance upon such promise, so that it would be 
inequitable for the insurer thereafter to enforce his right of avoidance of the contract. 
To establish an estoppel, first, it is necessary of the reinsurer to make a 
representation or conduct that intended to induce a course of conduct of the 
reinsured. The principles applicable to the representation appear to be much the 
same as for waiver.  It must be ambiguous and clear, therefore simply delay on the 
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reinsurer will rarely qualify as an unequivocal representation. However, in contrast to 
the principle of waiver, estoppel does not turn upon an election of the reinsurer 
between alternative or inconsistent rights. An unequivocal representation may be 
qualified even though the reinsurers do not possess the full knowledge of the facts 
that confer them the rights or remedies. Subsequently the reinsured need to react or 
makes an omission resulting from the inducement of the reinsurer’s representation or 
conduct. That is to say a requirement of reliance of the reinsured on the reinsurer’s 
representation or conduct which is difficult to prove is essential here and must be 
satisfied. Finally, it must be proved that there is detriment to the reinsured as a 
consequence of the reaction or omission. Such change of position to the prejudice of 
the reinsured’s reliance is the very fundamental element of establishing estoppel. As 
a result, the burden of proof rests upon the reinsured to prove that he has acted by 
reliance, and then suffered detriment on the reliance on the reinsurer’s statement or 
conduct. From this point, it can be said that it is more difficult to prove estoppel than 
waiver. As a result a plea of estoppel is unlikely to succeed if a plea of waiver had 
failed. Argument of availability of waiver is turned on in most cases rather than 
estoppel. Therefore, this chapter will focus on specific issues of waiver of the rights 
and remedies in context of reinsurance contract. 
7.2.3 Reservation of rights  
Due to the possibility of loss the right of avoidance by waiver, it is a common practice 
for reinsurers to issue a reservation of rights, providing that appropriate words are 
used while he is purporting to take advantage of contractual provisions. Such a 
clearly worded reservation can protect a reinsurer from being alleged to affirm the 
contract in later stage when he is committing such affirmatory act.532 Although it is 
not incumbent on a reinsurer to reserve his rights while making enquiries under the 
contract of insurance,533 the reinsurer is incumbent to reserve his rights if he takes a 
further step as invocation of contractual rights which would otherwise constitute 
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affirmation of the contract. To reserve the right of avoidance, the wording should be 
clear, explicit and adequate to cover the right.534  
7.3 Difficulties of contracting out of the legal regime of duty of utmost good 
faith in reinsurance context 
In contrast with the consumer insurance market which is regulated under a 
mandatory regime, business insurance market is inclined to adapt provisions which 
are appropriate in their particular circumstances and suitable for their own business 
interest. Commercial parties, who are normally in equivalent business power, will 
and should be allowed to contract out of the default provisions to design their own 
rules by clear and unambiguous contract terms which can bring sufficient attention to 
the business.  However, difficulties will arise in deciding the extent of the alteration of 
the default legal regime by the parties. It is suggested to be a question of 
construction of the parties’ intention in interpreting the contracting out provisions in 
individual case. The approach of construction will be analysed and it will be anaylsed 
on how to draft a contracting out provision to achieve the purpose successfully and 
to reduce the uncertainty to the contract at the same time. In addition problems may 
be caused as to the permissible scope of contracting out provisions in reinsurance 
contract; especially in the circumstances where express terms are drafted purporting 
exclusion of the reinsured’s liability for his broker’s fraud and to limit the reinsurer’s 
right of avoidance on the ground of such fraud. It needs to be considered whether 
the public policy should prevent such exclusion or limitation of the right or remedies, 
and whether there is any possibility to develop a room for a lawful contracting out 
provision where the agent to insure commits fraud against the reinsured. If the 
answer is positive, then it need be considered how to find out a solution to be 
consistent with current reinsurance market practice.  
7.3.1 Practicalities to waive the right and/or remedy in reinsurance area 
It suffices to say that the more sophisticated the insurance market is, the more 
widespread will the parties’ expectation of contracting out of the default legal regime 
be. In terms of operation of the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance area, it is 
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suggested that there may exist practical needs of the parties to curtail the operation 
of duty of utmost good faith in placing reinsurance contracts.  
The reinsurance market practice is not any more the archetypal position in Carter v 
Boehm535 when the doctrine of utmost good faith originates. In contrary to parties of 
direct insurance who may have a disparity of knowledge, underwriter of reinsurance 
contract or the reinsured’s broker may have a far greater expertise and ability to 
judge the extent of the underwritten risks and materiality of the information subject to 
disclosure than the reinsured. Therefore, although the contracting out clause is less 
frequently encountered than it is under other commercial insurance context, the 
doctrine of utmost good faith may actually lose its realistic premise in the placing 
certain types of reinsurance contracts. Such contracting out clause is of particular 
importance in certain forms of reinsurance where full disclosure is more or less 
impossible. For example, practicalities of certain situation in reinsurance market may 
sometimes render the duty of disclosure onerous to a certain degree, especially for 
large size, complicated nature and complex business. As under such large size and 
complex insurance business, identification, collection and collation of all material 
information related to the risks can be extremely difficult tasks involving multiple 
sources of information, proportionate to the size, nature and complexity of the 
business.  In addition, the reinsurance parties may incline to skip the disclosure 
process to provide an all but incontestable reinsurance cover for certain commercial 
reasons,536 such as in order to operate business with particular insurers in specific 
types of business, or due to the reinsurer’s relationship with the particular broker in 
niche business, or even because of the status of the business insurance market and 
the amount of premium etc.. As a result, the parties to business insurance contract 
may modify the unitary and strict duty of utmost good faith on the reinsured by use of 
express contractual terms in reinsurance contract. Such contracting out clauses, if 
suitably drafted to achieve the effect, can exclude, restrict, or limit the duty itself or 
restrict the reinsurer’s remedies in the event of breach of the duty.  
Moreover such practical need to expressly waive the duty can arise in the situation 
where the broker devises a marketable product to potential underlying insurer which 
has been previously negotiated by the broker with leading reinsurers. As discussed 
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in the previous chapter on broker’s duty of disclosure in placing reinsurance contract, 
in business insurance market which is a broker-based world, placing procedure may 
differ from that of direct insurance practice. Brokers may develop some types of 
business package at first, then search for and introduce the package to reinsurers 
who is running this type of business. Once the proposal is accepted by the reinsurer, 
the broker will approach the market to find proper reinsured. Therefore, the 
reinsurance may come into exist before the direct insurance contract leaving the 
identity of reinsured open. The reinsured, who may be even a fronting company in 
some circumstances, would actually be insulated from the placing process at the 
time of formation of reinsurance. As a result it is impossible for the reinsured to 
perform the duty of utmost good faith before the formation of the reinsurance 
contract. Placing entire chain of insurance agreements is completely under the 
broker’s organisation. It is the broker who devises the business, possesses the 
whole information relevant to the risks and undertakes the obligation to pass on and 
inform the information. The brokers are not instructed by the assured to place the 
original risks, but are marketing the pre-conceived package of business to the 
assured. Since the reinsured is not in a better position than the reinsurer in respect 
of relevant material information, it is not unfair for the reinsurer to waive the duty of 
disclosure upon the reinsured under such circumstances. 
In conclusion, such express contractual terms are efficient means used in practice to 
curtail the duty of utmost good faith in context of reinsurance contract. It is the 
parties’ own intention that decides the extent to which the default legal regime can 
be altered, and the meaning of the terms is a question of construction in individual 
cases.  
7.3.2 Difficulties as to the permissible scope of contracting out provisions in 
reinsurance contract  
In practice, problems may also arise as to the permissible scope of the express 
contract terms of waiver in a reinsurance contract. First of all, it should be clarified 
what determines the extent of alteration of the position of the default legal regime. In 
addition, it is arguable what the permissible scope of contracting out provisions is. 
Whether should there be any restriction to the reinsurance parties’ option of 
proposed changes, for example whether should such express waiver terms be 
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subject to any public policy or a rule of law which prevents use of contract terms to 
exclude liability for such fraud? What is the solution to be consistent with current 
business insurance market practice?  
7.3.2.1 What determines the extent of alteration of the default legal regime?  
It is suggested that it is the parties’ own intention that decides the extent to which the 
default legal regime can be altered. Therefore, interpretation of the reinsurance 
contract terms, which intends to modify the duty of utmost good faith, is a question of 
construction determined upon the specific meaning of words used in the terms, the 
parties’ particular intention, the context of the contract as a whole and the admissible 
factual background. 537  The leading authority on the impact and effect of the 
contracting out clauses is decision of the House of Lords in HIH Casualty and 
General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase).538 It was held that the true 
question in each case was the proper construction of the contracting out clause. It 
did not matter whether specific word is mention in the clause or not. What really 
mattered was whether the contracting out clause made commercial sense in such 
construction. However the issue whether there is a rule of law prevents the use of a 
contract term to contract out default legal regime, for example to exclude or reduce 
liability of a principal for the fraud of his agent, was left unsettled in HIH v Chase.  
In HIH v Chase, HIH issued a time variable contingency insurance to the Chase 
Manhattan Bank which had participated in a syndicated loan arrangement to finance 
a film production company and had insured against the inability of the company to 
repay the loan. This TVC insurance had been in part developed and placed as a 
whole package in the London market by brokers Health since 1992. The risk was 
negotiated and presented to HIH by the broker leaving the Bank no part to play in the 
placement process at all. There were clauses called “truth of statement clauses” in 
the contract which excluded the assured’s personal duty of utmost good faith, 
liabilities and restricted the insurer’s right of avoidance. When losses arose, HIH tried 
to avoid the line slip facility on the ground of a series of misrepresentation and non-
disclosure concerning the nature and extent of the risk insured. The preliminary 
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issue before the House of Lords is the correct interpretation of the ‘truth of statement 
clauses’. In the ‘truth of statement clauses’ it provides that: 
“6. … [the Insured] will not have any duty or obligation to make any 
representation, warranty or disclosure of any nature, express or implied (such 
duty and obligation being expressly waived by the insurers), and … 
7. … [the Insured] shall have no liability of any nature to the insurers for any 
information provided by any other parties and any such information provided 
by or non-disclosure by other parties including, but not limited to [Heaths] 
(other than Section I of the Questionnaire) … 
8. … and any such information provided by or non-disclosure by other parties 
including, but not limited to [Heaths] (other than Section 1 of the 
Questionnaire) shall not be a ground or grounds for avoidance of the insurers’ 
obligations under the Policy or the cancellation thereof.” 
By deciding the correct interpretation of the clause, answers would be found to the 
controversial issues whether waiver of the right of avoidance under phrase (6) 
should include the broker’s separate duty of utmost good faith, and whether phrases 
(7) and (8) exclude the reinsured’s and the broker’s liabilities for negligent and 
fraudulent misrepresentation and non-disclosure so that the insurer was not entitled 
to claim damages for it, if the duty of disclosure was not excluded by phrase (6).  
It was unanimously held by the House of Lords that the phrase (6) was a waiver of 
the insured’s personal duty of utmost good faith under s.18, separate from the duty 
of the agent to insure under s.19. The effect of relief of the insured’s duty by the 
clause did not extent to the broker. Therefore, the broker still owned the insurer a 
personal duty of disclosure.  In respect of the paragraph (7), the wording ‘no liability 
of any nature’ prima facie excludes all the liability of the assured’s arising from 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of the broker or any other parties. As the phrase 
(8) clearly restricted the insurer’s right to avoid the contract in case of 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure by the assured or his brokers no matter 
innocent or negligent, it is arguable whether paragraph (7) and (8) together are 
broad enough to restrict the insurer’s right to claim other remedies for breach of the 
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duty acted by the broker, such as damages for negligent misrepresentation under s 
s.2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and fraudulent misrepresentation under the 
common law tort of deceit.539 As to negligent misrepresentation, their Lordships held 
unanimously that, for commercial purpose, the construction of the phrase extended 
to negligence so that relieved the bank from any claim from damages as a 
consequence of negligent non-disclosure and misrepresentation by itself or by its 
broker, the absence of the word ‘negligence’ in the sentence is irrelevant. However 
their Lordships were divided on the fraud issue. The majority treated the fraud issue 
completely different from negligence. Only Lord Hobhouse and Lord Scott 
commented on this issue, with divided opinions. Lord Hobhouse thought it was 
impossible, as a matter of public policy, for such an express clause to entitle the 
insured a relief from the consequence of his own fraud. In addition if the insurer 
entered into the contract upon the broker’s fraudulent presentation of the risk, such 
express waiver terms could not itself have been validly consented by the insurers. 
Lord Scott held a completely opposite opinion supporting the possibility of agreed 
express terms to exclude liability of such fraud and broad interpretation of such 
clause so that paragraph (7) and (8) were clear enough to exclude the broker’s fraud 
from the assured’s liability.  The rest of their lordships simply held that the clause in 
question had not excluded the broker’s fraud even if it was possible to do so.  
As a result, it was decided that “truth of statement clauses” in the contract entitled 
the insurers in law to avoid the contracts of or for insurance against assured on the 
grounds, but only on the grounds, of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent non-
disclosure by the broker as agent of assured. In addition, the insurers were entitled 
to damages from the assured for, but only for, fraudulent misrepresentation and non-
disclosure by the broker as agent of assured if, but only if, such fraudulent non-
disclosure by Heaths amounted to fraudulent misrepresentation. Although it was 
unanimously acted by their Lordships that the assured cannot exclude his liabilities 
for his own fraud under public policy and settled rule of law,540 the issue whether 
there is a rule of law prevents the use of a contract term to exclude or reduce liability 
of a principal for the fraud of his agent was left unsettled in HIH v Chase.  
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According to the practicalities of the situation in placement of reinsurance contract, 
there are various different forms of agreement reached between the reinsured and 
the reinsurers to achieve the effect of limiting the duty of utmost good faith, generally 
in two aspects, i.e. limiting the duty itself or the remedy for breach of the duty. First 
but less frequently encountered, the reinsurance parties can reach an agreement to 
restrict the duty of disclosure by declaring all facts or certain types of information to 
be immaterial or restrict materiality to certain types of matters, so that no duty of 
disclosure is invoked by the reinsured or his agent to insure. Or the clause can be 
drafted to exclude the reinsured’s duty of disclosure  or the duty of its agent to insure 
in its entirety  or in part; and even probably to achieve the effect of excluding the 
reinsured’s duty not to make misrepresentation.  Moreover, the reinsurance parties 
may expressly exclude the authority on the agent to insure to make representations 
on behalf of the reinsured, thereby excluding the reinsurer’s remedy for any 
misrepresentation made by the agent to insure. As a result, no duty of disclosure or 
refraining from misrepresentation arises at all under the reinsurance contract.  
Alternatively or in addition it can be drafted to eliminate the reinsurer’s right to avoid 
the policy due to an actionable non-disclosure or misrepresentation by the 
reinsured’s or the broker’s.  In such circumstance, the reinsurer may have no 
substantive remedy, even if a breach of duty of utmost good faith by the reinsured or 
his broker can be established. It can be concluded that there is one critical difference 
between the waiver of the duty of utmost good faith itself and waiver of the remedy 
for breach if the duty remains.  As ruled by Aikens J in the above HIH v Chase case, 
an agreement to exclude the innocent parties’ right to avoidance a contract for non-
disclosure or misrepresentation should not extend to fraudulent withheld of true 
information, as public policy did not allow the a party to escape from liabilities for 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith if he is implicated in any fraud. Therefore it is 
suggested that where the reinsurance parties reach an agreement to waive the 
remedies for actionable non-disclosure or misrepresentation, such contracting out 
clauses may be subject to some limitation or public policies. By contract, in situation 
where the contracting out clause removes the entire duty rather than the remedies, 
then there is simply no duty to volunteer information at all. As a result, fraudulent 
concealment of material information relevant to the underwritten risks would be of no 
consequences at all. The difficulties arising from the unsettled permissible scope of 
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the contracting out provisions which restricts the duty of utmost good faith itself will 
be discussed in the following section.  
7.3.2.2 Difficulties as to the permissible scope of contract out provisions in 
reinsurance context  
It suffices to say the enforceability of a contracting out clause which may modify the 
duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance contract should be subject to certain 
overriding limitations on the scope, and wording of the clause. Thus, besides the 
question of interpretation of the meaning and effect of the contract out clause, it is 
arguable what the permissible scope of express waiver is. Whether should there be 
any restriction to the parties’ alternations, for example is there any legislative limits 
on the parties’ contracting out rights? Or whether should such express waiver terms 
be subject to any public policy or a rule of law, for example which prevents use of 
contract terms to exclude liability for committing fraud? What is the solution to be 
consistent with current reinsurance market practice?  
7.3.2.2.1 Legislation and justifiable public policy limiting the scope of contract 
out provisions  
In the Insurance Act 2015, section 16 in part 5 expressly enunciates that any term in 
a non-consumer insurance contract, which put the insured in a worse position than 
he would be in under the act will be to that extent of no effect, unless the 
transparency requirement in section 17 has been satisfied.541  Therefore, it can be 
said that in a non-consumer insurance market, the legislation does not intent to 
propose any limitation to the scope of any contract out terms, even if it is 
disadvantageous for the reinsured. As long as it is the reinsurance parties’ true 
intention to make such alteration of default regime, the legislation will not make any 
intervention, provided that reinsurer takes sufficient steps to draw such terms to the 
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reinsured’s attention before it is agreed, and draft such terms clearly and 
unambiguously to such effect.   
However, where the reinsured’s agent to insure has made any fraud vitiating the 
reinsurer’s underwriting assessment, it is arguable whether the contracting out 
provisions can exclude or reduce liabilities of the reinsured that should be 
responsible for such fraud in default regime. At least the broad wording in legislation, 
qualified only by the transparency requirement, does not forbid such express waiver. 
However, it is not settled whether there is a rule of law or public policy preventing the 
contracting out provisions from excluding or reducing liabilities of a principal for the 
fraud of his agent in common law.  In fact, fraud is a controversial issue in many 
disputes before the courts, which is always treated as a different issue apart 
unrivalled innocent or negligent misrepresentation. Like the reasoning behind fraud 
exception to the scope of the duty of disclosure imposed on the agent to insure 
discussed in previous chapter, it is not easy to reconcile the judges’ opinions and the 
courts are always reluctant to show mercy to the party who commits any fraud. 
Under the contract law the parties enter into a commercial contract recognising the 
fundamental basis that each party assumes the honesty and good faith of the other. 
It is arguable whether it should be forbidden that both of the reinsurance parties 
expressly agree to transfer the risk of the broker’s fraud from the reinsured to the 
reinsurer. According to their Lordships, the reason why such contract exclusion of 
liabilities for agent’s fraud should not be allowed is that the principal should not rely 
upon and take advantage of the very fraud that he is liable for. 542 Therefore it is 
justifiable for a public policy to come into play to protect the reinsurer where the 
reinsured actually knows of or be complicit in his agent’s fraud or where the agent’s 
fraud could be attributed into the reinsured’s. Consequently the reinsured is not 
permitted to rely on such terms to get rid of responsibilities in the event of fraud on 
his part.  
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7.3.2.2.2 Difficulties where the agent to insure commits fraud against his 
principal 
As discussed above, it should be justifiable for a public policy to come into play to 
prevent the contract out provisions from excluding the reinsured’s liabilities for his 
agent’s fraud non-disclosure or misrepresentation. However, there may be a difficult 
circumstance in the placing reinsurance where an agent to insure rather than agent 
to know of the reinsured committed a fraudulent misrepresentation in the placing 
process. In such scenario, neither was the reinsured complicit in such fraud, nor 
would such fraudulent knowledge be imputed into the reinsured’s knowledge. 
Especially in some scenario, like the facts in HIH v Chase,543 the broker possessed 
all the information and devised the whole reinsurance package without any 
involvement of the reinsured. It is hardly the case that the reinsured would rely upon 
and take advantage of his agent’s fraud. 
7.3.2.2.2.1 Possibility to develop a room for such lawful contracting out 
provision  
It is suggested that it not unfair to introduce a clause into the contract to exclude the 
reinsured’s liability for fraud of his agent to insure, provided that the reinsured is in 
no way implicated in the agent’s fraud. By use of such contractual terms, provided it 
is so clearly drafted to exempt the reinsured’s liability for his agent’s fraud,  the 
reinsurer must feel commercially sensible for himself to enter such extraordinary 
bargain and should be responsible for his decision to take the risk of the fraud of the 
reinsured’s agent.  
As to effect of such express waiver, it is proposed that such express waiver does not 
mean to establish a legal exception to the reinsured’s liability for his own agent’s 
fraudulent misrepresentation in placing process, nor the brokers are excused from 
conducting such fraud. It just suggests that it is at least legally permissible for the 
reinsurer to waive such consequences of fraudulent misrepresentation by the broker 
against the reinsured only, leaving the contract of reinsurance between them 
untainted. By agreeing to waive liabilities of the principal for his agent’s fraud, the 
reinsurer may give up possible remedies under the default regime, as the right to 
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avoid the contract under s.17 of the MIA 1906, or the entitlements under the new 
remedies regime under s.8 of the Insurance Act 2015, the right to claims damages 
for misrepresentation under s s.2 (1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 or under 
common law tort of deceit against the reinsured etc. However, the door to claim 
damages against the broker for tortious or contractual liability is still open for the 
reinsurer, as long as he can establish the broker’s personal liabilities for his loss 
arising from such fraudulent conduct.  
7.3.2.2.2.2 What is the solution to correspond with current reinsurance market 
practice?  
It is suggested that by inserting such waiver clause in reinsurance agreement, the 
parties agree that the risk of fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation made by 
the broker, no matter through the separate duty route codified by s.19 of the MIA 
1906 or through the imputation route under s.3 of the Insurance Act 2015, is 
reassigned to the reinsurers, provided that the reinsured acts in good faith and does 
fair dealing with the reinsurer. As a result, broker’s fraudulent misrepresentation 
does not entitle the reinsurer a right to avoid the contract between him and the 
reinsured, or to claim any damages against the reinsured. The remedy is removed 
by such an agreement by the parties. There are two alternative approaches 
supporting such agreement, namely such waiver can be deemed to remove the 
broker’s authority to speak on behalf of the reinsured or to treat the broker as the 
agent of the reinsurers. Both of the approaches can give a justifiable effect for the 
assured to discharge the liabilities for the broker’s non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation as to the material facts.   
Although it is settled that the broker is the agent of the assured in placing process, 
there is no reason to bar the parties to alter the relationship among them and shift 
the liability for the agent’s fraud by inserting a properly drafted term in the contract, 
as long as it can be consistent with their business practice. The scenario in HIH v 
Chase is a perfect example for the assured’s expectation to remove the broker’s 
authority to speak on behalf of himself in placing the risk, although it was decided by 
the court that “the truth of statement clause” in the contract did not success to 
achieve such effect. It does make sense that the assured expects to exclude his 
liability for the broker’s fraud when he is insulated from the broker’s placing process 
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at all. Therefore to remove the broker’s authority to speak on behalf of the reinsured 
would be a practicable and easy means for the assured to achieve such purpose, 
provided the contracting out provision is suitably drafted. 
As to the approach of treating the broker as the agent of the reinsurer, it may be 
inconsistent with the firmly established law which decides the broker to be the agent 
of the assured in placing insurance risks. However, it is a common practice in the 
business insurance market for the broker to play a role of dual agent. The existence 
of relationship of agency between the broker and reinsurer, for example underwriting 
agency, does not necessarily contradict the default legal relationship between the 
broker and the reinsured, although there may be some conflict of interests. Whether 
a relationship of agency can be established between the reinsurer and the broker 
depends on role of broker in the placing process and the intention of them. 
Sometimes the broker may function more like the agent of the reinsurer in placing 
practice in business insurance market, such as devising and managing a 
reinsurance facility for the reinsurers then find them proper underwriters to subscribe 
the risks. In such situation it is equally reasonable and justifiable for either of the 
parties to be protected by a contracting out provision from liability for his agent’s 
fraud. Therefore, it should be justifiable for the reinsured and reinsurer to reach an 
agreement to allocate the liability for the broker’s fraud to the reinsurer if the broker 
does actually serve as the underwriting agent of the reinsurer. Once the reinsured 
and reinsurer does reach such agreement, it is suggested that there is no burden of 
a duty of disclosure on the broker at all as the underwriting agent of the reinsurer, 
the duty of utmost good faith does not come into play, rather than waived by the 
reinsurer by such stimulation of the relationship between the parties.  
7.3.3 Difficulties arising from draft and construction of the clause in 
reinsurance context  
Although it is supported that the reinsurance parties should be able to contract out of 
the default legal regime, there was still significant concern of the business market 
that such freedom of contracting out of the default regime would result in uncertainty 
into reinsurance contracts. So that the parties would not know whether their express 
terms of waiver can be relied on until the wording of the terms had been tested 
before the court. It is impossible to set a standard clause of waiver for all classes of 
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complicated reinsurance insurance contracts; therefore the courts should be allowed 
sufficient flexibility to interpret the terms. Consequently, difficulties will arise as to 
how the contract out clauses should be drafted to achieve the effect of waiver of the 
right or remedy. In addition problems will also arise to the construction of the clause 
as to what approach should be adopted to construe the meaning of the wording so 
that it can reduce uncertainty to the reinsurance contract.  
In order to avoid the uncertainty to the reinsurance contracts and make sure the 
business insurance market running well without interference by onerous contract out 
clauses, it is suggested that a narrow and restricted approach should be taken in 
construction of such terms with the assistance of the practice of the reinsurance 
market. First of all from the reinsurance contract parties’ standing point, they need to 
consider whether it is necessary or appropriate for them to contract out of the duty 
regime. Then they need to negotiate their position, and finally make an informed 
decision to agree with the alternative position with knowledge of all the facts and 
consequences of contracting out. 544  Secondly, a transparency requirement is 
expressly enunciated in section 16 of the Insurance Act 2015.Therefore to serve 
such function of contracting out of the default regime, the clause must be expressed 
in clearest and unambiguous terms on the face of the contract. In addition, the 
clauses must be drafted appropriately and indicate their expectation explicitly to alert 
reinsurance contract parties sufficiently to such extraordinary bargain, considering 
individual parties’ statutes and abilities. If the meaning of the clause is unclear due to 
its ambiguity, or it is capable of more than one conflicting or alternative interpretation 
of the clause, then the rule of contra proferentem should be relied upon to construe 
the clause against the interest of the party who benefits from the intended 
modification. In general, it should be construed against the party who proposes and 
draft the clause, and in favour of the party who accepts the clause. As in context of 
reinsurance, the contract is often drafted by the reinsured’s broker, who is the 
regarded as the agent to insure of the reinsured and may sometimes play a dual 
agent role as the underwriting agent of the reinsurer, thus the contracting out clauses 
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relating to waiver of duty of disclosure can also be construed in favour of the 
reinsurer’s interest.545 
It should be noted that, to achieve the effect of alteration of a specific position of the 
default regime, general wording in the clause, no matter how comprehensive in legal 
sense, would not serve such purpose. For example, the wording of the ‘truth of 
statement clause’ clause in the HIH v Chase case—‘the insured will not have any 
duty or obligation to make any representation, warranty or disclosure of any nature’ 
is held by the HL to waive the reinsured’s duty of disclosure. However the clause did 
not extend the waiver to cover any representation the reinsured might choose to 
make. Therefore, once the reinsured did voluntarily make any misrepresentation, the 
clause cannot protect him from liability for misrepresentations.546 In addition, it was 
held that such wording only waived the personal duty of disclosure on the reinsured, 
rather than removed the separate duty of disclosure placed on the broker under s.19 
of the MIA 1906, because the simple wording did not serve the function to waive the 
duty of disclosure in its entirety, nor did it waive the materiality of the information 
itself. Moreover, the exclusion clause, stating ‘insured shall have no liability of any 
nature to the insurers for any information provided’, is not clear and explicit to 
achieve the effect to exclude the assured’s liability for the broker’s fraud, even the 
word ‘any nature’ can have comprehensive meaning. Similarly, in HIH Casualty v 
General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co & Others,547 an exclusion 
clauses was interpreted by the Court of Appeal to precludes the right to avoid for 
misrepresentation, 548  but not necessarily to exclude the right to claim damages 
under the Misrepresentation Act 1967, s.2(1), or possibly in very exceptional 
circumstances in tort for negligent misrepresentation. Although there had not been 
any reference to a case in which the contract term employed such language to be 
held to bar a remedy for fraudulent misrepresentation, it is suggested that the 
reinsurance parties should be allowed by law to do so as long as both of them truly 
agree with this, provided a clause is suitably worded to achieve the effect. The 
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“discovery limitation clause” in Brotherton v Asseguradora Colseguiros SA (No3)549 
can be another example. In the Brotherton case, the reinsurance policies contained 
a ‘discovery limitation clause’ stated that “ there shall be no liability in respect of any 
claim…arising out of or in connection with any circumstance or occurrences known 
to the assured prior to the inception hereof and that have not been informed to the 
insurers at the time of inception.” Morison J rejected the reinsured’s argument that 
the clause could exclude the reinsured’s obligation to disclose material matters to a 
claim within the reinsured’s knowledge prior to the inception of the cover, as the 
clause does not in principle mean that the reinsured is thereby excused from his duty 
of disclosure to reinsurers.550 In some way analogous to the ‘discovery limitation 
clause’ in Brotherton, it is held that a standard Errors & Omissions clause in a 
reinsurance contract does not refer to breach of the duty of utmost good faith either. 
In Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd & Another v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd,551 the 
Court of Appeal decided that such Errors & Omissions clause does not refer to 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith prior to conclusion of the contract or the right 
to avoid for misrepresentation or non-disclosure, irrespective of whether or not they 
were inadvertent, as such a clause in reinsurance contract is not drafted to apply to 
pre-contractual misrepresentation or non-disclosure at all.  
7.4 Implied waiver of the duty of utmost good faith in placing reinsurance 
In addition to the express contracting out provisions, implied waiver plays a 
significant role in reshaping the doctrine of utmost good faith attached in reinsurance 
placing process. When a reinsurer make an unequivocal conduct that can be 
regarded as giving up to be disclosed of  material information or surrendering his 
right of avoiding the reinsurance contract, and then the reinsured acts in reliance 
upon such promise, then it would be inequitable for the reinsurer to enforce his right 
later on. Therefore it has been used by the courts to prevent a reinsurer from 
avoiding a reinsurance contract where he has impliedly waived the disclosure of 
relevant information as described in s.18 (3) (b) of the MIA 1906 or section 3(5) (e) of 
the Insurance Act 2015, or where the reinsurer can be regarded to have impliedly 
waived the remedies for qualifying breach of the duty, if the duty remains. Difficulties 
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may arise in respect of the test of establishing an implied waiver. Moreover the 
parties in the disclosing or representing process will face practical difficulties as to 
whether the reinsurers need to ask questions to reveal material information and if so 
how far the reinsurers are obliged to ask questions in the placing process, and then 
whether the reinsurer’s non-inquiry, general or limited questions indicates his waiver 
of disclosure of those information falling outsider the questions. In solving those 
difficulties, the practicalities of the principles of implied waiver of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance placing process will be analysed first. In addition, Comparison will be 
made between the Australian law and English law to find a proper approach of 
establishing implied waiver, to purport the current legislative spirit of prompting both 
of the reinsurance parties to make fair effect to get relevant material information 
disclosed. Such spirit has been reflected by the partially codification of the current 
common law positions in respect of the principle of implied waiver in the Insurance 
Act 2015. 
7.4.1 Practicalities of implied waiver of the right or remedy in reinsurance 
context 
The s.18 of the MIA 1906 adapted an objective hypothetical prudent insurer test 
which does not require the insurer to ask questions or indicate what it wishes to 
know. However, the harshness and defect of the test has long been under criticism 
as it may be inappropriate to assume an absolute informational asymmetry between 
the business insurance parties in 21st century any more. It is not the time where the 
reinsured knows every details of the risk proposed whereas the reinsurer knows 
nothing about the risk at all. Moreover, practicalities of certain situation in 
reinsurance market may sometimes render the duty of disclosure under the Act 
onerous to a certain degree, especially for large size, complicated nature and 
complex business. As under such large size and complex insurance business, 
identification, collection and collation of all material information related to the risk can 
be extreme difficult tasks involving multiple sources of information, proportionate to 
the size, nature and complexity of the business.  In fact, it is not an economical way 
nor of much commercial sense to formulate a strict duty of disclosure which 
incentives the reinsured to dump all the relevant information in respect of the risks to 
the reinsurer who has to allocate those necessary material information to make 
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informed underwriting decisions. As a result, no matter the parties expressly contract 
out of the default legal positions or not, there should exist a set of rules of implied 
wavier of the duty of disclosure which can resolve the difficulties created by the gap 
between the default legal regime and the reinsurance market practice. So existence 
of such implied waiver of can prompt both of the reinsurance parties to make fair 
effect to get relevant material information disclosed. It is consistent with the spirit of 
current trend to encourage the reinsurers to get involved in the disclosure process 
more actively, rather than waiting for the reinsured to present relevant material 
information.  
7.4.2 Comparison between the Australian and English insurance law in 
respect of establishing implied waiver  
It is suggested that the Australian insurance law can be regarded as a good example 
and reference for reforming insurance legislation in past decade. It merits attention of 
the Australian insurance laws to provide a useful experience and guidance to clarify 
the positions of English insurance law. The sources of the Australian insurance law 
contain two aspects, i.e. legislation, both Federal and State, and the common law 
and equity as established by case law. The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 is the 
most relevant legislation in context of the duty of utmost good faith in insurance 
contract. By contrast to English consumer insurance law, the duty of utmost good 
faith is still alive in Australian insurance law, in both consumer insurance and 
reinsurance context. However, it should be noted that this Act regulates insurance 
contracts rather than reinsurance, marine insurance, workers’ compensation or 
health insurance. Consequently, the duty of utmost good faith in the context of 
reinsurance in Australia has not been modified by the legislation, but depends 
substantially on the MIA 1909, 552  and case law developed from English law in 
reinsurance context. The decisions of the English courts, though not binding, still 
remain of considerable persuasion. Even though, the formulation of the implied 
waiver of the duty in the Act can be a useful reference to analyse the proper rules 
governing the context of implied wavier in reinsurance area. 553 
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As per the scenario where general or limited questions are asked by the reinsurer in 
the placing process, the principle that such questions can amount to a waiver of 
related information appears to be a good law under the ICA 1984.554 After a s. 21 A 
was added by The Insurance Laws Amendment Act 1998, the original test was 
modified into a new test that required the insurer to identify the information required 
to the underwriting assessment by asking appropriate questions in a clear and 
specific manner. The insurer would lose his right and remedy unless he make an 
enquiry to the assured relating to specific information, in addition, to disclose 
exceptional circumstance. Also a general or limited question asked by the insurer 
had the practical effect of waiving the duty of disclosure in respect of matters which 
would otherwise have required disclosure, unless such questions were directed 
towards “exceptional circumstances”. However, there appears a shift of attitude 
recently so that such right of the insurer to ask limited or general question is thought 
to be unjustified, and then has been removed by the ICAA 2013. The new version of 
s.21A is then substituted by the ICAA 2013, which is going to takes effects in 2015. 
According to the ICAA 2013, it stipulates that before conclusion of the contract, the 
insurer may request the insured to answer one or more specific questions that are 
relevant to the decision of the insurer whether to accept the risk and, if so, on what 
terms. If the insurer does not make such request, the insurer is taken to have waived 
compliance with the duty of disclosure in relation to the contract. If the insurer makes 
such request and requests the insured to disclose to the insurer any other matter 
that would be covered by the duty of disclosure in relation to the contract; then the 
insurer is taken to have waived compliance with the duty of disclosure in relation to 
that other matter. It is suggested that this new version actually reproduces the effect 
of the previous one, with just a significant modification of removing the provision 
whereby the insurer could ask for disclosure of exceptional circumstances. As a 
result, the current test of implied waiver of the duty of disclosure in Australian 
insurance law can be summarised as following. There is a duty of disclosure only 
where the insurer requires the assured to answer one or more specific questions 
relevant to the underwriting assessment. As to the insured, he is deemed to comply 
with the duty of disclosure if he discloses each matter actually known or deemed to 
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be known by him. However, if no such specific questions are requested, such failure 
to ask a specific question is a complete waiver of disclosure. And a general question 
asked by the insurer can be regarded as a waiver of disclosure of that information 
even if it would otherwise been disclosed by the assured. While a limited question 
need to be answered only to the extent that the assured actually knows the 
information and to the extent that a reasonable person in the circumstances would 
have answered that question.  
In comparison with the Australian law, the English law turns out to be relatively 
flexible and more ambiguous in establishing implied waiver of the duty of disclosure. 
As the English legislation governing reinsurance context, i.e. the current MIA 1906 
and the Insurance Act 2015,555 is silent on the issue of implied wavier of the duty of 
utmost good faith, the sources on this issues all come from the English common law 
authorities.556 The common law authorities used to adopt a relatively tough attitude 
to establish an implied waiver of the reinsurer. It is suggested that there is no settled 
rules of implied waiver of the duty of utmost good faith in common law, which can 
affirm establishment of an implied waiver once certain requirements are satisfied. 
Neither is there a firmly established duty on the reinsurer to ask questions in the 
placing process. So the duty is still strictly upon the reinsured to make a full 
disclosure of every material circumstance and refrain from making misrepresentation. 
Moreover, there neither has any legal presumption in favour of the reinsured 
proposing that silence or asking limited or general questions suggests reinsurer’s 
implied waiver of such material information. So that the mere non-enquiry of a 
particular fact by the reinsurer or general or limited enquiry of that fact does not 
necessarily implies that the reinsurer is not interest in it and then waived the 
disclosure of the information. However, the court starts to gradually give greater 
recognition of the waiver principles to limit the application of the duty of utmost good 
faith. Although there has been shown a shift of attitude introducing a notion of 
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fairness into the test, it cannot be said to be easy for the reinsured to establish an 
implied waiver.  
Therefore difficulties will arise in deciding whether an implied wavier of the right or 
remedy can be established in reinsurance context. The attitude of the court in 
deciding whether there is an implied wavier in individual case is becoming less strict 
than before, by introducing a notion of fairness to focus on whether the reinsured has 
presented the information fairly and whether the reinsurer has asked questions fairly. 
Such shift of attitude will modify the test of implied waiver, thus modify operation of 
the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance context. Difficulties and problems will be 
discussed in details in the following sections, and advice will be put forward to the 
parties to make a good performance of the duty in the placing process of reinsurance 
contract.  
7.4.3 The need of reinsurer to make enquiries to reveal information prompted 
by the reinsured’s fair representation 
It is recognised that the reinsured and his broker may discharge the duty of 
disclosure by making a fair presentation of the risks. If any matters brought into the 
reinsurer’s attention invoke the reinsurer to make further enquiries, the reinsurer 
ought to ask questions if he indeed requires further information. Failure of the 
reinsurer to put on appropriate inquires of relevant material facts, which would be 
revealed by enquiries of a reasonably careful reinsurer, may imply that he had 
waived the disclosure of that information. As a result, the reinsurer is prevented from 
avoiding a contract by such implied waiver. 557 However, it is suggested that the test 
of implied waiver as to the context of duty of disclosure in reinsurance contract is still 
to certain degree unsettled. Problems may arise as to whether the reinsurers need to 
ask questions in the placing process.  
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7.4.3.1 Traditional formulation of implied waiver of the duty of disclosure in 
common law  
There were authorities across the time illustrating this doctrine of implied waiver, 
indicating whether the insurers need to ask questions and if so how far the insurers 
are obliged to ask questions in the placing process. In recent cases there has 
appeared a shift of attitude as to the test of the implied waiver. A notion of fairness 
has been introduced into the test to strike a right balance between the business and 
the insurers. This was discussed in details in the leading case on implied waiver of 
duty of utmost good faith, WISE v Grupo.558  
In WISE (Underwriting Agency) Ltd v Grupo Nacional Provincial SA,559 a Mexican 
insurer (GNP) insured a cargo cover for a shipment of luxury goods from Miami to 
Cancun and then got reinsurance cover in London market. The slip presentation 
prepared in Spanish, had referred to Rolex watches, but the English translation 
referred to clocks by mistake. Due to this faulty translation of documents, the 
claimant reinsurer did not aware that the consignment included Rolex and other 
expensive watches which were more susceptible to theft. A container of goods was 
stolen in transit and GNP made a claim for over US$ 800,000 of which US $ 700,000 
related to the loss of the watches. The reinsurer sought to avoid the reinsurance 
contract, arguing that it had been induced by a non-disclosure of material fact that 
the luxury Rolex watches rather than clocks were on shipment. Waiver and 
affirmation issues were submitted for decision. At first instance, the court decided 
that such mis-description amounted to a material non-disclosure which entitled the 
reinsurers to void the contract as reinsurers would not have agreed to cover watches 
if they were informed by the reinsured and the judges dismissed the argument that 
disclosure of such material fact had been waived by the reinsurers. Then the 
reinsured appealed on the waiver issue. In the Court of Appeal, majority Longmore 
L.J and Gibson L.J. decided that that there was no waiver by the reinsurers, as the 
representation of the list of consignment goods was complete and reliable from the 
point of view of a reasonable careful insurer. The judges followed the traditional 
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formulation that has long been adopted at common law.560 In order to establish an 
implied waiver from non-enquiry, the reinsured needs first to make a fair presentation 
of the risk to discharge his duty of disclosure. If he has not, a failure of the reinsurer 
to put on inquiry will not relieve the reinsured of his duty to make proper disclosure. 
Then after the reinsured performed his duty of disclosure, the reinsurer is favoured of 
an assumption that the assured has performed his duty of disclosure properly by 
making a fair summary of material facts and there is nothing exceptional or unusual 
regarding the representation, so the reinsurer is entitled to take at face value what is 
presented to him. Then the question need to be answered is whether the facts 
disclosed by the reinsured or his agent, in addition to the facts within a reasonable 
reinsurer’s knowledge, would raise in the mind of a reasonable reinsurer 561at least a 
suspicion that there were other circumstances which would or might vitiate the 
presentation made to him.562 If it does remind a reasonably careful reinsurer of a 
suspicion and naturally prompt him to make further inquiries so that a full knowledge 
of material information can be acquired, 563  but he still kept silence rather than 
making appropriate check, it would be regarded that the reinsurer had waived the 
disclosure of that information that would necessarily have been revealed by the 
appropriate inquiry. This was the situation in SAIL v Farex where the reinsurers 
alleged non-disclosure of the absence of a significant retention. It was decided by 
Gatehouse J that although such retention was material, the reinsurer must assume 
there is no retention unless told otherwise. However declarations had been offered 
which mentioned retention in earlier years, so the reinsurer’s failure to ask amounted 
to a waiver of that material retention. But, if nothing in the presentation of the risks 
prompted a reasonable insurer to make further enquiries, the reinsurer was entitled 
to take the presentation at face value. Then there is no waiver by the reinsurer as 
regard to further material information. This was the situation in Hill v Citadel 
Insurance Co Ltd where the retrocedants’ broker argued that full details of historical 
reinsurance protection of the retrocession had not been provided. It was decided by 
the Court of Appeal that the inception date of the reinsurance protection was material 
information that should be disclosed. However the statement as to the full details not 
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being provided was insufficient to put the retrocessionaire on enquiry. Therefore no 
implied waiver of such information can be established.  
 In addition to the reinsured’s making a fair representation of risks, the burden to 
prove the state of mind of the reinsurer is also upon the reinsured. In order to rely on 
implied waiver from non-enquiry of further information which would or might vitiate 
the presentation made to him, the reinsured must prove that the reinsurer has been 
put on at least a suspicion. As a result, no implied waiver of the duty of disclosure by 
the reinsurer can be established if the reinsured did not fulfil the obligation to make 
fair and complete representation, or if the reinsurer was just aware of the possibility 
of the existence of other material circumstances rather than was invoked to put on 
enquiries on further information.  
7.4.3.2 Introducing a new conception of fairness into the test 
It can be said that under the traditional formulation of implied waiver of the duty of 
disclosure, it is not easy for the reinsured to establish an implied waiver of material 
facts by the reinsurers in practice. Even if the reinsured can establish successfully 
that a fair misrepresentation is made, it is not easy for him to prove the state of mind 
of the reinsurer. Therefore the reinsured had better perform the strict duty of 
disclosure to the full extent rather than simply makes a fair presentation of the risk 
leaving the reinsurer to discover material information for themselves. However, by 
contrast to the majority opinion, Rix L.J. suggested a more extensive fairness 
conception564 in a different approach as to the insurer’s duty to ask questions. The 
Insurance Act 2015 applying to non-consumer insurance context corresponds with 
such notion by introducing a new duty of fair presentation which reduces the 
strictness level of the reinsured’s duty of disclosure in placing process and 
encourage the reinsurer to play more active role in discovering material information.  
7.4.3.2.1 Core of the wide fairness conception—whether the reinsured’s 
representation is unfair or not 
This new approach which combined the doctrine of waiver and the duty of utmost 
good faith integrated the possibility of waiver by the reinsurer into a wider questions, 
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namely whether the reinsured’s representation was unfair. According to Rix L.J., 
notion of fairness should be taken into consideration to examine the performance of 
the mutual duty. The need of the reinsurer to ask questions fairly arises both from 
the doctrine of waiver under s.18 (3) and the mutuality of the duty under s.17. The 
reinsurer is also under a duty to deal with reinsured fairly before he is entitled to 
avoid the contract. So whether the reinsurer needs to put on inquiries depends on 
the whole picture of information that had been presented to him in conjunction with 
the information he knows or ought to know under s.18 (3) (b). That is to say waiver of 
the information by reinsurer under the purpose of s.18 (3) (b) should also be 
considered when discussing the issue whether the presentation is unfair or not.565 It 
is unfair for the reinsurer to avoid the contract on the ground that the reinsured did 
not disclose relevant information that a reinsurer had waived under s.18 (3) (b). 
Therefore, the question ultimately turns out to be whether the presentation is unfair 
or not, considering the notion of fairness applied to both of the parties. Then the 
question needs to be answered first: has the insurer been put fairly on inquiry about 
the existence of other material facts that would necessarily be revealed by such 
inquiry? 566 It should be noted that the test is an objective one at the standard of a 
hypothetical reasonably careful insurer described by Lord Justice Rix as neither a 
detective on one hand nor lacking in common sense on the other. If the hypothetical 
reasonable reinsurer would put on inquiry to discover other material information, but 
the actual reinsurer kept silence on it, it should be treated as the reinsurer waives the 
information impliedly, as the wholly true position can be acquired by a simply ask, 
based on all the information processed by the reinsurer, the reinsurer chooses to 
stay ‘unknown’. Then it is not unfair to determine that the reinsured had not 
presented the risks fairly.  The reinsurer should be prevented from refusing the 
reinsured’s claims on the ground of the reinsured’s non-disclosure of further 
information.  
It is suggested that such approach gains support by the Insurance Act 2015. Section 
3 (4) reflects such notion by expressly enunciating that a disclosure which gives the 
insurer sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on notice that it needs to make 
further enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material circumstances is a fair 
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presentation, even though it fails to disclose every material circumstances known or 
ought to be known by the insured. Consequently, in reinsurance context, a 
presentation of material information should be fair enough to put a prudent reinsurer 
on notice. If the reinsurer chooses not to make any further enquiries to reveal that 
material information which he has already been put on notice, then it can be 
regarded that the reinsurer waives disclosure of such information.  
7.4.3.2.2 Difficulties arising from the new approach 
Although the new approach seems more welcome as it limits to some extent the 
draconian pre-contractual duty of disclosure on the reinsured, it is still not perfectly 
consistent with the reinsurance market as such approach may create uncertainties in 
the practice. In the traditional analysis, the reinsurer is entitled to assume that the 
presentation is fair, therefore he waives nothing if he proceeds to negotiate based on 
the presentation without enquiry as to its accuracy, although he cannot complain that 
the full details of the material information are not disclosed as long as the summary 
is fair.567 By contrast, under the new approach the reinsurer is not favoured of an 
assumption of fair presentation any more. As a result, the reinsurers cannot be sure 
whether the presentation of the reinsured is sufficient so that he can accept the facts 
disclosed at face value. Even if he is not prompted to put on any suspicion or thought 
as to the accuracy of the information disclosed, the reinsurer may confuse whether 
he needs to dig into the facts presented to find out further relevant material facts. If 
he does not make reasonable enquiry, he may face the risk of committing an implied 
waiver of further information.  Therefore there has been a division between the 
authorities as to which approach should be treated as the sound solution to establish 
implied wavier from non-enquiry.  
7.4.3.2.3 Which approach prevails? 
It is suggested that, in comparison to the traditional approach, the fairness approach 
that introduces notion of fairness into consideration of test of implied wavier should 
be given applause.  
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First, it transformed the test of implied waiver into an objective test that strikes a right 
balance between the business and the insurers. It emphasises how a reasonably 
careful insurer of this business would react to the presentation rather than focuses 
on whether the presentation is fair or not. It makes more commercial sense as it 
urges the reinsurer to deal with the reinsured prudently and fairly as a reasonable 
insurer should do. Under the new approach, the reinsurer cannot turn a blind eye to 
obvious incompleteness or keep certain information which indicates vitiation to the 
presentation to himself, and then complain of the bargain made in ignorance of the 
whole information. If he had not acted as a prudent insurer to put on reasonable 
enquiry to pursue relevant information, he should be treated as having waived the 
information and take responsibility for his inexperience, negligence or stupidity.  
Moreover, it encourages the reinsurers to play a pro-active role in acquiring material 
information of the risks, rather than taking the advantage of the traditional test which 
appears difficult and unfair for the reinsured to prove the state of mind of a 
reasonably careful reinsurer. The reinsurer need to be more cautious of the 
information presented by the reinsured and get more involved in the disclosure 
procedure to assist the reinsured to comply with the duty of disclosure of relevant 
material information. In the situation where the reinsured’s has made an obviously 
incomplete representation of material information, the reinsurer cannot shut his eyes, 
and then allege that he was not provided a full disclosure of information, 568 unless 
such circumstances can be regarded as an unusual circumstances which cannot be 
disclosed in an ordinary course of business. The doctrine of wavier cannot be 
applied to undisclosed facts which are unusual or special so that their non-disclosure 
distorts the presentation of the risk. In such cases, the underwriter is not put on 
enquiry about the existence of any such facts.569 If the non-disclosed information is 
an ordinary incidence of the matters, the reinsured’s obvious incompleteness of 
presentation of such matters would invoke the reasonable reinsurer to ask about 
more information about this. As a result, even if the presentation was unfair, there 
may still be a waiver if the information disclosed was such as would prompt a 
reasonably careful insurer to make further inquiries. A recently case which follows 
the new approach has shown such shift of attitude. In Garnat Trading & Shipping 
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(Singapore) Pte Ltd and Another v Baominh Insurance Corporation, 570 there was an 
alleged non-disclosure of fact that a risk assessment contained a declaration that 
sea towage of a floating dock was permissible in certain conditions (a wave scale up 
to 5 with a maximum wave height of 4.5 metres). it is found, at first instance, that 
there had been a fair presentation of the risk, and there was a waiver by the insurer 
of the height limitation that the floating dock could withstand, as he failed to put on 
inquiry into such information as a reasonable insurer would do based on the relevant 
information on the wind disclosed by the policyholder. But even if it had not been a 
fair presentation, the reinsurer was still put on notice that there was a towage plan 
which contained wave height restrictions. Therefore the insurer waived the 
disclosure. The decision was upheld by the court of appeal.  
7.4.4 Difficulties in the situation where the reinsurers ask limited, general 
questions  
As discussed above, the reinsurer may loss his right or remedy by impliedly waived 
the non-disclosure of material information by making no enquiry. Difficulties may still 
arise in certain scenarios where the reinsurer indeed expressly asks questions. 
Where a reinsurer is prompted to put on inquiries after the reinsured has made a 
presentation, the reinsurer may expressly ask a limited question, for example a 
readymade form may be created by the reinsurer putting forward the questions to 
acquire information that he would like to know, or he may be interested to ask 
specific questions about particular facts besides the information disclosed by the 
reinsured. In those scenarios, it may be doubted whether there is an implied waiver 
by the reinsurer in respect of those information falling outside the questions asked by 
the reinsurer. Such difficulties can be the result of two related unsettled issues. Is it 
indicating that, by asking limited questions, the reinsurer has no interest in the 
information which would otherwise be material but falls outside the scope of the 
limited questions? And has the duty of utmost good faith been modified to confine to 
the level of disclosure upon the reinsured dictated by the extent of the express 
questions asked by the reinsurer? If the answer is positive, then the duty of 
disclosure upon the reinsured may be modified by the form and nature of the 
questions asked by the reinsurers. As a result, the reinsurer may lose his right or 
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remedy due to waiver of the duty of disclosure of further information by asking limited 
questions.  
7.4.4.1 No legal presumption in favour of the reinsured  
With respect to limited questions asked by the reinsurer, there is no legal 
presumption that facts not mentioned in the proposal from are not material. The 
mere non-enquiry of a particular fact by the proposal form does not necessarily 
implies that the reinsurer is not interest in it and then waived the disclosure of the 
information that falls outside the scope of the question asked.  
This was illustrated in Schoolman v Hall571 where it was held by Asquith LJ that 
detailed questions about the trading nature of the insured’s business did not waive 
the obligation on the part of the insured to disclose that he had had criminal 
convictions. Although there are numerous cases which have proceeded on the basis 
that asking of a limited question is a waiver of further information relating to that 
peculiar matter, it can be said that the common law is not ready to take a further step 
to conclude that a failure to ask all questions amounted to a waiver of disclosure. 
The reinsurers cannot, nor is obliged to frame their questions so as to discover every 
material information that may affect the reinsured. After all, the information subject to 
disclosure may be something peculiar to an individual case. Therefore, whether 
there could be wavier of disclosure depends on the reinsurer’s intention as a whole, 
when he was formulating the questions.572 That’s to say whether there is an implied 
waiver by the reinsurer depends on the question asked by him under the whole 
framework of the policy rather than the answers provided by the reinsured. If the 
formulation of the question implies necessarily that the underwriter only requires 
information of a particular type, subject-matter or defined scope, then the reinsurer 
has waived his right to receive all other material information, otherwise the reinsured 
is still under a duty to disclose every material information.  
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 [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139; Asquith LJ formulated the principle in the following words: It is unquestionably plain 
that questions in a proposal form may be so framed as necessarily to imply that the underwriter only wants 
information on certain subject-matters, or that within a particular subject-matter their desire for information is 
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 Cape Plc v Iron Trades Employers Insurance Association Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 341; Doheny v New India 
Assurance [2004] EWCA Civ. 1705;  O’Kane v Jones [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 174. 
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7.4.4.2 What equals a necessary implication of waiver in such scenario?  
As to what equals a necessary implication of waiver where limited questions are put 
forward by the insurers, in Doheny v New India Assurance,573 Lord Justice Longmore 
formulated, in obiter, the test as whether or not there is a waiver depends on a true 
construction of the proposal form. When a reasonable man was reading the proposal 
form, is it justified in thinking that the insurer had restricted his right to receive all 
material information and consented to the omission of the particular information in 
issue. 574  This doctrine of waiver by putting forward limited questions has been 
accepted and illustrated in many authorities. For instance, in O’Kane v 
Jones,575where the insurer’s express questions on maintenance were held to waive 
further information potentially affecting the maintenance of the vessel, including the 
insured’s financial position. In Cape Plc. v Iron Trades Employers Insurance 
Association Ltd,576 Rix J held that the insurer, who had extensive experience as an 
insurer in this particular industry and knew that the insured’s claims were endemic in 
the industry, had waved separate disclosure of mesothelioma liability, as he had not 
required pneumoconiosis exposure to be disclosed separately.  
It should be noted that all the authorities relates to waiver of specific information 
rather than a wide category of information. It may be difficult for the reinsured to 
prove that the reinsurer had waived a broad category of information which was too 
wide or hard to define by ask a specific or limited question. This happened in 
Synergy Health (UK) Ltd v CGU Insurance Plc and others,577 where the judges 
decided that a form of Declaration of Material Facts concerning moral hazard was 
not supposed to obviate the duty of disclosure of the totally unrelated information 
such as an intruder alarm had not been installed on the premises. 
In a sentence, whether there is a waiver depends on the intention of the reinsurer 
which should be construed on the questions asked and the whole policy itself. Even 
if the reinsurer intends to waive other information falling outside the scope of his 
limited questions, the reinsured may still fail to answer the limited questions or 
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provide a full answer. In such circumstances, acceptance of such proposal by the 
reinsurer may indicate an implied waiver of the material information in the part 
omitted. The same test should be applied as implied waiver by the reinsurer in 
normal placement procedure. If a reasonable reinsurer would put on enquiries upon 
the material information provided by the reinsured in the proposal, then non-enquiry 
of the reinsurer indicates a waiver of any further relevant information which would 
vitiate the reinsured’s representation.  
7.4.5 Conclusion  
On the balance of the existing authorities and legislation, it can be said that there is 
not a general assumption that a failure to ask an express question by the reinsurer 
will be construed as a waiver of further information by the reinsurers.578 The current 
position of law suggests a mutual fairness of both parties in the placing process to 
make all the relevant material information disclosed. When the reinsured has 
presented the risks fairly, the reinsurer may be put on notice of any further material 
information, consequently prompted to ask questions about the existence of those 
material facts which would necessarily have been revealed by a reasonably careful 
insurers inquiry. That’s to say, as long as a reasonably careful reinsurer put on an 
appropriate inquiry, he would acquire full knowledge of material facts. Failure to ask 
such obvious questions will be construed as a waiver of such material information, 
and then the reinsurer would be prevented from avoiding the contract due to non-
disclosure of such material facts. However once the reinsurer puts forward enquiries 
about any further information prompted by the reinsured’s representation, the limited 
questions asked by the reinsurer may indicate a waiver of the information that falls 
outside the scope of the questions. But the test is still the same as the general 
doctrine of waiver, so that no general assumption of waiver will favour the reinsured. 
Whether the reinsurer has the intention to waive any relevant information not 
covered by his specific or limited questions depends on the questions he asked 
under the whole picture of the policy, leaving the courts to use his discretion to 
construe the facts of each case.  
7.5 Conclusion  
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The doctrine of waiver becomes a practical method used by the insurance market to 
modify the scope of the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance market. Whether 
there has been a waiver of the disclosure of material information depends on the 
reinsured’s and reinsurer’s intention construed under the whole policy terms, no 
matter it is expressly incorporated into the contract subject to suitable and effective 
wording or implied from the representation or conduct of the reinsurer. The principle 
of waiver modifies the operation of the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance 
context in following ways. 
The parties to the reinsurance contracts should be allowed to use express contract 
terms to tail the strict statutory duty of utmost good faith as long as the terms make 
commercial senses for them, unless it is restricted by the law or a public policy. For 
instance, a party is not entitled to exclude his liability for his own personal fraud. But 
it is conceptually possible in law to have an express clause in the contract that 
exclude the liabilities for negligent non-disclosure or exclude liability of a principal for 
fraudulent misrepresentation of his agent, only if such clause is suitably and 
effectively worded. To achieve the purpose of contracting out of the default regime, 
the clause must be worded clearly and unambiguously to alter the parties sufficiently 
to any extraordinary position caused by the clause. 
As to establishing an implied waiver by the reinsurer, it can be said that there is not a 
general assumption that a failure to ask an express question by the reinsurer will be 
construed as a waiver of further information by the reinsurers on the balance of the 
existing authorities. It is suggested that Rix L.J’s approach supported by the 
Insurance Act 2015 which emphasises a mutual fairness of both parties in the 
placing process to make all the relevant material information disclosed should be 
given applause. The test should be formulated as when a reasonable reinsurer 
would ask obvious questions to reveal further material information prompted by the 
reinsured’s presentation, failure to make such appropriate enquiries would imply a 
waiver of disclosure of relevant information. Once the reinsurer did put forward 
enquiries about any further information prompted by the reinsured’s representation, 
the limited questions asked by the reinsurer will not be assumed as a waiver of the 
information that falls outside the scope of the questions. Whether the reinsurer has 
the intention to waive any relevant information not covered by his specific or limited 
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questions depends on the questions he asked under the whole picture of the policy, 
leaving the courts to use his discretion to construe the facts of each case and take 
the particular type of insurance business into consideration.  
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Chapter 8 Deficiencies and difficulties of the regime of remedies applying in 
reinsurance context  
8.1 Introduction  
It is fair to say that the right to rescind is firmly established as the primary remedy for 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith under English law. Although alternative 
formulations to recover damages for actionable breach can be established in certain 
situations, it is suggested to only exist in theory. In fact, in practice the right to 
damages appears to have fewer practicalities in reinsurance context, leaving the 
right to rescind as the only actionable remedy in reinsurance market. The current 
regime of remedies which adopts an ‘all or nothing’ approach receives more and 
more criticism as it gradually shows deficiencies in practice. This chapter will analyse 
the deficiencies and difficulties of the regime of remedies applying in reinsurance 
context, and then suggest a proper solution to those problems after comparing the 
regimes under the ICA 1984 in Australian law, the current English law regime and the 
new proportionate remedies regime proposed by the Insurance Act 2015. 
This chapter will start with the summary of the current regime of remedies under 
English law that has long been criticised to be too harsh widespread the insurance 
market. Then it will proceed to scrutinize of the deficiencies, shortcoming of the 
current regime of remedy and difficulties caused to reinsurance practice. Thereafter 
an alternative approach to modify current remedy regime by introducing a notion of 
proportionality is discussed to find proper reforming resolution to make the duty of 
utmost good faith function better in the reinsurance market. The core spirit of the 
proportionate approach will be clarified first. Under the proportionate regime, the 
parties should only be restored to positions according to what the reinsurer would 
have responded, had the information been truly disclosed and represented. The 
most important change is to divide the regime into two parts according to the state of 
mind of the wrongdoer in committing the breach. And then it will be followed with 
detailed analysis of the proportionate approach adopted by the ICA 1984 in 
Australian law and the new regime proposed under the Insurance Act 2015. A 
method of comparison will be adopted to find a proper alternative approach to 
introduce the notion of proportionality into the regime of remedies.   
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However problems will arise in drawing a hypothetic picture of what the contract 
would have been and what the hypothetic ultimate position the reinsurance parties 
would have been in, had all the material information been truly and fully disclosed. 
Also difficulties will be incurred in defining the scope of the parties’ contractual 
obligations and duties. Even the above problem can be solved, it will still cause 
practical problems in applying the proportionate remedy approach in reinsurance 
context. Difficulties will arise in referring and proving a hypothesis of what the 
reinsurers would have been done had all material information been truly represented. 
It is not easy to resolve the issue of defining difference between what the reinsurers 
would have done had it made a fair presentation and what actually occurred. In 
addition such potential difficulties even become more complicated in applying the 
new regime in specialist or complex reinsurance contract. Especially where 
reinsurance is written "back to back" with the direct insurance, or placed on a 
proportionate basis, proportionate remedies should be problematic in operation. 
Whereas in the situation where the reinsurance contract is not back to back with the 
direct insurance, or placed on a non-proportionate basis, it is still arguable whether 
such proportionate regime will play practical roles in reinsurance market. Despite the 
problems mentioned above, the current proposed regime in the Insurance Act 2015 
that significantly changes the current common law rules gains strong support. 
However it to certain degree complicates the remedies available to the reinsurance 
parties for qualifying breach. It is suggested that it is better for the legislation to set 
up only ground principles of proportionality and allow the sophisticated and specialist 
parties free to opt out of the default proportionate remedies regime and find a 
suitable solution for their own practice. 
8.2 The current regime of remedy for breach of the duty of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance context 
Although the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 
comes into effect and removes the duty of utmost good faith in the consumer 
insurance context, the doctrine still remains applicable to the reinsurance context. As 
a result, the current regime of remedy for breach of the duty of utmost good faith, 
which origins both from the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and numerous common law 
cases but to be reformed by the Insurance Act 2015, applies to reinsurance context 
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too.579 Before discussing the deficiencies and difficulties of the current regime of 
remedy in reinsurance market, the current positions will be summarised in this 
section.  
8.2.1 Rescission and its consequence  
Under the current legislation, s.17 of the MIA 1906 declares without uncertainty that 
the contract may be avoided by the innocent party if the duty is not observed by 
either party. Moreover, section 18(1) and 20(1) also emphasises the right of 
avoidance again in case of material non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Therefore, 
an actionable breach of the duty entitles the innocent party a right to rescind the 
contract. It is firmly entrenched to be the primary remedy for breach of the duty of 
utmost good faith. Consequently once the party decided to exercise his right to 
rescind, the whole contract of insurance is treated as avoided ab. initio like it had 
never been in existence before.580 However, the remedies receive a reputation of 
harshness widespread the insurance market. It is to be reformed by the Insurance 
Act 2015. According to s.14 (3), s. 17 of the MIA 1906 is replaced and the wording ‘if 
the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided 
by the other party’ is removed. However, the new regime proposed retains the right 
to rescind but only under the relevant requirements is satisfied, namely the insurer 
may avoid the contract, refuse all claims and need not return any of the premiums 
paid only if a qualifying breach was deliberate or reckless.581 The practical difficulties 
arising from the deficiencies of both remedy regimes will be discussed later in this 
Chapter.  
Current English law adopts an ‘all or nothing’ approach in formulating the remedy for 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith. The wording ‘may be avoided’ in s.17 of the 
MIA 1906 reveals that the avoidance does not happens automatically, neither is the 
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(a) may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, and 
(b) need not return any of the premiums paid. 
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judicial intervention required.582 The contract turns to be avoidable rather than void, 
so that its voidability entitles the reinsurer an election to avoid the contract 
retrospectively to the time of its conclusion or to affirm it like the duty has been 
perfectly performed.583  
Until the contract is elected to be avoided by the reinsurers, the terms of the contract 
of insurance will remain valid and bind both parties.584 Therefore the reinsurer is 
bound to pay valid claims arising under the cover and the reinsured remains bound 
to pay the premium. Once the election of avoidance is made, the decision of 
avoidance becomes effective immediately and irrevocably. From then on the 
reinsured is not entitled to payment for any outstanding losses, and any premium 
paid is returnable to the reinsured,585 unless the reinsured is in breach of the duty 
fraudulently according to s.84 of the MIA 1906.586 It is a draconian consequence for 
the reinsured as it deprives the reinsured all cover whereas the reinsurer discharges 
all liabilities under the policy even the loss paid already is recoverable. Both of the 
parties go back to the exact position as they were as if the contract had not been 
brought into existence ever. 587 
Alternatively, the option of affirmation of the contract is also available to the reinsurer. 
If he elects to affirm the reinsurance contract which is of commercial sense to him, 
then the contact remains valid and enforceable as the reinsurer has waived his 
remedy by such affirmation. It should be noted that the reinsurer is entitled to choose 
either avoidance or affirmation. There is no discretion of the remedy of avoidance 
upon the reinsurer. There have been arguments that the non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation of a material fact would permit the insurer to refuse to pay a claim 
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 The notion that a non-disclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact automatically rendered the contract 
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in the case of deliberate or reckless breach, the insurer need not return any of the premiums paid.  
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 Brit Syndicates Ltd v Italaudit SpA [2008] UKHL 18, which confirms that until avoidance the policy is perfectly 
valid.  
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under the policy, rather than avoiding the contract. Then the necessary consequence 
of the refusal of the claim is the refund of the premium paid by the assured. However, 
such attempts have been dismissed by the court, at least in the situations where 
there is no contrary provision in the policy.  Therefore it is not open to the reinsurer to 
affirm the contract but decline a claim under it under the current legislation.588 
8.2.2 Damages  
Reinsurance contracts, as one of the types of contract uberrimae fidei constituting an 
exception to the general contract law,589 are based upon a doctrine of utmost good 
faith, deriving from a separate rule of law before a contact comes into existing.590 
The different origin of the doctrine determines its distinct effect. As a result, particular 
remedies for breach of the duty turn out to be different from those for breach of 
general contractual duties. It has been firmly established in common law authorities 
that avoidance of contract is the only available remedy for breach of the duty of 
utmost good faith. 591 Therefore, without assistance of alternative formulations falling 
outside the duty of utmost good faith, the remedy of damages is not available to the 
innocent party.592  
As general contract law does not recognise a duty of utmost good faith, there is no 
right to damages for breach of such duty through a contract route. However, 
damages are recoverable due to breach of contract if the duty is expressly or implied 
included into the contract as a contract term. The test of breach of contract and 
measurement of the damages should be subject to the general contract law. 
However, once the contract is chosen to be avoided on the ground of breach of the 
duty of utmost good faith imposed by the law in respect of insurance contracts, it is 
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952;[1990] 2 All ER 947. Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd; The Star Sea [2001] UKHL1. 
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erased entirely ab. initio like it has never existed at all. As a result, there is no 
existence of a contract of insurance from which an action for damages for breach of 
contract can arise. 
Since the contract route is closed unless the contract provisions provided, damages 
can only be claimed upon ordinary principles of law through the tortuous route and 
under statute on the ground of tort of deceit by making deliberate or negligently 
misrepresentation. It is firmly established by the common law that a fraudulent 
misrepresentation that has induced conclusion of a contract is the tort of deceit for 
which the innocent party may be able to claim damages. 593  In addition, the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides a statutory recourse to damages for 
misrepresentation. In s. 2(1) it entitled the innocent party to the contract to claim 
damages against the other contractual party, 594  not their agents who may be 
personally liable for deceit or misrepresentation,595 if all the following requirements 
are satisfied, namely where he has been induced to a contract due to such 
representation and has suffered loss thereby.596 However, such ground for damages 
is independent of breach of the duty of utmost good faith itself. Such right to claim 
damages for the tort of deceit in general law is considered as a cumulative rather 
than alternative remedy to the right of avoidance of the contract on the ground of 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith. And the ground for claiming damages 
survives independently of the contract which may be avoided or not.597 However, 
such damages would normally be awardable only where avoidance is not the 
preferred remedy or not an adequate remedy, or where the courts declined to justify 
an avoidance of the contract, or where the reinsurers waivered the remedy for 
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 Section 2 of The Misrepresentation Act 1967, (1) Where a person has entered into a contract after a 
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the notion of utmost good faith that applies to insurance contracts, it is submitted that such difference will not 
affect the innocent party’s right to recover his damages. 
263 
 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith, choosing not to avoid the policy or being 
estoppeled from doing so.598 
In addition to the possibility of recovering damages discussed above, s.2 (2) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides a further statutory recourse for damages, 
namely damages in lieu of rescission. It entitles the court a discretion to award 
damages to the claimant, who is seeking avoidance of the contract induced by the 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation, in lieu of rather than in addition to avoidance, if the 
court considers that it is equitable to grant a relief from avoidance of the contract,599 
and then substitute damages for avoidance as the remedy, by taking into account the 
relevant circumstances such as the nature of the misrepresentation, the 
consequences of the avoidance of the contract, the losses suffered from the 
avoidance or upholding of the contract etc. Such empower of discretion on the court 
can be considered as a balancing power and safeguard where the avoidance of 
contract on the ground of non-fraudulent misrepresentation works injustice, 
especially in the event of minor misrepresentation, though the underwriter would 
have still accepted the risks on a higher premium or different terms. As such 
discretion of the court to grant relief from avoidance on the ground of material 
misrepresentation may erode the efficacy of the rules set up by the doctrine of 
utmost good faith where the rules fulfill an important policing functioning in ensuring 
brokers to make a fair representation to underwriters. Moreover, such discretion is 
unlikely to be exercised by the court in a sophisticated and specialist reinsurance 
market. 
To sum up, although damages are not available as a remedy under the doctrine of 
utmost good faith itself, there are alternative formulations to recover damages for an 
actionable breach. The actionable routes includes the tortuous route for suing 
fraudulent misrepresentation as a deceit for damages under the common law, the 
contractual route where the contract has incorporate the duty of utmost good faith 
expressly or impliedly,  and a statutory source under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 
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to claim damages in addition to the remedy of avoidance of the contract. However, it 
is possible for the court to exercise its discretion to award damages alone in lieu of 
avoidance of the contract if the court considers it equitable to grant a relief from 
avoidance by taking into account particular circumstances in the dispute. It should be 
noted that such alternative formulations to recover damages for actionable breach 
only exists in theory. In fact, in practice the right to damages appear to have fewer 
practicalities in reinsurance context. It is not surprising that there are even no known 
cases in which a reinsurer has successfully claimed damages from the reinsured, 
even in cases involving fraudulent breach of the duty.600  In practice of reinsurance 
market, the main potential loss of the reinsurer caused by the reinsured’s breach of 
the duty of utmost good faith will normally be prevented by avoidance of the 
reinsurance contract. Even if in cases where there has been fraudulent breach of the 
reinsured, the reinsurer’s right to retain the premium may cancel out any further 
claims for damages. 601 As a result, the right to rescind of the innocent party can be 
regarded as the primary and only practical remedy for an actionable breach in 
practice. 
8.3 Deficiencies of current remedy regime for breach of duty of utmost good 
faith 
Although the approach of remedy adopted by English law gradually shows 
deficiencies in practice, it is argued here that the approach of the remedy is in fact 
more reasonable than it is generally assumed to be. Some of the particular aspects 
of the remedy approach can be better explained by more general principles of 
contract law and just illustrates the general position of English law. There should be 
a legal room for such doctrine and proper remedy regime to survive in reinsurance 
practice. However, the approach has long been criticised to be too harsh widespread 
insurance market, not only due to its all or nothing character which might deprive the 
reinsured of all coverage, but also because of the great injustice it may be capable of 
working, for instance the approach is disproportionate, lack of consequence, 
irrelevance of the state of mind of the wrongdoer when committing the breach and 
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maybe one-side favorable to the reinsurers. In the following sections the current 
approach will be under scrutiny, and the shortcoming and deficiencies of the current 
regime of remedy will be analysed.  
8.3.1 Draconian and inconsequential remedy? 
It has been commonly criticised that the remedy for breach of the duty of utmost 
good faith is lack of consequence between the non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
of material facts and the losses that the reinsured would claim payment for. However, 
it is argued here that the requirement of consequence between the reinsured’s non-
disclosure of relevant material information and the loss suffered by the reinsured is a 
misunderstanding of the relevant causal link. In English law, a causal link is required 
between the wrongdoing of a party and the loss caused by such a wrong before the 
innocent party can claim indemnity. Where a reinsured has made a non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation of material facts, the loss caused to the reinsurer by such breach 
is the possibility that the reinsurer may have been induced into entrance of the 
contract of insurance, rather than paying for particular claim which indeed has no link 
with the undisclosed matters. Therefore the remedy for breach is an indemnity for 
conclusion of the contract of insurance that the reinsurer might not have entered into, 
rather than for t particular claims arising under the contract. As a result, it is irrelevant 
how minor or inconsequential the non-disclosure or misrepresentation is in respect of 
the effect upon the losses under claims.  
In fact, the spirit of the remedy for breach of the duty of utmost good faith plays 
nothing special in the general principles of contract law. The justification of the 
remedy just represents the spirit of general principle of remedy under English 
contract law, namely that innocent party is entitled to the indemnity to restore his 
position where he would have had the duty been performed. Breach of duty of 
utmost good faith occurs before and induces the formation of the policy, vitiating the 
parties’ consensus leading to conclusion of the contract. Accordingly the remedy 
makes the parties go back to the position before the vitiation of the negotiation 
consent, namely it entitles the innocent party a right to rescind the contract. Though 
the remedy of avoidance ab. initio having a retrospective effect seems to be different 
from the remedy for breach of a contractual duty that appears to operate 
prospectively arising from the time of breach, they are actually the same in essence, 
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namely to restore his position where he would have had the duty been performed. 
Therefore, it can be said that there is nothing in the approach of remedy magic but 
the doctrine of duty of utmost good faith is. It is the specific characters of uberrimae 
fidei of the contract of insurance that makes the duty so draconian and harsh remedy 
is sure to result. It is still necessary to partially retain such so called harsh remedy, as 
least for deliberate or reckless breach.  
8.3.2 Shortcoming of the current disproportionate approach in reinsurance 
context  
As discussed above, although the remedy is not inconsequential or unique as 
alleged to be, it is suggested that the current approach adopted by English law is 
indeed harsh in certain aspects, which will cause injustice and problems in the 
reinsurance market practice.  
First of all, the disproportionality of the all or nothing approach might work injustice in 
the market practice. There exists a possible risk that a reinsurer may avoid the whole 
policy in respect of non-disclosure of a matter totally unconnected with the loss, or 
material information which may have at best a minimal effect on the assessment of 
the risk and calculation of the premium, subject to the reinsurer’s successful proof of 
inducement. Also it may be unfair to void the whole policy in certain circumstances 
where the reinsurer would have been happy to take the risk for a higher premium or 
to have included an additional term, such as a higher excess. Such disproportionate 
avoidance allows the reinsurer to refuse all claims under the reinsurance policy, 
including those which might have been accepted had the truth been disclosed. 
Especially in the case of obligatory treaty which is of itself a contract of insurance, 
avoidance of the whole treaty due to actionable breach at the first stage will erase all 
the declarations to it at the later stage, even if the non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation may be so disproportionate, and unconnected with the loss 
occurred in relation to other declarations to the treaty. There is no conception of 
proportionality recognised in current English law to accommodate an intermediate 
position as to the remedy. Although such proportionate approach may not always be 
suitable for all types of reinsurance contracts, especially for quota share or surplus 
treaty under which the reinsured and reinsurer share the premium in an advance 
agreed proportion, the all or nothing approach shuts the door which leads to an 
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intermediate balanced position so that it can protect both parties’ interest to the 
greatest extent, reduce the parties’ loss caused by the breach, and make the 
contract be performed according to the parties’ original intention. Therefore the 
reinsured is not able to recover the part of the loss represented by the short payment 
of premium, neither is him permitted to recover the full amount of any loss by tender 
the shortfall in premium in the situation where the reinsurer may have been happy to 
take the risk for a higher premium. Even the reinsurer may find themselves in an 
embarrassed position where they do not wish to avoid the reinsurance policy but 
have to do so, because no other remedy other than avoidance is available.  
Secondly besides the disproportionability of the remedy, the approach is also alleged 
to be one-sided to favour the reinsurer. Although the principle imposes a mutual duty 
on both parties and the remedy are open to both parties, in practice the remedy 
seems available only to the reinsurer rather than the reinsured. There is a debate 
that the draconian nature of the remedy can be balanced by the introduction of the 
subject test of inducement. It is suggested that such point of view is not quite 
convincing. The inducement into a contract of insurance by the reinsured’s non-
disclosure or misrepresentation is a necessary part of the establishment of the 
causation chain. Although it increases difficulty for the reinsurer to discharge the 
burden of proof, the result of avoidance is still one-sided as it is no benefit to the 
reinsured to seek avoidance in practice, as often the avoidance of the contract is 
undesirable or inadequate. In practice, it is probably unlikely for the reinsured to 
allege an avoidance of reinsurance cover so that he can get back the premium rather 
than get indemnified for all the losses. In most cases, the reinsured will probably 
prefer to maintain covered by the reinsurance contract. While from the reinsurer’ 
point of view, although the reinsurer may be prima facie one-sided favored, in some 
cases there may exist possibility that the reinsurer in fact is undercompensated for 
the reinsured’s breach. Where the courts wish to protect the reinsured against 
harshness of the remedy and counteract the effect of the unfairness of the remedy, 
they may be forced to find against the reinsurer that he was not induced or that he 
has waived its right to that material information, so that the claim can be ordered to 
be paid in full.  As a result, in practice, in many cases claims are often settled by the 
parties rather than avoided, even though the reinsurer may have been able to 
challenge the completeness and accuracy of the information disclosed. The 
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existence of all or nothing remedy would encourage litigation. It fails to reflect the 
commercial realities of the reinsurance market.  
Moreover, according to current doctrine to invoke a remedy of avoidance of the 
reinsurance contract, the state of mind of the wrongdoer is irrelevant when he 
commits the breach. That is to say that the reinsurer is entitled to avoid the contract 
ab. initio even if the reinsured’s commitment of breach is lack of fraud, i.e. innocent 
or negligent. It should be logical and fair to claim a remedy of avoidance in the event 
of a fraudulent or deliberate breach. However, in the event where the reinsured’s 
commitment of breach is negligent or innocent, it is arguable whether such approach 
is still appropriate for reinsurance practice any more. In fact in the reinsurance 
market, some reinsurers have already operated an informal system of proportionate 
remedies in practice. The underwriter in practice may do not seek avoidance of the 
reinsurance contract, unless he suspects dishonesty by the reinsured. For instance, 
on discovering the true facts, the reinsurer would still provide the reinsurer cover 
rather than avoid it, but cap the payment for a claim for loss, or pay the full claim on 
a different contractual term such as imposing a higher excess figure. This issue can 
be regarded as one of the most significant point calling for reform in the proposed 
proportionate regime which will be discussed in the later section. The most important 
part of the reform should focus on how the new framework should be established to 
reflect the core spirit of the proportionality of the new regime in the situation where 
no dishonesty is involved in the breach of the duty.  
In a sentence, the disproportionate approach of remedy for breach of the duty of 
utmost good faith under current law may overprotect the reinsurer then work injustice. 
The reinsureds have to disclose every material circumstance, whereas the reinsurers 
do not have sufficient incentive to ask questions to reveal all the material information 
that he might be interest to know of.  The reinsured’s failure to discharge the duty of 
disclosure may erase the whole policy and as a result deprive him all the benefits 
from the policy, even if the breach is so minor that the reinsurer would still have 
underwritten the risks with a small amount of additional premium or on slightly 
different terms had the material information been disclosed. Such all or nothing 
nature of the remedy are so draconian that it divorces with the commercial reality 
and encourages litigation in particular where most of the non-disclosure or 
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misrepresentation are not fraudulent and arose from genuine misunderstanding of 
the disclosure or statements, or sometimes even arose from the failure by reinsurers 
to ask appropriate questions to discover the true position. In addition such draconian 
remedy may even have a positive effect on the claim stage where the reinsured has 
a chance to negotiate for a settlement instead of losing the whole coverage, as the 
entitlement of avoidance of the reinsurer confers him a much stronger bargaining 
power in the negotiation of settling disputes in the claim stage.  
8.4 Alternative approach of proportionate regime of remedies   
Due to the practical difficulties caused by the harshness and disproportionability of 
current regime of remedy, alternative approaches to replace the current regime have 
been proposed all the time.602 In the reinsurance industry, some reinsurers have 
operated an informal system of proportionate remedies in practice already. In 
Insurance Act 2015 which reflects the latest legislative spirit, a new regime of remedy 
for breach the duty has been proposed, bringing significant changes to non-
consumer insurance context. It is fair to say that almost all the current reforming 
proposals support an introduction of concept of proportionality into English business 
insurance law. Therefore, in this section, proportionate approaches to modify current 
remedies regime are discussed to find proper reforming resolution to make the duty 
of utmost good faith function better in the reinsurance market. 
8.4.1 The core spirit and the potential difficulties of the proportionate approach  
It is suggested that the core spirit of the concept of proportionality is to adjust the 
party’s rights and obligations to make up the damage or loss caused by non-
disclosure or misrepresentation of relevant material information, so that the 
availability of the remedy should be in proportion to severity of the breach. As a 
result, it is the nature and extent of the loss suffered through the reinsured’s non-
disclosure or misrepresentation that decides the relevant extent of the remedies 
available to the reinsurers. Accordingly the reinsurer will not be permitted to avoid 
the whole policy for minor breaches of the duty of utmost good faith. The contract of 
insurance will remain its enforceability unless the reinsurer can prove that the breach 
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is so serious that the insurance could would not have been entered into at all had the 
proper disclosure been made.  
As discussed above, under the proportionate approach, once the contract of 
insurance remains enforceable rather than avoided, then the parties should be 
restored to positions where both of them had performed their contract obligations 
perfectly and got proper consideration in performance of the contract. However 
difficulties will arise in drawing a picture of what the contract would have been and 
what the hypothetic ultimate position the reinsurance contract parties would have 
been in. A question must be answered to define the scope of the parties’ contractual 
obligations and duties first, namely what contractual terms the parties should perform? 
Shall the law keep digging in pursuit of the hypothesis of ultimate position where the 
parties would have been in or focus on the insurer’s response to the disclosure of the 
true information, had the duty of utmost good faith been performed successfully. 
Answers would be found and suitable approach would be proposed in following 
discussion by comparison of current reforming proposals and the Australian 
legislation which can be the forerunner of the modification of the duty of utmost good 
faith in insurance law.  
8.4.2 The regime of remedy under the ICA 1984 in Australian law  
The Insurance Contract Act 1984 in Australia had taken an earlier step to depart 
from the common law principles by laying down a new statutory regime of remedies 
for breach of the duty of utmost good faith. A notion of proportionality has been 
introduced into the regime of remedies.603 The new regime of remedies under the 
Insurance Act 2015 in UK refers to and is built up based on but not identical to the 
Australian style.604 The regime for remedies for breach of the duty can be described 
as follow for later comparison purpose.  
First of all, the test of inducement is officially codified into the insurance legislation.605 
According to s.28 (1), the only circumstance that can give rise to a remedy for any 
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qualifying breach is where the insurer would have not entered into the contract for 
the same premium or on the same terms and conditions. That’s to say if the failure to 
perform the duty of utmost good faith does not induce the actual insurer into the 
contract, namely the insurer would have entered into the same contract of insurance 
anyway, the insurer should not be entitled a remedy, as there are no losses having 
been suffered by him.  
Once it is proved that the insurer has been induced into the contract by the assured’s 
failure to comply with the duty, different remedies available to the insurer will 
depends on the state of mind the insured when he was committing the breach.606 
The ICA 1984 s.28 (2) and (3) abolished the former rules and made the state of mind 
at the time of breach one of the decisive elements when measuring the 
corresponding remedy.607  As a result, the insurer is only entitled to avoid a contract 
ab. initio for fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation that is considered as a 
serious breach of the duty of utmost good faith. 
For innocent or negligent non-disclosure or misrepresentation which causes little or 
less serious damage, the insurer is not entitled to any remedy which exceeds the 
losses that he has suffered from the breach, so that avoidance of the whole contract 
is not open to the insurers anymore. Instead of avoidance, the remedies open to the 
insurer tear in two parts, one concerns the obligation to pay the existing claims and 
the other relates to the effect of the contract prospectively. In respect of the existing 
claims, the insurer is not entitled to refuse a claim, however the insurer should be 
able to reduce his liabilities to pay a claim, accordingly the amount of the payment 
would place the insurer in a position in which he would have been if the failure had 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
   (a)  failed to comply with the duty of disclosure; or 
   (b)  made a misrepresentation to the insurer before the contract was entered into; 
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(2). If the failure was fraudulent or the misrepresentation was made fraudulently, the insurer may avoid the 
contract.  
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not occurred or the misrepresentation had not been made at all.608 On the balance of 
authorities it proposes that the amount payable to the insured in respect of the 
claims can be reduced to nil if it can be proved by the insurer that he would not have 
entered into the contract at all had the true position been known.609 As in such 
circumstances, the damage suffered by the insurer equals the total amount of the 
payment of the claim. In the circumstance where the insurer would have entered into 
the contract but on different terms, the insurer is only liable for the amount that he 
would have been liable for, if the full disclosure had been made. This was the case in 
Dickinson v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd 610 where the insurer 
made a third party claim against his agent for not asking the assured questions 
about the previous injuries to his back. The insurer had successfully shown that 
there was a 20% chance that the insurers would have imposed exclusion if the 
correct questions had been asked. As a result the insurer was able to recover from 
his agent that proportion of the loss. In respect of the effect of the contract 
prospectively, s 60(1) of the ICA 1984 allows a right to cancel the contract for the 
future if there has been a failure to comply with the duty of the utmost good faith.611  
As far as fraud non-disclosure or misrepresentation concerned, the right to avoid the 
policy is still open to the insurer. However, the court should have power to grant 
relief in the case where avoidance of the policy would be unjustly disproportionate to 
the degree of the prejudice suffered by the insured’s fraud conduct.612 Therefore, the 
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court has a discretion to disregard the right of avoidance on an objective test where 
such remedy would be too harsh and it was unfair for the court not to do so; or on a 
subject test based on the degree of prejudice suffered by the insurer by the fraud 
conduct, namely where the insurer has not been prejudiced by the fraud or the 
prejudice is held to be minimal or insignificant by the court.613 It was the assured who 
has to burden the onus to prove the absence of the prejudice suffered by the 
insurer.614 However, If it can be proved that the insurer would be clearly prejudiced 
had the avoidance of policy is set aside, then the disregard of the fraud conduct 
should not be applied by the court, for instance it can be shown that the insurer 
would have significantly reduced the cover,615 or he would have not insured the risks 
at any price,616 or where the information fraudulently misrepresented or concealed 
has causal link to the claim itself etc.617 It should be noted that the right to obtain 
relief arising from s.31 can only be invoked in the case where there has been 
fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation on the assured’s part.618 Moreover, a 
further safeguard is designed to ensure the fairness of the regime. If the right of 
avoidance is disregarded, the rights of the insurer and the assured will be adjusted 
by the court by taking consideration of the interests of both the parties. To exercise 
the power, the court has a discretion to take into account relevant matters, such as 
the need to deter fraudulent conduct in relation to the insurance, to weigh the extent 
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of the culpability of the insured in the fraudulent conduct against the magnitude of 
the loss that would be suffered by the assured if the policy is avoided. As a result, 
the insured shall be allowed to recover the whole or part amount that would have 
been payable if the contract had not been avoided, and the assured shall be entitled 
to recover at least part of the loss, as long as the court decides it is just and 
equitable to do so in the circumstances. Therefore, it can be said that the spirit of the 
court’s power to disregard the avoidance of the policy is to make the parties get fair 
and just premium and recover of the loss regarding to the claims tainted by the fraud 
conducts. So it is clearly stated in s.31(4) that the exercise of the power by the court 
to override the insurer’s right of avoidance is only effective to preserve the claims in 
respect of the assured’s loss rather than to reinstate the contract which should 
presumably remain avoided for all other purposes.  
Moreover, as clarified in s.13 of the ICA 1984, the duty of utmost good faith is relied 
upon as an implied contract term in the contract of insurance rather than a duty from 
common law rules, so the insurer should be able to claim damages on a contractual 
basis rather than the tortious basis envisaged by s.28 (3) in the ICA 1984.619 The 
measurement of the damage is on a tortious basis to restore the insurer to the 
position that he would have been in had the non-disclosure or misrepresentation not 
been made. The damage suffered by the insurer from a non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation under s.28(3) cannot be separated from a claim that was made by 
the assured under the contract as the breach of the duty commonly reveals at the 
claim stage. When a claim is made by the assured under the contract, the insurer is 
entitled to set-off his loss suffered from the non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
against his liability of payment of the claim, for instance set-off of the short part of 
premium if a higher amount would has been charged, so that he is only obligated to 
pay the amount which he would have been liable for had he known all the true 
information and made an informed decision.  
Finally, as the ICA 1984 s.33 provides, the provisions are exclusive remedies which 
are open to the insurers against the assureds in respect of a failure to comply with 
the duty of utmost good faith, therefore no other greater remedies are available to 
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the insurer in the case of breach of the duty.620 As a result, the regime established by 
the act provides the widest scope of remedies available to the insurer so that it is not 
possible for the insurer to contract out of the regime to confer itself any remedies 
wider than that conferred by the Division.621 
8.4.3 Comparison between the ICA 1984 and current English law 
The Australian legislation relating to the doctrine of utmost good faith laid down a 
new regime of remedies departing from the common law rules. The difference 
between the two regimes suggests an alternative approach for reforming the current 
English regime.  
First of all, the legislation officially codified the test of inducement in common law. In 
order to justify an avoidance of the contract the first threshold to pass by the insurer 
is to prove that he would have acted differently had there been a fair presentation. 
Secondly, the Australian remedy regime makes the state of mind of the wrongdoer at 
the time of committing the breach significant criteria in deciding whether the choice 
of avoidance is available. This was totally different from current doctrine in English 
law that totally disregards the state of mind of the wrongdoer. As a result, the insurer 
is only entitled to avoid a contract ab. initio for fraudulent non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation. Therefore, once the burden of proof of inducement is discharged 
successfully, the issue turns out to be whether the insurer is entitled to avoid the 
policy.622 The proportionate approach of measuring the remedies on a hypothetical 
basis what the insurer would have done had the true information been known by him 
can be one of the most significant parts introduced by the Act that is different from 
the all or nothing approach under current English law. The nature and extent of the 
remedies depend on the nature and extent of the non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation. In the case of innocent breach, the insurer is not entitled to avoid 
the contract or reject the existing claims. However, the insurer is only liable for the 
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amount that he would have been liable for if the full disclosure had been made.623 
Moreover, a right of cancellation of the policy prospectively is introduced into the new 
regime so that the insurer would be free to re-consider whether he would like to 
continue the business with the assured. Furthermore, different from the current 
English regime, in order to ensure that proper remedies are granted so that it is just 
and fair to both parties, a power is conferred to the court to relief the insured from the 
harsh remedy of avoidance and adjust the parties’ rights and obligations by taking 
both parities’ interest into account, where avoidance of the policy would be unjustly 
disproportionate to the degree of the prejudice suffered by the insured’s fraud 
conduct, even if the insurer is entitled to avoid the contract; as long as the assured 
can successfully prove that insurer suffered only minimal or insignificant damage 
from the fraud breach.  
In addition to the proportionate rational governing the remedy regime, the ICA 1984 
clarifies that the duty of utmost good faith is relied upon as an implied contract term 
in the contract of insurance rather than a duty from common law rules. It is 
completely different from the English law under which the avoidance of the contract 
is the exclusive remedy open to the insurers.  So it makes the possibility for insurer 
to claim damages on a contractual basis rather than the tortious basis. The 
measurement of the damage is on a tortious basis to restore the insurer to the 
position that he would have been in had the non-disclosure or misrepresentation not 
been made.  
8.4.4 Reform of the English law proposed by Insurance Act 2015  
The common law decisions and insurance market practice have clearly shown that 
the current legislation governing the insurance contract area is in many aspects 
outdated, uncommercial and divorced from realities of 21st century business practice. 
The Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission have 
started a joint project to reform the law of insurance contracts since 2006. The 
reform programme has been divided into two parts in relation to consumer insurance 
and business insurance. After the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
                                                          
623
 The difference between the premium that had been charged and that would have been charged can be set-off 
against the insurer’s liability to pay the claims, or the amount of the insurer’s liability to pay can be reduced 
proportionately depending on the terms of the contract that would have been based on. 
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Representation) Act 2012 was born, reforming proposals and draft clauses regarding 
the non-consumer insurance context have been intensely published by the Law 
Commission since 2012.624 On 17 July 2014, HMT introduced a version of the Bill 
into parliament. 625  Then a Special Public Bill Committee has been convened to 
scrutinise the draft Bill. 626   Written and oral evidence was debated before the 
Committee and amendments was proposed accordingly by the Committee, before it 
was finally approved by House of Lords and House of Commons, 627  and then 
obtained royal assent in February 2015.628 The Insurance Act 2015 has had force of 
law and will come into effect in August 2016. In contrast to the new legislation regime 
governing the consumer context which removes the duty of disclosure, the proposal 
of the duty of fair presentation in non-consumer context can be described to a large 
                                                          
624
 It published its third consultation on wide range of reforming issues to the business insurance law including 
disclosure in business insurance in June 2012. It could be found at The Law Commission Consultation Paper No 
204 and The Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 155 INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW: THE 
BUSINESS INSURED’S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND THE LAW OF WARRANTIES, A Joint Consultation 
Paper. It can be found here: http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp204_ICL_business-disclosure.pdf. And 
then from January 2014, the Law Commissions have subsequently published a number of draft clauses of the 
Insurance Contracts Bill. On 28 January 2014, the Law Commissions published the first draft of the Insurance 
Contract Law Bill (‘the Draft Bill’) which indicates that some of the most significant reforms to insurance law, 
covering the duty to make a fair presentation of the risk in non-consumer insurance contracts, proportionate 
remedies, fraudulent claims, late payment of claims, and a short provision repealing the remedy of avoidance for 
breach of duty of utmost good faith. Subsequently a further consultation has been launched on draft clauses 
covering warranties, insurers’ remedies for fraudulent claims by members of group insurance schemes and 
contracting out of the legislation.  The draft clauses can be found here: 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/consultations/insurance-draft-clauses.htm; and 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/draft_insurance_clauses_January2014.pdf . By June 2014, over eight 
years detailed consultations with the stakeholders, the commissions published the second report, i.e. The Law 
Commission and The Scottish Law Commission (LAW COM No 353)(SCOT LAW COM No 238)  INSURANCE 
CONTRACT LAW: BUSINESS DISCLOSURE; WARRANTIES; INSURERS’ REMEDIES FOR FRAUDULENT 
CLAIMS; AND LATE PAYMENT Presented to the Parliament of the United Kingdom by the Lord Chancellor and 
Secretary of State for Justice by Command of Her Majesty Laid before the Scottish Parliament by the Scottish 
Ministers July 2014. The report can be found here: http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc353_insurance-
contract-law.pdf. 
625
 After HM Treasury consulted on the draft bill in June 2014, on 15 July 2014 a new draft of Insurance Contracts 
Bill was published and then submitted for further approval. The Law Commission and The Scottish Law 
Commission (LAW COM No 353) (SCOT LAW COM No 238) INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW: BUSINESS 
DISCLOSURE; WARRANTIES; INSURERS’ REMEDIES FOR FRAUDULENT CLAIMS; AND LATE PAYMENT, 
Appendix A at p.347. Following this, HMT introduced another version of the Bill into Parliament on 17 July 2014. 
That Bill includes all of the Law Commission’s recommendations apart from two provisions:  the clause relating to 
late payment, and the clause concerning warranties and other terms relevant to particular descriptions of 
loss.  These were omitted as HMT did not consider them suitable for the special procedure for uncontroversial 
Law Commission Bills.  The Law Commission will continue to work with stakeholders to find a workable solution 
on these points, to be introduced at the next legislative opportunity.  The detailed introduced version of the draft 
can be found here: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0039/lbill_2014-
20150039_en_1.htm. For details please refer to http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/insurance-contract-
law.htm; http://services.parliament.uk/bills/ 
626
 The Law Commission bills are normally committed to Special Public Bill Committees. This bill, the Insurance 
Bill [HL] was committed on 30 July 2014. Detailed information can be found here. 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/insurance-bill/.  
627
 Rob Merkin, and Ozlem Gurses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the interests of the insurer and 
assured, unpublished yet, p.1. The Bill was referred to a Special Public Bills Committee of the House of Lords, 
chaired by Lord Woolf, and it passed in December 2014 with minor amendments after four days of evidence from 
a variety of judicial, market, practitioner and academic witnesses, and one day of debate. The Bill then completed 
its House of Commons’ stages unscathed and with virtually no discussion. 
628
  The whole progress of the Bill can be found here: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/insurance.html 
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degree to clarify and codify the current rules of disclosure in common laws. However, 
the introduction of proportionate remedies regime is worth noted as new rules in the 
reinsurance law area.629  
8.4.4.1 The key changes brought by the new range of proportionate remedies 
Generally speaking, the new regime proposed by the Insurance Act 2015 has gained 
positive responses and strong support across the commercial insurance market. As 
one of most significant issues addressed, the current all or nothing approach of 
remedies for breach of the duty of utmost good faith is replaced by a new default 
proportionate regime which fundamentally changed the current position of law in 
non-consumer insurance context. 630  It has certain similarities with the Australian 
regime discussed above.  
First of all, remedies should be commensurate to the seriousness of the qualifying 
breach,631 i.e. that the reinsurer would have acted differently without the inducement 
either entered the contract on different terms or not entered the contract at all had 
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 Although there are arguments that reinsurance should be excluded from the reforms as such default 
proportionate regime may be not suitable for sophisticated and specialist reinsurance agreements conclusion of 
which are relied upon skilled reinsurance brokers in practice, the proposal of proportionate remedy regime in 
Insurance Act 2015 applies to all business insurance, including reinsurance and the insurance of large risks. The 
applicability to reinsurance context is not clarified in the sections, but can be referred from section 4(5) (b). It is 
suggested that it had better keep the legislative unity of the business insurance kingdom rather than isolating the 
reinsurance context as a separated regime, but keep the gateway of contacting out open for this sophisticated 
and specialist industry so that the parties can design and constitute their own terms. 
630
 The section 8 named ‘Remedies for breach’ of the Part 2 ‘The duty of fair presentation’ introduced a regime of 
remedies for qualifying breaches: 
(1) The insurer has a remedy against the insured for a breach of the duty of fair 
presentation only if the insurer shows that, but for the breach, the insurer— 
(a) would not have entered into the contract of insurance at all, or 
(b) would have done so only on different terms. 
(2) The remedies are set out in Schedule 1. 
(3) A breach for which the insurer has a remedy against the insured is referred to 
in this Act as a “qualifying breach”. 
(4) A qualifying breach is either— 
(a) deliberate or reckless, or 
(b) neither deliberate nor reckless. 
(5) A qualifying breach is deliberate or reckless if the insured — 
(a) knew that it was in breach of the duty of fair presentation, or 
(b) did not care whether or not it was in breach of that duty. 
(6) It is for the insurer to show that a qualifying breach was deliberate or reckless. 
The relevant remedies under Clause 8 are explained in details in Schedule 1 of the Bill. The Schedule named 
‘Insurers’ remedies for qualifying breaches comprises of 12 paragraphs in three parts, i.e. contracts, variations, 
and supplementary.   
631
 The duty of fair presentation is breached if the presentation fails to satisfy one or more of the three elements 
in section 3(3) which indicates: A fair presentation of the risk is one— 
(a) which makes the disclosure required by subsection (4), 
(b) which makes that disclosure in a manner which would be reasonably clear and accessible to a prudent insurer, 
and 
(c) in which every material representation as to a matter of fact is substantially correct, and every material 
representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is made in good faith. 
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been no such breach of the duty of fair presentation, although the remedies available 
is independent from the cause of the breach. The ‘inducement test’ which must be 
satisfied as a pre-requisite of remedies remains the same position of the current 
law.632 Although the test of inducement is not fresh concept in law, it is the first time 
that this subjective test established in common law is codified in legislation. 
Therefore, to invoke the remedy for a qualifying breach, the insurer must be able to 
show that without the non-disclosure it would have not entered into the contract at all, 
or would have done so only on substantially different terms.  
Besides the codification of the test of inducement, the key changes proposed by the 
new regime lies in a new range of proportionate remedies.633 It can be concluded in 
the following aspects. As same as the Australian regime, the state of mind of the 
party when committing the breach of the duty is introduced into the regime as a 
significant criteria which divides the remedies for disclosure failures into two camps: 
one for dishonest conduct and the other for non-dishonest failures to make a fair 
presentation of the risk. Accordingly where the qualifying breach is deliberate or 
reckless, the insurer is still entitled to avoid the contract as under the current remedy 
regime, refusing all the claims under the contract and still keep the premium.634  
Besides the remedies for deliberate or reckless breaches, all other breaches fall into 
the non-dishonest failures to make a fair presentation of the risk and then lead to 
proportionate remedies.635 Accordingly, the new range of proportionate remedies will 
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 Section 8(1) of the draft clauses bill indicates that the insurer has a remedy against the insured (formerly the 
proposer) for a breach of the duty of fair presentation only if the insurer shows that, but for the breach, the insurer 
would not have entered into the contract at all, or would have done so only on different terms. Such codification 
effectively clarifies the status of common law and receives strong support consequently. See the para. 10 of the 
evidence of AIRMIC submitted to the Special Public Bill Committee on the ‘Insurance Bill’ 
633
Section 8 (4): A qualifying breach is either— 
(a) deliberate or reckless, or 
(b) neither deliberate nor reckless. 
(5) A qualifying breach is deliberate or reckless if the proposer— 
(a) knew that it was in breach of the duty of fair presentation, or 
(b) did not care whether or not it was in breach of that duty. 
(6) It is for the insurer to show that a qualifying breach was deliberate or reckless. 
634
 Article 2 Deliberate or reckless breaches 
 If a qualifying breach was deliberate or reckless, the insurer— 
(a) may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, and 
(b) need not return any of the premiums paid 
635
 Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Schedule 1 of the Act set out a new proportionate approach to provide remedies for a 
qualifying breach which was neither deliberate nor reckless: 
4 If, in the absence of the qualifying breach, the insurer would not have entered into the contract on any terms, 
the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, but must in that event return the premiums paid. 
5 If the insurer would have entered into the contract, but on different terms (other than terms relating to the 
premium), the contract is to be treated as if it had been entered into on those different terms if the insurer so 
requires. 
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only apply to non-dishonest behaviours which are neither deliberate nor reckless, 
depending what the insurer would have done had all the true material facts been fair 
presented. If the insurer can show that it would have not entered into the contract at 
all, he will be entitled to avoid the contract and return the premium. If the insurer can 
prove that the contract would have been concluded on different terms, then such 
terms can be treated as having been included into the agreements. If the reinsurer 
can proved that a higher premium would have been charged, and then the amount of 
claims will be reduced proportionately. As the evidences submitted to the Special 
Public Bill Committee, it can be shown that the new regime of remedies received a 
major welcome from the business in the London insurance market, 636  although 
dissenting voices also can be heard either expressing that the new regime is only 
acceptable,637  or even rejecting the proposed regime due to its inefficiencies in 
application. 638  The new regime will be analysed in details. Each possibility is 
discussed as following.  
8.4.4.2 Dishonest breach of the duty of fair presentation 
As summarised in the above section, the state of mind of the party when committing 
the breach of the duty is introduced into the regime as a significant criteria which 
divides the remedies for disclosure failures into two camps: one for dishonest 
conduct and the other for non-dishonest failures to make a fair presentation of the 
risk. However, it should be noted that the reform of English law proposed here used 
a different concept of ‘dishonest’ from the ‘fraud vs innocent’ approach in the 
Australian law. To define the concept of dishonesty, the idea of ‘deliberate or 
reckless behaviour’ was adopted to avoid confusion with the criminal law which also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 (1) In addition, if the insurer would have entered into the contract (whether the terms relating to matters other 
than the premium would have been the same or different), but would have charged a higher premium, the insurer 
may reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim.  
   (2) In sub-paragraph (1), “reduce proportionately” means that the insurer need pay on the claim only X% of 
what it would otherwise have been under an obligation to pay under the terms of the contract (or, if applicable, 
under the different terms provided for by virtue of paragraph 5), where— 
        Premium actually charged 
X= ----------------------------------------X100 
               Higher premium 
 
636
 See the para. 15 of the written evidence from AIRMIC SPBC/14-15/12; para 4 of the written evidence from 
Marsh & McLENNAN Companies SPBC/14-15/5; para 7 of the written evidence from London & International 
Insurance Broker’s Association SPBC/14-14/16; para 5 of written evidence of British Insurance Law Association 
SPBC/14-14/17 , para 6.1 of the evidence of Wills Ltd SPBC/14-15/10; and para. 7.1 of the written evidence from 
Catlin Underwriting Agencies Ltd. And Catlin Insurance Company (UK) Ltd. SPBC/14-15/14 
637
 See the para. 6 of the written evidence from LMC. 
638
 See the para.11 of the evidence from ComBar.  
281 
 
uses the common law concept of fraud. Therefore, where the assured had actual 
knowledge of the relevant information or shut its eyes to the relevant information and 
where the insured knew that the facts were relevant to the insurer or did not care 
whether or not they were relevant to the insurer, but failed to disclose the information 
to the insurer, it can be defined as a deliberate or reckless non-disclosure. So where 
the reinsured is shown to have known that it was not making a fair presentation of 
the risk but still conceal the non-disclosed information deliberately, or shown not to 
have cared whether it made a fair presentation at all, the reinsurer should be entitled 
to avoid the policy and retain the premium like the existing principle. The elements of 
entitlement to rescind the contract should stay the same as the common law 
authorities decide before.  
It is arguable whether it is just and fair for the reinsurer who did not bear any risk to 
keep any premium paid. In practice, the reinsurer may be liable to pay or incur costs 
claims or expenses in dealing with the reinsured. Therefore, it is suggested that a 
compromised approach is probably the best approach under which the reinsurer 
should return the premium with the deduction of its reasonable costs after the 
avoidance of the contract.  
8.4.4.3 Non-dishonest breach of the duty of fair presentation  
In contrast to the simplicity of the test where the reinsured makes dishonest non-
disclosure, it becomes much more complicated where the reinsured’s failure to make 
a fair presentation is neither made deliberately nor recklessly. It was proposed that 
the reinsurer should not be entitled to avoid the policy, but should be given remedies 
which reflect what it would have done had a fair presentation of the risk was made. 
Here such complex remedy varies according to a range of different scenarios which 
reflect what reinsurer would have done had it received a fair presentation of the risk. 
It should be noted that the proportionate remedies regime would focus on the 
contract that the reinsurer would have entered into with the reinsured if the reinsured 
had complied with its duty of disclosure, so that the remedy will only indemnify the 
loss suffered by the reinsurer, namely the difference between his liabilities to pay the 
claims under the two contracts. This just reflects the rationale behind the 
proportionate approach that the nature and extent of the remedy depends on the 
nature and extent of the breach. 
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8.4.4.3.1 Where the reinsurer would not have entered into the contract at all  
It is comparatively easier where the reinsurer would not have entered into the 
insurance contract at all. As there have been no real element of consensus of the 
parties at all, it is fair and appropriate to confer the reinsurer a remedy of avoidance 
of the policy so that it reflects the legitimate expectations of both parties to the 
contract at the time of entrance into the contract even if the failure of disclosure was 
not made deliberately or recklessly. This is the scenario in which the proposed 
resolution gains overwhelming support among the market responses. It is suggested 
that the burden of proof should rest with the reinsurer so that the avoidance is only 
available if the reinsurer is able to prove clearly that it would not have entered into 
the contract at all. 
8.4.4.3.2 Where the reinsurer would have entered into the contract on different 
terms  
If the reinsurer would have entered into the contract on different terms (excluding the 
premium element), the contract is to be treated as if it was concluded on those terms. 
Such proposed resolution in this scenario has got second highest support across the 
market, as it is commented that such resolution would best reflect the reality of what 
would have happened had disclosure been fully made. The reinsurer is liable only for 
the amount for which the reinsurer would have been liable for, if such term had been 
included in the reinsurance contract. However, it should be noticed that the remedies 
may vary as the additional terms those would have been included into the contract 
may result in various effects on the contract and the claims under it. 
8.4.4.3.3 Where the reinsurer would have charged a higher premiums 
If the reinsurer would have charged a higher premium, the reinsurer may reduce the 
amount of the payment of a claim under the policy in proportion to the additional 
premium it would have charged had a fair presentation of the risk been made. It 
provides that the reinsurer may “reduce proportionately” the amount to be paid on a 
claim.639 “Reduce proportionately” is defined as meaning that the reinsured need 
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 The Insurance Act 2015 Schedule Part 1 paragraph 6(1): In addition, if the insurer would have entered into the 
contract (whether the terms relating to matters other than the premium would have been the same or different), 
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only pay X% of claims under the relevant policy, where X = (premium actually 
charged / higher premium) x 100.640 This proposal has the same rationale as the 
Australian approach which in the ICA 1984 s 28(3) stipulates that the liability of the 
insurer in respect of a claim is reduced to the amount that would place the insurer in 
a position in which the insurer would have been if the failure had not occurred or the 
misrepresentation had not been made. Such proposal received good support, 
although nearly one third of the responses from the London market disagreed. As it 
is clearly established that each renewal of contract of insurance is a brand new 
contract which triggers a fresh duty of utmost good faith. Therefore the reinsurer’s 
entitlement to set-off the higher part of premium must be limited to the claims made 
under the current contract period. 
In fact, the calculation of premium and negotiation of contract terms should not be 
considered in isolation from each other. The changes to the contract terms affect 
limits and pricing. In practice, it is possible that the reinsurer would have both 
increased the premium level and included additional terms. Therefore, the default 
proportionate regime should be constructed in a one or more structure rather than 
one or the other structure. More than one remedy may be open to the insurers 
according to individual circumstances of the cases.  
8.4.4.3.4 The prospective effect of the contract  
As to the prospective effect of the contract, the law commissions are generally in the 
same attitude as the Australian legislation. In s 60(1) of the ICA 1984, an insurer can 
be allowed to cancel the contract for the future if there has been a failure to comply 
with the duty of the utmost good faith, whereas the law commissions proposed that 
both the insurer and the assured should be able to cancel contracts prospectively 
that no longer achieved the purposes of either party subject to a reasonable 
notice.641 Although such entitlement is regarded right, it is arguable whether it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
but would have charged a higher premium, the insurer may reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a 
claim. 
640
 The Insurance Act 2015 Schedule Part 1 paragraph 6(2)“Reduce proportionately” means that the insurer need 
pay on the claim only X% of what it would otherwise have been under an obligation to pay under the terms of the 
contract (or, if applicable, under the different terms provided for by virtue of paragraph 6), where X=Premium 
actually charged/Higher premium × 100. 
641
 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No 204 and The Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 
155 INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW: THE BUSINESS INSURED’S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND THE LAW OF 
WARRANTIES, A Joint Consultation Paper, p. 121. The paper can be found here: 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp204_ICL_business-disclosure.pdf. 
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necessary to provide a specific statutory right to cancel in these circumstances. As 
the reinsurance contract often induced rights to cancel in any event.642 The proposal 
for cancellation rights did not receive that wide support like the other remedies 
mentioned above. Disagreement arises in two main aspects, whether it is necessary 
for the legislation to deal with such matter and who should be conferred such 
entitlement if a right of cancellation becomes a legislative right. Although majority of 
the responses agreed with the existence of the cancellation rights, the Insurance Act 
2015 finally keeps silent on this issue. It is suggested that the position of this issue in 
the Insurance Act 2015 is applausible. Legislation should keep silence on such 
matters. It is a common industry practice to include into the contract such terms of 
cancellation rights agreed by the parities. It is hardly for reinsurance especially in a 
sophisticated and specialist market not containing such provisions. Consequently it 
is not necessary for the legislation to deal with such matters any more, but leave the 
right to the contract.  
8.4.4.4 Summary of the proportionate remedy regime proposed by the 
Insurance Act 2015  
The fact that the existing disproportionate all or nothing approach is outdated and 
divorced from commercial reality is beyond question. Since Australia enforced the 
ICA 1984 made such reform as a forerunner, proportionality approach can be 
considered as the mainstream standpoint of reform that introduces a concept of 
proportionality into the remedy regime. The Law Commissions have followed the 
forerunner’s step by proposing a new system of proportionate remedies for breach of 
the duty of fair presentation in non-consumer insurance area. It can be said that the 
Insurance Act 2015 has the same spirits as the Australian legislation in most 
significant aspects with some fine distinctions.  
The core spirit of the concept of proportionality is that the availability of the remedy 
should be in proportion to severity of the breach. As a result, it is the nature and 
extent of the loss suffered through the reinsured’s non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation that decides the relevant extent of the remedies available to the 
reinsurers. So the reinsurer will not be permitted to avoid the policy for minor 
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 Ibid.  
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breaches of the duty of utmost good faith any more. The contract will remain its 
enforceability unless the reinsurer can prove that the breach is so serious that the 
insurance could would not have been entered into at all had the proper disclosure 
been made. Two issues can be addressed as the core aspects of the proportionate 
remedies regime, namely the state of mind of the insured when committing the 
breach and what the insurer would have done had he known the true position. 
1. Where the insured act dishonestly by making deliberate or reckless non-
disclosure or misrepresentation of material facts, the insurer should be entitled to 
avoid the policy and retain the premium like the existing principle, at least entitled 
to retain its reasonable costs after the avoidance of the contract.  
2. where the insured’s failure to make a fair presentation is not made dishonestly, 
the insurer should not be entitled to avoid the policy, but should be given 
remedies which reflect what it would have done had a fair presentation of the risk 
was made. 
(1) Where the insurer would have declined the risk altogether, the policy can still be 
avoided but the insurer should return the premium, different from the case of 
dishonest non-disclosure or misrepresentation.  
(2) Where the insurer would have accepted the risk but included a certain contractual 
term, the contract should be treated as if it included that term. 
(3) Where the insurer would have charged a higher premium, the claim should be 
reduced proportionately. 
As to the prospective effect of the contract which is not avoided by the insurer, the 
legislation should keep silence on such matters. It is not necessary for the legislation 
to deal with such matters any more, but leave the right to the contract, especially in 
the context of reinsurance. Last but not least, it is believed that the parties to 
reinsurance contract should be allowed to contract out of the default regime, except 
contracting out of the basis of contract clauses or contracting out to make for a 
deliberate or reckless late payment the claims, provided that the transparency 
requirement is satisfied.   
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8.5 Problems of operation of the proportional remedies approach in 
reinsurance context  
According to the core spirit of proportionate remedies regime discussed above, the 
reinsurer should only be indemnified of the loss proportionately to the nature and 
extent of the qualified breach. The reinsurer who has been induced by such breach 
should be restored to the position had the breach not been committed. So the 
proportionality of remedies available to the reinsurance parties are sorted in specific 
senses which reflect what the reinsurers would have done in deciding whether to 
accept the risk and to accept the risk on what terms or premium had it received a fair 
presentation of the risk, rather than attempting to ask what the ultimate position the 
reinsurance parties would have been in. Therefore, in the case of non-fraud 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure, after the threshold of test of inducement is 
passed, the issue comes to the test of proportionality where the difference between 
what the reinsurers would have done had it made a fair presentation and what 
actually occurred should be found out. However, there would be some problems of 
the test of proportionality in practice of reinsurance context which will be discussed in 
details in the following section.  
8.5.1 Problems in reaching a hypothesis of what the reinsurer would have 
done  
First of all, after successful establishment of objective material non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation qualifying a breach, to satisfy the test of proportionality, the court 
must accordingly arrive at a hypothesis as to what the reinsurer would have done 
had the information been truly disclosed or represented. As the draft Insurance 
Contracts Bill does not provide any further guidance of reaching the hypothesis, thus 
the courts are best placed to decide what evidence is admissible and sufficient so 
that it can establish the causation. So the question need to be asked is what would 
have happened absent the breach and subsequently form an estimate of the 
likelihood of the reinsurer acting in a particular way.  
However, practical problems may exist in applying the proportionate remedies to 
reinsurance. Such subjective approach emphasises on a particular reinsurer’s 
underwriting philosophy and requires evidence from individual underwriters. The 
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cases will be complicated and various as the reinsurance policies are more likely to 
be bespoke. It turns out what a reinsurer might have done had they known the true 
facts is speculative to certain extent, particularly in the cases of non-standard risks. 
Moreover, it even theoretically needs to expose all documentation that is relevant to 
a reinsurer’s approach to risk, negotiating the contractual terms or premium. But 
such evidence is not necessarily available to show the hypothesis.  It is not even a 
minority concern pointing out that difficulties exist in establishing the hypothesis how 
a reinsurer would have acted if proper disclosure had been made. The proportionate 
remedy approach is not invulnerable as the hypothetic position in which the parties 
would have been is sometimes a mystery far from being obviously predictable. Even 
some of those who supported proportionate remedies thought it would be difficult to 
establish what a reinsurer would have done. Difficulties of proof of such mysterious 
hypothesis will be discussed in each scenario stipulated in Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the 
Schedule 1 of the Insurance Act 2015. 
8.5.1.1 Where the reinsurer would have underwritten the risk but on different 
terms  
Where the reinsurer would have underwritten the risk but on different terms, it is not 
easy to predict what terms the reinsurer would have finally inserted into the policy. 
The inclusion of certain terms into the policy may be subject to many special factors, 
such as the contemporaneous factors changing overtime, unique circumstances 
under particular policy or of particular risks, the underwriting manuals of the 
underwriter in that place and commercial reasons in specific market or between 
particular business participants, etc. Those reasons may lead to conclusion of 
reinsurance covering identical risk for different reinsured on different terms.  
In addition to the difficulties arising from the potential inclusion of certain terms into 
the policy, there may be problems caused by the possibility that the reinsurer would 
have excluded any particular category of risk or imposed any additional terms which 
render the contract void or forfeit a claim under the contract later. For instance 
additional warranties or exclusions may be inserted into the contract which may 
affect the recoverability of claims. Although where the additional terms would have 
forfeited one claim, the rationale behind the proportionate approach will benefit the 
policyholder by preserving the insurance cover for other claims.  
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Moreover, there are some doubts as to whether there should be any procedural or 
substantive limits of the terms which a reinsurer can impose, as there may be 
possibility that the business’ interests would be impaired if the reinsurer would have 
imposed any unfair additional terms. The policyholder would have a chance to find 
better bargain from other underwriters or have any safeguard against such unfair 
terms in the policy if he had known such additional terms.  
Actually it is suggested application of such approach of proportionate remedies will 
have little practical effect in a reinsurance contract which is placed on a back-to-back 
basis with the direct insurance where the reinsurer promises to pay when the 
reinsured is liable to pay, provided the reinsured’s liability is established 
satisfactorily. As it is the fundamental spirit of a facultative reinsurance contract that 
it is written on identical terms with the underlying contract. In such situation, the 
reinsurer is still liable to pay the agreed proportion of the claims to the reinsured on 
the identical terms and conditions of the underlying contract, by collecting that 
proportion of the premium as agreed before. It is pragmatically difficult for the 
facultative reinsurer to argue for proportionate remedies in the case of an innocent 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation. 
8.5.1.2 Where the reinsurer would calculate the premium differently  
Contrary to imposition of additional terms into the contract, in practice the reinsurer 
may also have charged the reinsured a higher premium, made the reinsured bear a 
higher excess or includes any restrictions on his liability if he had been disclosed all 
the true information. It would be difficult to prove that the reinsurer would have 
required increased premium, higher excess, limited liabilities as same as proving that 
it would have required additional terms.  
Also difficulties may arise in considering what would happen if the both the insurer 
and reinsurer would have taken different approaches to the risk had both of them 
known the full facts. For example, if the insurer/reinsured charged £100,000 but 
would have increased the premium to £150,000 had all facts truly been known. 
According to the proportionate approach, the reinsured would be required to pay 
67% of the claim. If the reinsured ceded 80% of the risk to the reinsurer as agreed 
under the reinsurance policy, the reinsured was supposed to pay 80% of the 
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reinsured’s liability; say in this case it would be 54% of the full claim. However, 
problems will be caused where the reinsurer might argue that it would have charged 
the reinsured an even higher level premium if he had known the information, for 
example an additional 60% premium rather than 50% as assessed by the reinsured. 
It is arguable whether the reinsurer is entitled to pay a smaller proportion of the full 
claim to the reinsured than the reinsured is required to pay to the policyholder. It is 
suggested application of such approach of proportionate remedies will have little 
practical effect in a reinsurance contract which is placed on a back-to-back basis 
with the direct insurance, or on a proportionate basis, i.e. the reinsured and the 
reinsurer share the risks and premium on a fixed proportion agreed advance. In such 
situation, the reinsurer is still liable to pay the agreed proportion of the claims to the 
reinsured, by collecting that proportion of the premium as agreed before. Whereas 
under the non-proportionate reinsurance contract where the reinsurer making his 
calculation the premium according to his own underwriting assessment, the 
reinsurance market practice is able to cope with such issues by developing its own 
ways. So the reinsurance parties should be feel free to reach their own agreement 
by contracting out of the default proportionate remedy regime, although the 
reinsurance market is able to accommodate the proportionate remedy regime.  
In addition, it is suggested that an alternative approaches can also serve such 
purpose of reduction of the reinsurer’s liabilities of paying for the claims. The parties 
should be entitled to choose to pay the additional premium so that full payment of 
their claims can be protected from proportionate deduction, especially in the situation 
where the amount of the additional premium might be relatively small compared to 
the quantum of the claim. It is suggested here that the entitlement to elect whether to 
pay back the additional premium conferred on the insured who fails to fulfil its duty of 
disclosure does not seems to be an equitable resolution as it remains the reinsurer 
on the risk and in a passive position to pay for claims for which he would have not 
taken the liabilities on that quantum of premium. Even if an election can be made to 
preserve the full payment of the claims by charging additional premium, the 
entitlement should be conferred on the insurer rather than the insured. It should be 
the reinsurer who is empowered to set-off against any liability under the policy the 
loss suffered from the non-disclosure or misrepresentation. Thus, if the reinsurer 
would have charged a higher premium, he should be entitled to choose to reduce 
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from the reinsured’s claim the amount between the premium assessed and the 
higher premium.  
8.5.2 Difficulties increased by the burden of proof   
In fact, it is suggested that such new regime of remedies which effectively introduces 
a three-stage approach may increase the difficulties in getting the proposed 
remedies, so that it may fail to achieve the satisfied effect of the draft expected by 
the Law Commission. Before getting indemnified, the innocent party need to firstly 
evidence the qualified breach of duty, secondly satisfy the causation requirement, 
and then successfully apply the retrospective amendments to the reinsurance policy.  
8.5.2.1 Controversial issue as to who should undertake the burden of proof  
According to section 8(6) of the Insurance Act 2015, the burden of proving the 
qualifying breach sits on the reinsurers. So the reinsurers must show that the 
reinsured’s breach was deliberate or reckless. It should be noticed that here exists a 
complete difference in the test of the breach qualifying a remedy of avoidance 
between the Australian and new English approaches. The Australian law has 
preserved the ‘fraudulent’ test in proving a qualifying breach of avoidance of the 
contract. By contrast, the Insurance Act 2015 have lowered the standard of proof 
from fraudulent to ‘deliberate or reckless’, to response the insurer’s concerns that it 
is too difficult to prove fraud of the insured. Consequently, assertion of a 
policyholder’s deliberate or reckless breach would be a less difficult accusation, and 
therefore easier to prove.  However, there is still opposite opinion of LMC proposing 
that the burden of proof should be reversed, 643 that would mean it would be the 
insured to show that his breach was neither deliberate nor reckless, so that the 
insurer did not deserve such remedy of avoidance because the insured was innocent 
to breach the duty of fair presentation. It is suggested that it should not be right to 
make such reservation of burden of proof. It is a long established legal principle that 
it is the party who alleges the remedy to prove a qualifying breach. There seems no 
reason for the case of business insurance to be an exception of law. Such reversion 
of burden of proof may have been tantamount to setting up a presumption of fraud in 
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 See para. 34-36 of Written submissions of the Lloyd’s Market Association and the International Underwriting 
Association for the Special Public Bills Committee of the House of Lords, SPBC/14-14/8  
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the insured’s breach, unless the insured can prove that he committed the breach 
neither deliberately nor recklessly. So such shift was not in accordance with the spirit 
of legal principles of burden of proof. Moreover, although the reversion seemed to 
secure the insurer’s remedy of avoidance, it just jumped from one extreme to the 
other extreme. Notwithstanding there may be indeed certain circumstances where 
the insurer will be rarely able to know why the insured breached its duty, and then be 
unable to plead that the breach was deliberate or reckless. Consequently, in practice 
even where an insurer has good reasons to suspect that the breach was deliberate 
or reckless, he may be still precluded from pleading such a breach. However such 
shift of burden of proof would have provided the insurer a big advantage to just 
demonstrate relevant facts of the breach on the balance of probabilities, and then 
made the insurer’s life so easy.644 In fact, in the London market, many members of 
the LMA and the IUA,645 which represent a very significant constituency of London 
market buyers and sellers of reinsurance contracts to which English law is 
applicable, approach the Bill not only in the position as insurers, but also reinsured. 
Their dual capacities as both buyers and sellers of reinsurance make it a significant 
concern of them whether the changing positions tend to favour one side or the 
other.646 It had better for the Bill to restore a balance to the commercial relationship 
between the policyholder and the insurers, so that the proposed new regime could 
rectify current one-sided regime which is in an unduly favour of the 
insurer/reinsurer.647 However, such reversion of burden of proof would effectively 
retain the right of avoidance as the default remedy for breach of the duty of fair 
presentation, leaving the regime of proportionate remedies in a secondary position, 
unless the insured can prove that he is neither deliberate nor reckless. It can be said 
that such enhanced standard of burden of proof is not accordant with the spirit of the 
reform proposed by the Law Commissions. In conclusion, the burden of proof of 
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 See para 17 in the Appendix of the written evidence from Law Commissioner David Hertzell SPBC/14-15/4; 
and  para. 3 of the Written Evidence on the Insurance Bill from Insurance Law Research Group of University of 
Southampton;  
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 The Lloyd’s Market Association (LMA) represents the interest of the 57 Lloyd’s managing agents underwriting 
on behalf of the 90 syndicates operating in the Lloyd’s market and 3 members’ agents which advise capital 
providers. http://www.lmalloyds.com. The International Underwriting Association of London (IUA) represents 42 
international and wholesale insurance and reinsurance companies operation in or through London. 
http://www.iua.co.uk 
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 See para. 1.4 of Written submissions of the Lloyd’s Market Association and the International Underwriting 
Association for the Special Public Bills Committee of the House of Lords, SPBC/14-14/8  
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 See para.8 of written evidence from Willis Ltd, SPBC/14-15/10. 
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deliberate or reckless breach should remain upon the insurer to invoke a remedy of 
avoidance.  
8.5.2.2 Difficulties arising by proof of the hypothesis  
In practice, even the reinsurer successfully pass the first threshold, it is hard for him 
to discharge the burden of proof to evidence the causation on an objective basis. So 
it needs to be shown that the reinsurer would acted completely different had all true 
positions are known. Also it would be difficult for the reinsured to disprove that a 
particular reinsurer would have considered a certain breach so serious that makes it 
a qualifying breach i.e. that he would not have written the risk at all. It requires 
detailed retrospective analysis of what the relevant underwriter would have done. 
Normally in such proving process, witness evidence and documentation such as the 
relevant underwriting guides is highly likely needed. It will be an issue of credibility 
and consequently increase the possibility of even more disputes. However too much 
focus on those disputes will turn on investigation into the facts of each individual 
case and reduce the ability to rely on precedential case law. 
In addition to the possibility of more disputes, retrospective analysis approach may 
also result in more claims and then increase of premium in practice. In order to prove 
that he would have reached a different underwriting decision had all information truly 
disclosed, the reinsurer may have to disclose any or all documentation that may be 
relevant to his underwriting approach to assess risks, set the terms or calculate the 
premium. It could lead to disclosure of an enormous amount of significant 
information, most of which will be commercially sensitive or even confidential. It is 
easy to imagine that the reinsurers must be reluctant and reticent to disclose such 
type of information. So alternatively, the reinsurer may even seek to avoid such 
disclosure so that no remedies can be relied on at all. It is commercially reasonable 
to say that it could eventually result in more claims which reinsurers have to pay and 
consequently increases the premiums that the reinsured have to pay. Those 
outcomes cannot be regarded as good for the business and reinsurance market. 
Even if the hypothesis of what the reinsurer would have done can be clearly inferred, 
there is still a limitation of the test that it does not extend to consider what the 
business will react to the reinsurer’s responses. For example, where the reinsurer 
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can prove that he would have imposed on the reinsured an obligation, a further 
hypothetical inquiry would arise as to what would have happened in response to the 
imposition of the obligation. It could still produce stalemate if the reinsured insists 
that it would have complied with any addition term such as a warranty so that the 
claim under the contract should remain valid now. In McNeill v O’Kane 648  the 
insurers succeeded in established that they would have imposed an obligation to 
comply if the assured had not misrepresented that they had an operative alarm 
system on their hotel premises. However, the assured argued that in order to rely 
upon such misrepresentation, the insurer had to continue to show that the assured 
would have failed to comply with the obligation if such term was included in the 
contract. It was held by Holmes J that the insurer was not obliged to prove the 
assured’s failure to comply with the obligation, on the contrary the burden of proof 
rested on the assured to show that he would have been complied with the obligation 
that would have been imposed had the facts not been misstated and a policy would 
have been issued. 649  
As a result, although the business’s reaction is crucial to place the final position 
where the parties would have been had all the true information been disclosed, the 
proposed proportional remedies regime is not able to go that further to find out the 
ultimate outcome. Certainly it will result in endless debates and always be a mystery. 
How far hypothetical inquiry can the law make into would be a pragmatic problem in 
modifying the proportionality remedy regime. After all the business who would like to 
recover their claims under the contract has to try their best to prove the hypothesis 
that he would have comply with all the obligations even if such terms had been 
imposed into the policy.  
8.5.3 Difficulties in applying the new regime in specialised or complicated 
reinsurance market  
In addition to the problems of inferring and proving the hypothesis position in 
reinsurance practice, difficulties may exist in applying the proportionate remedies 
approach in specialist or complex reinsurance context.  First of all, it is doubtable 
whether the new regime applies to the reinsurance context. Also it is suggested that 
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 (2003) 12 ANZ Ins Cas 61-554. 
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 Applying Commercial Union v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 6 ANZ Ins Cas 61-042 at 77,009. 
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the effect of the proposed changes to the remedy regime may be diluted due to the 
particular character of special or complex reinsurance contract. 
8.5.3.1 The issue as to whether the Act extends to reinsurance  
As many of the written evidences to the Special Public Bills Committee shown, it is a 
widespread concern of many stakeholders that whether the Insurance Act 2015 
proposed should extend to reinsurance context. 650  The Act does not expressly 
confirm its applicability to reinsurance context, but just mentioned reinsurance in 
defining who the person is connected with a contract of insurance in relevance of the 
knowledge of the insured.651  Therefore, it is worthy debating whether there is any 
room of uncertainty left by the bill on this issue, and whether the bill intends to apply 
to reinsurance context.  
Rather than simple codification of the existing common law positions into a statute 
like what the MIA 1906 did, the Insurance Act 2015 expressly intends to reform and 
replace many respects of the existing common law. In particular, the ss.18 to 20 of 
the 1906 Act which used to provide formulation of the most important two aspects of 
the duty of utmost good faith, i.e. the duty of disclosure and the duty to refrain from 
misrepresentation, are to be removed and replaced by a new duty of fair 
presentation in the act. In Chapter 6 it has been mentioned that actually many 
important aspects of formulation of the duty of disclosure and non-misrepresentation 
in ss.18 to 20 derive from reinsurance disputes, and the application of the duty of 
utmost good faith plays significant role in reinsurance contracts. So it is fair to say 
that it indeed leaves some room of uncertainty in the Insurance Act 2015 by omitting 
the ss.18 to 20 which are precisely provisions most often applying to reinsurance 
contracts.652 However this does not mean that the reason why the act is silent in this 
regard is that it should not extend to reinsurance contract. It is just at least possible 
to argue that the new act has removed the provisions most often deriving from 
reinsurance contracts, and replaced the duty by a new doctrine which are not 
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 See the written evidences  to Special Public Bill Committee House of Lords on the Insurance Contract Bill, 
para. 9 of Marsh; para.7 of Willis; para.3 of LIIBA; para.13 of BILA; para.8-10 of City of London Law Society. 
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 Section 4(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) the persons connected with a contract of 
insurance are— 
(a) the insured and any other persons for whom cover is provided by the contract, and 
(b) if the contract re-insures risks covered by another contract, the persons who are (by virtue of this subsection) 
connected with that other contract. 
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 Please refer to Chapter 6.  
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designed for reinsurance contracts. However, it is suggested that the act should be 
applicable to reinsurance context. First, as stipulated in the part 2 of the act, it states 
that the duty of fair representation should only apply to insurance contracts in the 
category of non-consumer insurance contracts. Therefore it is reasonable to 
presume that the act should extend to cover reinsurance contracts, which could not 
fall into the category of consumer insurance. Secondly, as the act is proposed to 
replace relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, it is not unreasonable 
to presume that the act follows the MIA 1906 to continue applying to reinsurance 
context.  Moreover, the act introduced a default regime which has been trying to 
provide a fair balance of interest between commercial policyholders and insurers. It 
is fair to expand the scope to include the stakeholders in reinsurance market. 
Notwithstanding the reinsurance market often operates as a specialist and 
sophisticated end of insurance market, the act has already left a reasonable room 
entitling the specialised reinsurance parties to contract out of the default regime 
designed for the non-consumer insurance market, provided that such alternative 
contractual terms successfully serve their purpose. Accordingly, it is suggested that 
the act is highly desirable to clarify its scope of application that includes reinsurance 
and retrocession. 
8.5.3.2 Situations where the proportionate approach may play little practical 
effect 
First of all, the reinsurance which deals with risks in a wholesale mode in the London 
subscription market is often non-commoditised. The reinsurance risks are often large 
and complex in nature, requiring specialist and sophisticated skills to design bespoke 
policy for their particular commercial need. Even for the facultative reinsurance 
contract which can be considered as the simplest form of reinsurance agreement, 
there would still be problems for application of the proportionate regime. It is the 
fundamental spirit of a facultative reinsurance contract that it is written on a ‘back-to-
back’ basis with the underlying contract. So under the policy the reinsurer 
undertakes to pay for an agreed proportion of the claims on the identical terms and 
conditions of the underlying contract for a fixed proportion of the premium of the 
direct insurance. Also it is suggested application of such approach of proportionate 
remedies will be difficult in a reinsurance contract which is placed on a proportionate 
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basis, i.e. the reinsured and the reinsurer share the risks and premium on a fixed 
proportion agreed advance. In such situation, the reinsurer is still liable to pay the 
agreed proportion of the claims to the reinsured, by collecting that proportion of the 
premium as agreed before. Consequently, it is pragmatically difficult for the reinsurer 
to argue for proportionate remedies under a facultative reinsurance contract or 
proportional reinsurance treaty in the case of an innocent non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation. Whereas under the non-proportionate reinsurance treaty, where 
the reinsurer making his calculation the premium according to his own underwriting 
assessment, the reinsurance market practice may be already able to deal with such 
issues by developing its own ways. As concerned by the Law commissions, there 
indeed exist many alternative ways for the reinsurer to refuse claims other than 
invoke a proportionate remedy for the breach in the case of an innocent non-
disclosure or misrepresentation. For instance, provided necessary requirements are 
all satisfied, the reinsurer may refuse the reinsured’s claims by establishing that the 
reinsured has not been induced to the direct insurance; or the reinsurer can establish 
that the reinsured have impliedly waived the non-disclosure by asking limited 
questions or failing to make proper enquiry; or there exist difference between the two 
jurisdictions, say for example the reinsured underwrites the direct insurance under a 
civil law system which adopts proportionate approach, while the reinsurer sits in UK; 
or where the reinsured underwrites the direct insurance with a consumer, then the 
reinsured may be required to pay the claim by the FOS applying its fair and 
reasonable jurisdiction etc. Consequently, it is fair to say in certain situation 
discussed above, the proportionate approach may actually play little practice effect in 
reinsurance market. So the reinsurance parties should be feel free to reach their own 
agreement by contracting out of the default proportionate remedy regime, although 
the reinsurance market is able to accommodate the proportionate remedy regime.  
8.5.3.3 Difficulties of applying the approach due to the specific placing process 
of reinsurance in subscription market  
In addition underwriting mode of reinsurance agreement is also different from that of 
the consumer insurance in normal underwriting procedures. In the subscription 
market where signing down is a common practice, the risks are regularly signing up 
or down so that they will be under-or oversubscribed. Each underwriting subscription 
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could be considered as a separated contract between the reinsurer and the 
reinsured. For pragmatic reasons, it is extremely complicated to trace out the total 
effect on the claim of a change in line size by one reinsurer or a change of the terms 
of the reinsurance agreement, especially where such change was made by the 
leading underwriter whose decision may have the decisive effect upon those of the 
following market. If one reinsurer had successfully discharged the burden of proof 
that he would have to accept only a smaller line size whereas other reinsurers 
cannot show this, others may unexpectedly underwrite more percentage of the risk 
and forced to meet more of the claim. Such approach would still be harsh and 
arbitrary from other subscriber’s point of view. Or in the case where the leading 
underwriter can show that he would have entered into the reinsurance agreement on 
different terms then reduce its liabilities accordingly, it is far from obviously and 
extremely complicated to predict what the following market would have reacted if 
they had known the leading underwriter’s response. Therefore, it can be said that 
where there would be a change in the line size accepted by the subscriber or change 
of the reinsurance agreement terms, such proportionate remedies regime has many 
pragmatic difficulties in application so that the default regime cannot be considered 
as a suitable remedy for reinsurers in the subscription market.   
8.5.3.4 No mention as to recovering payments of claims already made  
For non-dishonest breach of the duty to make fair presentation, no prescription in the 
Bill has been made as to the remedies for the reinsurer to recover any payments of 
the claims already made prior to discovery of the material non-disclosure. For 
instance, in a declaration treaty, qualified claims are allocated into the treaty 
individually, normally in an account year. Upon discovery of a material non-
disclosure, notwithstanding the reinsurer would be entitled to evidence that he would 
have excluded a certain type of loss consequently reject claims for that type of loss, 
or would have charged a higher premium consequently reduce a future claim 
payment proportionately to the difference of premium that would have been charged, 
such remedy is only prospectively from the discovery of the qualifying breach in the 
relevant account year. It is still not defined clearly whether such approach of remedy 
has a retrospective effect on the payment already made for previous declarations in 
this account year. The Act does not expressly include any right of recovery for 
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previous payments that would not have been made had a certain term been 
included, or a higher premium would have been charged. If a reinsurer is able to 
prove that the payments would otherwise have been excluded, then it is reasonable 
to regard the payments which have already been made by the reinsurer recoverable. 
Consequently it is suggested that such a right should be allowed in full accord with 
the core spirit of the proportionate remedy approach. So that the reinsurer should be 
allowed to recover all the payments of such attainted claims under the contract to the 
date that would not have otherwise been paid if the underwriters would have not 
accepted the risks or would have underwrites the risks on different terms, or entitled 
to claim the difference in the premiums payable in previous years during which the 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation was committed.  
8.5.4 Entitlement of reinsurance parties to contract out of the regime of 
proportionate remedies 
8.5.4.1 The new Act’s attitude towards the entitlement to contract out of the 
default regime  
Besides proposing the default regime of proportionate remedies, the act regulates in 
part 5 concerning the entitlement of the parties to contract out. It believes that the 
parties to reinsurance contract should be allowed to contract out of the default 
regime.653 In contrast to a mandatory regime established for consumer insurance,654 
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 Insurance Act 2015, section 15 Contracting out: non-consumer insurance contracts 
(1) A term of a non-consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, which would put the insured in a worse 
position as respects representations to which section 9 applies than the insured would be in by virtue of that 
section is to that extent of no effect. 
(2) A term of a non-consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, which would put the insured in a worse 
position as respects any of the other matters provided for in Part 2, 3 or 4 of this Act than the insured would be in 
by virtue of the provisions of those Parts (so far as relating to non-consumer insurance contracts) is to that extent 
of no effect, unless the requirements of section 16 
have been satisfied in relation to the term. 
(3) A term of a non-consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, which would put any person referred to 
in section 12 as “C” in a worse position as respects the matters dealt with in that section than C would be in by 
virtue of section 12 is to that extent of no effect. 
(4) In this section, references to a contract include a variation. 
(5) This section does not apply in relation to a contract for the settlement of a claim arising under a non-consumer 
insurance contract. 
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 Part 5 Good faith and contract out , section 14 Contracting out: consumer insurance contracts 
(1) A term of a consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, which would put the consumer in a worse 
position as respects any of the matters provided for in Part 3 or 4 of this Act than the consumer would be in by 
virtue of the provisions of those Parts (so far as relating to consumer insurance contracts) is to that extent of no 
effect. 
(2) In subsection (1)— 
(a) references to a contract include a variation, 
(b) references to the consumer include any person referred to as “C” in section 12. 
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the new range of remedies proposed in the act is only default provisions reinsurance, 
entitling the commercial parties free to contract out of the reforms and substitute their 
own agreed terms, subject to the transparency requirements under the s.16. 655 
Therefore, it can be said that there is one general transparency requirement set out 
in  s.16 and two exceptions set out in s.15 limiting the reinsurer’s entitlement to 
contract out under a non-consumer insurance contract. The parties of business 
insurance contract will neither be allowed to contract out of the rule prohibiting basis 
of contract clauses or similar clauses, nor to contract out of the liability for a 
deliberate or reckless breach of the implied duty to pay within a reasonable time 
stipulated under section 13(1). Any disadvantageous term that puts the reinsured in 
a worse position which they would be under the default regime, despite not falling 
into the two exceptions, will have no effect unless the reinsurer takes sufficient steps 
to draw the disadvantageous term into the reinsured’s attention before the contract is 
concluded and the term is clear and unambiguous drafted as to its effect. In 
determining whether the requirements of transparency have been met, the 
characteristics of reinsured persons of the kind in question, and the circumstances of 
the transaction, are to be taken into account. 
8.5.4.2 Necessity of the entitlement of reinsurance parties to contract out of 
the default regime  
Although the new range of remedies clauses proposed received major supportive 
response, contracting out was still a controversial issue of which the market’s 
opinions divided in whether there should be entitlement on the reinsurance parties to 
contract out of the proportionate remedies regime.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(3) This section does not apply in relation to a contract for the settlement of a claim arising under a consumer 
insurance contract. 
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  Insurance Contracts Bill Section16 The transparency requirements 
 (1) In this section, “the disadvantageous term” means such a term as is mentioned in section 15(2). 
(2) The insurer must take sufficient steps to draw the disadvantageous term to the insured’s attention before the 
contract is entered into or the variation agreed. 
(3) The disadvantageous term must be clear and unambiguous as to its effect. 
(4) In determining whether the requirements of subsections (2) and (3) have been met, the characteristics of 
insured persons of the kind in question, and the circumstances of the transaction, are to be taken into account. 
(5) The insured may not rely on any failure on the part of the insurer to meet the requirements of subsection (2) if 
the insured (or its agent) had actual knowledge of the disadvantageous term when the contract was entered into 
or the variation agreed. 
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It can be said that the new remedy regime to certain degree complicates the 
remedies available to the reinsurance parties for qualifying breach. It is not 
necessary to leave the reinsurance context which is a significant type of business 
insurance alone outside the scope of reform. Nor is it possible for the legislation to 
design and draft universal provisions applying to the wide variety of forms of 
reinsurance contracts and specific provisions under them in practice. It is suggested 
that it is better for the legislation to take a compromised method by setting up only 
ground principles of reduction of the insurer’ liabilities proportionately and allowing 
the sophisticated and specialised reinsurance parties free to opt out of the default 
proportionate remedies regime to find a suitable solution for themselves. 
In last chapter it was concluded that parties should be allowed to contract of the 
doctrine provided certain requirements are satisfied. Just as it is possible for the 
parties to exclude, limit or restrict the duty of utmost good faith by substitutional 
agreements, it is suggested that it should also be open for the parties to contract out 
of the default proportionate remedies regime by agreements for the similar reasons. 
The reasons for supporting contracting out are easy to understand. It is a 
fundamental principle of commercial law that the parties in business insurance have 
freedom of contract. Generally speaking, the parties, who have the balanced 
negotiation powers and ability to negotiate suitable substitutional arrangements, 
should be allowed to work out their own detailed terms on how proportionate 
remedies would apply to these contracts of insurance concluded under the 
framework concluded by each declaration, notwithstanding the entitlement to 
contract out may be subject to certain limits. For instance a kind of clause can be 
inserted into the insurance contract, providing that the only remedy available will be 
the additional premium which the insurer would have charged had all the true 
positions been known. In addition, it is already a common industry practice especially 
in sophisticated reinsurance markets for parties to contract out the default routine so 
that there should not be any legislative intervention restricting their business free will. 
The market does have some practical countermeasures deal with the defect of the 
current remedy approach. For example, it is a common practice in the present 
market for policies to be sold on a combined basis that covers for different risks are 
designed to be granted by divisible parts of the policy, so that the parties will 
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preserve undisputed claims instead of sinking into avoidance of the whole policy.656  
As shown in the evidence to the Special Public Bill Committee on the Act,657 s.15 
received general welcome. The parties to a reinsurance contract should be allowed 
to consider from their own standing points whether contracting out of the default 
routine is appropriate in their particular circumstances.  
However, there do exist opposite opinions which disagree with opt-out entitlement. 
For instance, there are concerns that such freedom to contract out could render the 
proposed remedy regime undermined. Also there is some concern that contracting 
out would become the insurance market norm so that a standard opt-out clause 
would be devised in the market and consequently imperil the interest of the 
policyholders.658 Also some concern is expressed that the policyholders who are in a 
weaker bargaining position may be left exposed due to such opt-out entitlement.659 
There is even strong opposition alleging that the contracting out provisions are 
inappropriate for reinsurance under which the parties will in principle be of equal 
commercial strength. 660 
However, even if the parties are not allowed to contract out the default proportionate 
regime, the proposed test of proportionality still entirely depends on the parties’ 
subjective choice. This is similar to the situations under current all or nothing regime, 
it is not in all the cases that the parties would routinely seek for the remedy of 
avoidance in either consumer insurance or business insurance. It is not easy for the 
reinsured to disprove that the particular reinsurer would have taken his breach of the 
duty of disclosure so seriously that he would not have underwritten the risk at all. 
After all, the proposed proportionate approach is only a default regime and the 
parties’ subjective choice had the all the true information disclosed should have been 
the decisive element in determining the final remedies. From this point of view, the 
effect of the proposed changes to the remedy regime will be diluted by the test of 
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proportionality, so that it is a just and reasonable choice to entitle the parties to 
contract out freely provided that all the requirements are satisfied.  
8.5.4.3 Limitation or restriction of the entitlement of contracting out  
Even though entitlement of contracting out is basically agreed by majority of the 
market, some concerns had been expressed that there might be general limits or 
restrictions to which the default regime can be altered or excluded by the contract, so 
that contracting out is only allowed in limited circumstances in specialist risks.661  
In fact, such need for introducing some limits upon the entitlement of contracting out 
has shown the same concerns behind the disagreement with the contracting out. 
There may be possibility that the insurers may use their bargaining power or take 
advantage of the insured’s lack of understanding to impose non-negotiable 
contracting out policy terms on business insured, 662  so that the proportionate 
remedies regime which intended to achieve “neutrality” between the parties would be 
undermined. Moreover, it was significantly concerned that entitlement to contract out 
would introduce contract uncertainty that made the parties find it difficult to know 
whether they could rely upon terms altering the default position and stipulating their 
own duties and obligations until the effect of such terms had been tested in the court. 
As a result the generous clauses of contracting out could have a negative impact on 
the business insurance market and lead to even greater uncertainty and more 
disputes, conflicting with the aims and objectives of the reform.  
In contrast to the Australian legislation that provides the provisions are exclusive 
remedies which are open to the insurers against the therefore no other greater 
remedies are available to the insurer in the case of breach of the duty, the Insurance 
Act 2015 barely propose to place any general restrictions on the extent to which the 
regime can be altered or excluded by the contract but just clarified two exceptions to 
the entitlement and one general transparency requirement.663 Therefore parties may 
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be allowed to contract out of the default regime entirely, provided all the necessary 
requirements are met. It is suggested that such approach of barely any limitation 
imposed upon the entitlement of contracting out should be given applause, despite 
the negative impact of the right to contract out shown by the market concerns 
discussed above. Consequently, the courts will have discretion to determine the 
effect of the terms in different scenarios. Also it gives the parties freedom to consider 
whether it is necessary and appropriate to opt out of the default regime in their 
particular situation, so the parties can make an informed decision as to whether to 
stay within the default regime or to negotiate for the alternative position. 
Notwithstanding such approach may sacrifice contractual certainty for flexibility to 
some extent, for instance in subscription placements involving more than one 
reinsurer, it could cause problems if some reinsurers contract out the default regime 
while others do not, leaving the reinsured with a gap in cover in the same claim.664 
The parties in a sophisticated insurance market are believed to have the ability to 
draft their contracts appropriately to satisfy the requirements for contracting out 
which can be considered as the last safeguard in the default regime.   
Although no general limitation was imposed upon the parties’ right to contract out of 
the default regime, it is enunciated that, to be valid, a term which purports to contract 
out of the default regime to the detriment of the policyholder must be clear, 
unambiguous and sufficiently brought to the attention of the other party. That means 
to serve the contracting out purpose successfully, the term must satisfy two 
procedural requirements. First the insurer must take sufficient steps to draw the term 
into the insured’s attention before conclusion of the contract. Then the opt-out clause 
must be clear, unambiguous as to its effect. Whether a clause has such effect 
depends upon its true construction in particular cases according to the parties’ true 
intentions. As a result, to serve the purpose of contracting out, the parties must draft 
the terms clearly and ambiguously, in case a narrow and restricted construction 
might be adopted before the court. The parties need to negotiate their position, and 
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finally make an informed decision to agree with the alternative position with 
knowledge of all the facts and consequences of contracting out.665 In addition the 
clauses must be drafted appropriately and indicate their expectation explicitly to alert 
commercial parties sufficiently to such extraordinary bargain, considering individual 
parties’ statutes and abilities. Generally speaking, the more sophisticated and 
professional the parties are, the less attention needs to be addressed by the 
provisions.  
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CONCLUSION  
Reinsurance contract as a contract of uberrimae fidei, in contrast to ordinary 
commercial contracts, attracts a duty of utmost good faith. There are various forms 
of reinsurance which adopt different ceding methods. Each of them has specific 
characters in the placing progress. The unique placing process in London 
subscription market of such complex and complicated reinsurance contracts by 
specialist brokers has to certain degree modified the operation of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith in reinsurance context. Moreover, from partial codification by the 
MIA 1906 to significant changed by the Insurance Act 2015, it  is fair to that the 
doctrine of utmost good faith has experienced one hundred years long revolution.  
Development of the doctrine itself has important affect upon its operation in 
reinsurance context too.  
Modification of the doctrine in reinsurance occurs due to several reasons. First, the 
special placing process in London subscription market affects the formation 
procedure of reinsurance contracts, consequently reshapes operation of the doctrine. 
Secondly, the characters of reinsurance contracts distinguished from underlying 
insurance would have some impact on operation of the doctrine in reinsurance 
context. In addition, other significant common law rules such as the principle of 
waiver, which is in extensive use in the reinsurance market practice, will also modify 
the operation of the doctrine in reinsurance context. Moreover, evolution of the duty 
itself, from an absolutely strict duty to a duty only requiring fair presentation, and a 
proposal of a new proportionate regime of remedies brings potential problems of its 
operation in reinsurance context. Consequently, notwithstanding there has been a 
long history of the doctrine and clarification of many aspects of the doctrine comes 
from a reinsurance cases, difficulties and problems still exist in operating such duty 
in reinsurance context. Such problems extend to every specific aspect of operation 
of the duty in reinsurance context, from the formation to performance, and then 
remedies for qualifying breach of the duty in claim stage.  
First of all difficulties and problems exist in reinsurance broker’s placing process at 
the contract formation stage. According to the current legal status, s.19 of MIA1906 
which imposes a separate duty of disclosure on agent to insure only applies to the 
placing broker who is the last tache in the chain to deal with reinsurer directly. But for 
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those underwriting agency who holds the cover and underwriting pen on behalf of 
the reinsurers or brokers who effect a binding authority on behalf of a coverholder, 
they are exercising judgment on behalf of the reinsurer, therefore do not have a duty 
of disclosure for the purpose of s.19 (b) at all. There may be more than one 
producing brokers involved in the process of effecting reinsurance. No matter 
appointing a sub-broker or dealing with the reinsurer directly, he is supposed to pass 
his possessed material information down. The placing broker is deemed to know 
such information in his ordinary course of business then disclose it to the reinsurer 
under s.19 (b). Also s.19 (a) should be able to cover the gap and protect reinsurers 
from situations where material information does not reach placing broker. However, 
such seemingly settled positions are significantly changed by the Insurance Act 2015 
under which the approach switches from the separate duty route to the imputation 
route. Consequently the duty of fair presentation is solely imposed upon the 
reinsured by attributing all the disclosable knowledge of the agent to insure into the 
reinsured’s. At a face value, it appears more simplified and clearer in the position of 
the new insurance act that integrates the current two separate duties of disclosure 
into one, and then technically makes the test rules and scope of duty easier to 
understand. No matter how many intermediates are involved in the placing process 
and no matter what their capacities are, all their relevant information material to the 
prudent insurer’s underwriting assessment are attributed into the reinsured’s, 
therefore disclosable by the reinsured for the purpose of the duty of fair presentation. 
However, it is suggested that such imputation approach may cause difficulties in 
practice. It is harsh to deem the reinsured to know all the material facts possessed 
by the placing brokers who are at the end of the intermediate chain, as the reinsured 
may even not know the existence of such agent to insure. Neither is it easy for the 
reinsured to know or ought to know all the material information processed by the 
brokers, nor is it practical for the reinsured to make reasonable search to reveal such 
information. Moreover, attribution of agent to insure’s knowledge into the reinsured’s 
is inconsistent with current common law rules.  
Difficulties may also arise as to the scope of knowledge for the purpose of disclosure 
by the reinsurance brokers. It’s not uncommon practice that reinsurance brokers play 
multiple roles in the operation of the business involving in some other processes with 
the reinsurer or the reinsured, and even in a dual agency of both parties. It may give 
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rise to the potential for conflicts of interest, enlarge the ambit of knowledge of the 
broker accessed in multi capacities, and then affect the scope of the duty of 
disclosure. The broad wording of s.19 (a) of the MIA 1906 makes ambit of disclosure 
controversial. As it is not easy to reconcile the conflicting common law authorities, 
the proposition that broker’s duty of disclosure is merely confined to facts known in 
capacity of the reinsured’s agent in effecting reinsurance contract is still not 
convincing. Consequently, before any suitable case comes to the court, it is 
suggested that the placing broker should disclose all material circumstances known 
to him; even he has acquired or held such knowledge in a different capacity, 
including his capacity as broker in different levels of the placement chain of 
reinsurance. In the situation of dual agency, even when the broker offers the firm 
indication from the proposed reinsurer to his original principal, he is still acting on 
behalf of his principal, the reinsured. Therefore, the broker should take his intending 
principal’s interest as priority above all other clients, even though he may not know 
its identity. The Insurance Act 2015 reflecting the latest legal spirit supports such 
proposition too. But the ambit and test of the knowledge of the reinsured for the 
purpose of duty of fair presentation is still complex, involving new legal and factual 
test to be established and clarified. It is yet unknown whether the new tests can 
serve the market practice better than the current existing rules. It will take some time 
and judicial decisions, like the current settled rules, to show whether the prescriptive 
approach of attribution of knowledge route will successfully eliminate current 
unfairness or uncertainty in existing legislation and common law cases.  
In addition, in the broker’s placing process, sometimes problems may arise where 
the broker may do wrongs or even commit fraudulent conduct against the reinsurer 
or his principal, i.e. the reinsured. It is unsettled whether there are any common law 
or public policy exceptions undermining the broker’s duty of disclosure besides 
circumstances expressly excluded from the scope of the duty in legislation. It is 
suggested that s.19 does operate subject to a fraud exception that brokers are not 
required to disclose their fraud against their principals to reinsurers, although 
different from the Re Hampshire Land principle which is through the imputation of 
knowledge route. Although the imputation of knowledge approach adopted by the 
Insurance Act 2015 may cause problems discussed above, it indeed eliminates 
difficulties in justification of fraud exception to the broker’s disclosure. The Re 
308 
 
Hampshire Land principle can apply to the duty of fair presentation directly beyond 
questions then. Any fraud conducted against the reinsured’s interest is not material 
information that can be imputed into the reinsured’s knowledge. Therefore the broker 
is not obliged to present such information to the reinsurer. However, it is doubtful 
whether there exists any wider exception beyond fraud to the broker’s duty. Although 
there are some authorities supporting a gloss on it, the reasoning is still 
unconvincing. Therefore the reinsured still needs to make a fair presentation of all 
the material circumstances possessed by his brokers, no matter producing brokers 
or placing brokers, no matter in what capacities, as long as such circumstances are 
known or ought to be known by the him for the purpose under s.3. While brokers are 
advised on the behalf of the reinsured to disclose all material information within his 
knowledge received in all capacities before a suitable case reaches the court. 
After clarifying the difficult issues in reinsurance broker’s role in placing process, it 
proceeds to problems arising from modification of the duty of utmost good faith by 
specific formation procedures of placing reinsurance contracts in London 
subscription market. Difficulties exist because the duty of utmost good faith cannot 
attach reinsurance contracts straightward because of the formation procedures. A 
reinsurance contract is concluded when the reinsurer scratches the MRC as an 
acceptance of the broker’s offer on behalf of his principal, i.e. the reinsured. Each of 
the reinsurers has an individual contract of reinsurance with the reinsured on the 
same risk and only liable for his own subscribing proportion of the risks, and each 
contract of reinsurance attracts a separate duty of utmost good faith between the 
parties involved. As a result, the reinsured and broker owes separate duty of 
disclosure and duty of refraining from misrepresentation in the scratching process to 
individual reinsurers. Each reinsurer, not only the leader but also the following 
reinsurers, deserves a full disclosure of all material information concerning the 
underwritten risks so that an information underwriting decision can be made by him. 
Once the reinsurer scratches the slip after an underwriting decision is made, a 
reinsurance contract is concluded. Thus terminates the operation of duty of utmost 
good faith. No more duty of disclosure of material facts is required by the broker to 
the reinsurer even if the underwritten risk is not fully subscribed yet. If a loss had 
occurred between the date which the slip became fully subscribed and the date 
which the policy is issued, the reinsured would still be covered. As to the 
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circumstances where the reinsurance comes into existence before the direct 
insurance, it is suggested that initialing the MRC is just functioning as a binding 
promise to provide reinsurance for whatever person who subsequently write a line on 
the primary insurance and desire to cede the risks to the reinsurer. Once the 
reinsurance had been accepted by the original underwriter, the reinsurance contract 
is concluded binding the parties. Even without a communication of that acceptance 
made to the reinsurers by the broker, a binding contract comes into existence on 
strict contractual analysis. As a result, the duty of utmost good faith has attaches the 
reinsurance contract since the broker starts to approach the reinsurer at the 
beginning of the scratching process. The broker must anticipate the placement 
request of a potential reinsured in respect of a proper reinsurance protection and 
then make a full disclosure of all material facts and information concerning the 
underlying risks and the reinsurance agreement itself to individual proposed 
reinsurers during the scratching process. The duty of disclosure continues after the 
reinsurer has put down his line on the MRC. Any material information comes into the 
broker’s knowledge after the reinsurer has made the scratching must be disclosed by 
the broker to the proposed reinsurer. As a result, in contrary to normal situation, the 
broker remains under a duty of disclosure until the underwriter of the underlying 
cover has accepted the offer to conclude a binding contract.  
From the problems discussed above, it can be said that a gap is created between 
the rules of law and the market practice. Rather than going through the contractual 
negotiation with the broker, the following underwriters subscribe the contract simply 
and largely by considering who the leading underwriter is and what proportion he has 
subscribed the risks. As a result, in case where a misrepresentation or non-
disclosure is made to the leading underwriter, the gap between the rule of law and 
the market practice will cause difficulties as to whether the following underwriters 
would have the same defense as the leading underwriter does to avoid their 
individual insurance contracts. Solutions are found to cover the gap in both common 
law and market practice aspects, instead of the flaw deemed communication rule, a 
supposed rule was proposed by the common law authorities. So if a custom or 
usage of such supposed rule can be proven in the particular market, or it imported 
an implied term into the contracts between the reinsured and the following 
underwriters, or an implied representation had been made to following underwriters 
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that all material circumstances had been accurately provided to the leading 
underwriter, then the deemed communication rule should be valid. In addition to this 
supposed rule, an alternative solution on different ground also becomes popular, 
suggesting that the fact that a misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material fact 
has been made to the leading underwriter is on its own a material fact which should 
be disclosed to the following underwriters. However, it is suggested that the 
reasoning that each of the underwriters was induced by the misrepresentation 
including the following underwriters who relied upon the presentation to the leading 
underwriter and the leader’s judgment in respect of the risk is more attractive. 
Therefore, if a reliance or expectation can be established, the following market 
should be entitled the same defense as the leading underwriters. In practice such 
using of deemed communication rule, supposed rule or other alternative solutions 
can be avoided by inserting a leading underwriter clause into the reinsurance 
contracts. So the leading underwriter can be regarded as the representative on 
behalf of the following market in respect of any disputes between the parties under 
reinsurance contracts within his authorities.  
Besides the problems discussed above, the characters of reinsurance contracts 
distinguished from underlying insurance would also have some impact on operation 
of the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance context. Notwithstanding reinsurance 
is recognised as insurance for insurer, not all reinsurance contracts can be 
categorised as contract of insurance to attract the duty of utmost good faith 
straightward. Where the duty is indeed attracted by the reinsurance contract, it may 
still not apply to the contract straightforward. Difficulties may arise as the duty is 
modified in respect of the applicability, duration, and the extent of material facts 
subject to disclosure in the reinsurance context. The attachment and duration of the 
duty may vary according to various placing methods. And the specific nature and 
characters of the reinsurance contract will also have some impact on what material 
facts need to be disclosed, different from those under underlying insurance contracts.  
It is long established under common law that the doctrine of utmost good faith 
applies to all form of contract of insurance, therefore the reinsurance contracts 
should be subject to the same test of materiality like all direct insurance contracts. 
However, in reinsurance market practice the duty of disclosure under the MIA 1906 
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has become onerous to a certain degree, especially for large size, complicated 
nature and complex business. To minimise the difficulties and the deficiency of 
enforcing the law, the reinsurers commonly follow the current reinsurance market 
practice by designing particular standards and formal procedure of disclosure and 
inserting a specially draft clause in the reinsurance contracts overriding the current 
legal rules set out in the MIA1906, rather than seeking enforcement of the full 
requirements of the act. It is significant for the reinsured and reinsurer to identify 
various disclosure roles and allocate responsibilities, and the nature of the material 
facts and information in advance, so that it can facilitate a suitable and sufficient 
disclosure of material facts. Material facts subject to duty of disclosure differ between 
the direct insurance and reinsurance contracts, determined by the nature of the 
insurance contract and the placing method by which the contract is concluded. As to 
material facts to be disclosed in placing reinsurance contract, in addition to the 
material facts relating to the underlying risks, any information relating to the manner 
in which the reinsureds run his business and operation of the reinsurance agreement 
itself may be material to be disclosed to the reinsurers. Generally speaking, placing 
information material to facultative agreement will normally be material the treaties too. 
In addition to those, other information may also be material to the reinsurer, 
depending on particular features of the treaty, the method taken by the treaty, and 
the nature of business in original insurance to be ceded. It suffices to say that, being 
different from material facts in direct insurance, material facts to be disclosed in 
placing reinsurance agreements mainly relate to two aspects, compromising of 
operation of the treaty itself such as information about previous declarations to the 
treaty falling outside the treaty scope at renewal of the treaty; and the manner in 
which the reinsureds run their business under the direct insurance, make 
underwriting assessment and handle claims, rather than the circumstances relating 
to the underlying risks. Normally, the reinsured’s retention, the reinsured’s potential 
exposure under the direct insurance, the reinsured’s loss experience in respect of 
direct insurance, estimated premium income, the reinsured’s claim handling 
philosophy would be material facts which the reinsurers would be interest to know in 
most cases. Some other relevant circumstances such as estimated premium income, 
retrocession protection offered to the reinsurer, refusal of another reinsurer to accept 
or renew the risk, identity of other co-reinsureds if any, or existence of other 
reinsurance cover and retention level etc may also influence the reinsurers’ 
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underwriting assessment. Although the types of material information may be different 
between direct insurance and reinsurance agreements, there is a similar fact under 
both direct insurance and reinsurance context, i.e. there is no hard and fast rule that 
what circumstances can be material in placing insurance agreements. The reinsured 
and his broker acting on his behalf face most exposure of the reinsurer’s potential 
allegation of materiality of a particular representation or non-disclosure. There are 
always inevitable disputes between the parties; even the market expert witnesses 
may put forward conflicting advices. Therefore the assessment of the materiality in 
respect of a particular circumstance is a question of fact in individual cases.  
In practice, reinsurance contracts which have large size, complex nature are usually 
placed in various complicated methods. Such different placing methods result in 
distinct nature of the reinsurance contracts, and then modified the applicability and 
duration of the duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance. No matter what method is 
adopted to place the risks proposed, there are always three significant timing in 
deciding the applicability and duration of the duty, i.e. setting up a facility under 
which risks are ceded by the reinsured, the reinsurers’ underwriting assessment of 
the risks proposed and conclusion of contract of insurance to cede the risks 
proposed. In direct insurance and facultative reinsurance contract which is similarly 
placed in practice, it is normally easy and simple to coordinate the three timing 
together in the negotiation of the contract. However, as to the treaties, especially 
where business is ceded to the reinsurer for example by use of bordereau under the 
treaties in future, it is more complicated than the direct insurance as there may exist 
gaps between the three timing according to the placing procedure in practice. As a 
result, applicability and duration of the doctrine is modified and varies under different 
types of reinsurance treaties. The determinative criterion is that whether the 
reinsurance agreement is a contract of insurance in nature synonymous to the direct 
insurance, as the incidence of the disclosure and representation obligation may arise 
only when the contract of insurance is made. If the reinsurance contract is in 
essence a contract for insurance which works more like a contract of agency 
between the parties rather creating a partnership, then the question to be answered 
should be when the reinsurers make underwriting assessment and when a contract 
of insurance is concluded according to the facility, then the attachment point of the 
duty to the policy is reallocated to the stage of each individual declaration which 
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appears to be the case if the policy is facultative in that the reinsurers can refuse any 
individual declaration. Consequently, it is the nature of the reinsurance contract that 
determines whether the duty of utmost good faith attracted in a reinsurance contract. 
Such nature is also critical to any consideration of the role which declarations were 
intended to play in the reinsurance agreement. Therefore the duty of utmost good 
faith is only attracted when underwriting assessment is made to conclude a contract 
of insurance between the parties. All other features of the agreement, such as the 
form or the words used to describe it by the parties, are not determinative.   
In conclusion, the application and duration of the duty of utmost good faith in 
reinsurance agreements could be summarised as following. As to facultative 
reinsurance agreements which are in essence contracts of insurance between 
reinsureds and reinsurers, the doctrine of utmost good faith as a principle of law is 
equally applicable to facultative agreements as it is to original insurances. As to 
reinsurance treaties, it can general be separated into three categories. The crucial 
criterion is when the contract of reinsurance is concluded. Under an obligatory treaty, 
the treaty itself in effect operates as a contract of reinsurance, as the reinsurer is 
bound to accept the risks ceded by the reinsured automatically. Accordingly, a duty of 
utmost good faith applies to the obligatory treaty itself. Declarations to an obligatory 
treaty in later stage do not attract duty of utmost good faith any more. Under a 
facultative obligatory treaty, the treaty itself is a standing offer only binding the 
reinsurer to offer cover in the future. No contractual obligations arise until 
declarations are made to the treaty in later stage. Consequently, the duty should 
apply to the contracts of insurance concluded by declarations rather than to the 
fac/oblig treaty itself. According to the general rule of duration, it supposes to last 
from parties’ negotiation of the fac/oblig treaty to their conclusion of the contracts of 
insurance by future declarations. However, as the reinsurer waiver the duty of 
disclosure at declaration stage by automatic acceptance of the reinsured’s cessions, 
the duration of the duty is modified as if it only attach to the first stage, i.e. conclusion 
of the fac/oblig treaty just like the practice in an obligatory treaty. Under non-
obligatory treaties which are best categorised as contracts for reinsurance, a duty of 
utmost good does not apply to such framework facility which does not bring any 
contract of reinsurance into existence. When the reinsurer decides to accept a 
declaration by the reinsured, a contract of reinsurance is concluded between the 
314 
 
parties. Then the duty of utmost good faith arises in the declaration stage. Where the 
reinsured fails to make a fair presentation in relation to the risks ceded, only the 
declaration relating to the particular risks is avoided, leaving the non-obligatory treaty 
and other declarations under it untainted.   
In addition to the difficulties and problems caused by reinsurance contracts nature 
characters and placing process discussed above, other significant common law rules, 
such as the principle of waiver which is in extensive use in the reinsurance market 
practice, will also modify the operation of the doctrine in reinsurance context. The 
doctrine of waiver becomes a practical method used by the reinsurance market to 
reshape the scope of the duty of utmost good faith. The parties are free to tail the 
strict statutory duty of utmost good faith, as long as the terms make commercial 
senses for them and such contracting out is permitted by the common law and public 
policy. The parties can curtail the duty by waiving duty of disclosure of a particular 
type of information as the parties treat such information not material; or waiving the 
duty itself so that the reinsured or his brokers need not to burden such a duty at all; 
or the remedies for qualifying breaches; also the reinsured should be entitled by 
clear contract wording to limit the authority of brokers to make a pre-contract 
representation. Whether there has been a waiver depends on the reinsurer’s 
intention construed under the whole policy terms, no matter it is expressly 
incorporated into the contract or implied from the representation or conduct of the 
reinsurer. However difficulties exist in clarifying the permissible scope of contracting 
out provisions in reinsurance contract. Whether a contract term extends to waiver of 
the remedies or liabilities for a negligent misrepresentation is a question of 
construction depending the meaning of the language used by the parties construed 
in the context of the whole instrument and against the admissible background. 
Absence of the word ‘negligence’ is irrelevant, as long as the wording is literally wide 
enough to cover negligence. However, it may be problematic as to the fraudulent 
presentation, as a matter of public policy or a settled rule of law would come into play. 
Therefore the reinsured could not exclude liability for his own personal fraudulent 
misrepresentation which had induced the contract in question. But it is suggested 
that it is to be conceptually possible in law to have an express clause in the contract 
that excludes liability of the reinsured for fraudulent misrepresentation of his brokers, 
only if such clause is clearly, suitably and effectively worded to achieve such effect. It 
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is consistent with current market practice by inserting a clause of waiver into the 
reinsurance contract to exclude the reinsured’s liability for the fraud of his agent to 
insure, subject to a precondition that the reinsured is in no way implicated in the 
agent’s fraud. There are two alternative approaches supporting such agreement, 
namely such waiver can be deemed to remove the broker’s authority to speak on 
behalf of the reinsured or to treat the broker as the agent of the reinsurers. Both of 
the approaches can give a justifiable effect for the assured to discharge the liabilities 
for the broker’s non-disclosure or misrepresentation as to the material facts.   
Although it is affirmative that the reinsurance parties should be allowed to contract 
out the default legal framework, it is possible to cause difficulties in draft and 
construction of the clause in reinsurance context. In order to avoid the uncertainty to 
the reinsurance contracts and make sure the reinsurance market running well 
without interference by onerous contracting out clauses, it is suggested that a narrow 
and restricted approach should be taken in construction of such terms with the 
assistance of the reinsurance market practice. Such approach receives support from 
the Insurance Act 2015 that expressly enunciates a requirement of transparency. 
Consequently, to achieve the purpose of exclusion of specific rights or remedy, the 
term must be drafted in a clear and unambiguous way, and appropriately indicate 
their expectation explicitly to alert reinsurance contract parties sufficiently to such 
extraordinary bargain considering individual parties’ statutes and abilities. If the 
meaning of the term is unclear due to its ambiguity, or it is capable of more than one 
conflicting or alternative interpretation of the clause, then the rule of contra 
proferentem should be relied upon to construe the term against the interest of the 
party who benefits from the intended modification. 
As revolution of the test in common law authorities and the scope of duty of utmost 
good faith in legislation, the test of implied waiver of the duty evolutes too. Difficulties 
may arise in clarifying the requirements to establish an implied waiver of duty of 
utmost good faith. It is suggested that Rix L.J’s approach which emphasises a 
mutual fairness of both parties in the placing process to make all the relevant 
material information disclosed should be given applause. Such rationale receives 
supports from the Insurance Act 2015 that balances the parties’ interest in 
performing the duty and requires the reinsurer to become more active in making 
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enquiries to get the material information put on his notice fairly disclosed and 
represented. Consequently, when a reasonable reinsurer has been put on notice of 
any further material information, and obvious questions would reveal such material 
information prompted by the reinsured’s presentation, failure to make such 
appropriate enquiries would imply a waiver of disclosure of relevant information. 
However, there is still not a general assumption that a failure to ask an express 
question by the reinsurer will be construed as a waiver of further information by the 
reinsurers on the balance of the existing authorities. Once the reinsurer did put 
forward enquiries about any further information prompted by the reinsured’s 
representation, the limited questions asked by the reinsurer will not be assumed as a 
waiver of the information that falls outside the scope of the questions. Whether the 
reinsurer has the intention to waive any relevant information not covered by his 
specific or limited questions depends on the questions he asked under the whole 
picture of the policy, leaving the courts to use his discretion to construe the facts of 
each case and take the particular type of insurance business into consideration.  
At last but not least, the evolution of the duty itself, from an absolutely strict duty to a 
duty only requiring fair presentation and a proposal of a new regime of remedies for 
qualifying breaches also brings potential difficulties in operating the duty in 
reinsurance context. Neither the current remedies regime nor the new proportionate 
regime proposed by the Insurance Act 2015 can be said to function perfectly in 
reinsurance context. It is fair to say that the right to rescind is firmly established as 
the primary remedy for breach of the duty of utmost good faith under current English 
law. Although alternative formulations to recover damages for actionable breach can 
be established in certain situations, it is suggested to only exist in theory. In fact, in 
practice the right to damages appears to have fewer practicalities in reinsurance 
context, leaving the right to rescind as the only actionable remedy in reinsurance 
market. Although the current all or nothing regime of remedies is in fact not as 
draconian and inconsequential like it is generally assumed to be, the 
disproportionate approach does have some deficiencies, namely depriving the 
reinsured of all coverage, causing great injustice, disproportionate, being lack of 
consequence, irrelevant of the state of mind of the wrongdoer when committing the 
breach, and one-side favorable to the reinsurers etc. 
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By comparison between the regimes under the ICA 1984 in Australian law, the 
current English law regime, and the new proportionate regime proposed by the Law 
commissions, it can be said that the new proportionate regime of remedies for 
qualifying breaches introduced by the Insurance Act 2015 should be supported and 
welcomed. The core spirit of the concept of proportionality is that the availability of 
the remedy should be in proportion to severity of the breach. The most important 
change in the new regime is to divide the regime into two parts according to the state 
of mind of the wrongdoer in committing the breach. It is the seriousness of the 
breach and extent of the loss suffered due to the breach that determines the relevant 
extent of the remedies available to the reinsurers. Therefore, the parties should be 
and only be restored to positions according to what the reinsurer would have 
responded, had the information been truly disclosed and represented. 
Notwithstanding the new regime can overcome the deficiencies of current regime, 
there are still difficulties in applying such regime in reinsurance.  Difficulties will arise 
in drawing a hypothetic picture of what the contract would have been. The scope of 
the parties’ contractual obligations and duties must be defined first, namely what 
contractual terms the parties should perform. It is suggested that it is impossible for 
the law to keep digging in pursuit of the hypothesis of ultimate position where the 
parties would have been in, but just need to pursue the reinsurer’s hypothetic 
response to the disclosure of the true information had the duty of utmost good faith 
been performed successfully.  
Even the above problem can be solved, it will still raise practical difficulties in 
applying the proportionate remedy approach in reinsurance context. First of all, 
difficulties will arise in the applicability of the new regime to specialist and 
complicated reinsurance context. Moreover it is still not easy to go through the test of 
proportionality where the difference between what the reinsurers would have done 
had it made a fair presentation and what actually occurred should be found out. It is 
problematic in referring and proving a hypothesis of what the reinsurers would have 
been done had all material information been truly represented. In fact the hypothetic 
position in which the reinsurance parties would have been is sometimes a mystery 
far from being obviously predictable, and speculative to certain extent. In addition, 
the detailed retrospective analysis of what the relevant underwriter would have done 
will normally requires witness evidence and highly likely needs documentation such 
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as the relevant underwriting guides. It will be an issue of credibility and consequently 
increase the possibility of even more disputes. Too much focus on those disputes will 
turn on investigation into the facts of each individual case and reduce the ability to 
rely on precedential case law. Moreover, the retrospective analysis approach may 
also result in more claims and then increase of premium in practice. Furthermore as 
to the controversial issue of burden of proof, it is suggested that the burden of proof 
of deliberate or reckless breach should remain upon the insurer to invoke a remedy 
of avoidance. Reinsurance risks are often large and complex in nature, requiring 
specialist and sophisticated skills to design bespoke policy for their particular 
commercial need. It is extremely complicated to trace out the total effect on the claim 
of a change in line size by one reinsurer or a change of the terms of the reinsurance 
agreement, especially where such change was made by the leading underwriter 
whose decision may have the decisive effect upon those of the following market. It is 
far from obviously and extremely complicated to predict what the following market 
would have reacted if they had known the leading underwriter’s response. Therefore, 
it can be said that where there would be a change in the line size accepted by the 
subscriber or change of the reinsurance agreement terms, such proportionate 
remedies regime has many pragmatic difficulties in application so that the default 
regime cannot be considered as a suitable remedy for reinsurers in the subscription 
market.  Moreover, it is suggested application of proportionate approach will be 
difficult in a reinsurance contract which is placed on a proportionate basis, i.e. the 
reinsured and the reinsurer share the risks and premium on a fixed proportion 
agreed advance. In such situation, especially in a back-to-back cover, the reinsurer 
is still liable to pay the agreed proportion of the claims to the reinsured, by collecting 
that proportion of the premium as agreed before. Consequently, it is pragmatically 
difficult for the reinsurer to argue for proportionate remedies under a facultative 
reinsurance contract or proportional reinsurance treaty in the case of an innocent 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation. Whereas under the non-proportionate 
reinsurance treaty, where the reinsurer making his calculation the premium 
according to his own underwriting assessment, the reinsurance market practice may 
be already able to deal with such issues by developing its own ways. As concerned 
by the Law commissions, there indeed exist many alternative ways for the reinsurer 
to refuse claims other than invoke a proportionate remedy for the breach in the case 
of an innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation. Consequently, it is fair to say in 
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certain situation discussed above, the proportionate approach may actually play little 
practice effect in reinsurance market. So the reinsurance parties should be feel free 
to reach their own agreement by contracting out of the default proportionate remedy 
regime, although the reinsurance market is able to accommodate the proportionate 
remedy regime, provided that all the limitation and requirements are satisfied.  
Despite the problems mentioned above, it is suggested that the proportionate regime 
in the Insurance Act 2015 that significantly changes the current common law 
positions should be welcomed. Notwithstanding it to certain degree complicates the 
remedies available to the reinsurance parties for qualifying breach and creates new 
practical problems, it basically resolves the difficulties and problems caused by the 
deficiencies and difficulties caused by current remedy regime. It is better for the 
legislation to set up only default principles of proportionality and then allow the 
sophisticated and specialist reinsurance parties free to opt out of the default regime 
to find a suitable solution for themselves. 
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